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GLASGOW 
UNIVERSITY yUüaHARY:
A b s t r a c t
After Poland assumed a pro-Western orientation following the end of the communist 
regime in 1989, its immediate foreign policy goals became to join NATO and the EU. The 
Importance of Poland’s relations with the newly emerging states in the ex-Soviet region 
lagged behind in the foreign policy agenda. While there was political consensus among the 
policy making elite and the populace about Poland's integration into Western structures 
and necessary resources and efforts were channelled to this end, challenges posed by the 
transformation in Poland’s East was dealt with in a piecemeal fashion, devoid of a 
coherent conceptual Eastern policy framework and a strong institutional backing. However, 
as Poland’s prospects of Joining NATO and the EU became more secure, Eastern policy 
was increasingly debated in intellectual and academic circles and foreign policy makers 
searched for a more structured and robust response to the challenges brought about by 
relations with Poland’s Eastern neighbours. Poland’s Eastern policy has progressed since
the early 1990s when its existence was doubted and became an important dimension of 
Poland’s foreign policy and after joining the EU in 2004, Polish policy makers even 
contemplated how Poland’s Eastern policy could influence and even shape the EU’s 
relations with its Eastern neighbours.
This study investigates the factors that contributed to the formation of an Eastern policy 
concept and domestic and International determinants that shaped Poland’s relations with 
Its Eastern neighbours. It presents how Polish foreign policy responded to a changing 
regional and international environment and gives an account of Poland’s accession 
process to NATO and the EU and concurrent development of relations with the Eastern 
neighbours, it explores the legal framework and institutions that take part in foreign policy 
making and execution and offers an analysis of 20’’^  century historical currents and 
Intellectual and academic debates on EP. Poland’s bilateral relations with Russia, Ukraine 
and Belarus constitute the main case studies where the impact on relations of domestic 
political discourses in Poland, the EU and NATO enlargement, economic and investment 
links, regional energy politics and the role of minorities and historical heritage are 
examined. As well as extensive primary and secondary sources, the study utilises in-depth 
interviews with high level Polish policy makers, academics and businessmen undertaken 
during fieldwork in Poland.
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C h a p t e r  One
I n t r o d u c t i o n
1.1 PRESENTATION AND THE SCOPE OF RESEARCH
This study is about the changing context and content of Poland’s foreign policy In the post- 
Cold War period. Poland did not lose its formal statehood after the Second World War and 
had even a quasi-independent foreign policy. But due to the transformation of the Polish 
state and the emergence of a completely different international system and regional 
context, the scope for continuity of any pre-1989 foreign policy was unfeasible and 
undesired. Therefore, the study will take 1989 as a starting point and will refer to the 
periods before it only in the context of historical and intellectual background shaping the 
conceptual framework of current foreign policy debates and policy making.
From the very beginning of the period in question, the new Polish political elite harboured 
hopes of becoming a part of Western political and defence structures. The cautious policy 
of avoiding any conflict with the Soviet Union white gradually building up relations with the 
West gave way to a bolder policy of actively seeking membership in NATO and the EU 
following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The changing regional context, with newly 
independent states emerging on the eastern border of Poland, presented a new challenge 
for Polish foreign policy, which Poland perceived as a chance to create a zone of friendly 
countries, buffering itself from a possible Russian expansionist resurgence. Policies 
geared towards the main focus and the two ultimate goals of Poland, namely Polish 
accession to NATO and the EU, were allocated most of the foreign policy resources and 
necessary institutions were formed thanks also to an almost universal support for these 
goals across different political parties and public opinion. Relations with Poland’s Eastern 
neighbours, meanwhile, developed in a more piecemeal fashion owing to the persisting 
political and economic ambiguities and diversity in the region as well as the difficulties 
posed by the process of developing a coherent foreign policy concept applicable to the 
region. However, as the confidence in the prospect of Poland’s participation (and eventual 
membership) in Western structures grew, the debate among intellectuals in search for an 
Eastern policy (EP) concept intensified, as did the activity of foreign policy making 
agencies attempting a more structured response to the challenges arising from relations 
with the East.
Poland’s entry into NATO in 1999 and Russia’s acceptance (albeit reluctant) of NATO 
enlargement brought an end to the deeply instilled historic perception of constant 
insecurity. It was the first step of anchoring Poland in Western structures. Now Polish
foreign policy could look towards extending the zone of security, which was demonstrated 
by Poland’s support for extending NATO even further east. Similarly, a process of gradual 
emboldening emerged as Poland’s membership in the EU became imminent. The next 
challenge to be tackled was set as how to make Poland’s vision of EP operational within 
the EU context, utilising the EU’s power and capabilities. However, Poland’s own EP was 
in a process o f evolution and its implementation exposed the means and ends gap and 
tested the coherence of the concepts it entailed.
This study will analyse aspects of Poland’s foreign and Eastern policy and relevant 
developments up to Autumn 2004. There are two reasons why this particular cut off point 
was chosen. The first stems from the intention to cover events as recent as possible but 
permitting a safe temporal distance to be able to place the analysis in a context. The 
second reason is that Poland’s EP faced its biggest test in Autumn 2004 during the so- 
called Orange Revolution in Ukraine following the contested presidential elections in 
October. By this time Poland was a member of the EU and had formal participation in and 
a greater influence on EU institutions. It was, hence, acting not only as a neighbour and 
aspiring regional power but also as an EU member state. Poland’s response to the 
“Orange Revolution” was a case in itself to test how operational its EP concepts were and 
the constraints for action. Therefore, this episode merits a study in its own right.^
Within the time frame given, the present study will be concerned with the evolution of the 
Eastern dimension of Polish foreign policy. It will analyse the factors that contributed to the 
formation of an EP concept and domestic and International determinants that shaped 
Poland’s relations with its Eastern neighbours. The limitations of the EP concept and its 
application will be assessed. In order to address these questions, the study will present 
how Polish foreign policy responded to a changing regional and international environment 
and give an account of Poland’s accession process to NATO and the EU and concurrent 
development o f relations with the Eastern neighbours. This study regards the nation state 
level as the fundamental realm of foreign policy formulation. Therefore, an account of the 
legal framework and institutions that take part in foreign policy making and execution 
processes will be provided. However, this is not to mean that foreign policy is simply a 
product of interaction within and between government offices and the legislature. The 
external factors that emanate from international or regional settings also contribute to 
foreign policy alongside domestic actors. This study will take up an analysis of intellectual 
debates on EP as one such domestic and non-governmental influence. It will also point out 
linkages between domestic politics and foreign policy.
 ^Two books about the “Orange Revolution" have already been published since then: the first by Wilson In 
November 2005 and the second, edited by Asiund and McFaul, In March 2006. Andrew Wilson, Ukraine's 
Orange Revolution, New Haven; Yale University Press, 2005. Anders Asiund and Michael McFaul (Eds), 
Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough, Washington: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2006.
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policies towards the countries in the region other than Russia, Ukraine and Belarus still
1.2 THE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY
 ^Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 3.
Bilateral relations between Poland on the one hand and Russia, Ukraine and Belarus on 
the other constitute the main case studies. The relationship with Russia is pivotal as it Is 
the dominant power in the region and its relations with Ukraine and Belarus, and the EU 
for that matter, have a direct impact on Poland’s policies. As a middle size state Poland’s 
policy choices in terms of Its relations with Russia are limited by the circumstances of 
Russian-EU or Russian-NATO (or Russian-US) relations. Similarly, relations with Ukraine 
and Belarus cannot be considered without reference to international and regional contexts. 
However, the power and size gap between Poland and these countries are not as large as 
it is with Russia and there are specific issues such as minorities, historical heritage and 
border relations that have a direct impact on the formulation and Implementation of 
Poland’s EP. Looking at bilateral relations with the strategic-partner-to-be, Ukraine, and 
bête noire of the West, Belarus, also demonstrate what a diverse variety of geostrategic, 
political and economic issues an EP had to address. ■
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Relations with Lithuania will not be examined in detail as its accession process to the EU 
and eventual membership puts its bilateral and regional relations in a context different than i
that of Poland’s EP. Moldova, which has officially become an EP concern as it was to 
become a direct neighbour of the enlarged EU, will not be covered, either. The scope of 
Poland’s EP is flexible and can be extended to the whole ex-Soviet area, but Poland’s
rank lower in importance and are mostly issue driven. However, examination of how 
Poland’s EP expands to govern relations with the remaining ex-Soviet states (as well as 
Russian regions) would make an interesting study in the future.
Foreign policy, according to Hill, is “the sum of official external relations conducted by an 
independent actor (usually a state) in international relations.’’^  A comprehensive study of 
foreign policy requires a multilevel and multidimensional analysis o f both domestic and 
international environments, governmental or non-governmental actors that influence 
decision making and goal setting processes, linkages between policy issues and 
responses to foreign policy actions (outcomes). Although the role of non-state actors such 
as multinational corporations, international organisations, NGOs or civil movements has 
been widely acknowledged, the nation state is still the main agency that generates the bulk 
of foreign policy.
While foreign policy has been studied by historians, political scientists and area specialists, 
the field of International Relations (IR) has produced the most considerable body of 
theoretical work on the subject. Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) has developed as a sub­
field of IR since the 1960s. The present study does not purport to be an analysis of Polish 
foreign policy in this fashion or to advance (or negate) any particular IR or FPA theory. It is 
a case study that adopts a traditional area studies approach and focuses on the analysis of 
empirical data. However, it takes into consideration contending approaches and theories 
generated by IR and FPA. The ideas offered by these theories help us to understand how 
complex and multifaceted a subject foreign policy is and confirm the need to select and 
focus on analysing certain aspects o f the foreign policy to bolster the explanatory power 
and consistency of the study at hand.
Central to any foreign policy study is the choice of level of analysis. Theoretical trends 
have changed since the days of Singer who defined the levels o f analysis problem and 
advised against studying a certain phenomenon at different levels simultaneously.^ A 
sound FPA is now considered to build on a multilevel analysis, taking into consideration all 
three main levels utilised by IR, namely system, state and individual levels.^ A strict 
categorisation of theories (especially those examining foreign policy) in terms of levels of 
analysis is almost impossible as many include aspects relating to different levels. Foreign 
policy analysis, as mentioned above, is multilevel by nature. However, for the sake of 
clarity, a survey of a select number of theories will be given below, classified under the 
three levels of analysis.
1.2.1 System level theories
The system level deals with the interaction between units active in the international arena 
such as states, international organisations and transnational civil groups. System level 
studies produce generalised (and often deterministic) theories that intend to explain the 
behaviour of international actors by identifying inherent rules and limitations of the 
international arena, which is regarded as something more than the sum of its constituent 
parts. The realist school maintains that the governing principle of international relations is 
anarchy, which arises from the lack of a central authority and the struggle between self- 
interested (and rational) states for maintaining sovereignty. The power struggle between 
states is a zero-sum game and states seek power as an end in itself.
Neorealists (or structural realists), on the other hand, interpret power seeking by states as 
a means to maximise their security. While classical realists regard a selfish and power
;s.
 ^J. David Singer, "The Levei-of-Anaiysis Probiem in International Relations", World Politics, Vol. 14,1961, No. 
1, pp. 77-92.
Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy: US and Comparative Foreign Poiicy in the 21st Century, Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, pp. 11-14.
grabbing human nature to be at the root of international interaction, neorealists argue that 
it is the anarchical system and the position of states within that system dictates how states 
behave.® This approach and its rationality assumption are often utilised in explaining 
NATO enlargement in Europe or Russia’s foreign policy towards the states of the ex-Soviet 
sphere. But it is a less useful tool in studying foreign policy as it considers domestic factors 
that shape foreign policy as irrelevant, as according to it the structure determines how 
states behave and not the other way round.® Its state centric approach and the state as 
unitary actor assumption also rules out examination of any domestic-international linkages 
or the role of non-state actors in explaining foreign policy behaviour.
The main rival of realism, liberalism, regards human nature as altruistic (without 
challenging the rationality aspect), believes in the existence of an international society in 
which cooperation is possible and desirable. It stresses the importance of strengthening 
international institutional arrangements to lessen conflict and war. The main challenge to 
neorealism was posed by neoliberalism, which disputed the neorealist explanation of 
international cooperation as states seeking relative gains (i.e. gaining more than others).^ 
According to the latter, states are motivated by absolute gains that benefit all parties in 
cooperation. Focusing on international political economy and underlining the role of 
transnational regimes and institutions rather than security arrangements, neoliberal 
theories allow an insight into cooperative phenomena such as trade regimes or the EU.
The theory of complex interdependence (or transnationalism) explains international politics 
through the Interconnectedness of societies in a web of international transactions 
performed not only by states but also by transnational actors. There is an “absence of 
hierarchy among issues” and, unlike the realist claim, security and military power do not 
dominate the agenda.® Complex interdependence is a useful concept for examining 
Poland’s relations especially in the European context. Throughout the 1990s Poland had 
been gradually integrating into the complex web of European interconnectedness that 
ranges from security arrangements to economic interdependence. Poland’s relations with 
its East also involves promotion of economic and intersocietal ties at different levels, and 
the decreasing salience of the use of military power in favour of more mutually beneficial 
conflict resolution, carried out both bilaterally and within international institutions.
A third and most recent theory is a challenge to the positivist methodology employed by 
neorealists and neoliberals. Constructivism challenges the rationality assumption and the
® Main proponents include Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, London; McGraw Hill, 1979 and 
John J. Mearshelmer, The tragedy of great power politics, New York: Norton, 2001.
® Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, p.7 and p.161.
 ^David A. Baldwin, "Neorealism, Neoliberalism, and World Politics" in David A. Baldwin (Ed.). Neorealism and 
Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 3-25.
° Roberto. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, New York: Columbia University Press, 
1977, p. 25. . 5
notion that identities and interests of actors are predetermined by the structure of the 
international system.® It shifts the focus from structure to processes during which identities 
and interests are formed. In turn, through these identities and interests, social reality is 
created. In effect, agent and structure constitute, reproduce and shape each other. As 
Wendt has put it. “anarchy is what states make of i f  as states do not automatically find 
themselves in a security dilemma.^® States perceive the international system to be 
anarchic and adjust their identities and values accordingly and respond with a self-help 
b e h a v io u r.A s  constructivism involves analysing identities, norms and culture as 
determinants of interests and behaviour and studying endogenous processes of social 
construction within a state, It is more conducive towards foreign policy studies than 
neorealism or neoliberalism.^^
A recent study that utilises a constructivist research framework is Cordell and W olffs work 
on Germany’s Ostpolitik and relations with Poland and Czech Republic.^® It analyses the 
link between societal and international norms to explain the consistency in Ostpolitik 
emerging in the 1960s and continuing after the end of Cold War. It also explains variations 
in policy outcomes in terms of Germany's relations with Poland and the Czech Republic 
primarily by reference to the existence of different norms governing the relations. The book 
examines the changing attitudes of political parties in Germany towards Ostpolitik and the 
influence of German expellee organisations and German minorities on relations between 
Germany, Poland and Czech Republic.
Another important contribution of constructivism was reinstating the importance of 
historical analysis in examining the emergence of values, norms and ideas (which form 
foreign policies). In contrast, the positivist (or rationalist) theories held that state behaviour 
was determined by a universal mode of rationality and exogenously given system 
dynamics which are not context or value s e n s it iv e .In  keeping with a constructivist 
framework, historical narrative is also extensively employed in the above referred study by 
Cordell and Wolff. The present study also regards the constructivist approach as relevant 
to explaining and interpreting how concepts of Polish foreign policy are shaped. For this
® There are other post-positivist or reflectivist theories such as feminist theory, post-modernism and normative 
theory that also challenge the tenets of neoreallst-neollberallst discourses. However, only constructivism will be 
covered here for reasons of space. For Information about these theories see Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, 
“Alternative Approaches to International Theory'" In John Baylls and Steve Smith (Eds), The Globalization of 
World Politics (Third edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 271-293.
Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is what States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics", 
International Organization, Vol. 46, 1992, No. 2, p. 407.
Neack, The New Foreign Poiicy, p. 169.
Vendulka Kubâikovâ, “Foreign Policy, International Politics and Constructivism" In Vendulka Kubâikovâ 
(Ed.), Foreign Policy in a Constructed World, New York: M.E.Sharpe, 2001, p. 19.
Karl Cordell and Stephan Wolff, Germany’s Foreign Policy towards Poland and the Czech Republic: 
Ostpolitik revisited, London: Routledge, 2005.
Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism" In Scott Burchlll et al. (Eds), Theories of International Relations, (2nd 
edition), London: Palgrave, 2001, p. 226.
reason, a chapter is devoted to elite debates on EP and the historical background to the 
way In which Poland’s perceptions of its Eastern neighbours were formed.
1.2.2 State level theories
State level theories examine two categories of factors that affect foreign policy: 
governmental factors such as regime type, institutions and bureaucracy; and societal 
factors such as history, political party and NGO activities, culture, media and public 
opinion.''® Although FPA is a multilevel and multidisciplinary approach, its beginnings as a 
subdiscipline in IR could be traced back to middle range state level theories. For instance 
Rosenau classified states according to their economic development, size and regime in 
order to determine which level of analysis would have the biggest explanatory value for a 
certain state type.'® Other forerunners were Snyder, Bruck and Sapin who laid the 
foundations of decision making theory which offered analytical models to study decision 
making units and their settings.'^
A classic work in decision making was written by Allison who analysed three conceptual 
models, criticising the system level Rational Actor Model, which assumes that states are 
essentially rational and unitary actors.'® Instead, he proposed the Organisational Process 
and Bureaucratic Politics models. The former defined foreign policy behaviour as outputs 
of autonomous governmental institutions, each of which has its own internal rules and 
dynamics and focuses on solving a specific, short-term problem. Therefore, decisions are 
not always the results of deliberate and rational choices made by a unitary government. 
They are, rather, the result of coordination among separate government organisations that 
deal only with specific aspects of a foreign policy issue and are bound more by their inner 
rules than any overarching governmental strategy.'® Bureaucratic Politics, on the other 
hand, sees bureaucracies and leaders with different agendas and conflicting perspectives 
of foreign policy competing against each other. Whichever bureaucracy has more power 
and better bargaining skills can reflect its own vision in foreign policy decisions. In the case 
of Poland this could be a useful model in explaining competition between the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Office of the President concerning foreign policy {especially EP) 
initiatives. A llison’s work is important in terms not only of opening the "black box" of the
Neack, The New Foreign Policy, pp. 77-78.
James N, Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in R. Barry Farrell (Ed.), Approaches to 
Comparative and Internationai Politics, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966, pp. 27-92.
Richard Snyder, H, W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, “Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of 
International Politics" in Richard Snyder, H, W, Bruck and Burton Sapin (Eds), Foreign Policy Decision-Making, 
New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, pp. 14-185.
Graham Allison. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston: Little Brown, 1971.
Michael Clarke, “The Foreign policy System: A Framework for Analysis" in Michael Clarke and Brian White 
(Eds), Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989, 
pp. 50-51.
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State to a vigorous examination of its components but also of demonstrating the use all 
three levels of analysis to the study of foreign poiicy.^®
In addition to decision making processes and institutions, state level theories also 
emphasise regime type, political culture, public opinion and the media. Theory of 
democratic peace, for instance, holds that liberal democracies are less likely to go to war 
than non-democratic states and do not engage in violent conflict with other democracies 
because of the democratic norms and institutions that constrain foreign policy makers at 
home and the political culture that favours non-violent conflict resolution.®' Analyses of 
linkages between public opinion and foreign policy abound, with varying results. Earlier 
studies, such as Almond’s, found that public opinion was mostly indifferent to and 
vacillated over foreign policy issues whereas later researchers, such as Shapiro and Page 
and Risse-Kappen, found pubiic opinion about foreign policy much more stable. They 
concluded that public opinion mattered in terms of setting limits to policy choices available 
to governments (in liberal democracies) and has indirect influence on the course of 
coalition building processes among the policy making elite.®®
A useful theoretical approach to explain linkages between domestic politics and 
international relations was offered by Putnam. Using a game theoretical model he 
maintained that foreign policy decision makers played games at two levels, domestic and 
international, at the same time and had powerful incentives to achieve consistency 
between the two games:®®
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to 
adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among these 
groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to 
satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign 
developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central-decision makers as long as 
their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign.
For a survey of recent works in decision making, psychosocial and leadership theories of FPA see Valerie M. 
Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations", ForeignI l uoui I, I V] c yi I f vi v m l i o o. rvvivi v(Jcvh v i i icvi i lu li ic \ j i  v i lu vi ii iivi i l i vi l i iw i iiv i lo , i  w i c y i i
Policy Analysis, Vol. 1, 2005, No.1, pp. 13-21.
T. Clifton Morgan and Sally Howard Campbell, “Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So 
Why Kant Democracies Fight?”, Journai of Confiict Resolution, Vol. 35, 1991, No. 2, pp.189-190. Bruce 
Russett, Grasping the democratic peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War world, N J: Princeton University Press,
1995, pp. 30-42.
®® Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950, pp. 54-71. Y.
Robert Shapiro and Benjamin I. Page, “Foreign policy and the rational public”, Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 32, 1988, No, 2, pp,211-247, Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure and Foreign 
Policy in Liberal Democracies", World Politics, Vol. 43, 1991, No. 4, pp. 479-512, Pierangelo Isernia, Zoltan 
Juhasz and Hans Rattinger, “Foreign Policy and the Rational Public in Comparative Perspective", Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46, 2002, No. 2, pp. 201-224.
Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games", International 
Organization, Vol. 42, 1988, No. 3, p. 434.
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This analytical framework proved popular especially among authors that studied EU 
negotiations.®^ Onis, for instance, used this model to compare the EU’s negotiations with 
Poland and Turkey and explain why it led in the case of the former to a relatively smooth 
membership accession, whereas for the latter, to an unending process stalled by empty 
promises and half measures.®® He found that for historical and cultural reasons Poland’s 
EU membership was more acceptable to domestic constituents of EU member countries 
than Turkey's and the elite consensus on joining the EU was stronger In Poland than in 
Turkey. At the same time, the EU displayed a strong commitment to Poland’s integration 
whereas it sent weak and conflicting signals to Turkish decision makers.
1.2.3 individual level theories
Individual level theories take the impact of leaders as their focus. Hermann and Hermann 
identified three “decision units” within a state that make foreign policy decisions.®® These 
are the predominant leader (an individual with the “power to make the choice and stifle the 
opposition”), single groups (members of a certain organisation who “collectively set a 
course of action”) and multiple autonomous actors (individuals, groups or coalitions who, "if 
they co n cu r..., can act for the government”).®^  Decision units may vary from one foreign 
policy issue to the other. The study argues that single groups are the most likely to adopt 
more extreme foreign policy behaviour than predominant leaders and multiple autonomous 
actors. In a more recent study, Hermann et al. examined the predominant leader category 
and found that when taking foreign policy decisions, “contextually responsive” leaders are 
more constrained by the domestic political setting and behave in a more consensus 
seeking, flexible and pragmatic manner.®® In contrast, “goal driven” leaders apply their own 
beliefs and attitudes regardless of their environment, opt for quick resolution of problems 
and are more likely to undertake extreme foreign policy decisions that may lead to conflict. 
The leadership styles of the two Polish presidents Lech Watçsa and Aleksander 
Kwasniewski could be analysed within this framework. Kwasniewski was contextually 
responsive and utilitarian in his outlook whereas Wat^sa displayed a more goal driven and 
conflict prone attitude.
When analysing foreign policy making at this level, effects of various factors on the 
decision making process are assessed. While some studies build on the assumption of
His original article published in International Organization was cited 594 times according to IS! Web of 
Knowledge (compared to Alexander Wendt's groundbreaking “Anarchy is what states make of it" (also 
published in International Organization) which was cited 340 times, (as of September 2006) 
http://wok.mimas.ac.uk.
Ziya Onis, “Diverse but Converging Paths to European Union Membership: Poland and Turkey In 
Comparative Perspective", East European Poiitics and Societies, Vol. 18, 2004, No. 3, pp. 481-512.
Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F, Hermann, “Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An 
Empirical Inquiry", international Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, 1989, No, 4, pp. 361-387.
Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, “Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions", pp. 363-364.
Margaret G. Hermann, Thomas Preston, Baghat Korany and Timothy M. Shaw, “Who leads matters: the 
effects of powerful individuals”. International Studies Review, Vol. 3, 2001, No. 2, pp. 83-131.
rationality, others challenge this by examining the process of forming perceptions and 
images (cognition) by decision makers while others focus on the effects of flow of 
information, pre-existing belief sets, normative concerns and value judgements. For 
instance, in her study on post-Soviet foreign policies of the Baltic states, Park examined 
the political and social background of leaders as domestic determinants of foreign policy 
decisions.®® She argued that the effect of interest groups, public opinion, media or political 
parties had no significant explanatory value in analysing the foreign policies of Baltic states 
and individual level analysis of leaders offered more insight into the foreign policy 
processes of small states undergoing transition.
1.3 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS
The following chapter will offer an outline of Poland’s evolving foreign policy and its 
relations with West and East since 1989. Important events and turning points, such as 
NATO and EU accession, will be highlighted and events will be presented in a 
chronological approach. This chapter aims to present the setting in which both Eastern and 
Western policies developed and to provide reference points to the events and concepts 
elaborated in the following chapters.
Chapter Three will focus on the legal and institutional context o f foreign policy making in 
Poland. The provisions of the 1992 Little Constitution and 1997 Constitution governing the 
sphere of foreign and security policy will be explained. Institutions that take part in making 
and supervision of foreign policy will be discussed. The supervisory and advisory functions 
of the legislature, the Sejm and the Senate, will be explained through the functions and 
practices of their relevant committees. The role o f the executive will be explained through 
its most relevant offices, i.e. the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Economy as 
well as the Intelligence Agencies and offices dealing with European integration. Finally, the 
President’s role will be discussed.
The origins of and contemporary conceptual debates on Eastern policy will be the subject 
of Chapter Four. The evolution of an EP thought will be traced throughout the 20th century 
beginning with the opposing Pitsudskiite and Dmowskiite approaches which created the 
basic terms of reference for the ensuing debates about EP. The continuity of the debate 
was ensured by Polish émigrés in Europe after the establishment of the Polish People’s 
Republic {Polska Rzeczpospoiita Ludowa -  PRL) and the vision created by the Paris 
journal Kultura was to become a reference point for formulating EP after the collapse of the 
PRL. The intellectual debate did reach Poland before then (in the 1970s) but was confined 
to samizdat publications by the opposition and was of a highly speculative and abstract
Ausra Park, “Starting from Scratch: The Role or Leadership in the Foreign Policymaking of the Baltic States, 
1991-1999”, East European Quarterly, Vol. 39, 2005, No. 2, pp. 229-270.
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character given that a regime change or the collapse of the Soviet Union was not 
considered imminent at the time. The second part of the chapter will cover selected 
intellectual and academic debates on EP in the post-1989, Third Republic period. The 
main trends in the evolution of the intellectual debates in the mid-1990s will be evaluated.
A somewhat simplistic but practical classification of main positions on EP will be employed 
and thoughts o f prominent advocates of three camps, pro-Russian, pro-Western and 
Kultura will be highlighted. After establishing the dominant discourses in EP, the chapter 
will follow how the debate was diversified and present a sample of the most commonly 
debated issues regarding relations with Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus {Kultura's ULB 
concept), importance of Russia and gaining Eastern markets. The last section of the 
chapter will cover the most important recent intellectual and conceptual exercise on EP, 
the so-called minimalism debate of 2000-01, sparked by a newspaper editorial questioning 
how realistic the dominant EP of the government was and criticising the grandiose aims 
set forth by it. The ensuing debate not only highlighted the means and ends gap of Polish 
EP but also signalled the search for a more effective and engaging policy bolstered by 
increasing confidence in a more consolidated position for Poland in the West.
Chapters Five, Six and Seven are on Poland’s bilateral relations with Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus, where Poland’s EP is put to the test, revealing the weaknesses as well as 
strengths o f the dominant concepts and contending visions. A general structure and 
methodology is applied to all three case studies: The first section in each chapter deals 
with the evolution of bilateral relations within the European and international context, i.e. 
towards the backdrop of NATO and EU enlargement as well as Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus’s own relations with these organisations. These sections highlight the fact that the 
Western and European context is a highly significant determinant of Poland’s relations with 
its East and Poland’s EP cannot be analysed in Isolation from its Western policy, hence 
the title of the thesis. The second section of the chapters cover economic relations. Issues 
such as changes in bilateral trade, investment and the effects of EU enlargement will be 
discussed. In the case of Russia the recent scandal concerning the sale of the Polish oil 
refinery Orlen will be highlighted to point out the linkages between domestic politics in 
Poland and Poland’s economic relations with Russia. This episode also demonstrates 
competing visions of and discourses on Russia across the post-communist/post-Solidarity 
axis in Poland. In the case of Ukraine, the extent of "strategic partnership” in terms of 
economic relations is examined through the attempts of the Ukrainian steel giant Industrial 
Union of Donbas to buy Poland’s Huta Czestochowa which was privatised.
Trade and delivery of energy sources is pivotal both in terms of Poland’s relations with its 
East and for the EU and the West. Poland, like other European countries, is dependent on 
imports of gas and oil from mainly Russia and also imports a fair amount of crude and
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refined energy products from Ukraine. It is also an important transit route for carrying 
Russian gas and oil to Western Europe. For that reason, and given the objective and 
strategic nature of energy demand and supply, energy politics is one field that exposes the 
limits o f Poland’s EP the best. A case study of Poland’s natural gas purchase contracts 
with Russia and the controversy on the building of a second gas pipeline is presented in 
Chapter Five. In the case of Ukraine the building, management and uses of the Odessa- 
Brody-Gdahsk Pipeline, projected to carry Caspian crude oil to Western European markets 
via Poland and in turn decrease the dependence on Russian crude oil, will be considered. 
Chapter Seven on Belarus will not contain a similar case study as the volume of trade and 
investment between Belarus and Poland remains relatively low compared to Russia and 
Ukraine and no major energy projects have been proposed.
Chapters Five on Russia and Six on Ukraine highlight controversial issues stemming from 
different interpretations of their common history. The case of the Katyn massacre in the 
case of Russia and contending perceptions on the events in Volhynia following the Second 
World War and Action Vistula and the controversy over the Eaglets’ Cemetery in Lwôw in 
the case of Ukraine will be examined. Chapters Six (Ukraine) and Seven (Belarus) will also 
cover the issue of ethnic minorities.
Poland’s relations with each of the countries in focus have their own characteristics and 
present a diversity of issues specific to each country, which renders a parsimonious 
concept of EP impractical. Two of these country specific issues will be considered:
Chapter Five on Russia will present the hard and soft security challenges posed by the 
Kaliningrad region in bilateral relations as well as Poland’s involvement in the Chechen 
problem and Chapter Seven on Belarus will elaborate Poland’s attitudes towards and 
relations with the Belarusian opposition. The final chapter (Eight) will sum up the main 
findings of the thesis.
Findings from the fieldwork undertaken in 2002 by the author was published in the journal 
Perspectives on European Poiitics and Society {\/o\. 6, 2005, No. 1, pp. 1-30) under the 
title “Regional Perceptions of Foreign Policy: Eastern Poland”. It explores the perceptions 
of foreign policy in the borderlands of Eastern Poland and assesses the impact of 
Warsaw’s foreign policy decisions on these regions with a focus on the Podlasie region on 
the border with Belarus. This study is relevant to the thesis as it considers the effects of 
EU accession, prospects of economic change, Euroregions, cross-border contacts and 
trade, perceptions of foreign and Eastern policy, and ethnic and religious minority issues, 
which have an impact on Poland’s foreign and Eastern policies. However, the article 
focuses on the local level, in contrast with the national and international levels employed
12
throughout the thesis and is a complete study in itself. For this reason, it will be will be 
presented separately in the form of an appendix and will be referred to where relevant.
1.4 SOURCES USED
1.4.1 Secondary sources
Post-1989 Polish foreign policy has been extensively researched in Poland and in the 
West. However, the majority of publications deal with Poland’s EU negotiations and 
accession process and NATO membership. Of numerous books and articles, Poland and 
the European Union edited by Karl Cordell is the most comprehensive covering issue 
areas ranging from Polish public opinion to regional r e f o r m . T w o  books in Polish by 
Austrian journalist, Klaus Bachmann, Polska Kaczka-Europejski Staw  and Ktor^dy do 
Europy, offer original insight into the eurodebates and competing visions of the European 
Union in P o l a n d . T h e  books offer a very good assessment of Poland’s uncomfortable 
position between Germany and post-Soviet East.
Poland’s security policies and accession to NATO was covered in Roman Kuzniar’s edited 
volume Polska Polityka Bezpieczenstwa 1989-2000, which presents a comprehensive 
account of how Poland’s security policies evolved in the context of both bilateral relations 
and multilateral institutional s e t t in g s .Polityka Zagranlczna RP 1989-2002 edited by 
Szczepanik and Kuzniar is also a large collection of articles relating to all aspects of 
Poland's foreign p o l i c y . T h e  process of Polish accession to NATO and the intensive 
diplomacy and lobbying activities behind the scenes were recounted in Wielki final by 
Tomasz Lis and, although not an academic work, reflects the process by which arguments 
against NATO enlargement were defeated and makes the point that Poland’s NATO 
accession was the result of concerted activity by Polish policy makers and pro­
enlargement Western elites and not a natural process which unravelled by itself.
Research reports written by NATO fellows, some of whom are prominent academics such 
as Kobrinskaya and Stadtmuller, also offer valuable analysis.
Karl Cordell (Ed.), Poland and the European Union, London: Routledge, 2000.
Klaus Bachmann, Polska Kaczka-EuropeJski Staw: Szanse I Pufapki Polskiej Polityki Europejskiej, 
Warszawa: Centrum Stosunkow Mlçdzynarodowych, 1999. Klaus Bachmann, Ktôrçdydo Europy, Warszawa: 
Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 2002.
Roman Kuzniar (Ed.), Polska Polityka Bezpieczehstwa 1989-2000, Warszawa: Scholar, 2001.
Krzysztof Szczepanik and Roman Kuzniar (Eds), Polityka Zagraniozna RP 1989-2002, Warszawa: Askon, 
2002.
Tomasz Lis, Wielki final. Kulisy wstqpowania Polski do NATO, Krakôw: Znak, 1999.
Irina Kobrinskaya, “Implications of the PfP Program and Perspectives of NATO Enlargement on the Reform 
of the Military In the Central Eastern European States and Impact on Russian Domestic and Foreign Policy”, 
NATO Research Fellowship Final Report, 1998. http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/ (accessed 11 March 
2007). Elzbieta Stadtmuller, 'The Issue of NATO Enlargement In Polish -  Russian Relations", NATO Research 
Fellowship Final Report, 2000-01. http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/f99-01.htm (accessed 11 March 2007)
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A detailed description of the institutional framework of foreign policy making is given by 
Stemplowski in his 2004 book, Ksztaltowanie polityki zagranicznej w Polsce.^^ Sanford’s 
1999 article focuses on the legal basis of foreign policy making in Poland and the 
parliament’s means of controlling the p r o c e s s . I t  also explains the relative power and 
influence of the president, the government and the parliament In terms of foreign poiicy 
decisions. Sanford’s book, Democratic Government in Poland: Constitutional Politics Since 
1989, is the most authoritative publication in English and a standard reference concerning 
the shaping of the institutional make-up of the Polish state and post-1989 démocratisation 
process.^®
Poland’s relations with its East and the historical roots of EP has recently become a 
popular subject, especially after Poland’s attempts to introduce an Eastern dimension to 
the EU. However, literature on the subject is still scarce in English. The only work that 
covers similar strands with the current study is Prizel’s study of Polish, Russian and 
Ukrainian foreign policies where he examines the effect of national identity and historic 
perceptions on foreign policy.^® The chapters concerning Poland also refer to early 20^ *^  
century influences on historic thinking, post war émigré literature and its effects on 
Poland’s post-1989 foreign policy. There are a number of valuable publications on the 
historical evolution of Poland’s EP, published both in Poland after 1989 and before that 
abroad by Polish émigrés, the émigré journal Kultura published in Paris being the most 
prominent voice on EP. Discussion on EP ceased to be an exclusively émigré matter when 
domestic opposition in Poland gradually emerged in the1970s and opposition figures 
started publishing their views on Poland’s future EP both as samizdat in Poland and 
through émigré channels in Western Europe. Texts published in Polskie Porozumienie 
Niepodlegioéciowe, Polityka Polska, Niepodleglosc and G hs  reflect the perceptions of the 
anti-communist opposition (albeit o f different political leanings) on Poland’s relations with 
neighbouring nations to the East and the Soviet Union.
Among post-1989 publications, Hofman’s book and articles are the most comprehensive 
on Kultura's “Eastern programme” and vision of Kultura on Poland’s relations with Ukraine, 
Lithuania, Belarus (ULB) and Russia.'^” Hofman argues that Kultura’s doctrine on EP is the 
only strategy which is devoid of nationalistic overtones and requires good relations with
Ryszard Stemplowski, Ksztaltowanie polityki zagranicznej w Polsce. Wstçp do analizy, Warszawa: PISM, 
2004.
George Sanford, “Parliamentary Control and the Constitutional Definition of Foreign Policy Making in 
Democratic Poland", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, 1999, No. 5, pp. 769-797.
George Sanford, Democratic Government in Poiand: Constitutional Politics Since 1989, New York: PaIgrave, 
2002 .
Ilya Prize I, National identity and foreign policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poiand, Russia and Ukraine, 
Cambridge Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, No, 103, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Iwona Hofman, Ukraine, Litwa, Biaiorus w publicystyce paryskiej "Kuitury", Poznan: Wydawnictwo Forum 
Naukowe, 2003. Iwona Hofman, Szkice Paryskiej "Kulturze”, Torun: Adam Marszalek, 2004. Iwona Hofman, 
""Kultura” paryska 1989-1999 -  problemyjednocz^cej siç Europy”, Przeglqd Europejski, Vol. 2, 2001, No. 1, 
pp. 262-274.
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to Poland. The Yearbooks of Polish Foreign Policy (the in-house publication of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs), are a good source for following developments in government policies.
Russia and ULB at the same time. As such, it is the main basis of Poland’s post-1989 EP.
In the same vein, Figura and Bakuta investigate the role of Kultura's vision in shaping
Ï
•:S,
Polish-Ukrainian relations and maintain that in the post-communist bilateral relations were 
built on the basis of concepts devised by Kultura.^'^ However, not all commentators agreed 
on what Kultura’s EP prescription actually was and an intellectual debate ensued in 
Tygodnik Powszechny to reassess Poland’s role in the East and different perceptions of 
EP.'*^
i î
As mentioned above, the subject of EP was in the beginning overshadowed by Poland’s 
NATO accession and relations with the EU but following the success of Polish Western 
policy, rose gradually to prominence. Earlier discussions of EP can be found in two books: 
Polska-Rosja. Czas przewartosciowan and Patrzqc na Wschôd, edited both by Bieleh.'^^
The first Is a collection of conference proceedings which reflected the view that Poland’s 
policy towards Russia needed to be based on a more pragmatic approach and that
Russian sensitivities about the ex-Soviet republics and NATO should be taken into account 
when approaching ULB. The second is an edited volume with chapters analysing the 
international and regional contexts Polish EP had to address as well as bilateral economic 
and cultural relations.
Since the late 1990s, Polish think tanks, governmental or otherwise, have produced a 
steady stream of reports and books on EP and Poland’s relations with Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus. This study makes extensive use of reports published by the Stefan Batory 
Foundation, Centre for International Relations {Centrum Stosunkow Mi^dzynarodowych - 
GSM), Institute of Public Affairs {Instytut Spraw Publicznych - ISP), Centre for Eastern 
Studies, {Osrodek Studiôw Wschodnich - OSW) and Polish Institute of International Affairs 
{Polski Instytut Spraw Mi^dzynarodowych -  PISM). Publications by ISP, CSM and PISM 
have more analytical and academic content (and those of PISM reflect government policy).
The Batory Foundation, funded mostly by George Soros, is more policy oriented in line 
with its funded programmes that aim to influence political and social life in especially 
Ukraine and Belarus. Although the main focus of OSW is the countries of the post-Soviet 
region (and recently Balkans) and not Poland’s foreign policy, it has published reports
about issue areas such as the EU’s Eastern policy or Kaliningrad that are of direct concern
1----------------------------------------
Marek Figura, "Dialog Polsko-UkraitiskI w Dzialalnosci Jerzego Gledroycia”, Przeglqd Zachodni, Vol. 306,
2003, No.1, pp. 127-139. Bogusiaw Bakuta, "Polska I Ukralna w dziatalnoécl kuitury", Et/razya (Osrodek 
Studiôw Wschodnich), 1995, No.1, pp. 122-131 
See The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, Vol. 1, 2001, No.1, pp. 227-279.
Stanistaw Bieleh (Ed.), Polska-Rosja. Czas przewartosciowan, Warszawa: Centrum Badah Wschodnich,
1995. Stanistaw Bieleh (Ed.), Patrzgc na Wschôd: Z Problematyki Polityki Wschodniej III RP, Warszawa:
Centrum Badah Wschodnich UW, 1997.
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Untike Russia and Belarus, Poland’s relations with Ukraine have received much greater 
attention by Western academics. This is hardly surprising, given the importance of
Poland's bilateral relations with Russia and Belarus, just like Poland’s EP, has not yet 
been widely examined in the West, except for a few contributions to edited books such as 
Magdziak Miszewska’s essay in Independent Belarus edited by Balmaceda, Clem and 
Tarlow and Gromadzki’s contribution to The EU and Belarus edited by Lewis.
Publications in Polish, on the other hand, multiplied only in recent years parallel to the 
ascent of EP concerns in Poland’s foreign policy agenda. Polska i Rosja, edited by 
Magdziak-Miszewska, contains a sober analysis of asymmetrical interests of two countries 
in the region and Polish misperceptions about Russia’s attitude towards Poland.'^® 
Accordingly, Russia viewed Poland as an element of its Western policy rather than a 
partner in its own right. Poland’s relations with Belarus are examined in detail in Polska I 
Biaiorus and especially the Belarusian contributors’ essays reflect the expectation of 
Belarusians that Poland would pursue a more flexible policy towards Belarus than the EU
or the US.'*®
if
Ukraine’s position in shaping the geopolitical map of post-Soviet Europe and the unique 
place Ukraine has in Poland’s EP both currently and historically. The Wolczuks have
published extensively on the subject and investigated the “strategic partnership” between 
Poland and Ukraine.'^^ Their work is based on primary research and employs a multilevel 
analysis not only within the context of the EU and NATO but also at a domestic and loca 
level, examining societal relations, minority problems and transborder relations. Like the 
Wolczuks, Burant also argued that a strategic partnership between the two countries had 
not developed in full yet.
1.4.2 Primary sources
Owing to the contemporary nature of this study and the scarcity o f secondary sources on 
many issues covered, this study makes extensive use of news media to obtain factual 
information and statements by policy makers and to find out about intellectual debates on
'
a
EP. The centrist and liberal leaning Rzeczpospolita has been until recently one of the most_______________________
Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska, "Belarus: Poland's Strange Neighbor’’ in Margarita M. Balmaceda, James I. 
Clem, Lisbeth L. Tarlow (Eds), Independent Belarus: Domestic Determinants, Regional Dynamics, and 
implications for the kVesf, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003, pp. 344-365. Grzegorz Gromadzki, 
"Not all roads lead to Moscow: Belarusian relations with Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania" in Ann Lewis (Ed.),
The EU and Belarus: Between Moscow and Brussels, London: Federal Trust, 2002, pp. 249-259.
Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska (Ed.), Polska i RosJa. Strategiczne sprzecznoàcl Imozliwosci dialogu, 
Warszawa: Centrum Stosunkow Miçdzynarodowych, 1996.
Adam Eberhardt and Utadzimir Utachowicz (Eds), Polska i Biaiorus, Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw 
Miedzynarodowych, 2003.
Kataryna Wolczuk and Roman Wolczuk, Poland and Ukraine: A Strategic Partnership in a Changing 
Europe?, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002. Roman Wolczuk, Ukraine's Foreign and 
Security Policy 1991-2000, BASEES/RoutledgeCurzon Series on Russian and East European Studies, No. 1, 
London: Routledge, 2003.
Stephen R. Burant, Poland, Ukraine and the Idea of Strategic Partnership, The Carl Beck Papers, 
Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh, 1999.
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objective newspapers on the Polish market. It has extensive coverage of Polish foreign 
and Eastern policy. So does Gazeta Wyborcza but political undertones are more apparent 
in this case. Trybuna and Przeglqd are especially valuable as they reflect trends and 
perceptions among Poland’s post-communist elite, in contrast to Rzeczpospolita and 
Gazeta \A/yborcza which support the liberal wing of the post-Solidarity elite.'*^
Although electronic accessibility of debates and resolutions on the Sejm’s efficient website 
made the researcher’s life somewhat easier, she still had to read through thousands of 
pages of transcripts and bulletins of parliamentary committees, of Foreign Affairs, Liaison 
with Poles Abroad and Economy among others. General parliamentary debates and, in 
particular, the annual expose of the Minister of Foreign Affairs presented to and debated 
by the MPs contain important clues about the shaping of foreign policy. In addition, 
interpellations (and responses to these by the relevant governmental office), oral and 
written questions and resolutions issued by the Sejm were referred to. Zbiôr Dokumentow, 
published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, contains parallel texts in Polish and other 
languages of many key bilateral and multilateral treaties that form the basis of Poiand’s 
relations with its Eastern neighbours. Laws, regulations and ordinances are published in 
the official gazette o f laws, Dziennik Ustaw, and Monitor Polski. Texts published in both 
since 1995 are fully searchable online.
This study also uses the official publications on foreign trade and industry figures 
published by the Central Office of Statistics {Glôwny Urzgd Statystyczny - GUS) when 
analysing economic and financial relations between Poland and Russia, Ukraine, Belarus 
and energy politics. Statistical yearbooks published by GUS’s Russian, Ukrainian and 
Belarusian counterparts were also examined. Complementary information was obtained 
from the websites of the Economic and Trade Departments at Polish embassies In the 
region. Reports by government ministries were also used as reference, especially the 
Ministry of Economy’s programme for regaining Eastern markets. To examine energy 
policies in the region, especially the trade and transport of natural gas and crude oil, both 
Polish and European Union documents on energy policies were consulted.
As for public opinion polls, the study makes use of reports published by the two reputable 
research agencies, Public Opinion Research Center (Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej 
-CBO S) and TNS OBOP (formerly Osrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej).
It must be noted that the editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza, Adam MIchnik, was accused by right wing 
commentators of having made a deal with SLD politicians and president Kwasniewski and of whitewashing the 
corrupt ways of the post-communist politicians. See Bronislaw Wildstein, “Koniec swiata Michnika", Wprost, 16 
October 2005.
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1.4.3 Interviews
The author conducted 38 in-depth interviews with members of the policy making elite, 
academics, local government officials, business consultants, minority activists and 
journalists in Warsaw and the Podlasie region bordering Belarus in 2002. Interviewees 
were asked a set of questions on Poland’s foreign and Eastern policy, effects of the EU 
enlargement on Poland’s relations with the East and effects of EP on the Eastern regions. 
Except for two all interviews were conducted in Polish and some were totally and others 
partially recorded. Interviewee confidentiality was fully respected and some of the names 
were withheld upon request. Still, the author was much impressed by the openness of the 
respondents, with most of them spending hours answering questions in detail.
The focus of the interviews differed according to the position, expertise and the location of 
the respondent, with interviewees in the Podlasie region elaborating more on the regional 
aspect and ethnic minority viewpoint and those in Warsaw and Biatystok commenting on 
foreign policy making and the EP concept. Interviews were indispensable for gaining 
insight into how some elites defined, perceived and criticised EP and especialiy finding out 
a great deal o f information about Poland’s relations with Belarus. Based on part of the 
interviews, the author published ajournai article on how Podlasie elites located on the 
border with Belarus and having the most direct contact with it, perceived Poland’s foreign 
and Eastern policies. The article is presented as appendix.
It must, however, be noted that the author does not claim to have mapped elite opinion as 
such due to the qualitative manner by which interviews are conducted and the number of 
interviews. It is the insights, interpretation and information gained from the interviews, 
which cannot be found in available printed or electronic sources, that made the greatest 
contribution to the study.
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C h a p t e r  T wo
P o l a n d ’ s R e l a t i o n s  w i t h  i ts W e s t  a n d  Ea s t ,
1 9 8 9 - 2 0 0 4
Relations with the European Union (EU) and the West became the dominant feature of 
Polish foreign policy rhetoric after 1989, and most commentators treated this phenomenon 
as a natural consequence of Polish independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Poland, indeed, had the chance to regain control over its foreign and defence policies. 
However, Poland had to form its new policies amidst uncertainty in the international 
environment between 1989 and 1991 and radical transformation at home.
For most Poles the demise of the Communist regime meant a return to Europe after 45 
years of foreign domination. However, the Europe they meant to return to was much 
different from when they were forced to leave it. Western Europe had undergone an 
institutional transformation itself, drawing gradually towards integration by means of the 
European Community (EC).^ Polish poiicy makers, elites and the majority of public opinion 
expected a swift reorientation towards liberal democracy and a market economy, and a 
quick integration into Western economic and security structures.^ Events from 1989 to 
1991 proved that these expectations were unrealistic and that Polish integration with the 
West was dependent upon three factors. First, Poland had to radically transform its 
economy, political system and society to be eligible to join Western organizations. 
Overthrowing the Communist rule was a good start but did not suffice in itself. Second, 
even though the Soviet Union was obviously heading downhill, it still existed and Poland 
had to play its hand very carefully as long as the threat remained extant. Third, how 
Poland was perceived by the EC countries proved to play a much more decisive role than 
how Poland perceived them and the Community. The process of European integration and 
institutional reform occupied the agenda of the Community. Chances for enlargement to 
become a priority were not high.
Starting from this point, the following chapter will give a chronological outline of Poland’s 
foreign policy towards its West and its East until 2004 and highlight the changes in 
Poland’s international environment and challenges it faced.
’’ For reasons of consistence and clarity, the term European Community (EC) will be used in the first two parts 
of the history until 1994. From then on European Union (EU) will refer to the same organization. This does not 
reflect the actual history of the evolution of the Community into a Union,
^Teresa Los-Nowak, "Contemporary government attitudes towards the European Union" in Karl Cordell,
Poland and the European Union, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, pp.8-9.
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2.1 FROM THE END OF THE COMMUNIST RULE TO THE EUROPE AGREEMENT, 
1989-1991
2.1.1 Poland’s westward turn
Poland’s official relations with the EC date back to September 1988 when it established 
diplomatic ties and began negotiations on a trade and economic cooperation treaty.® The 
treaty was signed on 19 September 1989 and included a Most Favoured Nation clause for 
both sides giving Poland tariff reductions on its industrial exports to the Single Market 
through participation in the Universal System of Preferences for developing countries.'^
With this so called first generation agreement, Polish trade was reoriented towards the 
West and the EC became its main trading partner.
■
Meanwhile, the first non-communist government was formed under Tadeusz Mazowiecki in 
June 1989 foliowing the Roundtable negotiations and the first semi-free elections. Even 
though the Mazowiecki government was intent on reorienting Poland towards the West, 
international political circumstances as well as domestic required "cautious seif-limitation’’.®
Poland’s free hand in foreign policy was constrained by three interrelated factors: the 
power sharing arrangement of the Roundtable Talks, the Warsaw Pact troops on Polish 
territory and the uncertainty of the effects of German unification.
The Roundtable Talks had resulted in a negotiated distribution of power between Solidarity 
and the incumbent communist regime. Foreign and home affairs and defence policies 
remained under the control of the communists. The new presidency under Wojciech 
Jaruzelski was to oversee foreign policy and security issues. The appointment of a lawyer 
and a political independent, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, as Minister of Foreign Affairs was a 
sign that Warsaw was cautious with regard to the Soviet Union.® Both Skubiszewski and 
Mazowiecki reiterated Poland’s wish to stay in the Warsaw Pact alliance.^ It was noted, 
however, that Poland perceived this alliance as a "sphere of security” and not a "sphere of 
influence” and that allies should be free to choose their domestic political orientation.® In 
October 1989, a Soviet-Polish communiqué confirming the "principles of the free choice of 
the path of deveiopment, respect for sovereignty, equal rights, non-interference in internal
® Katarzyna Kofodziejczyk, “Procès stowarzyszenie Polski z Unl^ Europejsk^”, Stosunki Migdzynarodowe,
1998, No, 19, p. 70.
Kofodziejczyk, "Procès stowarzyszenie” and Negocjacje Czlonkowskie: Polska na Drodze do Unli 
Europejskiej, Warszawa: Pefnomocnik Rz^du do Spraw Negocjacji o Czfonkostwo RP w Uni! Europejskiej, 
Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrow, 2000, p.9.
® Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, “Poland’s foreign policy since 1989: the challenges of independence". Communist 
and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 33, 2000, No.1, p.9.
®Terry, "Poland’s foreign policy” , pp.9-10.
 ^Andrew Cottey, East Central Europe After the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic. Slovakia and Hungary 
in Search o f Security, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995, pp. 28-29.
® Cottey, East Central Europe, p.29.
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affairs” was issued.® The Polish government was also reluctant to push the Soviet Union 
on the troop withdrawai issue prematurely despite popular pressure and Czechoslovak and 
Hungarian calls in January 1990 for immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops.
By September 1990, Poland began to pursue a clearer policy towards the Soviet Union by 
formally requesting troop withdrawals. After long and hard negotiations, it was agreed in 
1992 that combat troops would be withdrawn by November 1992 and support troops by the 
end of 1993.^® By later 1990, it also became clear that Poland no longer regarded the 
Warsaw Pact as its long-term security arrangement. The Pact was disbanded in Prague at 
the last meeting of its Poiitical Advisory Committee in July 1991."
One of the most important events that prompted more determination in Poland’s policies 
was the outcome of the Ottawa and Paris summits on German unification. The uncertainty 
about how the unification would proceed and what shape the new Germany would take 
had fuelled security concerns in Poland. There had been talk in the Polish media about 
German neo-imperialism and a possible irredentist movement by the German minority in 
Silesia. However, in July 1990, the feeling of insecurity was aileviated by the commitment 
made at the Paris summit (after a diplomatic campaign by Poles during the Ottawa 
summit) to sign a border treaty and ratify it as soon as German unification was 
c o m p le te d .T h e  final settlement on the German unification issue, signed in Moscow in 
September 1990, provided for an international guarantee for the current border and 
prompted the signing of a border treaty. Subsequently, in November 1990, the border 
treaty, confirming the Oder-Neisse line and prohibiting parties from making any territorial 
claims in the future was signed by Poland and the united Germany.'*®
A further development which effectively freed Poland of all ties to the formerly communist 
structures was the collapse of CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) in June 
1991. Unlike the Warsaw Pact, CMEA was initially seen by Poland as a structure which 
could be transformed Into a genuine forum of cooperation between the Central and 
Eastern European countries." In fact, Poland was trying to prevent the collapse of its
^"Wspôlny komunikat o wizycie czlonka Biura Politycznego KC KPZR, Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych ZSRR, 
Eduarda Szewardnadze w Polsce, Warszawa, 25 pazdzlernlka 1989 r.", Zbiôr Dokumentow, Vol. 522, 1990,
No. 4, pp. 35-41,
"T h e  treaty on the withdrawal of Russian troops was signed in Moscow on 22 May 1992 but the text was not 
published, Ryszard Stemplowski, Ksztaltowanie polityki zagranicznej w Polsce. lYsfçp do analizy, Warszawa: 
PISM, 2004, p. 48.
"  See “Protokôt o utracie mocy uktadu o przyjazni, wspôlpracy o pomocy wzajemnej, podpisanego w 
Warszawie 14 Maya 1955 roku oraz protokotu o przedlu±eniu jego obowictzywanla, podpisanego wWarszawie 
26 kwietnia 1985 roku", Zbiôr Dokumentôw, Vol. 528, 1992, No. 2, pp. 144-147.
"  Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "The Signing of the Polish-German Border Treaty”, Report on Eastern Europe, 7 
December 1990, p. 18.
"  "Traktat miçdzy Rzeczqpospolit^ Polskq a Republikq Federainq, Niemiec o potwierdzeniu istniejq.cej miçdzy 
nimi g ran icy (traktat zostat ratyfikowany 26 listopada 1991 roku), Warszawa, 14 listopada 1990 r.", Zbiôr 
Dokumentôw, Vol. 528, 1992, No. 2, pp. 26-30.
"  It is hard to say that other Central Eastern European countries like Czechoslovakia and Hungary shared 
Poland’s enthusiasm. Los-Nowak, "Contemporary government attitudes", p. 13.
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regional economic and trade relations until it firmly redirected its trade and secured 
necessary revenues from trade with the West. However, reforming the obsolete structures 
of CMEA proved to be impossible and the reluctance of its members to cooperate within its 
framework brought it to an end. in June 1991, it was disbanded by a protocol signed in 
Budapest. At the same time, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary decided to retain their 
economic ties and enhance mutual security within a new regional cooperation framework, 
the Visegrad group. However ingenious the idea of regional cooperation sounded, it never 
made a breakthrough because each country perceived It as nothing more than a stepping- 
stone to joining the EC.
2.1.2 Eastern neighbours declare independence
Another important development to the east of Poland was the declaration of independence 
by Lithuania on 11 March 1990, and declaration of sovereignty within the Soviet Union by 
Ukraine on 16 July and Belarus on 27 July 1990. In the period lasting until the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 
December 1991, Polish foreign policy towards its East was described as "dual-track" 
[dwutorowosc). On the one hand, Poland recognised the sovereignty and independence of 
Soviet republics and established direct relations with them; on the other hand it maintained 
relations with the central Soviet authorities and exercised caution in reiations with republics 
so as not to jeopardise Poland's security and economic interests vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union. Poland had all the reason for being cautious. First of all, political uncertainty 
dominated its East. Secondly, Poland was going through a transition period itself. Thirdly, 
the United States was pursuing a policy of forming a partnership with the Soviet Union and 
existence of the Soviet Union was convenient for the West in general. Under these 
circumstances Poland had no alternative but to keep a low profile.^®
Lithuania's declaration of independence was received positively in Warsaw and support 
was extended quickly. Besides verbal expression of support for Lithuanian independence, 
the Polish government made symbolic gestures like sending a parliamentary delegation to 
Vilnius in March 1990 when Moscow was threatening Vilnius militarily.^® However, Poland 
did not extend formal recognition to Lithuania until after the August 1991 putsch in Moscow 
which culminated in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and opened the way to 
international recognition for Lithuania (as well as the other constituent Soviet republics). 
On 2 September 1991, Poland recognised Lithuania but the relations between the two 
states were less than amicable due to the tension caused by the pro-Soviet and anti-
"  See Pawei éwieboda, "Zachodnie uwarunkowania polityki wschodniej III RP" in Stanistaw Bieleri (Ed.), 
Patrz^c na Wschôd: Z Problematyki Polityki Wschodniej III RP, Warszawa: Centrum Badah Wschodnich UW, 
1997, pp. 98-100.
"  Stephen R. Burant, “ International Relations in a Regional Context: Poland and Its Eastern Neighbours - 
Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, 1993, No. 3, pp. 395-418.
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independence actions o f the Polish minority in Lithuania. Tensions were exacerbated by 
the fears in Lithuania that Poland might be tempted not to recognise the post war border 
settlement and to claim its lost territories. Despite tensions, Poland officially recognised 
Lithuania and the two countries issued a declaration on friendship and cooperation. 
However, signing of a full treaty was delayed due to a controversy which arose after the 
Lithuanian government requested a formal denunciation by the Polish government of 
incorporation of Wiino region into Poland in 1921-22.^^ After several rounds of negotiation, 
deadlock was overcome as both sides agreed not to include controversial historical issues 
in the body of the treaty and the treaty was signed on 26 April 1994."
Like Lithuania, Ukraine also received support from Poland in its initial declaration of 
sovereignty and on 13 October 1990 the two countries signed a declaration of friendship. 
Similarly, the Polish government initially fell short o f establishing official diplomatic 
relations with Ukraine and Poland's support for Ukrainian sovereignty as well as 
connections with the West became increasingly important for Ukraine in the face of 
Moscow's th rea t." Realising the strategic importanôe of Ukraine, the Polish government 
signed a consular convention on 8 September 1991 and an agreement on trade and 
economic cooperation on 4 October 1991.^° Finally, Ukraine proclaimed its independence 
on December 1991 and Poland was the first state to recognise it on 2 December. In 
comparison, the signing of the state treaty was delayed until 18 May 1992. Burant 
attributes this to Poland's fear of provoking Russia in the face of ongoing negotiations 
between Poland and Russia over specific issues regarding the withdrawai of Soviet troops 
from Poland.^'*
In this period the legacy of historical animosity and minority issues were not on the 
forefront of Polish Ukrainian relations. With the 1992 treaty the two sides recognised the 
current borders and provided extensive freedoms to minorities on each side of the border. 
Nevertheless, the underlying reasons for the lack of manifest conflict on these issues seem 
to be the strategic importance attributed by each country to the other. For Poland, an 
independent and friendly Ukraine meant relative freedom from a direct threat on its border 
and a buffer zone between itself and Russia. For Ukraine, Poland could be a gateway to 
the West and Polish support (which might link up with the West) was a possible 
counterbalance against Russian domination.
"  Jôzef Kukulka, Traktaty Sqsiedzkie Polski Odrodzonej,\Nroda\N: Ossolineum, 1998, pp. 100-101.
"  “Traktat miçdzy Rzeczpospolita Polsk^a Republikq^Litewsk^o przyjaznych stosunkach i dobrospiedzkiej 
wspôlpracy WiIno, 26 kwietnia 1994 r.", Zbiôr Dokumentôw, Vol. 538, 1994, No. 4, pp.36-41.
"  Burant, “International Relations', p. 409-410.
Kukutka, “Najwazniejsze dokumenty", p. 91.
Burant., “International Relations", p. 412.
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Belarus was the last among Lithuania, Ukraine and Russia to declare its sovereignty and 
to issue a declaration with Poland on friendly relations on 10 October 1991.^® In the period 
preceding the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations between Poland and its Eastern 
neighbours developed on a level commensurate with the degree of their independence 
from the Soviet Union. Belarus, with its “tame reputation” , took observers by surprise when 
it declared independence, as it was known to be one of the most pro-Moscow republics.^®
-
That might offer an explanation for the lack of intensity of Poiish-Belarusian relations. A 
treaty on good neighbourliness and cooperation was signed by the two countries on 25 
June 1992.^^* Relations flourished from that point on and several agreements on economic 
cooperation and defence matters were signed.
2.1.3 Association with the EC
With the Soviet Union collapsed, the Warsaw Pact and CMEA disbanded, good relations 
with Germany and its Eastern neighbours secured, Poland could now concentrate its 
foreign policy on how to access Western institutions. The EC was quick to respond to 
changes to its East. After signing economic cooperation treaties with Poland in September 
1989, It set up the Polish and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring their Economies 
(PHARE) programme to assist the process of transformation in those countries. PHARE 
was the brainchild of the July 1989 meeting of G7 in Paris which gave the EC Commission 
the task of coordinating financial assistance to Central and Eastern Europe.^® The 
establishment of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in May 
1990 to aid the economic initiatives in the region was another timely step taken to address 
the new situation.
The impetus of the first steps taken by the EC did not last very long. The negotiations for 
an association agreement between the EC and Poland exposed the hesitancy of the 
former and the overoptimistic expectations of the latter. As early as October 1989 Poland 
began unofficial talks on association with the EC.®® In April 1990, the Dublin European 
Council decided to open negotiations for association, and a month later Poland submitted 
its formal application to the EC to begin with the negotiations. The application was 
prompted by the speech made by President of the European Commission, Jacques
“Deklaracja o dobrym s^siedztwie, wzajemnym zrozumieniu i wspôlpracy miçdzy Rzeczeipospoiit^ Polsk^ i 
Republikq^Bialorué, Warszawa, 10 pazdziernika 1991 r.” , Zbiôr Dokumentôw, Vol. 528, 1992, No. 2, pp. 18-22.
Walter Stankiewicz, "The Events behind Belorussla’s Independence Declaration", Report on the USSR, 20 
September 1991, pp. 24-26.
"International Chronology”, The Polish Quarterly of internationai Affairs (hereafter PQIA), Vol. 1, 1992, No. 1- 
2 p.229.
Negocjacje Cztonkowskie, p. 9.
Teresa toé-Nowak, "Od adaptacji do integracji: Model polityki integracjynej Polski z Uni^ Europejsk^", 
Polska a perspektywy integracji europejskiej, Zeszyt 4, Zeszytyt Naukowe Instytutu Badan Spolecznych I 
Mlçdzynarodowych, Warszawa: Fundacji im. Kazimlerza Kelles-Klausa, 1999.
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Delors, to the European Parliament in January 1990.®^ He proposed that the EC sign 
association treaties with the Central and Eastern European countries to create a 
framework for political dialogue and extend cooperation in technical, scientific, cultural and 
environmental issues. However, he did not endorse future membership.®® The Commission 
was apprehensive about opening the way for new members at a time when the deepening 
of the integration process was a priority.
Kotodzlejczyk, "Procès stowarzyszenie", p.71.
Stanistaw Parzymies "Integracja europejska w polltyce zagranicznej III RP" In Roman KuÉniar and Krzysztof 
Szczepanik (Eds), Polityka Zagranlczna RP 1989-2002, Warszawa: Askon, 2002, p. 72.
Kofodziejczyk, "Procès stowarzyszenie”, pp.71-72.
Kofodziejczyk, “Procès stowarzyszenie", p. 72.
Kofodziejczyk, “Procès stowarzyszenie", p. 72.
Parzymies, “Integracja europejska", p. 69.
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The first round of negotiations between Poland and the EC started in December 1990 in 
Brussels. The overoptimistic approach of many in Poland led them to expect a relatively 
swift negotiation process and elimination of all complications by early 1991.®® The first
round exposed the discrepancy between the perceptions of the two parties. The 
Commission was opposed to setting full membership as the main aim of association as it 
was apprehensive about possible negative economic consequences. It was unlikely that 
Poland could catch up with even the poorest member of the EC in the foreseeable future 
and it expected its transformation process to be a protracted one. The Commission’s 
opinion was tempered by the Council of Europe which perceived the situation more in 
political terms. In the Council it was felt that the gesture of including the prospect of future 
membership in the association treaty would lend support to the démocratisation and 
economic transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe and would fulfil the 
expectations of the societies and the new governments in the region.®® The European 
Parliament shared the concerns of the Council of Europe and in May 1991 passed a 
resolution suggesting the inclusion of a clause in the treaty which defined membership in 
the EC as the final aim of association.
However, the importance of economic concerns should not be overlooked. The first round 
of negotiations gave a good indication of the problems which were to complicate 
negotiations for years to come (for instance, liberalisation of trade in sensitive sectors, 
such as textiles, agricultural products and steel). Especially the poorer states of the EC 
feared competition from cheap Polish raw materials and food and were afraid of fresh 
competition for the community funds.®® For the time being, a gradual liberalization in the 
trade of sensitive products and a very limited elimination of customs barriers on agricultural 
products was foreseen. The negotiations were complete at the end of the eighth round in
September 1991 and on 16 December 1991, the so-called Europe Agreement forming the 
association between Poland and the EC was signed.
Parallel to the efforts to join the EC, Poland endeavoured to have closer ties with NATO 
and to obtain security guarantees. Even though NATO established diplomatic contact with 
Central European states as early as 1990, it followed a cautious approach towards making 
any commitments. The establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 
November 1991 was meant to be a positive response from NATO. However, Central
'■ iX'
Europeans were disappointed at what they saw as a half-hearted initiative.
2.2 RATIFICATION OF THE EUROPE AGREEMENT, 1991-1994
The signing of Europe Agreement was a significant milestone on Poland’s road to 
integration into Western Europe. The main aim of the agreement was first and foremost to 
create a framework for closer relations between Poland and the EC, to start an enhanced 
political dialogue, eventually establish free trade, regulate free movement of goods, capital 
and services and harmonise Polish law with that of the Community. The Agreement did 
include a provision regarding possible future membership of Poland but it did not provide a 
date or specific conditions for accession®'*;
Recognising the fact that the final objective of Poland is to become a member of the 
Community and that this association, in the view of the Parties, will help to achieve this 
objective, have agreed as follows: ... to provide an appropriate framework for Poland's 
gradual integration into the Community. To this end, Poland shall work towards fulfilling the 
necessary conditions.
This reflected the compromise reached between the economic concerns of the 
Commission and the political necessity to acknowledge the Polish effort to integrate with 
the West and transform its system. The EC felt it could not commit itself yet to a future 
Polish membership (which would no doubt be accompanied by Czech and Hungarian 
memberships). There were too many uncertainties as to how Poland would cope with the 
transformation process and what priority would be given to Eastern enlargement within an 
EC agenda dominated by deepening o f integration.
Complete text of the Europe Agreement and amendments can be found at the European Union website. 
"Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, 
of the one part, and the Republic of Poland, of the other part", OfficialJournal L 348, 31/12/1993 P. 0002- 
0180. (hereafter Europe Agreement)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21993A1231(18):EN:HTML (accessed 06 
November 2006).
Europe Agreement.
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The EC fulfilled its obligation to open up prospects for Poland's integration into Europe. 
However, such a prospect was dependent on the efforts o f Poland to adapt its economic 
and legal structures to those of the EC. For the first time, faced with the technical
requirements of their country's "return to Europe” , the Polish political elite had to analyse 
the situation with reference to facts and not to emotional rhetoric. It was clear that joining 
the EC was an undisputed aim, but the question now was how and on what terms.
During the discussions in the Sejm on the ratification of the Europe Agreement, MPs from 
the Christian National Union (Zjednoczenia Chrzescijansko-Narodowego - ZChN), Union of 
Real Politics (Unia Polityki Realnej - UPR), Confederation for Independent Poland 
{Konfederacja Polski NiepodlegleJ - KPN) and the non-post-communist left wing Union of 
Labour (Unia Pracy - UP) expressed their concerns about the treaty. The main points 
raised were threats to sovereignty, national identity and values within the EC, possible 
negative effects o f opening up the Polish economy and agriculture to EC competition.®® 
MPs also voiced doubts about the viability, desirability and the costs of adaptation of the 
Polish economy and its legal system to those of the EC.®  ^ Doubts were voiced mostly by 
members of post-Solidarity parties which dominated the Sejm after Poland’s first fully free 
elections in October 1991. These were the initial stages of the anti-EU discourse of the
right wing.
The first session was on 21 May 1992 and the second one was on 3 July 1992, just before ratification.
Most of the concerns voiced about national identity and sovereignty revolved around Christian values, the 
subsidiarity principle of the EC and supranationalism, Janusz Korwin-Mikke {Unia Polityki Realnej - UPR) In his 
speech to the Sejm on 21 May 1992 pointed out, in his humorous style, that most EC governments and the 
European Parliament were dominated by socialists and the Sejm would be in effect voting for or against joining 
the “European Soviet Socialist Republic”. Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 1 Kadencja , 15 Posiedzenie, 1 
Dzien, 21 May 1992. All parliamentary debates from the First Sejm on can be searched at 
http : //ks. sej m. g 0 V. p1:8009/fo rm s/kad. h tm. (accessed 06 November 2006)
See Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 1 Kadencja, 19 Posiedzenie, 3 Dziert, 03 July 1992.
Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 1 Kadencja, 19 Posiedzenie, 3 Dzien, 03 July 1992. 
http;//ks.sejm.gov.pl:8009/forms/kad.htm. Also quoted by Los-Nowak,“Od adaptacji do integracji", p.66.
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The Sejm finally ratified the Europe Agreement on 4 July 1992. After all Poland did not , i 
have any other alternative to signing the treaty but isolation from mainstream European 
economic and political developments. The speech of MP Andrzej Malachowski (Unia Pracy 
- UP) at the Sejm on 3 July 1992 Illustrated the dilemma between misgivings about the 
treaty and lack o f a better alternative: “I think that the idea of rejecting the [treaty] is 
wrong. The idea of accepting is double madness... The choice is not between accepting or 
rejecting it but between madness and insanity- and only in madness is there some hope.”®®
■: :
Growing apprehension about the terms of the Europe Agreement and doubts of Centrai 
Eastern Europeans about their prospects of EC membership led the EC to formulate a 
somewhat clearer road map at the Copenhagen European Council of June 1993. Here the 
political, economic and legal criteria for membership were set. Unlike the Treaty of Rome 
which laid down geography as the only condition for eligibility, the Copenhagen criteria
Î
i
spelled out specific requirements.®® These were having a democratic system, respect for 
civil liberties and minority rights, a functioning market economy, a legal system 
encompassing EC laws, i.e. acquis communautaire, and economic and institutional 
compatibility to join the Single Market.
The criteria for joining the EC were indeed clearer but the tasks set for candidates were 
getting more difficult. The eastern enlargement of the EC (if it were to take place) would 
not be based solely on political motives (or so it looked at the outset), as had been the 
case in the Mediterranean enlargement. The Central East European countries were 
already on a steady course to transform themselves and anchor their systems firmly in 
Western Europe. As there was no imminent danger of a return to an authoritarian system 
and no alternative in the East or in the region in terms of economic cooperation, the EC 
was in a good position to demand all the effort from the aspirants. Meanwhile, it couid 
proceed with its internal reforms. The EC did pledge financial aid to assist the adaptation 
process.'*® However, the final result depended entirely on the abilities of the candidate and 
outcome of the negotiation process. This raised some concerns in Central East Europe 
about how genuine the willingness of the EC was to eventually include new members.'*'*
Domestic political developments in Poland gave rise to concerns in EC circles. At the 
September 1993 elections, two post-communist parties. Democratic Left Alliance {Sojusz 
Lewicy Demokratycznej - SLD) and the Polish Peasant Party {Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe 
- PSL), dominated the Sejm and formed a coalition government. The origins of these 
parties and the sceptical attitude taken by some of the PSL members towards Poland’s 
association with the EU gave rise to bleak scenarios about a U turn in Polish 
transformation. The scenarios proved in no time to be completely wrong and the new 
government turned out to be even more pro-European and market oriented than the 
previous ones.'*^ Besides, Polish politics was entering a period of consolidation and relative 
stability after two years of a fragmented parliament which caused the ouster of two 
governments and the eventual dissolution of the Sejm.
Poland waited patiently for the Europe Agreement to enter into force upon its ratification by 
all the EC states. As the Maastricht Treaty (signed on 7 February 1992) occupied the 
agenda of EC members, ratification of the Europe Agreements was put on the backburner.
“European Council In Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993.Conclusions of the Presidency." 
http://ue.eu.int/cms3_applications/Applications/newsRoom/loadBook.asp7ta rget=1999&infoTarget=before&bid 
=76&lang=1&cmslD=347 (accessed 20 February 2006)
Articles 96-101 of the Europe Agreement spell out the framework for EU financial assistance to Poland.
Andras Inotal, “The CEECs: From the Association Agreements to Full Membership?" in John Redmond and 
Glenda G. Rosenthal (Eds),. The Expanding European Union: Past, Present, Future, London: Lynne RIenner, 
1998, p. 159.
As a representative of the rural population, PSL was indeed sceptical about the EU and it remains to be so. 
However, it was well balanced by the SLD within the coalition and it did not take any actions contrary to the 
general foreign policy line.
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But after the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in November 1993, having overcome the 
Danish and French obstacles, the stormy debate abated and Europe Agreements were 
once again on the agenda. Consequently, the agreement went Into force in February 1994 
after being ratified by all EC members and the European Parliament. At Athens on 8 April 
1994, the Polish government submitted its application for membership to the Greek 
Presidency of the E C ."
2.3 THE BEGINNINGS OF POLISH EASTERN POLICY
The coalition formed after 1993 elections raised concerns not only about its European 
policy but also about its Eastern policy (EP). Especially, PSL leader and Prime Minister 
Waldemar Pawlak's idea of cultivating the Russian market for Polish agricultural goods 
and developing a special relationship with Russia (at the expense of Poland's Eastern 
neighbours) caused apprehension in several quarters. Commentators criticised the 
government's lack of initiatives towards Ukraine and Belarus and of a well-defined EP. 
Kaminski suggested that Poland so far had only one foreign policy aim, i.e. to join NATO 
and viewed its geopolitical environment through that prism o n ly ."  He mentioned that even 
the deepening Russian-Belarusian military cooperation (thus heightening the security 
threat) was perceived as serving the cause of bringing Poland closer to NATO. In the 
same vein, Zajqczkowski criticised the government for considering Russia as the partner in 
the East for economic relations.'*® Accordingly, this illusory approach towards "mythical 
Eastern markets” overlooked the fact that Russia was in economic and financial chaos and 
had not much to offer.
In fact there were both domestic and international reasons that limited the Polish 
government's room for manoeuvre. First, the new left-wing government had to coexist with 
a Solidarity president, Waiçsa, who held the key appointments of Foreign and Defence 
ministers (see Chapter Three). Domestic political tensions were inevitably reflected onto 
foreign policy. Second, the post-Soviet politics were taking shape as Russia's position over 
the Black Sea Fleet conflict and the future of nuciear arsenal and debts was becoming 
clear. That was one of the reasons why Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk's project of 
building a Baltic to Black Sea security zone received no enthusiasm from the new 
government (like its predecessor).'*® Another reason was the lack of any concrete 
perspective at the time for Poland to integrate into the Western security structures even 
though this was the main foreign policy aim. Given that the West also pursued a Russia- 
first policy towards ex-Soviet space, it would have been difficult for Poland to undertake
“International Chronology", PQIA, Vol. 3,1994, No. 3, p. 170.
Antoni Z Kamiiiski, "DIaczego Polska nie ma polityki wschodniej", Rzeczpospolita, 08 March 1995. 
Wojciech Zajq^czkowski, “Sp6r o Moskwç", Rzeczpospoiita, 16 May 1995.
See Roman VVolczuk, “Ukrainian-Polish Relations between 1991 and 1998; From the Declarative to the 
Substantive", European Security, Vol. 9, 2000, No. 1, pp. 127-156.
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any actions contradictory to Western policy. Thirdly, Poland had an economic interest In 
not provoking Russia given the prospect of building pipelines carrying Russian gas to the 
West through Poland, as well as Poland's need for Russian energy supplies." In 1993 
Poland and Russia signed an agreement to build two pipelines carrying gas from the 
Yamal peninsula through Belarus and Poland notwithstanding Ukrainian fears that Russia 
would reroute some of the gas from the Ukrainian pipeline and deprive Ukraine of a
would have a different foreign policy orientation than Ukraine: in February the Supreme
Zagranicznych Senatu RP na Tern at Gtownych Eiementôw Polskiej Polityki Wshodniej", Zbiôr Dokumentôw, 
Vol. 535, 1994, No. 1, pp. 42-54.
"  Terry, "Poland's foreign policy”, pp.27-28.
See Ustina Markus, “Belarus a "Weak Link" in Eastern Europe?", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, 10 
December 1993, No. 49. pp. 21-27.
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bargaining chip.
1
In this period, the dual-track policy of Skubiszewski was reformulated into a relatively more 
assertive EP by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrzej Olechowski. In his statement to the 
Foreign Affairs Committee in the Senate on 17 February 1994 Olechowski set out the new 
aims of Polish E P ." He stated the need for "a clear warming of the climate" with Russia 
and expressed the hope that Russia would join the Partnership for Peace. He said that the 
“rock-bottom condition” for friendliness with Russia was the letter's respect for Poland's 
integration into Western institutions like EU, NATO and WEU and warned about the threat 
of a neo-imperialist option in Russian foreign policy.
Olechowski attributed Ukraine almost equal importance to Russia and underlined the 
strategic importance of Ukraine for Poland, expressing hopes of further cooperation in 
international fora like Partnership for Peace, Centrai European Initiative and CSCE. He 
added his concerns about the "speciai interests” of Russia in Ukraine and reiterated
'Poland's commitment to the independence of Soviet successor states. Not surprisingly, 
hopes of good relations with Belarus were expressed only briefly.
Olechowski's straightforward comments and Poland's unwavering commitment to NATO 
membership did not go down well with Russian policymakers. Instead of a warming of the 
climate, a cooling down of relations followed as demonstrated by the Russian Foreign 
Minister Kozyrev's visit to Warsaw in February 1994 and Sejm speaker Oleksy's visit to 
Moscow.'*®
Meanwhile, Belarus was already drifting towards acknowledging its dependence on 
Russia. It had the most Russianised population, it was economically dependent on Russia 
(which supplied 67.7% of Belarusian trade and 90% of its energy supplies) and its army 
was dominated by Russian officials.®® In 1994 two events signalled to Poland that Belarus
The issue of energy dependence and pipelines are examined in Chapters Five and Six.
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Soviet chairman, one of the few reformists eager to keep Belarus neutral, Stanislav 
Shushkievich, was removed from office.®* In July, Alexander Lukashenko, who 
championed a closer union with Russia, was elected as president.®^
Around the same time presidential elections were underway in Ukraine, and Leonid 
Kuchma, who advocated the pursuit of Ukrainian interests in "Eurasian economic and 
cultural space”, was elected.®® Unlike Lukashenko, Kuchma initiated an economic reform 
package which gave an opportunity to Poland for invigorating economic ties. But due to its 
own domestic political turmoil (as weli as the reasons outlined above), Poland was unable 
to undertake the necessary steps. In January 1995, Olechowski resigned due to the 
divergence on foreign policy between him and Pawlak, without being able to implement his 
new EP vision.®'* in March 1995 the Pawlak cabinet was ousted by the Sejm. However, it 
must be noted that, despite shortcomings, relations with Ukraine developed much faster 
and on more levels than with Beiarus. For example, at the end of 1994 the Polish- 
Ukrainian Presidential Committee established to coordinate policies and improve relations 
started functioning. In 1995 decision was taken to create a Ukrainian-Polish brigade which 
would take part in peacekeeping measures (it came into life in 1998). Two agreements on 
border crossing (29 September) and customs (18 December) were signed in the same 
year.®® Poland also backed Ukraine in regional initiatives and supported Ukrainian 
membership to the Central European Initiative (Ukraine became member in 1996).®®
2.4 FROM ASSOCIATION TO ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS, 1994-1998
2.4.1 Implementation of the Europe Agreement
The Polish government and Sejm began work on implementing the requirements of the 
Europe Agreement immediately after its ratification in Poland. An Extraordinary 
Commission was already established in the Sejm on 4 July 1992 in order to supervise the 
process, and in January 1993, the government prepared a programme for the adaptation 
of the economy and the legal system to the requirements of the Europe Agreement. ®^
The political dialogue foreseen by the Articles 2-5 of the Europe Agreement started straight 
away with the establishment of the Association Council, the Association Committee and
Ustina Markus, “Conservatives Remove Belarusian Leader”, RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, 25 February
1994, No. 8, pp. 13-18.
Ustina Markus, “Belarus Elected Its First President", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, 29 July 1994, No. 30, 
pp. 1-7.
Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, “Ukraine under Kuchma: Back to 'Eurasia'?", RFE/RL Research Report, 
Vol. 3, 19 August 1994, No. 32, pp. 1-12.
Louisa Vinton, “Poland's Olechowski Abandons Government” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, 16 January
1995, No. 11.
®® Kukutka, Traktaty Sqsiedzkie, p.95.
See www.cei.org.
Negocjacje Cztonkowskie., p.11.
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the Parliamentary Association Committee.®® The Association Council was a ministerial 
meeting where delegations were headed on the Polish side by the Polish Foreign Minister 
and on the EU side by the Foreign Minister of whichever state holds the EU presidency. 
The first meeting of the Association Council took place in March 1994 and it has been 
meeting annually ever since.®® The Association Committee consisted of representatives of 
the European Council and Commission and senior Polish government officials and the 
Parliamentary Association Committee, of representatives from The European Parliament 
and the Sejm.
With the commencement of structured political dialogue, Poland started pressing the EU to 
speed up the association process and preparations for the upcoming Corfu and Essen 
European Councils. On 2 August 1994, Poland submitted a memorandum to the German 
Presidency of the EU expressing Polish expectations for a quicker tempo for integration.®® 
In September, Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Koiodko presented the so-called Strategy 
for Poland at the Sejm.®* It contained a programme for economic, social and administrative 
reforms for adaptation to EU requirements. This document was the forerunner of future 
national programmes for preparation for EU membership. On 31 November 1994, at the 
first meeting of foreign ministers of the EU and associated states in Luxembourg, 
Olechowski presented a timetable for integration of Poland but it was not accepted by the 
EU ministers.®^ The EU’s persistence in not specifying dates was to cause great 
apprehension among candidates in the future.
While knocking hard on the EU’s door, Poland also stepped up diplomatic initiatives 
towards NATO notwithstanding Russian objections. For Polish foreign policymakers, 
joining NATO was an intégrai part of their European policy. Accordingiy, NATO was the 
security framework in which the EU operated.®® WEU was seen by Poland as the 
European pillar of NATO. Besides, without NATO membership, Poland would always be 
vulnerable to instabilities on its East. Poland’s quest for NATO membership met a more 
efficient and organised response in comparison with the EU. Already in 1994, NATO 
introduced the Partnership for Peace programme and in 1995, with the publication of the 
"Study in NATO Enlargement", Poland’s entry into NATO became a matter of time.
See Matgorzata Lidia-Wenerska, “Foreign Policy Issues Under Poland’s Association with the European 
Union", PQIA, Vol. 8, No, 2, 1999, pp. 102-103 and Clare McManus, “Poland and the Europe Agreements: The 
EU as a regional actor” In John Peterson and Helene Sjursen (Eds), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? : 
Competing Visions of the CFSP, London: Routledge, 1998, pp.115-132.
Stanistaw Parzymies, Unia Europejska a Europa èrodkowa: Polityczna Aspekty Wspôlpracy, Warsazawa: 
Polsak Fundacja Spraw Mlçdzynarodowych, 1997, p. 31.
®® Lidia-Wenerska, “Foreign Policy Issues", p. 106.
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2.4.2 Pre-accession strategy
The path to ELI was still thorny and full of uncertainties. The Essen European Council on 
9-10 December 1994 adopted a pre-accession strategy.®'* The document focused on the 
measures for integrating the associate countries to the internal market, cooperation in 
trans-European issues like environment and energy, as well as in common foreign and 
security policy, home affairs and justice. It formulated PHARE, which would be 
“appropriately funded within a multi-annual financial framework in accordance with the 
preparatory strategy” , as the financiai backing to accomplish the tasks. The pre-accession 
strategy also defined a closer political dialogue enhanced with more meetings at ministerial 
level. In addition, the Council requested the Commission to prepare a White Paper to 
identify the relevant acquis which the candidates had to adopt in order to join the internal 
market. In addition, the document reminded the candidates that while they strove to adapt 
to EU norms. Community acquis and the Community policies would themselves continue 
to evolve. The pre-accession strategy envisaged deeper political and economic 
cooperation but failed to live up to Poland's expectations: a timetable for the accession 
process and more participation in the EU institutions.®®
The strongest point (and the only concrete contribution to the accession process) of the 
Essen strategy was enhanced structured multilateral political dialogue. Yet, the Polish side 
was not totally satisfied with the nature of the meetings within this framework. In its ever­
lasting quest for more certainty, Poland found most of these exchanges insubstantial.®® 
The multilateral character of the meetings had earlier become a bone of contention. 
Poland requested to conduct relations on a bilateral basis at the Association Council but 
was refused.®^ The Polish Foreign Minister, Wtadystaw Bartoszewski, felt the need to 
remind the EU states that “ It is true that Poland’s membership depends primarily on the 
fulfilment of certain economic and political condition; but it also depends on the conviction 
of our partners in the Union that this investment will be beneficial for them.” ®®
The Madrid European Council in December 1995 called on the Commission to prepare its 
opinions on the applications by the associate countries. The opinions were to be fonwarded 
to the Council after the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 1996, and 
consequently a composite paper on enlargement would be prepared. Accordingly, this
Resolution on the White Paper; "Preparing the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe for 
integration into the internal market of the Union", COM (95) 0163 - 04 - 0166/95 and Official Journal C 141, 
13/05/1996 P. 0135. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:51996IP010T.EN:HTML 
(accessed 06 November 2006)
Lidia-Wenerska, “Foreign Policy Issues". p.107.
®® Lidia-Wenerska, "Foreign Policy Issues", p. 108-109.
Parzymies, Unia Europejska, p. 34.
“Address to the Diet on the main directions of the Polish foreign policy by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Poland Wtadystaw Bartoszewski", Warsaw, May 24, 1995", Zbiôr Dokumentôw, Vol. 540, 1995, 
No. 2, p. 16.
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Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia pius Cyprus. This recommendation
■4-;
procedure would ensure treatment of applicant countries on an equal basis. Yet again, 
there was no reference to any concrete dates; “Following the conclusion of the [IGC] and 
in the light of its outcome and of all the opinions and reports from the Commission..., the 
Council w i l l ... take the necessary decisions for launching the accession negotiations” .®®
The IGC in 1996 opened at the Turin European Council in March 1996 and ended In 
Amsterdam European Council in June 1997. It dealt primarily with the reform of EU 
institutions to face the challenges of both deepening and enlarging, and the revision of the
Treaty on European Union. The IGC announced that the EU intended to open accession 
negotiations as soon as possible after the Luxembourg European Council in December 
1997. It requested the Commission to prepare its opinion on applicants and a 
comprehensive report about enlargement (Agenda 2000) by July. This was a confirmation 
of EU’s commitment to start negotiations with the applicants. In spite of this, the IGC 
decisions were inconclusive about the future enlargement. While dealing with the monetary 
and economic issues extensively, it failed to. include solutions to problems which 
enlargement would pose to the institutional makeup of the EU, like the composition of the 
EU organs.
2.4.3 Agenda 2000
On 16 July 1997 the European Commission published Agenda 2000.’'® The document 
covered the future of EU policy, EU’s financial perspectives for the period 2000-2006 and 
enlargement. Commission's opinions about membership applications were included. The 
Commission proposed that negotiations for membership be launched initially with Poland,
started a debate within the EU about the enlargement strategy.^* The Commission’s
proposal met with opposition from the EU states which preferred starting negotiations with 
all of the applicants (so called “regatta approach”). In their view, enlargement was first and
'foremost a political move to reinforce the transformation process in Eastern Europe. The 
other states, however, demanded that enlargement should go ahead only with applicants 
which could live up to EU standards. There was, therefore, no point in starting negotiations 
with countries which had no prospect of fulfilling the criteria in the near future. The 
divergence of members’ approach had its bearing on the meeting o f EU Foreign Ministers 
in Brussels on 15 September 1997 where Italy, Greece, Denmark and Sweden opposed 
beginning talks with only a selected number of associates.
IMadrid European Council Presidency conclusions, 16 December 1995, Document 00400/95.Agenda 2000, http://europa.eu.lnt/comm/agenda2000/lndex_en.htm. (accessed 06 November 2006)
Heather Grabbe and KIrsty Hughes, Enlarging the EU Eastwards, Chatham House Papers, London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1998, pp. 56-59.
“International Chronology", PQIA, Vol. 6, 1997, No. 4, p.129.
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The issue was resolved in the Luxembourg summit in December 1997 when the Council 
decided to launch an accession process on 30 March 1998 with ten Central East European 
applicants and Cyprus. It was pointed out that “all these States are destined to join the 
European Union on the basis of the same criteria and that they are participating in the 
accession process on an equal footing.”*'® However, in compliance with the Commission’s 
opinion, the Council agreed to convene bilateral intergovernmental conferences to begin 
accession negotiations with Poland, Hungary, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
Malta and Cyprus.
2.4.4 National Strategy for Integration
On the Polish front the preparations were continuing. In August 1996, the Committee of 
European Integration {Komitet Integracji Europejskiej - KIE) was established to plan and 
coordinate Poland’s integration with the EU.' '^* The Committee consisted of the Prime 
Minister, the Chief Negotiator, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Economy, 
Finance, Labour, Agriculture and Justice. The Office of the Committee of European 
Integration {Urzqd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej - UKiE) was established to undertake 
the administrative work for KIE. In January 1997, the Council of Ministers accepted the 
National Strategy for Integration whose aim was to formulate Poland’s negotiation 
mandate and form the basis for an action programme for the 1997 -  2000 period to be 
prepared by KIE.*'®
In this period, an outstanding legal problem about adopting EU statutes was also solved. 
The “Little Constitution” of 1992 made it difficult to incorporate EU law into domestic law. 
The new constitution (ratified by national referendum in May 1997) solved the problem by 
making it possible to delegate competence of state authority to an international 
organisation by virtue of international agreements.*'® The 1997 constitution also aimed to 
define the competence of government bodies dealing with EU integration. Accordingiy, KIE 
would prepare the government’s negotiating stance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
would be responsible for carrying out the negotiations.*'*'
Luxembourg European Council Presidency conclusions, 12 December 1997, Document No. SN400/97.
Negocjacje Cztonkowskie, pp. 13-15.
"National Strategy for Integration", The Committee for European Integration, Warsaw, 1997. 
http://www2.ukie.gov.pl/dokumenty/Nsien.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006)
1997 Polish Constitution. Article 90, Paragraph 1: "The Republic of Poland may, by virtue of international 
agreements, delegate to an international organization or international institution the competence of organs of 
State authority In relation to certain matters". Article 91, paragraph 3: "If an [International] agreement, ratified 
by the Republic of Poland, establishing an international organization so provides, the laws established by It 
shall be applied directly and have precedence in the event of a conflict of laws." For a detailed discussion of 
Article 90 see Jan Baroz, "The Integration Act of Poland With the European Union in the Light of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland", Polish Contemporary Law, Vol. 1-4, 1999, No. 121-124, pp. 5-18.
Los-Nowak, "Contemporary government attitudes", p,21.
35
36
However, the problem of policy coordination was not resolved by the judicial reforms. The 
new centre and right wing government coalition of Solidarity Electoral Action {Akcja 
Wyborcza Solidarnosc, AWS) and Freedom Union {Unia Wolnosci, UW) formed after the 
September 1997 elections had a direct effect on the institutions of European integration.
AWS was intent on the appointment of Ryszard Czarnecki, the leader of the radical 
Christian Union, as the head of KIE. Appointment of a eurosceptic to such a key position in 
Polish-EU relations, especially when the negotiations were imminent, gave rise to concern 
among the predominantly pro-EU Polish political elite and EU circles.*'® Underlying political 
tensions culminated in lack of coordination. Czarnecki’s brusque statements about a tough
■negotiation style and KIE's failure to communicate with the other related ministries caused 
serious problems. The government had to intervene when the EU axed 34 million ECU in 
aid to Poland from PHARE sources in May 1998 because project applications were found 
to be badly prepared.*'® This inefficiency was due to a brawl between the UW dominated 
Finance Ministry and Czarnecki’s KIE.®® Subsequently, the government decided to take 
over the control of KIE and issued a regulation to reorganize the negotiation team and 
competencies of each department.
2.5 NATO ENLARGEMENT AND IMPLICATIONS ON EASTERN POLICY
2.5.1 Relations with Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania
Alongside the Luxembourg summit, the year 1997 also witnessed an important 
development for Poland; Poland was invited to join NATO at its Madrid summit in July. The 
actual entry into NATO was foreseen for until after the ratification of the accession 
protocols by NATO member states. Yet the firm commitment was there and it was all 
Poland could ask for. Poland eventually became a NATO member in March 1999.
The security Poland had been looking for was granted at the Madrid summit. The summit 
results had buttressed Poland's growing attention and initiatives towards its Eastern 
neighbours. While relations with Ukraine progressed, there was a stalemate in relations 
with Belarus. Poland, alongside the West, criticised political decision and actions of the 
Lukashenko presidency and Belarus's plans for unification with Russia. Polish Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Bronislaw Geremek stated in his expose on 5 March 1998 that Poland 
strove to maintain economic and social relations with Belarus. He added that Poland did
The UWwIng of the government tried to balance Czarnecki with the selection of Jan Kulakowski as the Chief 
Negotiator. However, Kulakowski's position was inferior to Czarnecki's.
Jçdrzej Bielecki and Piotr Apanowicz, "Polska trad 34 miliony ecu", Rzeczpospolita, 26 May 1998.
Bernadeta Waszkielewicz and Marcin Dominik Zdort, "To ziy minister", Rzeczpospolita, 22 June 1998.
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■not intend to isolate Belarus but to help overcome “Belarus's self-isolation” and help it 
return to the community of democratic states.®*
Relations with Lithuania, meanwhile, had progressed after the signing of the friendship and 
cooperation treaty in 1994. Between 1995 and 1997 key agreements on free trade, 
cooperation for EU and NATO membership, creation of a peacekeeping battalion and 
border cooperation were signed. Before and after its invitation to NATO, Poland declared 
its support for Lithuanian aspirations to join the EU, NATO and the Central European Free 
Trade Agreement (CEFTA). Pleased with Poland's support, Lithuanian Foreign Minister 
Algirdas Saudargas during his visit to Warsaw on 7 January 1997 referred to Poland as the 
“main geostrategic partner" of Lithuania.®^
2.5.2 Relations with Russia
The negative consequence of the Madrid summit was the worsening of relations with 
Russia which opposed NATO enlargement and Polish interest in Ukraine and Belarus. At 
the European security meeting in Vilnius on 5 September 1997 attended by leaders of 
Central and Eastern Europe, the Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin called the 
eastward expansion of NATO "the largest strategic mistake since the end of the Cold 
War".®® He referred to the "anti-Russian tone" of the meeting, which was a Polish- 
Lithuanian initiative in fostering Baltic to Black Sea cooperation. Russia was also irritated 
by Poland's support for the Chechen cause.®'*
EP during the period in question has been described by Catka as a period of consensus 
following periods of doubt in 1992-93 and re-evaluation in 1994-95.®® There was 
consensus in the sense that despite the election of a new president in 1995 and the 
government change in 1997, foreign policy was more or less stable and was assuming a 
bipartisan character. This is also a good indicator of consolidation of the Polish political 
system and successful transformation.
"Sejmowe expose ministra spraw zagranicznych RP Bronislawa Geremka na temat podstawowych 
kierunkôw polityki zagranicznej Poiski w 1998r,", Zbiôr Dokumentôw, Voi. 551,1998, No. 1, p. 32.
Maja Narbutt, "Dobry odbiôr", Rzeczpospolita, 08 January 1997.
"Chernomyrdin Detaiis Moscow's Ideas on Baltic Security", RFE/RL Newsiine, 08 September 1997 and Jerzy 
Haszczynski, "Sq.siedzi daiecy I bliscy", Rzeczpospolita, 06 September 1997.
Piotr Jendroszczyk, “Nie omijac Moskwy", Rzeczpospolita, 27 January 1998.
Marek Janusz Catka , “Polska polityka wschodnia w tatach 1989-1997. Prôba oceny, nowe wyzwania i 
perspektywy" in Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 1998, Warszawa: Zarzqd Obstugi MSZ, 1998, 
http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pi/ (accessed 01 April 2006)
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2.6 ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EU
2.6.1 Negotiations begin
The negotiation process with the EU officially commenced on 31 March 1998 with the 
opening of a bilateral IGC on Accession. It was envisaged that the process of accession 
would progress in three steps.®® The first step to be completed by November 1999 was 
screening, i.e. checking the compliance of Polish legislation with the acquis and identifying 
problem areas. The second step to last until June 2000 was formulating position papers for 
each of the 31 chapters to be negotiated. Simultaneously, the negotiations on separate 
chapters would begin as soon as both parties had presented their positions. And finally on 
the basis of these negotiations an accession treaty would be drawn and submitted for 
ratification.
Stepping up efforts at home, Poland presented its National Programme for Preparation for 
Membership in the EU in June 1998.®^ The actual negotiations started in November 1998, 
before the end of the screening process, on seven unproblematic chapters. At the same 
time, the Commission presented its Regular Report on Poland’s Progress for 1998. While 
praising Poland’s credentials as a democracy and a functioning market economy, the 
report criticized Poland for “gaps in the administrative and institutional capacity in key 
areas" and for its “uneven rhythm of transposition” .®® The report estimated that Poland 
would become a member in the "medium-term” if it sustained the current progress. By the 
end of 1999, Poland had presented to the EU all of the position papers, and by July 2000 
negotiations were proceeding on 29 chapters (with 11 already provisionally closed).®® The 
chapter “Institutions” was not opened for negotiations until after the IGC in 2000 would 
take decisions on the future institutional make-up of the Union. The last chapter, “Other” , 
was reserved for any outstanding issues not dealt with under the other 30 headings.
Meanwhile, the EU was undertaking internal reforms to prepare itself for the ensuing 
enlargement. Berlin European Council in March 1999 agreed on financial perspectives for 
the period 2000-2006.®° The budget included financial commitments to future members. It
Negocjacje Czionkowskie, p. 18.
The programme contained the strategy for 1998-2002 and was modified every year in the light of the 
developments. Narodowy Program Przygotowania do Czfonkostwa w UE
http://www2.ukie.gov.pl/HLP/files.nsf/a50f2d318bc65d9dc1256e7a003922ed/8945c11b8cea8c5ac1256e7b004 
89cf8?Open Document (accessed 09 November 2006)
®® Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession, November 1998. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/reports 1998_en.htm. (accessed 06 November 
2006)
In February 2000, the Government Plenipotentiary on European integration published a report comprising all 
the position papers. It can be found at
http://www2.ukie.gov.pl/VWWV/dok. nsf/0/A040340D2A6A5863C1256E86004E7C8C?Open&RestrictToCategor 
y - (accessed 09 November 2006), See Negocjacje Czhnkowskie, pp.48-58 for a detailed chronology of 
negotiations.
Berlin European Council Presidency conclusions, 25 March 1999, Document 100/1/99 rev.
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designated the amount of aid to be given in this period and established two new funds 
(alongside PHARE) for candidates.®^ On the other hand, the new budget changed neither 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) guidelines to create means to absorb the new 
member’s agricultural sectors nor the distribution of structural and cohesion funds. It 
foresaw certain adjustments before the first enlargement but did not specify them. This 
caused disappointment in Poland as it had hoped for inclusion in the CAP system of its 
huge and inefficient agriculture.®^ Another step towards institutional reform was the 
entering into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in May 1999. In June 1999, the Cologne 
European Council decided, on the basis of the Amsterdam protocol, that the IGC in 2000 
would deal with key institutional reforms like composition of the commission and voting 
procedures In order to accommodate new members.®®
2.6.2 Waning public support
The opening of negotiations fuelled public debate in Poland on European integration and 
public opinion gradually sobered up to the fact that joining the EU was more than just 
approval of Poland’s democratic and Western credentials.®'* Nor was EU membership a 
natural consequence of any historical process which would unfold by itself. It was rather a 
detailed cost-benefit calculation and tough negotiation based on political decisions, it 
became clear that certain sectors of the economy (especially agriculture and heavy 
industry) and social groups (farmers, workers of publicly subsidized industries) would be at 
a great disadvantage in the short and medium term, and that the EU was not willing to 
compensate them. In addition, the deadline for Poland’s entry into the EU seemed to be 
frequently postponed. Public opinion polls reflected this social fatigue with the “return to 
Europe”.®® In May 1999, asked about how they would vote if there was a referendum on 
Poland’s entry into the EU then and there, only 55% of respondents answered positively 
and 26%, negatively, in contrast, the response in May 1996, when the euphoria was 
running high, was 80% in favour and only 7% against.®®
One of the funds, SAPARD, is for agricultural development and the second, ISPA, for structural 
development.
Made] Popo\wski, “Polska a Unia Europejska” in Rocznik PolskieJ Polityki Zagranicznej 2000, Warszawa; 
Zarz^d Obstugi MSZ, 2000, p. 44.
Cologne European Council Presidency conclusions, 04 June 1999, Document 150/99.
Public frustration with the EU negotiations also supported the eurosceptic movements in Poland which 
opposed to membership for various reasons. The most prominent of these were the fear of losing national 
sovereignty, compromising "Catholic values” and the Polish politicians settling for an economically unsound 
deal with the EU in order to increase their political capital at home. Fine examples of a growing Polish 
eurosceptic literature are Milosz Marczuk andTomasz Somer, Poza Uniq_jest zycie, Warszawa: AWRIL S.C., 
2003 and Filip Adwent, DIaczego Unia Europejska jest zgubq dia Polski, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Antyk - 
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Public opinion about the EU in Central Eastern European countries plays a very important role because 
integration into the EU is treated as a domestic issue running parallel to the transformation process at home. 
The public in the EU member states, on the other hand, does not treat EU enlargement as a priority or an end 
in itself.
Beata Roguska, "Poparcie dIa Integracji Polski z Uni^ Europejska”, Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej 
(CBOS), Serwis Informacyjny, No.11, 1999, pp,49-58.
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Another fact Poles (and other Central and East Europeans) realised was that the EU itself 
was undergoing transformation and was deeply divided over the enlargement issue. The 
moral imperative of welcoming the Eastern nations and the advantages o f access to large 
Eastern markets were soon outweighed by fears of the enormous costs of enlarging (at the 
expense of poorer members’ benefits), of a flood of cheap labour to exacerbate already 
high levels of unemployment and a possible delay to integration. Besides motivations for or 
against enlargement depended to a large extent on the national priorities of individual 
member states.
The European Commission’s Regular Report on Poland in 1999 reflected the increase in
Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession, October 13, 1999, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archlves/pdf/lcey documents/1999/poland_en.pdf (accessed 06 November 
2006)
^  For Polish government's opinion on the report see Przeglqd Rzqdowy, Vol. 105, 2000, No. 3, pp. 124-141. 
Helsinki European Council Presidency conclusions. 11 December 1999, Document 00300/1/99.
Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria Lithuania, Latvia and Malta. They are sometimes referred to as "the Helsinki 
Group" and the first group of candidates, "the Luxembourg Group".
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tension.®^ The report pointed out difficulties in agriculture, heavy industry and trade, it 
criticised the Polish parliament for its slow pace in passing necessary legislation and 
blamed the lack of progress in alignment with the acquis on this situation.®®
"3
The Helsinki European Council in December 1999 commented on the report and 
concluded that “Although the evaluation found that some progress had been achieved, ... 
certain candidate countries would not be able to meet ail the Copenhagen criteria in the 
medium term.”®® it endorsed the Commission’s opinion on the date of accession of new 
members and added that “ ...the Commission considers It possible to conclude 
negotiations with the most advanced candidates in 2002. ... therefore recommends to the 
European Council in Helsinki to commit itself to be able to decide from 2002 on the 
accession of candidates that fulfil all necessary criteria”. The Council reiterated that the EU 
would be ready to accept new members after the ratification of the 2000 IGC results.
Another very important development of the Helsinki summit was the opening of 
negotiations with the second group of candidates.^®® In line with the “regatta approach” (or 
“differentiation principle” in EU terminology), candidates started negotiations on an equal 
footing but the timetable for their accession depended on the progress in each individual 
case. This meant that accession of any country, be it in the Luxembourg or the Helsinki 
group, might be delayed if the EU was not satisfied with its progress.
i :
a
2.6.3 The scramble for a date
The 2000 IGC opened in February and as planned, ended at the Nice European Council in 
December 2000 having produced a treaty tackling institutional reform for an enlarged 
union. The treaty outlined the weighting of votes in the European Parliament, the Council,
—
the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee and extended 
Qualified Majority Voting (OMV)J®^ To its satisfaction, Poland was allocated the same 
number of votes as Spain. However, when exactly Poland (or any other candidate) would 
join remained untold. As far as the dates were concerned, the IGC reiterated that the EU 
would be able to “take in any applicants that are ready as from 1 January 2003” .^ °  ^The 
new members, accordingly, could take part in the June 2004 European elections. This 
vague roadmap was as far as the EU felt it could go in terms of providing candidates with 
dates.
Meanwhile, the negotiations were proceeding and talks on controversial chapters such as 
agriculture, environment, and movement of labour and services. Frustration was growing 
both in Poland and the EU about the pace of negotiations. EU officials repeated their 
earlier complaints about the slow legislative process in Poland and the consequent delays 
in the harmonisation of Polish law. This had yet again spurred discussions on the 
coordination of EU integration with the government, parliamentary committees and KIE all 
blaming each other for delays.”'®® The elusive quest for obtaining a timetable also occupied 
public debate and caused much political bickering. The government held on to January 
2003 religiously as the projected date of entry into the EU despite the fact that this became 
unrealistic in the course of negotiations. This obsession with the projected date became 
almost farcical when the Minister for European Integration was ostracised by the 
parliament for expressing his doubts about the 2003 plan during his visit to Brussels in 
May 2001, and had to submit his resignation.'’®" However, the aim of accession in 2003 
was abandoned soon. The Council of Ministers formed by the new post-communist SLD- 
PSL government formed after the September 2001 elections issued a European strategy 
on 15 November 2001 and declared that it aimed to conclude the negotiations in 2002 and 
accede to the EU in 2004.^®®
2.6.4 Reservations about Poland
The negative image of Poland as the biggest and most troublesome candidate was proving 
harmful to Poland’s prospects. The implementation of “Building Poland's Image in the EU 
Countries” programme by the government did not seem to yield any immediate results as
The text of the Nice Treaty can be found at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/ nice_treaty_en.pdf 
(accessed 06 November 2006)
Helsinki European Council Presidency conclusions, 11 December 1999, Document 00300/1/99.
Referring to the frustration that lack of coordination creates and possible delays to Poland's EU entry, the 
Head of the parliamentary European Integration Committee, Czeslaw Bielecki said “When the politicians forget 
to look at their watch, the citizens do so". Krzysztof Gofata and Andrzej Szoszkiewicz, “Ekspres sejmowy”, 
Wprost, 22 February 2000.
' “Nie bçdzie dymisji", Gazeta Wyborcza, 25 May 2001 and Dominika Pszczôtkowska et al., "Upomnienie, nie 
dymisji", Gazeta Wyborcza, 25 May 2001. The Prime Minister did not accept the resignation.
Europejska Strategia Rz^du RP, http://www.rcie.kielce.pl/ddkumenty/ 
Europejska_Strategia„Rzadu„po_RM_15_11_2001.pdf (accessed 09 November 2006)
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support for Polish membership among EL) citizens fell to low levels.”'®® in autumn 2000, 
only 44% of EU citizens declared themselves for enlargement and 35% against. The fact 
that only 36% of Germans supported enlargement was alarming for Poland as it counted 
on the German government’s political will to support its membership.
The debates fuelled by the difficulties in the negotiations and the general unease about 
enlargement did not help Poland’s image. It should also be noted that individual EU 
governments had their own attitudes towards enlargement. National agendas dominated 
the negotiations most of the time, given that each EU country had the power to block the 
settlement. For instance. Spain had shown the biggest resistance to the extension of 
structural funds to new members, as most of its regions would be deprived of Union aid 
after enlargement. Spain used its veto on the free movement of labour as a bargaining 
chip to extract guarantees for its funding in return for its support for the common EU 
position on transition periods (mainly advocated by Germany and Austria, fearing that their 
labour markets would be flooded by East Europeans).
Various other reservations about Poland’s accession to the EU ranged from accusations 
that Poland would be the “Trojan horse” of America in the Union to complaints about the 
number of derogations requested by Poland.^®® For instance, France argued that Poland 
would not be able to implement the Schengen rules and Its porous borders would continue 
to allow illegal immigrants and drugs Into the Union, This was perceived in Poland as an 
easy pretext for France to stall the enlargement process.”'®® :
The future of its Eastern border did present a problem for Poland. As the Schengen Treaty 
allowed no derogations, Poland had to adopt EU border and visa procedures on its 
Eastern border which threatened Poland’s good relations with its neighbours, something 
that Poland has worked hard to achieve. The inability of the Schengen Treaty to allow any 
scope for the special relationship of Poland to its East became a bone of contention 
among the Polish political elite and adversely affected Poland's relations with its Eastern 
neighbours. The imposition of invitation and voucher requirements for the citizens of 
Russia and Belarus in 1998 was received with apprehension in these countries, in 
addition, the future of the Kaliningrad region, surrounded by the territories of the enlarged 
EU, entered the agenda. The issue of how Poland could have an independent EP crucial
Ï
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Eurobarometer Report No. 54 (November-December 2000), http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
public_opinion/archlves/eb/eb54/eb54_en.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
Jacek Pawiicki, "Hiszpahskim targiem", Gazeta Wyborcza, 31 May 2001.
The role of being the spokesman of America has been attributed to Britain but it seems now that Poiand is a 
contender for this position, Jarostaw Gizihski, "Europa kontra Ameryka", Wprost, 28 May 2000.
Piotr Kudzia and Grzegorz Pawelczyk, “Brama Europy’’, Wprost, 04 June 2000. Also according to Wprost of 
28 May 2000, French President Jacques Chirac ailegedly asked Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek whether 
Poland intended to be the 51st state of the United States. Jaroslaw Gizihski, "Europa kontra Ameryka”, Wprost, 
28 May 2000.
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for its security in a prospective fortress Europe started to resonate among the Polish 
political elite and intellectuals.
2.7 EVOLVING EASTERN POLICY
Even though Poland’s relations with its East followed the main trends formed after 1995,
EP became increasingly salient as the accession negotiations with the EU progressed. In 
the face of rising instability and explosive issues that influenced bilateral relations with 
Eastern neighbours, Poland's EP took an evolutionary leap fonward.
Already troublesome relations with Russia were exacerbated when Russia accused 
Poland of sympathising with the Chechen rebels. Although there was no open stance 
taken by the Polish government, anti-Russian feelings of the Polish society in general were 
exhibited through pro-Chechen demonstrations and comments in the media. The fact that 
Poland headed the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1998 
also meant that Polish government representatives had to take up the Chechen Issue in 
their capacity of OSCE leaders.
Polish-Russian relations were further shaken by a crisis at the beginning of 2000. On 20 
January, Poland declared nine Russian diplomats on its territory personæ-non-grata, 
accusing them of spying, in retaliation Russia asked nine Polish diplomats to leave 
Moscow on 28 January 2000.^^® In February, relations reached a breaking point when 
Polish demonstrators belonging to a group called Free Caucasus Committee {Komitet 
Wolny Kaukaz) came into the grounds of the Russian Consulate in Poznan and destroyed 
Russian state symbols. Russia denounced the demonstration and the hands-off attitude of 
the Polish police. It withdrew its ambassador from Warsaw and cancelled the visit of its 
Foreign Minister to Warsaw scheduled for 3 March 2000.^^^ In addition, retaliatory 
demonstrations were held in front of Polish missions in Moscow and St Petersburg.
in the background of these scandals, relations were being steadily eroded at a less 
spectacular level. The economic crisis that Russia plunged into in August 1998 caused 
trade with Poiand to plummet and economic cooperation had to be scaled down. The crisis 
affected not only Poiish-Russian trade but also Poland’s economic relations with all the 
Soviet successor states. No headway was made in bilateral issues even though series of 
meetings were held between the officials of the two countries in 1999 and 2000. These 
issues included not only general topics like regional cooperation and European integration 
but also specific problems like the return of Polish art works and archives taken to Russia 
during the war and compensation for the damage caused by Soviet troops in Poiand.
Anna Marszalek, "Polscy dyplomaci niepozqdani", Rzeczpospolita, 22 January 2000.
Stawomir Popowski, “Duma oskar±a polskie wiadze", Rzeczpospolita, 26 February 2000.
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Tension between Poland and Russia was eased to an extent by the Moscow visit of 
President Kwasniewski on 11 July 2000 with the express aim of "breaking the ice"/^^ Even 
though no concrete solutions were found for outstanding problems, the visit brought about 
the revival of the channels of communication at the highest level.
Unlike Polish Russian relations, Polish Ukrainian relations continued to develop at the 
highest level with frequent meetings between the two countries' presidents. The re-election 
of the Ukrainian president Kuchma in 1999 contributed to the continuation of the “strategic 
partnership". This strategic partnership, however, must be interpreted with regard to the 
limitations in the international politics and geopolitical circumstances of the two countries. 
Ukraine’s ties with Russia, voluntary and involuntary, limited possibilities for revolutionising 
Polish Ukrainian relations. It is not surprising that Kuchma stressed Ukraine's strategic 
partnership with Russia alongside his country's positive approach towards European 
integration and importance of P o l a n d . O n  the other hand, the strategic partnership of 
Ukraine for Poiand was a secondary aim compared to Polish membership of the EU and 
wherever objectives of the two aims clashed, the latter prevailed as a priority. For example, 
Poland committed itself to fulfilling Schengen requirements, even at the expense of curbing 
transborder contacts with its Eastern neighbours. Kuchma referred to this as the building of 
a "paper curtain" in the place of the iron one.”'^" In short, cooperation between two 
countries progressed at the economic, social and cultural levels but a full blown strategic 
partnership was not in evidence.
A good example of the rhetorical character of the strategic partnership was the refusal by 
Kwasniewski in July 2000 of the Russian proposal to build a second gas pipeline from 
Russia to Slovakia through Poiand, bypassing Ukraine (the first pipeline was completed in 
1999). Kwasniewski assured Kuchma that Poland would not support "anything that would 
have an overtly anti-Ukrainian characte r".^S evera l emotional statements were uttered by 
Polish politicians, expressing their commitment to the strategic partnership. However, the 
overambitious advocacy of Ukrainian interests faded away in the face of economic realities 
such as Poland's and Ukraine’s dependence on Russian gas and expectations of 
revenues from the planned pipeline.
Even though the impact of economic and strategic calculations on shaping Poland’s 
relations with its Eastern neighbours was evident, historical grievances also occupied the
stawomir Popowski, "Przetamywanie iodôw", Rzeczpospolita, 11 July 2000.
Zofia Szmyd, "Stosunki z Ukrainq." In Rocznik PolskieJ Polityki Zagranicznej 2000, Warszawa: Zarzq^d 
Obstugi MSZ, 2000, tittp://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/ {accessed 01 April 2006).
He made ttiis comment at the Baltic to Black Sea presidential meeting in Yalta on 11 September 1999. 
“Lukaszenko zostatwdomu", Rzeczpospolita, 11 September 1999.
"Politicians Express Concern over Gas Pipeline Project Bypassing Ukraine", RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and 
Ukraine Report, Vol. 2, 25 July 2000, No. 26.
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agenda and contributed to the formation of an EP discourse. One instance where historical 
memory influenced relations was the conflict over the Orlqt Cemetery in Lwôw where 
Polish soldiers fighting against the Ukrainians in 1919-20 were buried. In 2000 the 
objection of Lwow city authorities against the wording of the planned commemorative 
plaque (perceived as anti Ukrainian) flared into a con f l ic t . ^The  conflict was played down 
by the presidents and the foreign ministries of the two countries in the name of the 
“strategic partnership” . However, the issue was pursued by the relevant state 
a u th o r i t i e s . T h e  fact that the decision of a local authority could escalate to the interstate 
level is a good Indication of the power of historical memory in the region as well as its 
potential to divide.
Lithuania is another country where common history proved to be conflictuai. However, the 
divisive potential of historical memory was mitigated by the uniting force of the common 
international goals shared by the two countries. Throughout 1999 and 2000 there were 
problems concerning the Polish minority in Lithuania (like education issues and the effects 
of the new administrative reform on electoral districts inhabited by Poles) and the 
Lithuanian minority in Poiand (the planned Puhsk border crossing facilities). But efficient 
channels of communication between the two countries and common goals like EU and 
NATO membership prevented the escalation of such problems. Polish support for 
Lithuania's accession to the EU was reiterated many times by Polish statesmen. When 
Lithuania was invited for negotiations with the EU in December 1999, a new platform of 
cooperation was created.
Relations with Belarus resumed their low key and icebound character as the EU and 
Polish policy of isolating the Lukashenko regime continued and Belarus progressed 
towards a union with Russia. The vagaries of Lukashenko damaged the relations even 
further when he ordered the eviction of Western diplomats from their residences in Minsk 
in June 1998 In breach of the Vienna convention. The Polish ambassador left the country 
in June 1998 not to come back until January 1999.” ®
Despite the relaxation of the crisis in the beginning of 1999, relations with Belarus 
remained cold. Poland insisted on limiting contacts at the regional or ministerial level and 
Polish officials held meetings on subjects like combating organised crime, border crossing, 
cultural exchanges and regional cooperation (especially between Podlasie and Grodno 
regions). Another hitch in relations came in December 1999 when the Blalystok based
Conflicts with a historical background featured In Polish-Ukrainian relations before. See Kasia Wolczuk, 
"Polish-Ukrainian Borderlands and Nation-States, The Case of Lviv and Przemysl" in Kazimierz Krzysztofek 
and Andrzej Sadowski (Eds), Pogranicze etniczne w Europie: Harmonia i konflikty, Biatystok: 2001, pp. 213- 
231.
The Council for the Defence of the Memory of Struggle and Martyrdom and the Institute of National 
Remembrance {Rady Ochrony Pamiqci Walk I Mqczenstwa - ROPVViM and Instytut Pamiqci Narodowej- IPN) 
"Polska wzywa ambasadora”, Rzeczpospolita, 24 June 1998.
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Radio Racja started its broadcasts. Radio Racja was established by the Belarusian Union 
In Poland, the anti-Lukashenko faction of the Belarusian minority in Podiasie, and it was 
funded mainiy by American sources.” ® The Lukashenko administration was not pleased 
with this initiative.
2.8 EU ACCESSION AND THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF EASTERN POLICY
Despite public frustration and protracted negotiations (especially on financial matters such 
as agricultural subsidies and budget allocation), Poiand and the EU managed to conclude 
negotiations during the Copenhagen European Council on 13 December 2002 and Poland, 
alongside nine other candidates, were set to become a full member of the EU on 1 May 
2004. Poiand signed the Accession Treaty to the EU during the Athens European Council 
on 16 April 2003 and held a referendum on 7-8 June 2003.”'^ ® The results demonstrated 
that the government’s huge efforts for promoting Poland’s EU accession and its extensive 
and costly public information programmes as well as its decision to devote two days to 
voting succeeded in avoiding a dreaded scenario of a majority no vote during the 
re fe re n d u m .W h ile  the turnout was a sufficient 55 %, 77.45% voted for and 22.55% 
against Poland’s entry into the EU.”'^ ^
Despite tough negotiations on a possible future constitution for the EU and haggling over 
the voting system agreed on at Nice, Poiand became a member of the EU, as planned, on 
1 May 2004. The issue was now what role Poland would play in the EU and not whether 
Poland would be a full member anymore. Since Lithuania’s EU membership became 
certain, Poland’s relations with that country was carried onto a platform much different than 
its relations with Belarus or Ukraine and Lithuania was no longer an EP concern. Bilateral 
cooperation became much more intense and problems about minorities eased within the 
atmosphere of mutual effort to fulfil EU requirements.
However, the main EP concerns for Poiand, i.e. relations with Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus, remained challenging. The academic-journalistic debate about the theory and 
practice of Poland’s EP in 2000-01 reflected the soul searching that also went on among 
the policy makers. The debate focused on how active should Poland’s engagement in its 
East be and what kind of role Poland wanted to play in the region. While some 
participants in the debate criticised Poland’s professed policy of being Ukraine’s gateway
interview with Oieg Latyszonek, 25 July 2002, Katedra Kultury Biatoruskiej, Biatystok.
The treaty went into force after parliaments of all the EU member states ratified it. "Traktat podpisany w 
Atenach w dniu 16 kwietnia 2003 r.", Dziennik Ustaw, No. 90, pos. 864, 30 April 2004.
"Jak przyciqgnqc do urn?’’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 11 June 2003.
“Obwieszczenie Partstwowej Komisjl Wyborczej z dnia 9 czerwca 2003 r. o wyniku ogolnokrajowego 
referendum w sprawie wyrazenia zgody na ratyfikacjç Traktatu dotyczq^cego przystqpienia Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskie] do Unii Europejskiej", Dziennik Ustaw, No. 103, Pos. 953, 11 June 2003.
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to the EU and its paternalistic attitude, others believed in the necessity of extensive 
engagement in Ukraine and in Eastern Europe in general. Historical sources of Poland’s 
EP thought, especially the vision of the émigré publicists Jerzy Giedroyc and Juliusz 
Mieroszewski, and their reflection on current foreign policy were discussed.
Meanwhile, Poland’s impending EU accession encouraged the Polish Foreign Ministry to 
issue a set of proposals in June 2001 demonstrating Poland’s intention to influence the 
EU’s Eastern policy.”'^ ® The paper argued for an active role for Poland in EU programmes 
for the post-Soviet region and stressed Poland’s extensive experience in engagement in its 
East. It also proposed that EU make security dialogue with Ukraine a priority (although 
adding a disclaimer about Poland carrying Ukraine into the EU). In January 2003 the 
Foreign Ministry issued a non-paper with more concrete proposals for the EU’s Eastern 
policy, which called for the creation of an "Eastern dimension” (similar to the Northern 
dimension which governed cooperation with Russian regions near the EU).^^"
Poland’s efforts at increasing its leverage on its Eastern neighbours were visible also in 
economic initiatives. In 2001 the government introduced a programme for offering export 
credit insurance to businessmen who wanted to export to Russia and in 2003 announced 
an initiative called ’’Programme for regaining the Eastern markets” to boost exports to its 
Eastern neighbours in order to revive the slump in trade caused by the 1998 financial crisis 
in R u s s i a . T h e  downward trend in trade figures was reversed and by 2004 Poland’s 
exports to Russia, Ukraine and Belarus was almost double the 1998 levels while Polish 
investment in the region (and investment in Poland by those countries) was lagging 
behind. (See Chapters Five, Six and Seven for details)
A much more definitive role was played by energy politics in the region. By 2003 almost 
90% of Polish imports from Russia and around 50% from Ukraine and Belarus were 
mineral products (including re-exports of Russian crude oil and natural gas as well as 
processed mineral products). As mentioned above in the case o f Ukraine, Poland’s 
dependence on Russian energy sources and larger energy geopolitics in Europe injected 
some realism into Poland’s ambitious EP. The effects of this dependence could also be 
observed in domestic political struggles, especially on a post-Communist-post-Solidarity 
axis. The AWS-UW governments’ policy of signing natural gas supply contracts with 
Norway and Denmark in an effort to diversify supply was quickly reversed when the SLD
“The Eastern policy of the European Union in the run-up to the EU’s enlargement to Include the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe -  Poland’s viewpoint’’, Warsaw, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 June 2001.
“Non-paper with Polish proposals concerning policy towards new Eastern neighbours after EU 
enlargement’’. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 2003. http://www.mfa.gov.pl/Non-
paper,with,Polish,proposals,concerning,policy,towards,the,new,Eastern,neighbours,after,EU,enlargement,2041 
.html (accessed 06 November 2006)
Zahtenia polityki handlowej wobec rynkôw wschodnich na lata 2003 -  2004. Program Odzyskania Rynkôw 
Wschodnich, Minlsterstwo Gospodarki, Pracy I Polityki Spotecznej, Warsaw, February 2003. 
http://www.mpips.gov.pl/pliki_do_pobrania/rynki_wschodnie.doc (accessed 09 November 2006)
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.s
came to power in 2001. Another example is the Orien scandal of 2002-04 where high 
ranking SLD politicians were accused of facilitating the Russian takeover of Polish oil 
refining industry and control of oil delivery contracts. Gas contracts and the Orlen affair will 
be considered in greater detail in Chapter Five.
Another project drawn up with the intention of furthering the Polish-Ukrainian strategic 
partnership and breaking the monopoly of Russian oil pipelines was extending the 
Odessa-Brody pipeline to Gdansk to carry Caspian oil to European markets (see Chapter 
Six). Despite continued political support of Poland for the project, the extension failed to 
materialise due to economic considerations and in 2004, succumbing to intense Russian 
pressure, the Ukrainian government authorised the pipeline to carry Russian oil in the 
reverse direction. This was another stark reminder to Poland that it lacked to means to 
spearhead an ambitious strategic partnership with Ukraine.
Policy towards Belarus, meanwhile, underwent reconsideration both In Poland and the EU 
as the restrictive approach failed to bring about any political change in Belarus. Stopping 
short of contacts at the highest political level, the Polish government (especially after the 
2001 elections) focused especially on cooperating with Belarusian counterparts on dealing 
with regional and cross border issues. Policy makers realised that relying on the so far 
fragmented and ineffectual Belarusian opposition, NGOs and civil society to bring regime 
change in Belarus was proving impossible and governmental contacts were essential to 
have any influence on Belarusian policies. They have previously realised that adhering 
strictly to EU policies towards Belarus disrupted Poland’s own EP perception of 
maintaining constructive dialogue with all its Eastern neighbours and during the Drozdy 
crisis of 1998 refused to join the travel ban imposed by the EU and the US on high ranking 
Belarusian o f f i c i a l s . I n  January 2004, shortly before Poland’s accession to the EU, 
Poland also stood against a proposal by the EU Commission to impose trade sanctions on 
Belarus.
2.9 CONCLUSION
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the constant in Polish foreign policy was the objective of 
integration into the Western European and transatlantic structures. Subsequent Polish 
governments, regardless of their domestic political orientation, pursued the cause of Polish 
accession to NATO and the EU, and domestic political instability had not caused any 
alteration in the main concepts of foreign policy. Poland's EP, however, evolved much 
more gradually and had always been perceived as secondary to European integration. The
Andrzej Stankiewicz and Jçdrzej Bielecki, “Szczegôina sytuacja", Rzeczpospolita, 14 July 1998.
Mirostaw Ikonowicz, “Polska do Unii, Biaiorus do...", Przeglqd, No. 4, 20 January 2004.
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discussion on Poland's European policy had always been about the methods pursued and 
initiatives taken whereas the existence of an EP concept had been periodically questioned.
Poland obtained the security guarantee it sought from NATO and fuifiiied its main foreign 
policy objective i.e. EU accession. The stability factor created by these successes contrast 
with the growing instability in the East in the face of a new division in Europe following the 
EU enlargement. That was why EP became increasingly salient in Polish foreign policy 
discourse and promised to dominate the agenda in the years to come.
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e  
L e g a l  and  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  F r a m e w o r k  of  
F o r e i g n  P o l i c y  M a k i n g  in P o l a n d
The regime change in Poland in 1989 necessitated an overhaul of the legal system and 
state institutions which made possible the ensuing political and economic transformation 
and in turn were shaped by the transformation itself. Institutions and laws that shape 
foreign policy and supervise its application were a part of this process. This chapter will 
first present the constitutional aspect of foreign policy making and constitutional provisions 
concerning the power balance between the government and the president in terms of 
influencing foreign policy. It will give brief information about the institutions that take part in 
making and supervision of foreign policy. First, the supervisory (and at times advisory) role 
of the Sejm and Senate and their relevant commissions will be discussed. Second, 
relevant institutions under the Council of Ministers will be presented and the role of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the main foreign policy making institution will be elaborated. 
Third, the president’s role in both making and supervising foreign policy will be considered 
and institutions that are under his control will be presented.
3.1 CONSTITUTION AND MAKING AND EXECUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY
The sweeping changes in 1989 brought about the necessity to amend the legal system in 
Poland and the legislation concerning the conduct of foreign policy. After several 
constitutional amendments establishing the basis of the new political system, discussions 
centred on the need to replace the 1952 Constitution with a new one establishing the legal 
framework for the new institutions of the Third Republic. The process of drafting a new 
constitution began soon after the Mazowiecki government took office in autumn 1989.
Notwithstanding its urgency, drafting a constitution proved tricky. Political divisions that 
cropped up in the anti-communist Solidarity camp hindered consensus, especially 
regarding the division of power and responsibilities between the institutions in general, and 
the scope of presidential powers versus parliamentary in particular.
The presidency had been reintroduced by a constitutional amendment in 1989 as a result 
of the Roundtable deal, with Wojciech Jaruzelski intended as incumbent.^ Accordingly, the 
role of the President would be to “to watch over the observance of the Constitution, to
 ^ Leszek Garlicki, "The Presidency in the New Constitution", East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 6,
1997, No. 2-3, pp. 81-89.
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safeguard the security and sovereignty of the state, as well as the inviolability and 
indivisibility o f its territory; and the implementation of political and military alliances with
other states."^ These extensive powers were soon to be taken up by Lech Watçsa when 
he won the presidential elections in December 1990. After the parliamentary elections of 
October 1991, the division of the Solidarity camp reflected itself in the composition of the 
parliament and the ensuing fragmentation further hindered efforts at constitution making.
 ^Garlicki, “The Presidency in the New Constitution", p. 82.
 ^"Ustawa Konstytucyjna z dnia 17 pazdziernika 1992 r. o wzajemnych stosunkach miçdzy wtadz^ 
ustawodawczq^ i wykonawczq. Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz o samorzq^dzie terytorialnym", Dziennik Ustaw, 23 
November 1992, No. 84, pos. 426. Text of the Little Constitution can also be found at 
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/pl02000_.html (accessed 08 March 2007)
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3.1.1 The 1992 Little Constitution
The idea of an interim solution was increasingly favoured. As a result, the Constitutional
.
Act, referred to as the Little Constitution, was enacted by the Sejm in October 1992. As 
Poland was in the process of re-establishing the basic principles of its foreign policy, a 
constitutional guideline concerning division of powers and duties in the conduct of foreign 
policy was needed. The Little Constitution aspired to provide this framework but failed to 
delineate competencies clearly.
The powers of the President in the area of foreign policy was one of the most contentious 
issues of the Little Constitution. The Suchocka government (inaugurated in July 1992) led 
by the post-Solidarity Democratic Union {Unia Demokratyczna - UD) was well aware of 
Walesa's quest to dominate Polish politics by means of strengthening the presidency vis-à- 
vis the parliament and the Council o f Ministers. The Little Constitution sought to strike a 
balance between presidential and parliamentary powers, but failed to curb Wafçsa’s 
ambitions.
Article 28(1) of the Little Constitution stated that®
The President of the Republic of Poland shall be the supreme representative of the Polish 
State in internal and international relations. The President shall ensure observance of the 
Constitution, safeguard the sovereignty and security of the State, the inviolability and 
integrity of its territory, as well as upholding international treaties.
This provision was further qualified by Article 32(1) which read "The President shall 
exercise general supervision in the field of international relations" and Article 34, “The 
President shall exercise general supervision with respect to the external and internal 
security of the State.” The term “general supervision” was interpreted liberally by Wat^sa 
and used as a justification for his foreign policy initiatives. Furthermore, Article 61 stated
I
that "The Prime Minister shali lay a motion to appoint the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of 
National Defence and of Internal Affairs after consultation with the President". The wording 
was ambiguous enough to give Watçsa a free hand to insist on single-handedly appointing 
these state ministers to work within his Presidential Chancellery. Watçsa's interpretation 
was strengthened by the fact that Article 32 (3) was in the Chapter regarding the powers 
and duties of the President. The article stated that “relations with foreign states, as well as 
with Polish diplomatic representatives abroad, shall be maintained through the appropriate 
minister dealing with foreign affairs."
The friction between government and President over the interpretation of the constitution 
was evident in the conflict about control over the military. The Little Constitution stated that 
“the President shall exercise general supervision with respect to the external and internal 
security of the State. The advisory organ to the President in connection with such matters 
shall be the National Security Council" (Article 34). Article 35 designated the President as 
the supreme commander of the armed forces and gave him the right to appoint the chief of 
staff and army generals “In agreement with the Minister o f National Defence". Again, to 
Watçsa this meant that he could sideline the said minister and the government over army 
appointments and use the army as a political power base."^
After the presidency was taken over by Alexander Kwasniewski in 1995, tensions between 
his office and the government, dominated by the post-communists, eased considerably. 
Kwasniewski nevertheless carried on exercising presidential powers secured thanks to his 
predecessor's interpretation of the constitution.
The Little Constitution also provided extensive powers to the Council of Ministers in terms 
of foreign policy making. Articles 51(1) and 52(2/7-8) stated that “The Council of Ministers 
shall conduct the internal affairs and the foreign policy of the Republic of Poland." and 
"[The Council of Ministers] shall maintain the relations and shall conclude treaties with the 
governments of foreign states and with international organizations; shall ensure the 
external and internal security o f the State." However, due to ambiguous wording, the 
competencies of the President and the Council of Ministers overlapped. Whoever took the 
upper hand in political competition, seized the authority.
3.1.2 1997 Constitution
Meanwhile the quest for a full constitution to replace the interim one found its 
organisational base in the Constitution Committee of the National Assembly, which worked
For more information on the conflicts between Watqsa and the government over the control of the military see 
Dale R, Herspring, “Civil-military relations in post-communist Poland; problems in the transition to a democratic 
polity", Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 33, 2000, No,1, pp. 71-100.
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on the preparation of a constitutional draft from 1993.® its members came from both Sejm 
and Senate (hence the name National Assembly). Constitution drafting activities couid 
proceed faster now that the Sejm was much less fragmented in terms of party 
representation and a stable two party coalition was in government. Until the end of 1995 
seven constitutional drafts prepared by political parties, the labour union Solidarity and the 
presidential advisor. Lech Faiandysz, were submitted to the Committee.®
After long and bitter discussions dominated by tough political bargaining, the Committee 
completed the constitutional draft in 1996.^ After going through procedures of editing upon 
parliamentary and presidential recommendations, the draft was adopted by the National 
Assembly in April 1997 and submitted for a referendum in May, where it was accepted by 
a narrow margin of 53.7% of votes for and 45.9% against.® The 1997 Constitution went 
into force after it was promulgated in the Journal of Laws {Dziennik Ustaw) in October.
The new constitution limited the powers of the President in the area of foreign and security 
policy not by taking away specific competencies but by removing ambiguous terms.®
Article 126(3) set clear limits by stating that "The President shall exercise his duties within 
the scope of and in accordance with the principles specified in the Constitution and 
statutes."^® The 1997 Constitution scrapped the term “general supervision in international 
relations” that had caused so much bitter political dispute and with Article 133 defined the 
President as "representative of the state in foreign affairs” and required him to “cooperate 
with the prime minister and the appropriate minister with respect to foreign policy.” The 
President retained the title of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and the right to 
appoint the Chief of General Staff and army commanders (Article 134) but that was made 
subject to the countersignature of the Prime Minister (Article 144).”  The controversial 
clause regarding appointment of ministers o f foreign affairs, defence and interior was also 
removed, and Article 161 made it possible for the President to “effect changes in the 
composition of the Council o f Ministers” but only “on request of the Prime Minister."
® Krzysztof Jasiewicz, “Dead ends and new beginnings: the quest for a procedural republic in Poland", 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 33, 2000, No.1, p. 102.
® See George Sanford, “Parliamentary Control and the Constitutional Definition of Foreign Policy Making in 
Democratic Poland", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, 1999, No, 5, pp. 787-789.
 ^One of the most controversial issues in constitution making was whether to include a reference to god and 
Christianity in the preamble. Lengthy and fiery debates were underway at the Committee between mainly the 
post-Solidarity and post-communist and secular left wing members. This demonstrated that constitution making 
was about which political view would dominate the basic organisation and structure of the Third Republic. For 
discussions about the preamble see Biuletyn Komisji Konstytucyjna Zgromadzenia Narodowego, No. 1228/11, 
25 January 1995. All commission bulletins from 1993 on are searchable at http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Biuletyn.nsf 
(accessed 06 November 2006).
Jasiewicz, Dead ends”, p. 103.
® Garlicki, “The Presidency in the New Constitution".
The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw: Sejm Publishing Office, 1999.
Garlicki, “The Presidency in the New Constitution".
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A more definitive curbing of the presidential prerogatives in foreign policy was put into 
effect by introducing clearer provisions concerning the duties of the Council of Ministers. 
Accordingly, “the Council of Ministers shall conduct... the foreign policy...” The same 
provision. Article 146, designated the Council of Ministers to “conduct the affairs of the 
state not reserved to other state organs." According to Ciapafa, an inference could be 
drawn from this provision that neither parliament nor the President couid conduct foreign 
policy.^^ in addition to legal considerations, successful formulation and conduct of foreign 
policy depended on striking a balance and ensuring political consensus between the 
branches of the executive and the legislative. Excluding the participation of the President 
or parliament from the process would have been disruptive. Therefore, a strict application 
of the above mentioned inference would have gone against the interest of the state, and 
hence, the political viability of the government.
The 1997 Constitution does not have direct provisions regarding the role of the legislative 
organ in the conduct of foreign policy. The only exceptions are provisions regarding 
declaration of war and deployment of foreign troops in Poland and of Polish troops abroad. 
The Sejm oversees foreign policy decisions by exercising general control over the 
activities of the Council of Ministers (Article 95).”'® The most important foreign and security 
policy initiative where the above-mentioned competence of the Sejm came into play was 
the Polish entry into NATO in 1999. It was seen once more that where political consensus 
exists between the legislative and the executive, interpretation of legal competences is not 
contentious. Polish entry into NATO was, thus, smooth and both the ratification o f relevant 
treaties and parliamentary consent for troop deployment was unproblematic. The North 
Atlantic/Washington Treaty was ratified by the Sejm, the Senate and the President within a 
week in February 1999, and all three displayed a consensus almost unprecedented in 
post-1989 Poiand.”
This brings us to the issue of ratification of international agreements in the 1997 
Constitution. Article 89 states that:
Ratification of an international agreement by the Republic of Poland, as well as renunciation
thereof, shall require prior consent granted by statute - if such agreement concerns:
1) peace, alliances, political or military treaties;
2) freedoms, rights or obligations of citizens, as specified in the Constitution;
”  Jerzy Ciapala, 'The position of the Sejm in the area of foreign policy and international relations”, The Sejm 
Review Special Issue, October 1999, pp. 83-104.
Sanford argues that Sejm is concerned more with other governmental decisions than foreign policy due to 
their "intrinsically executive character”. However, Sejm inspects foreign policy activities by means of 
committee debates, interpellations from MPs and annual expose by the Minister of Foreign Affairs performed at 
Sejm. Sanford, “Parliamentary Control", pp. 775-776.
The minutes of ratification at the Sejm can be found at Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 4 Kadencja, 44 
Posiedzenie,1 Dzieiï, 3 Punkt, 17 February 1999. All parliamentary debates from the First Sejm on can be 
searched at http://ks.sejm.gov.pl:8009/forms/kad.htm. (accessed 06 November 2006) 54
3) the Republic of Poland's membership in an International organization;
4) considerable financial responsibilities imposed on the State;
5) matters regulated by statute or those in respect of which the Constitution requires the
form of a statute.
Such a statute is passed by two-thirds majority of the Sejm and the Senate with at least 
half of the MPs and senators present [Article 90(2)]. However, granting consent for 
ratification may also be done by a nationwide referendum [Article 90(3)] which can be 
ordered either by absolute majority of the Sejm in the presence of half of the MPs or by the 
President with the consent of the Senate given by absolute majority [Article 125 (2)].
According to the 1997 Constitution the Council of Ministers initiates the process of deciding 
which international agreement falls into one of the five categories listed in Article 89, and 
the parliament and President cooperate in this process.^® In the past there had been 
conflicts about this issue due to the wording of the Little Constitution and attempts, 
especially by Wafçsa, to hijack this function and sideline the parliament had been made. 
One illustrative example of this was Waf^sa's attempt to ratify the Concordat with the 
Vatican signed by the Suchocka government shortly after the latter had been ousted.^®
The 1997 Constitution also addressed the issue of precedence of international agreements 
over domestic law and delegation of competence to international organisations. These are 
crucial in view of Polish entry into the EL) in 2004. Article 90(1) says, "The Republic of 
Poland may, by virtue of international agreements, delegate to an international 
organization or international institution the competence of organs of State authority in 
relation to certain matters.” This provision is necessary to delegate certain powers to EU 
bodies. A question may be raised as to whether the Constitution would facilitate a possible 
loss of state sovereignty by permitting delegation of powers. It can be argued that the 
provision does not allow for the delegation in general of all state powers, but only those 
arising from treaties that have already been ratified and a p p r o v e d . A s  for the primacy of 
laws, Article 91(2-3) states that "An international agreement ratified upon prior consent 
granted by statute shall have precedence over statutes if such an agreement cannot be 
reconciled with the provisions of such statutes" and that "if an agreement, ratified by the 
Republic of Poland, establishing an international organization so provides, the laws 
established by it shall be applied directly and have precedence in the event of a conflict of 
laws.” This means that EU law would have precedence over Polish domestic law and 
would prevail over the latter in case of conflict, it might be said that the constitution makes
Ciapala, “The position of the Sejm", p.90. See also Jerzy Ciapala, Prezydent w systemie ustrojowym Polski 
(1989-1997), Warszawa; Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1999, pp.220-226.
Ciapala, “The position of the Sejm", p. 101.
For a detailed discussion of the subject see Jan Barcz, "The Integration Act of Poiand With the European 
Union in the Light of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland”, Polish Contemporary Law, Vol. 1-4, 1999, 
No.121-124, pp. 5-18.
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it all too easy to let the jurisdiction of Polish state organs be limited by international 
agreements and, by implication, may facilitate the erosion of sovereignty vested in the 
nation by the constitution itself. However, an international agreement goes through 
arduous processes of review and ratification before it enters into force. Besides, if the 
provision is interpreted as to mean delegation of "exercise of powers” and “not the powers 
themselves” , it is not absolute; therefore the state may decide to re-establish its 
competence in relevant activities.”  However, integration with the EU and accepting the 
supremacy of its laws is primarily a political process, and unless the course of Polish 
foreign policy is drastically altered, it seems unlikely that any Polish state organ would 
resort to the above-mentioned interpretation of the Constitution.
3.2 INSTITUTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY MAKING
Polish foreign policy institutions are in a constant process of redefining themselves. This 
arises not only from the new challenges posed by the international environment but also 
from the domestic political struggles to dominate foreign policy. Constitutional and legal 
transformation advanced towards consolidation after 1997, and the same trend can be 
observed in the formation of institutions.
3.2.1 The Sejm
The role of the Polish Parliament, the Sejm, in making and supervision of foreign policy is 
formally limited. Constitutionally the Sejm is vested with the rights to declare war or state of 
war, determine terms of peace, to approve of stationing of foreign troops on Polish soil and 
Polish soldiers abroad and to ratify certain categories of international agreements by 
statute. The Sejm exercises general supervision over the Council of Ministers and 
influences the direction of foreign policy by means of debates, questions, interpellations 
and its specialist committees. Despite the formally limited role, the Sejm still provides a 
very important forum for foreign policy projects and ideas to be discussed and, especially 
through its committees, the Sejm provides useful scrutiny into the practice of foreign policy 
by the executive.
The parliamentary debates on foreign policy provide a forum where opinions of individual 
MPs as well as party preferences are voiced. Resolutions or appeals may be produced at 
the end o f these debates. These acts are not legally binding but political prudence requires 
the government to take them into account.”  High profile resolutions such as the those 
preceding ratification of an important treaty (like the Europe Agreement) or the decision for 
Polish entry into international organisations/alliances (like NATO) have an impact on
”  Barcz, "The integration Act”, p. 10. 
Ciapata, “The position of the Sejm", p. 103.
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foreign policy execution as they provide the executive with the fuli backing of the 
democraticaliy elected legislative and symbolise the national resolve regarding the issues 
at hand. However, not all resolutions are that influential in effect and not ail reflect a total 
unanimity. For instance, the resolution of 19 November 1996 expressing the Sejm’s 
support for the Belarusian Soviet and appealing for solidarity with Belarusian political 
groups that “stood for the defence of democracy and independence" was passed relatively 
smoothly with only one MP voting against it and two abstaining.^® However, when the Sejm 
considered sending a similar message to the Belarusian nation in 1999, expressing 
support for the Belarusian opposition, there were fierce debates in the Foreign Affairs 
Committee (where the text was debated) and after four weeks of debating in the 
Committee, the final text was submitted for v o t i n g .E v e n  the watered down text received 
seven votes against and 49 abstentions.^^
Since May 1992, debate on foreign policy has followed the presentation by the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of his annual exposé (usually presented in May).^® Minister’s exposé is 
important in terms of presenting the main directions and concepts o f foreign policy to 
scrutiny by the elected.
Other instruments of foreign policy supervision available to the Sejm are interpellations, 
questions and oral questions. Although questions {zapytania) and interpellations 
{interpelacje) are less significant for public opinion, they are the means by which MPs can 
investigate specific foreign policy issues. MPs can submit written interpellations to any 
member of the Council of Ministers, interpellations should focus on policy issues and 
essence of state policies.^'' The minister is required to respond within 21 days and the 
issue may further be discussed in the Sejm after a 15 minute exchange between the 
interpellant and interpellee. Questions, on the other hand, can address more specific 
issues related to the implementation of foreign policy by the executive and the same rules 
as interpellations a p p l y . T h e  number of interpellations and questions on foreign policy 
submitted by the MPs steadily increased from the First Sejm onwards. During the First 
Sejm (1991-93), a total of 34 requests were addressed to Minister of Foreign Affairs, which 
increased during Second Sejm (1993-97) to 112, Third (1997-2001) to 186 and Fourth
For the number of votes see http://ks.sejm.gov.pl/proc2/opisy/2025.htm (accessed 06 November 2006) 
“Uchwata Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Poiskiej z dnia 19 listopada 1996 r. w sprawie sytuacji w Republice 
Blalorus”, Monitor Polski, 30 November 1996, No. 71, Pos. 654.
"Postanie Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej do Narodu Biaforuskiego, Uchwata Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej z dnia 22 stycznia 1999 r.”, Monitor Polski, No, 4, Pos. 16, 27 January 1999. For the number of votes 
see http://ks.sejm.gov.pi/proc3/opisy/780.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
See Sanford, “Parliamentary Control", pp. 776-778.
Regulamin Sejmu (Standing Orders of the Sejm), Dziat III, Rozdziat 4, Art. 191-194, Interpelacje, Informacje 
Bieèqce, Zapytanie Poselskieil Pytania w Sprawach BieZq^cych. 
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/regulamin/regsejm.htm (accessed on 20 February 2006).
Regulamin Sejmu, Dziat III, Rozdziat 4, Art. 195.
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(2001-05) to 313.^® Of course, there were interpellations submitted to other ministries and 
the PM concerning foreign policy issues so these numbers are just an indication of growing 
interest in interpellations and questions as a tool by the MPs.
Oral questions (pytania), on the other hand, must be submitted to the Presidium of the 
Sejm and Convent o f Seniors 12 hours preceding their presentation and these organs 
decide whether to include the question in the agenda or not. The question must be 
submitted on the floor of the house in one minute and the response should be given within 
five minutes.^^
Specialist committees of the Sejm play the most important and active role in the 
supervision of foreign policy. There are standing and special committees. The latter are 
formed to deal with specific issues which need closer scrutiny than a permanent committee 
can provide and they exist temporarily. Committees can also form temporary 
subcommittees from their own members to deal with particular tasks. The functions of the 
committees are examining draft laws and resolutions of the Sejm and providing opinions 
on these, monitoring activities of the state organs and their administration and checking 
implementation of laws.^® Committees can also put forward dezyderaty (desiderata - 
requests) to the Council of Ministers and heads of key state institutions and call for the 
addressee to adopt a prescribed position on a certain issue. According to Article 84 of the 
Standing Orders, committee resolutions, opinions or declarations are adopted by a 
majority vote in the presence of at least one third of the members.^® Different committees 
can hold joint sessions if the agenda item discussed is relevant to the competence of all of 
them.
The standing committees of the Sejm dealing directly with foreign policy related issues are: 
Foreign Affairs Committee, European Committee, Committee on Liaison with Poles 
Abroad, National Defence Committee and Economic Committee. Although it will not be 
covered under a separate heading, mention must be made of the Committee on National 
and Ethnic Minorities. Even though it does not deal with foreign policy in a strict sense, its 
subject matter necessitates discussions on bilateral relations with countries such as 
Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus and Germany and especially of Eastern policy (EP) as both 
Poiand and its Eastern neighbours have ethnic minorities of considerable size on each 
side of the border.
Interpellations, questions and oral questions are fully searchable on the website of Sejm. Full text of 
submissions and replies can be retrieved from the third term onwards. http://ks.sejm.gov.pl;8009/forms/lz.htm 
htm (accessed on 06 November 2006). The contract Sejm of 1989-91 is considered the 10th term.
Regulamin Sejmu, Dziat III, Rozdziat 4, Art. 196.
Regulamin Sejmu, Dziat II, Rozdziat 14, Art. 150-68, Posiedzenia Komisji Sejmowych.
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/regulamin/regsejm.htm (accessed on 20 February 2006).
Regulamin Sejmu, Dziat II, Rozdziat 14, Art. 150-68, Posiedzenia Komisji Sejmowy 
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/regulamin/regsejm.htm (accessed 20 February 2006).
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A number of special committees have been formed at the Sejm since 1989. Only one of 
them, though obsolete at the time of writing, will be discussed briefly here; the European 
Legislation Committee, formed during the Third Sejm (1997-2001) to act on adaptation of 
Polish laws to those of EU. A parliamentary inquiry commission formed in 2003 to 
investigate the Orien scandal could also be listed under special commissions.®® Although it 
was not a commission related to foreign policy per se, its investigations about the 
government’s and the president’s dealings with the Russian secret services and energy 
concerns demonstrated the intersection of foreign economic and political relations with 
domestic politics and economic interests of the state. The Orlen affair will be covered in 
detail in Chapter Five and hence will not be examined as a separate item here.
3.2.1.1 Foreign Affairs Committee (Komitet Spraw 
Zagranicznych - SZA) ®^
SZA is the main organ of the Sejm that assists the formation of a general foreign policy line 
and determining its objectives.®^ SZA (as well as other Sejm committees) has strong 
means of obtaining information and getting opinions about foreign policy as it can invite 
visiting foreign statesmen, parliamentarians, diplomats as well as academics and 
specialists from governmental and non-governmental organisations to participate in its 
meetings. In addition delegations from SZA can pay visits to foreign parliaments.
Another important function of SZA is its supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
{Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych - MSZ) through the appointment of diplomats, 
oversight of its policies and its opinion on the allocation for foreign affairs in the state 
budget. Appointment of ambassadors takes up a considerable part of the SZA agenda as 
can be seen from the list of opinions addressed to MSZ in the Third Sejm: 77 out of 93 
opinions concerned ambassadorial candidates put forward by MSZ.®®
3.2.1.2 European Committee {Komisja Europejska - EUR)
EUR changed its name twice from Committee on European Agreement Affairs to 
Committee of European Integration and got its current name during the Fourth Sejm 
formed in October 2001. As Poiand moved closer to EU membership, the pace of 
negotiations accelerated and the scope of issues to deal with was enlarged. Approximation
The full name of the commission is Komisja Siedcza do zbadania zarzutu nieprawidlowosci w nadzorze 
Mlnlsterstwa Skarbu Panstwa nad przedstawicielami Skarbu Panstwa w spôlce PKN Orlen S.A. oraz zarzutu 
wykorzystania sluzb specjalnych (d. UQP) do nielegalnych naciskow na organa wymiaru sprawiedliwosci w 
celu uzyskania postanowien sluzacych do wywierania presji na czlonkôw Zarzadu PKN Orlen S.A. (SORN).
I will use the official abbreviations of the committees as provided in the Sejm website (www.sejm.gov.pl). 
For an account of SZA's activities see Sanford, "Parliamentary Control", pp. 780-781.
®® See http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/SQL.nsf/opinie3?OpenAgent&SZA (accessed 20 February 2006).
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of Polish law to EU law {acquis communautaire) and drafting new legislation for EU 
accession became the most crucial tasks in the process of EU accession and became a 
specialist subject on its own, which would overextend SZA's capabilities. Democratic 
control and approval of Poland's European policy, supervision of negotiations and 
overview of negotiating stance were the main duties of EUR.
It should be noted that draft laws concerning EU harmonisation were submitted to 
committees according to their subject areas and all parliamentary committees concerning 
key issues like agriculture, transport, environment and the like would examine the so called 
approximation laws.
Although sending approximation bills to specialised committees seemed like an all out 
effort for the Polish EU cause, it actually hindered the process.®'^ Many draft laws were 
under discussion in the committees for months.®® in order to prevent the slow pace of 
legislation from stalling negotiations and to avoid further critical comments in the upcoming 
Regular Report of November 2000, a special committee called the European Legislation 
Committee was established in July 2000.
3.2.1.3 European Legislation Committee {Komisja Prawa 
Europejskiego - NPE)
NPE was formed with the aim of accelerating the harmonisation process as well as 
showing the EU the necessary resolve on the part of the government and the parliament 
about Polish EU accession.®® As NPE's task was to accelerate the harmonisation process, 
a new working mechanism, novel to Sejm procedures, was formulated: Draft laws which 
needed to be harmonised with EU law would be set aside, grouped into a bundle (called 
the horizontal method) and then sent to NPA as a “package” by the Marshal of the Sejm 
upon the proposal o f the government.®^ The decision making process in NPE was speeded 
up as well by introducing shorter deadlines.®® The establishment of NPE was received 
positively by the EU. ®® However, at home NPE sparked discussions concerning its
For example it took the Telecommunication Law 15 months to go through the relevant committee and be 
adopted. Piotr Buras and Marek A. Cichocki, "The Impact of the Political Situation In Poland Following the 
Formation of a Minority Government on the Harmonisation of Polish Legislation with the Acquis 
Communautaire (Part 2)”, Centre for International Relations, Reports and Analyses No. 3/01, 2000, p.7. 
(www.csm.org.pl)
 ^Out of 30 draft approximation laws which the government hoped to finalise by the end of June 2000, as 
many as discussions on 17 were still not completed by the relevant committees. Jerzy Pilczyhski, “Szybka 
sciezka z wybojami”, Rzeczpospolita, 11 July 2000,
Piotr Buras and Marek A, Cichocki, "The Impact of the Political Situation in Poland Following the Formation 
of a Minority Government on the Harmonisation of Polish Legislation with the Acquis Communautaire (Part 2)", 
Centre for international Relations, Reports and Analyses,2001, No. 1/0, p.6. (www.csm.org.pi)
Buras and Cichocki, “The Impact of the Political Situation"(Part 1), p.7.
®® Jerzy Pilczyhski, “Szybka sciezka z wybojami", Rzeczpospolita, 11 July 2000.
The Commission’s Regular Report on Poland issued in November 2000 reflected the mood: “The fresh 
impetus which can be noted since the Sejm debate on European integration in February and the creation of the 
Parliamentary Committee on European Law is already beginning to bear fruit with a marked acceleration in the
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effectiveness and democratic credentials. ”  NPE ended its term in September 2001. By 
that time it had succeeded in processing 67 draft laws and the Sejm had passed 52 of 
them.'*^
3.2.1.4 Committee on Liaison with Poles Abroad {Komisja 
tqcznosci z Polakami za Granicq - LPG)
LPG, like its counterpart in the Senate, examines draft laws and resolutions concerning 
Poland’s ties with the Polish diaspora (Polonia) and Polish minorities living in the ex-Soviet 
states; gives opinion on the budget allocation for Poionia and Polish minority affairs and 
sends dezyderaty io  state organs, mostly MSZ and Council of Ministers. Since the 
beginning of 1990s the Senate assumed the role of the patron of Poles abroad and the 
Senate committee on Polonia has been much more active than LPG.'*^ As the members of 
LPG expressed in 2001, LPG lacks the financial means of the Senate committee and the 
coordination between the two committees is weak.''®
3.2.1.5 National Defence Committee {Komisja Obrony 
Narodowej - CBN)
CBN deals with issues relating to national and civil defence, armed forces and defence 
industries.
adoption of the acquis in comparison to the iast reporting period.”
http://ec.europa.eu/eniargement/key_documents/index_archive_en.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
First, there was criticism of lumping diverse draft laws together just because they were to be harmonised 
with EU law. Second, the new working method required that a minority motion on NPE reports and an 
amendment to the draft bill could only be proposed by a minimum of three MPs-members of NPE in the first 
reading. (Jerzy Pilczyhski, "Szybka éciezka z wybojami”, Rzeczpospolita, 11 July 2000.) In the second reading 
the minimum number increased to five whereas in other committees. Individual MPs have the right to propose 
amendments. The new rule was deemed undemocratic especially by minority parties, as their representation in 
NPE was congruent with their overall representation in the Sejm. The situation ran the risk of heightening the 
feeling of those parties of being sidelined by larger parties on the issue of Poland's integration with the EU. 
Third, questions were raised about possible abuses of the 'fast track’ system by the government as it couid 
easily be used to serve for the ruling parties’ preferences in which law to pass.
"Komisja Prawa Europejskiego podsumowata swoje prace”, Europap, 18 September 2001. The concerns 
expressed about NPE were overshadowed by this success in achieving the aim, i.e. accelerating 
harmonisation of Polish law. Political parties represented in NPE managed to reach a political consensus on 
cooperating for the aim of speeding up Polish integration with the EU and mostly refrained from using NPE as 
an arena to weaken each other. NPE was also successful in terms of showing the EU the Polish resolve to 
adopt flexible solutions and achieve an all-party consensus on European issues. Perhaps, what facilitated this 
consensus the most was that the main opposition party. Democratic Left Alliance {Sojusz Lewicy 
Demokraticznej"  SLD), had a high stake in cooperating, as it was the most likely victor of the upcoming 
elections in 2001.
The term "Polonia” refers to emigrants from Poiand or those of Polish origin settled outside of Poland. It, 
therefore, does not include most of the Polish communities East of Poland, who have not emigrated there in • 
the recent past and who are considered local inhabitants. Especially, Poles in Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania 
are considered ethnic minorities and not Poionia. See Ryszard Stempiowski, Wprowadzenie do anaiizy polityki 
zagranicznej RP, Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Miçdznarodowych (PiSM), 2006, pp. 18-20.
Biuletyn Komisji tqcznosci z Polakami za Granicg, No. 4709/111, 05 September 2001,
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3.2.1.6 Economie Committee {Komisja Gospodarki ~ GOS)
GOS Is included here as economic and trade relations with abroad are the most influential 
factors shaping foreign policy. International trade and bilateral economic exchange are two 
of many subject areas covered by GOS since 1997. Prior to that, during the First and 
Second Sejms there was a separate committee focused solely on foreign economic 
relations. Until June 1994 it was called the Committee on the Economic Relations with 
Abroad and Maritime Economy and after that it lost the tasks related to maritime economy. 
Finally its functions were taken over by GOS in 1997, parallel to the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Cooperation being merged into the Ministry of Economy.
3.2.2 The Senate
The rote of the Senate in foreign policy is much more limited than that of the Sejm. Its main 
task is to ratify laws passed by the Sejm. The Senate may either accept the referred law 
unchanged and send it on to the President, or reject it and send it back to the Sejm with a 
notification or proposed amendments. Like in the Sejm, there are special and standing 
committees in the Senate and their working mechanisms are similar to their counterparts in 
the Sejm. The committees debate the draft opinions of the Senate and vote on them and 
express their own opinion to the house. Alongside legislative work, the committees also 
deal with current issues of importance to the country and can express their views on them 
by means of resolutions. Just like their counterparts in the Sejm, they can invite specialists, 
civil servants and representatives of various organisations to their sessions.
Despite its low-key role in foreign policy issues, the Senate has distinguished itself in the 
area of Poland’s relations with Poionia and Polish minorities in the East. The Senate 
adopted a resolution on 30 April 2002 which defined Poland’s policy concerning Poionia 
and Polish minorities in the East.'''' The main aims were defined as ensuring that Poles’ 
minority rights were upheld; supporting education in their mother tongue, promoting Polish 
culture, arts and sciences as well as economic activities undertaken by Poles; fostering 
activities of Polish language media and press; gaining support among Poles abroad for 
Polish national interests. The resolution pledged to carry out these aims in conformity with 
international law and national laws of the countries where people of Polish origin live.
The Senate has a budget to finance projects serving these aims. The Speaker of the 
Senate determines the budget line for Poles abroad and the Presidium decides how it
"Uchwata Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 30 kwietnia 2002 r. w sprawie polityki Paristwa Polsklego 
wobec Polonit I Polakôwza granicq”, http://www.senat.gov.pl/arch.htm (accessed 20 February 2006)
62
should be spent."*® Senate has been allocating the funds for projects of NGOs, mainly 
Wspôlnota Polska (the main recipient) and Fundacja Pomoc Poiakom na Wschodzie 
(which helps Poles In the ex-Soviet states)."*® These organisations, alongside other smaller 
NGOs, received 45,216,705 zfoty in 2002.'*'" The majority of the funds are allocated for 
Poles In Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus, and they concern building and renovation of 
Polish schools, churches and community buildings, and assisting Polish language press 
and publications.
The Senate committees concerning foreign policy are Emigration and Poles Abroad, 
Foreign Affairs and European Integration and National Defence and Public Security."*®
3.2.2.1 Emigration and Poles Abroad Committee {Komisja 
Emigracji i Polakow za Granicq)
The Committee examines draft laws and resolutions concerning Poland's policy towards 
Polonia and the Polish minorities in the East and assesses the allocation of funds for 
relevant projects. It also discusses the resources assigned for Polonia and Poles abroad In 
the annual state budget. Members of the Commission pay visits to Polish communities 
abroad.
5.2.2.2 Foreign Affairs and European Integration {Komisja 
Spraw Zagranlcznych I Integracji Europejskiej)
This committee is the successor of the original standing Committee of Foreign Affairs and 
International Economic Relations. It was amalgamated with the special Committee on 
European Integration which operated under the auspices of the former in the Third Senate 
(1993-1997) and the special Committee on European Legislation formed in August 2000 
during the Fourth Senate (1997-2001) which paralleled NPE."*®
"*® ‘'Involvement of the Senate of the Third Republic of Poland In the life of Poles abroad", 1999, 
http://wwv\/.senat.gov.pl/k5eng/hlstorla/noty/nota21a.htm (accessed 06 November 2006).
http://www.wspolnota-polska.org.pl/ and http://www.wschod.org.pl/dzialanle.html 
"*^  "Zestawienie przyznanych dotacji sporz^dzone na podstawie uchwat Prezydium Senatu zlecajq^cych 
wykonanie zadah partstwowych w zakresie opieki nad Poloni^ i Polakami za granic^w roku 2002." 
http://www.senat.gov.pl/k5/polonia/Res.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006)
"*® The competence areas of committees are defined in the Senate Regulations. See Regulamin Senatu, 
“Uchwala Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 23 listopada 1990 r." 
http://www.senat.gov.pl/senatrp/ustawy/reguiaml/regulamin.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006). 
http://www.negocjacje.gov.pl/ngcj/ngcj2f.html (accessed on 16 December 2001).
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3.2 2.3 National Defence and Public Security {Komisja Obrony 
Narodowej i Bezpieczehstwa Pubiicznego)
The committee functions in the area of national security and defence, defence industries, 
army and institutions of public security.
3.2.3 The government
Constitutionally the Council of Ministers conducts the foreign policy of Poland and it does 
so through its agencies responsible for preparation and execution of foreign policy. It also 
supervises Poland's negotiations with the EU and approves Poland's negotiating stance 
through the institutions of European integration subordinate to itself. MSZ Is the key organ 
dealing with ali aspects o f making and application of foreign policy.
3.2.3.1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs {Ministerstwo Spraw 
Zagranicznych - MSZ)
According to the Law of 04 September 1997, the main duties o f the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs are to maintain relations between Poland and other states or international 
organisations: to facilitate diplomatic and consular representation of Poland abroad; to 
initiate and formulate foreign policy to be adopted by the Council of Ministers, to carry out 
these policies by coordinating agencies subordinated to or supervised by him; and to 
cooperate with other state organs.®® In addition to 103 embassies and permanent 
representations and 186 consular offices abroad, MSZ operates 20 Polish cultural 
institutes in European cities as well as Tel Aviv and New York. MSZ also has three 
research institutes under its sponsorship and supervision that provide academic analysis 
and expert opinion on international affairs and foreign policy. There were three such 
institutes at the time of writing:
Among them the Polish Institute of International Affairs {Polski Instytut Spraw 
Miçdzynarodowych - PISM) is the biggest, having inherited some of the resources of its 
namesake, which functioned from 1947 to 1993, only to be liquidated in 1993 by Minister 
Skubiszewski. The new PISM began functioning at the end of 1999 and is financed by the 
state budget (about 1.4 million USD in 2006).®* Western Institute {Instytut Zachodni) has 
been in existence since 1945 and although it maintained its original focus on Polish- 
German relations, since 1989 it has also been working on issues of European integration
“Ustawa z dnia 4 wrzeénia 1997 r.o dziafach administracji rz^dowej”, Dziennik Ustaw, 24 November 1997, 
No. 141, Pos. 943.
"Sprawozdanie z wykonania budzetu panstwa za okres od 1 stycznia do 31 grudnia 2005 r.", 
http://bip.mf.gov.pl/index.php?dzlai=337&wys=4&idp=28294 (accessed 06 November 2006)
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and East-West relations.®^ Institute of Central Eastern Europe {Instytut Europy Ôrodkowo- 
Wschodniej) is, on the other hand, a creation of the post-communist era, responding to the 
increasing importance o f Poland’s relations with its Eastern neighbours and position in 
Central Eastern Europe. It was established in 2001 in Lublin to undertake research and 
consulting activities regarding politics, history society and economy o f the region and also 
regarding the development of Eastern borderlands of Poland.®®
Ministers of Foreign Affairs were members of the President's Chancellery until the 1997 
Constitution came into force. This was due to Walçsa's personal interpretation of the Little 
Constitution during his presidency. This anomaly was the source of many political disputes 
within the state structure and was remedied by the 1997 Constitution according to which 
the Minister ceased to serve in the President’s Chancellery and took his place in the 
Council o f Ministers.
Organisational structure of the MSZ evolved continuously since 1989 and especially with 
the EU accession process in progress and relations with Poland’s Eastern neighbours 
being cultivated, new departments were created and the tasks of existing departments 
modified. European Department (ED), created in 1990, were divided into two sections in 
1994 which were reorganised into ED-East and ED-West, alongside a separate European 
Integration Department to oversee EU affairs and the Department of Security Policy to deal 
with NATO.®"* In 1998 ED-East and ED-West were once more merged under the European 
policy Department and in 2002 was renamed the European Department and dealt with 
Poland’s relations with both the East and West Europe, alongside the European Union 
Department.®® As Poland's membership in the NATO and the EU became a certainty and 
the importance of Poland’s EP was gradually recognised, a separate Eastern Poilcy 
Department was finally created within the MSZ with a focus on Poland’s relations with the 
whole of the ex-Soviet states.®® Issues related to Polonia and Poles abroad were covered 
by the Consular Department and, like EP, the importance of the department and scope of 
its activities grew and by the end of 1990s the department itself was renamed Consular 
and Polonia Department.
As well as structural reorganisation, constant reform of MSZ included also personnel 
changes which proved often to be controversial. Keeping in mind the pendulum effect of
“  http://www.iz.poznan.pl/ (accessed 06 November 2006}
“  "Rozporz^dzenie Minlstra Spraw Zagranlcznych z dnia 5 paidziernika 2001 r. w sprawie utworzenia 
jednostki badawczo-rozwojowej Instytut Europy érodkowo-Wschodnlej”, Dziennik Ustaw, No. 20, pos. 1296,17 
October 2001.
Krzysztof Szczepanik, Dyplomacja Polski, 1918-2000. Struktury organizacyjne, Warszawa: Askon, 2000, 
pp. 161-163.
"Zarz^dzenie Nr SIPrezesa Rady Ministrbw z dnia 1 lipca 2002 r. w sprawie nadania statute Ministerstwu 
Spraw Zagranicznych”, Monitor Polski, 03 July 2002, No.28, pos. 456.
®® “Zarz^dzenie Nr 136 Prezesa Rady Ministrbw z dnia 23 grudnia 2005 r. zmieniaj^ce zarz^dzenie w sprawie 
nadania statute Ministerstwu Spraw Zagranicznych”, Monitor Polski, 30 December 2005, No.84, pos. 1217.
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Polish elections since 1993 with the power shifting to and fro between the post-Solidarity 
and post-communist parties, political appointments and dismissals at every term was 
commonplace and the spectre of décommunisation was prevalent. In January 1994 a 
subcommittee of SZA was established to look into the personnel issues at MSZ after 23 
mostly senior officials of MSZ dismissed by Minister Skubiszewski in September 1993 (just 
before the elections that ended with victory for the post-communists) took the decision to 
court claiming that they were dismissed due to their communist party membership pre- 
1989.®^ Since 1989 almost three quarters of MSZ diplomats left their jobs or were 
dismissed and aimost 90% of ambassadors and consul generals serving abroad were 
replaced.®® The work o f the subcommission was quite controversial as statements of 
anonymous informers to the subcommission accusing Skubiszewski administration of 
pursuing an aggressive political cleansing of the cadres were leaked to the media.
Besides, the subcommission was bitterly opposed by post-Solidarity deputies, the new 
Minister Olechowski (nominated by President Watçsa) and Walçsa himself.
Ambassadorial nominations also turned into political struggles from time to time between 
post-Solidarity and post-communists. For instance in October 1996 post-Solidarity 
members of the SZA attempted unsuccessfully to block the nomination and appointment of 
Ewa Spychalska, head of the post-communist trade union, the All Poland Alliance of Trade 
Unions {Ogolnopolskie Porozumienie Zwiqzkow Zawodowych -  OPZZ). Spychalska had 
to resign in February 1998 under pressure as her status caused a conflict between 
Minister Geremek and President Kwasniewski, and she was harshly criticised by the 
members of AWS and UW at SZA for her close relations with the Lukashenko 
administration.®® in September 2000 President Kwasniewski in turn blocked the 
nominations of Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska and Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, two figures 
close to the ruling post-Solidarity AWS and UW, for key EP ambassadorial posts in 
Moscow and Vilnius.®®
Allegations o f political favouritism had not ceased since 1994. Despite MSZ claiming to 
have achieved a meritorial system for appointment of ambassadors and high level officials, 
this was commonly disputed.®* An MSZ official writing anonymously to Rzeczpospolita in 
2004 argued that most ambassadorial appointments approved by Minister Cimoszewicz 
after 2001 were diplomats trained by the Communist Party Foreign Service School or its
Danuta Frey, "Zaskarzone MSZ”, Rzeczpospolita, 08 January 1994. It was also claimed that the commission 
was created by Longin Pastusiak’s, an SLD MR and a long time worker of PISM, to take "revenge" on the 
liquidation of PISM by Skubiszewski. Kazimierz Groblewski and Marcin Dominik Zdort, 'Targi o dyplomacjç", 
Rzeczpospolita, 21 January 1994.
Sanford, “Parliamentary Control", p. 785 and Kazimierz Groblewski and Marcin Dominik Zdort, “Targi o 
dypiomacjç”, Rzeczpospolita, 21 January 1994.
® Bluletyn KomlsJI Spraw Zagranicznych, No. 2, 68/111, 05 December 1997. "Polish Ambassador to Belarus 
resigns", RFE/RL Newsline, 16 February 1998.
Katarzyna Montgomery, "Kulisy nominacji", Gazeta Wyborcza, 09 September 2000.
Bogustaw M. Majewski, "Ambitni, zdecydowani i pelni pomystow", Rzeczpospolita, 13 May 2004.
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Moscow counterpart and most were connected to pre-1989 intelligence services.®^ It is 
highly likely that political appointments and décommunisation issues will burden not only 
the MSZ but also the whole political system for the foreseeable future.
3.2.3 2 Ministry of Defence {Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej -
MON)
The Law of 14 December 1995 sets out MON’s main responsibilities as shaping the 
concept of national defence and managing activities of the armed forces in times of peace 
and national military service.®® According to Article 143 of the Constitution the President, 
as the supreme commander of armed forces, exercises his command through the Minister 
of Defence. MON also plans the army’s participation in international peacekeeping or 
humanitarian missions and military exercises carried out jointly with foreign armies or 
within international organisations.
Poland’s quest to join NATO brought about reforms which increased the competence and 
importance of MON. The main challenge was the subordination of the military to civilian 
control. This was achieved by efforts to depoliticise the military, appointment of a civilian 
Minister and implementation of parliamentary control over the armed forces.®"* With the 
Law of 14 December 1995 General Staff was fully subordinated to MON and Article 26 of 
the 1997 Constitution guaranteed the political neutrality of armed forces and their 
subjection to civilian and democratic control.
MON also contributed experts to the Negotiating Team created in 1997 to carry out 
Poland’s accession negotiations with NATO. Other members of the team came from MSZ, 
Ministry of Finance {Ministerstwo Finansôw), National Security Bureau {Biuro 
Bezpieczenstwa Narodowego - BEN) and Office of State Protection {Urzqd Ochrony 
Panstwa - UOP).®®
5.2.3.3 Ministry of Economy {Ministerstwo Gospodarki - MG)
As mentioned above MG took over the foreign economic reiations agenda in 1997. MG 
piays an active part in the execution of EP. Following the Russian financial crisis of 1998 
and plummeting trade with Poland’s eastern neighbours, MG introduced a programme in 
2000 offering state guaranteed export credit insurance to Polish businessmen trading with
“'WIdmo PRL krqzy po MSZ”, Rzeczpospolita, 13 May 2004.
“Ustawa z dnia 14 grudnia 1995 r. o urzçdzie Ministra Obrony Narodowej”, Dziennik Ustaw, 30 January 
1996, No. 10, Pos. 56.
Report on Poland's Integration with NATO, (Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Poland),
Warsaw: Adam Marszatek, 1998, http://www.wp.mil.pi/Poland-NATO.html (accessed 19 March 2000)
Boguslaw éwietlicki, "Integracja Polski z NATO: Rozwôj wspoipracy z Sojuszem w 1997 i 1998 roku”, 
December 1998. (www.msz.gov.pl, accessed on 11 April 2003).
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Russia. In 2003 MG prepared the “Programme for regaining the Eastern markets” adopted 
by the Council of Ministers. MG is also active in shaping energy policy, a crucially strategic 
sector, as Poland’s energy dependence on Russia and gas and oil pipeline politics 
concerning Belarus and Ukraine are dominant factors in shaping EP. These will be 
covered in detail in the oncoming chapters.
A very important area studies institute researching mainly politics and society in Central 
East Europe, Balkans, ex-Soviet states and Central Asia is curiously situated under the 
supervision o f MG. Centre for Eastern Studies {Osrodek Studiôw Wschodnich -  OSW) 
was established in 1990 and is financed by the state budget, having received about 2.1 
million USD, a third more than what PISM had received in 2005.®® OSW publications 
analyse events in and policies of the countries in the region mentioned and do not 
comment on Polish foreign policy. However, many of its analysts, such as Tadeusz 
Olszahski, Barttomiej Sienkiewicz and Jacek Cichocki, were active participants in the 
academic and journalistic debates surrounding Poland’s EP. This will be examined in 
Chapter Four.
3.2.3.4 Intelligence Agency {Agencja Wywiadu - AW) and
Internal Security Agency {Agencja Bezpieczehstwa 
Wewnçtrznego -  ABW)
AW was created in June 2002 as a result o f its predecessor State Protection Office {Urzqd 
Ochrony Panstwa - UOP) being divided into foreign (AW) and internal intelligence 
(ABW).®'' ABW ’s task is to protect the internal security and constitutional order of the state 
but it also has an international dimension as it deais with terrorism, drugs trade, economic 
crime and runs counterintelligence activities in the territory of Poland. AW, on the other 
hand, deals with external threats and it is authorised to operate abroad. ABW and AW  are 
directly answerable to the PM. Both agencies also cooperate with the Military Information 
Service {Wojskowe Sfuzby Informacyjne -  WSI) which is subordinated to MON. An organ 
of the Councii of Ministers, Special Services Affairs Commission {Kolegium do Spraw 
Siuzb Specjalnych) and the Special Services Committee {Komisja do Spraw Sluzb 
Specjainych) at Sejm control the operations of these three agencies.
“Sprawozdanie z wykonania budzetu partstwa za okres od 1 stycznia do 31 grudnia 2005 r.”, 
http://bjp.mf.gov.pl/dokument.php?const=6&ld=34372&dzial=337 (accessed 11 March 2007)
"Ustawa z dnia 24 maja 2002 r. o Agencji Bezpieczehstwa Wewnçtrznego oraz Agencji Wywiadu", Dziennik 
Ustaw, 14 June 2002, No. 74, pos. 676.
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3.2.3.S Government bodies dealing with European integration
Since Poland applied for EU membership in 1991, structures supporting Poland's 
European bid were gradually formed and slowly metamorphosed into a coherent network.
In January 1991 the Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for European Integration and 
Foreign Assistance was established within the Office of the Council of Ministers (the 
predecessor of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister) to run Poland's European policies. It 
functioned until October 1996 when Committee of European Integration {Komitet Integracji 
Europejskiej -  KIE), which submitted to the Council of Ministers position papers on 
negotiating chapters, draft legal acts and progress reports on economic and legal 
integration, replaced it.®®
When KIE was established, concerns had been raised especially by Freedom Union {Unis 
Woinosci - UW) about the possible conflict of competence between this new organ and 
offices dealing with EU affairs in ministries (especially in MSZ).®® Such a conflict did, 
indeed, materialise, and a political struggle to dominate Poland's European policy was at 
the core of the matter. The rift between the Solidarity Election Action {Akcja Wyborcza 
Soiidarnosc -  AWS) and UW was evident, as AWS feared that if UKIE and KIE were 
subordinated to MSZ, UW, already in control of MSZ, would completely capture the sphere 
of European integration. After the PHARE scandal, calls were made to transfer the 
inspection and control of foreign assistance allocation to the Ministry of Finance. This 
sparked yet another protest from AWS as that ministry was also UW's turf. However, under 
the pressure from its UW wing and due to the deadlock caused by lack of coordination of 
institutions of European integration, the government decided to reappoint the Prime 
Minister to the Chair of KIE and the Secretary of State at MSZ (Andrzej Ananicz) took on 
the political coordination of integration and all elements thereof relating to foreign policy.^® 
The government also issued a decree on 16 June 1998 whereby the Undersecretary of 
State at the Ministry of Finance would become the Plenipotentiary for Financial Assistance 
from the EU administering and inspecting EU funds. The shaping of Polish EU institutions 
was continued in 1998 with the creation of the post of Government Plenipotentiary for 
Polish Accession Negotiations to the EU, i.e. the Chief Negotiator {Giôwny Negocjator) as 
well as the Negotiation Team for Poland's Accession Negotiations to the EU {Zespôi 
Negocjacyjny)P  The Inter-Ministerial Team {Zespoi Migdzyresortowy do Spraw
“Ustawa z dnia 8 slerpnia 1996 r, o Komitecle Integracji Europejskiej", Dziennik Ustaw, 30 August 1996, No. 
106, Pos. 494. Agnieszka Blegaj (Ed.), Accession Negotiations. Poland on the Road to the European Union, 
Government Plenipotentiary for Poland's Accession Negotiations to the European Union, Chancellery of the 
Prime Minister Republic of Poland, October 2000, p.20.
Rzeczpospolita, 9 June 1998.
“WIelowtadza integracyjna”, Rzeczpospolita, 28 July 1998.
“Rozporzqdzenie Rady Ministrbw z dnia 24 marca 1998 r. w sprawie ustanowlenia Petnomocnika Rzqdu do 
Spraw Negocjacjl o Czfonkostwo Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unll Europejskiej.”, Dziennik Ustaw, 26 March 
1998, No. 39, Pos. 225. “Zarzqdzenie Nr 19 Prezesa Rady Ministrbw z dnia 27 marca 1998 r. w sprawie 
Zespolu Negocjacyjnego w Sprawie Negocjacjl o Gztonkostwo Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unll Europejskiej”
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Przygotowania Negocjacjl Akcesyjnych z UE) to prepare draft negotiation positions on 
each of 31 negotiating chapters was also established by an ordinance on 16 July 1998 as 
an advisory organ to the Poland's former EU Ambassador and the Secretary of State 
in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Jan Kutakowski, was appointed in 1998 to the 
position and was succeeded by Jan Truszczyhski in 2001.
Following the elections in 2001 a new “European Secretariat” was created to embrace 
UKIE and the Department of European Integration at MSZ and was headed by the new 
Secretary of State at MSZ, Danuta Hdbner. In another move to avoid past mistakes and 
as a gesture to the opposition, the government offered three extra-governmental seats at 
KIE to figures associated with the former government, Tadeusz Mazowiecki of UW, Jacek 
Saryusz-Wolski (the former head of UKIE) and Jan Kutakowski (the former Chief 
N e g o t i a t o r ) A  European Committee of the Council of Ministers {Komitet Europejski Rady 
Ministrôw  - KERM) was also established in March 2004 in order to form the official position 
of the Polish government on for EU matters and resolve interministerial conflicts.
3.2.4 The President
Until 1997 the President enjoyed wide ranging authority in foreign policy thanks to a 
flexible interpretation by Lech Wat^sa of the vaguely worded Little Constitution. With the 
new constitution the President lost the authority to appoint ministers o f foreign affairs, 
defence and internal affairs and his appointment of Chief of Staff of armed forces (and 
ambassadors) needed the PM’s countersignature, but he stiii kept an important role in 
foreign affairs as the head of state. In addition to directly Influencing foreign policy through 
his powers of representing the state abroad, ratifying (and if necessary referring to the 
Constitutional Court) international agreements and declaring state of emergency or war, he 
also exerts indirectly effect on foreign policy by official acts or “prerogatives”, for which he 
does not have to seek the PM’s countersignature.^® These are listed in Article 144(3) of the 
Constitution and are powers such as proclaiming referendum, addressing the Sejm,
Senate of the National Assembly, granting and withholding Polish citizenship to foreigners 
and ordering appointments to important state organs like Council for Monetary Policy, 
National Security Council and National Council of Radio Broadcasting and Television.
http://www1.ukie.gov.pl/test/VWVW/dok.nsf/0/FB6FB87E4E76BEA8C1256E83005F228E?Open&RestrlctToCat 
eqory= (accessed 06 November 2006).
Zarzq^dzenie Nr 53 Prezesa Rady Ministrôw z dnia 16 lipca 1998 r. w sprawie Miçdzyresortowego Zespolu 
do Spraw Przygotowania Negocjacjl Akcesyjnych z Uniq  ^Europejskq”, 
http://www1.ukie.gov.pI/testA/WVW/dok.nsf/0/FB6FB87E4E76
BEA8C1256E83005F228E?Open&RestrictToCategory= (accessed 06 November 2006).
"UKIE wtqczyé w struktury MSZ", Europap, 15 October 2001 and "Sprawy europejskie w jednej rgce", 
Rzeczpospolita, 08 November 2001 and Gazeta Wyborcza, 4 February 2002.
"Dwie osoby spoza rzqdu bgdq. cztonkami KIE", Europap, 08 November 2001. Mazowiecki declined the offer 
whereas Saryusz-Wolski and Kulakowski accepted it,
Ryszard Stemplowski, Ksztaltowanie polityki zagranicznej w Polsce. Wstgp do analizy, Warszawa: PISM, 
2004, pp. 101-103.
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The President’s influence stems not only from the powers conferred upon him by law but 
also from his popular standing due to electoral support as well as mass media exposure 
and his ability to utilise his domestic contacts and foreign connections through visits and 
meetings/® The President retained also his position in the process of Poland's integration 
with the EU. As the 1997 National Strategy for Integration put it^ ,^
The carrying out of tasks by the organs of the Government will take place with the consent 
and co-operation of the President of the Polish Republic and his Office. The constitutional 
role of the President in the field of foreign policy allows him, as Head of State, to become 
actively involved in promoting Poland's interests in the states of the EU, and in 
implementing and monitoring the process of attaining full membership of the EU.
The President’s influence is also increased at times when the political party or parties in 
government do not have a clear majority in the Sejm which de facto limits the PM's power 
and strengthens the President’s role.''® By the same token, the President’s relative power 
increases when there is a government from the same political orientation as his and 
decreases when otherwise. However, Kwasniewski managed not only to coexist but also 
to cooperate with the AWS-UW dominated parliament and government from 1997 to 2001 
on foreign policy issues and he claimed credit for successes like Poland's entry into NATO 
in 1999 and in the EU in 2004. No wonder Kwasniewski owed his popularity at home and 
abroad to his non-partisan and fairly objective (and utilitarian) attitude in implementing 
foreign policies. And it seemed true that after the election victory of Kwasniewski's old 
party SLD in 2001, he had an even stronger influence on foreign policy. This was also 
obvious in terms of appointments: Key positions in the reorganised European integration 
institutions were handed to people who were previously working for the President at his 
Chancellery. The Secretary of State who heads the whole structure, Hiibner, was the Head 
of the Chancellery from 1997 to 2000. The Chief Negotiator, Truszczyhski, was the 
Undersecretary of State, advising the President on European affairs. Likewise, Pawet 
Ôwieboda, the new head of Department of European Integration at MSZ, was the head of 
the Office of European Integration.^® Also, the ambassador to EU as of spring 2002, Marek 
Grela, was a close associate of Kwasniewski.
Assisting the President is his Chancellery consisting of secretaries of state, each 
responsible for a different subject such as security, foreign relations and culture. Advisers
George Sanford, Democratic Government in Poland: Constitutional Politics Since 1989, New York: Palgrave, 
2002, p. 139,
"National Strategy for Integration”, The Committee for European Integration, Warsaw, 1997. 
http://www2.ukie.gov.pl/dokumenty/Nsien.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006).
Sanford, Democratic Government, p. 139 and Stemplowski, Ksztaltov\/anie polityki zagranicznej, p,96.
It was alleged in the conservative daily Zyc/e that SLD was dependent on Kwasniewski to run European 
integration policies and dominate the field. Arkadiusz Dawidowski, “Sojusz wprowadza Polskç do Unii", Zycie, 
29 October 2001.
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and press and public relations officers also serve at the Chancellery. An important office 
under the President’s administration is the National Security Bureau {Biuro 
Bezpieczehstwa Narodowego -  BBN) which is the secretariat of the National Security 
Council {Rada Bezpieczehstwa Narodowego -  RBN), an advisory body to the President on 
issues of internal and external security. Within RBN there are three presidential 
consultative committees, Poland-Lithuania, Poland-Romania and Poland-Ukraine.
Poland-Ukraine Committee was established in 1993 on the basis of the Polish-Ukrainian 
Good Neighbourliness Treaty of May 1992 in order to provide a continuous forum for the 
Presidents of both countries and their representatives to discuss issues such as 
cooperation in international organisations, common security initiatives (such as the Polish- 
Ukrainian battalion), cultural and economic exchange and problems of historical heritage. 
The Committee had produced many important agreements and declarations such as the 
1996 agreement emphasising the “strategic partnership” between the two countries or the 
February 2003 declaration calling for opening of the Eaglets’ cemetery in Lwow.®°
As mentioned above, the President was a part of the concerted and highly organised and 
institutionalised effort of Poland’s EU accession. However, the office of the President and 
especially Kwasniewski was much more visible in relations with the Eastern neighbours. 
Especially through presidential contacts Kwasniewski was highly active in building 
Poland’s relations with Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. Kwasniewski boasted in 2000 about 
having met the Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma more than 40 times (in 5 years).®* He 
managed to sustain dialogue and cooperation with the Ukrainian President and upheld 
Poland’s commitment to building a “strategic partnership” despite the pressure by some 
post-Solidarity politicians to boycott Kuchma’s domestic political decisions, deemed 
undemocratic also by many Western governments. Kwasniewski was also instrumental in 
toning down much of anti-Russian rhetoric pervasive among conservative post-Solidarity 
and right wing circles and approached relations with Russia from a pragmatic point o f , 
view.®^ He was also pragmatic in his approach to Belarus, stressing the need for dialogue 
when appropriate and mobilising protest against Lukashenko’s policies when Poland’s 
alliance with the West necessitated it. These will be covered in detail in the oncoming 
chapters.
http://www.bbn.gov.pi/?strona=pLkomitet_archiwum#1 (accessed 20 July 2006)
®* Aleksander KwaéniewskI, Dom wszystkich Polska, Warszawa: Perspektywy Press, 2000, p. 201.
Kwasniewski, like most post-communist politicians, was accused of being subservient to Russian interests 
many times. The last time he faced this accusation in a serious manner was during the Orlen commission and 
even though the accusations were not substantiated, the Inquiry process cost him his popularity and his SLD 
colleagues, the election. See the section on the Orlen scandal in Chapter Five.
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3.3 CONCLUSION
Since 1989 Poland’s legislative, executive and judicial institutions and the legal framework 
supporting them have undergone extensive reform and reorganisation and a degree of 
stability has been reached. For purposes of foreign policy the most important milestone 
was the 1997 Constitution which brought an end to the power struggles caused by the 
ambiguities of the Little Constitution. Although the institutions that formulate and supervise 
foreign policy have become organisationally stable, they are still prone to the effects of 
party political struggles between the post-Solidarity and post-communists. As shown 
above, personnel issues have arisen every time after the government was changed. It also 
became clear that not only the legal framework but also the personal approach of the 
President matters in maintaining a balanced working relation between the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Presidential offices dealing with foreign policy. Despite the 
remarkable consensus between different political parties on the main objectives of 
Poland’s foreign policy, the formulation and application of specific policies depended highly 
on the smooth working of the institutions presented in this chapter and the power balance 
between them. That is why reference to institutions and consideration of their remit is 
necessary to assess the making and execution of foreign policy.
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C h a p t e r  F o u r  
P o l i s h  E a s t e r n  P o l i c y :  O r i g i n s  a n d  D e b a t e s
The need for a comprehensive Eastern Policy (EP) was pronounced by Polish policy 
makers from the beginning of the Third Republic. However, the presence of the Soviet 
Union until late 1991 and the uncertainties surrounding the nascent republics in Central 
and Eastern Europe made it difficult for foreign policy makers to establish at the outset any 
medium and long-term objectives concerning the East. Reorientation of Poland towards 
the West took priority due not only to ideological reasons but also to pressing security 
needs. While the Western orientation of Poland was swiftly and firmly consolidated, EP 
developed only gradually. Commentators on foreign policy criticised Polish EP for lacking a 
solid concept, a doctrine, behind it and dealing with problems arising in the East on an ad 
hoc basis.
Transition from PRL {Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa -  Polish People’s Republic) to the 
Third Republic was a systemic change, involving a total overhaul o f the state and its 
structures. The Second Polish Republic’s experience of the interwar period undoubtedly 
provided the tradition of independent statehood which the Third Republic could hark back 
to for the legitimacy of its institutions. The reestablishment of the Senate, which was 
abolished by the Communist regime, demonstrates this. In terms of foreign policy, 
continuing a modern historical tradition was trickier. Naturally, there could not be many 
continuities in terms of foreign policy from PRL to the Third Republic so the Second 
Republic was also the obvious source to search for linkages. However, as a result of 
substantial systemic change in the international order, consequent variation in the 
challenges posed and the controversial results of Polish EP during the interwar period, 
only the doctrines formed during first half of the 20th century were referred to rather than 
concrete policies and institutions of the interwar period.
Despite the fact that PRL had no independent EP to speak of, it would be wrong to 
assume that EP o f the Third Republic materialised out of a 43-year void. During this time, 
Polish émigré publications in the West were debating not only how a future independent 
Polish state should be structured but also what foreign policy such a state should pursue. 
They provided a forum for discussing and reinterpreting the EP doctrines of the pre-war 
period. Unlike the consensus on democratic nature and unconditional sovereignty of that 
future Polish state, EP was an issue much more open to debate and disagreement. The 
debate was carried on to Poland via the samizdat publications of the budding anti­
communist opposition in the country in the 1970s.
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This chapter will present the evolution of EP in Polish political thought from the beginning 
o f the 20**^  century by highlighting the political, academic and journalistic debates on the 
subject. It is true that Polish thought about the East has formed over many centuries. 
However, as the focus of the thesis is on the post-1989 period, the chapter will cover 
doctrines that were borne out of the Pitsudskiite and Dmowskiite traditions and EP 
programmes formulated by intellectuals in emigration during the communist period. These 
two approaches created the basic terms of reference for future EP debates and 
established a continuity in the modern Polish thought on EP, where abrupt historical 
changes prevented the formation of a Polish EP as a state tradition.
Debates after the establishment of the Third Republic will be presented in two parts. The 
first part will deal with the 1994-95 period when EP came to be discussed as a concept in 
its own right and not merely one of the many dimensions of foreign policy, and was 
intensely debated due to political developments in Poland and abroad. The second part 
will highlight a specific debate on EP sparked by a newspaper article in 2000 and which 
developed into a whole scale appraisal of post-1989 EP.
4.1 THE ORIGINS OF POLISH EASTERN POLICY
4.1.1 Early 20**’ Century: Pitsudski versus Dmowski
The roots o f contemporary Polish political thought on the Eastern question are the 
doctrines of the two main political movements: National Democrats {Stronnictwo 
Narodowe) led by Roman Dmowski and the movement led by Jozef Pitsudski, the leader of 
the Polish Socialist Party {Polska Partia Socjalistyczna) and the interwar Sanacja. 
Pitsudski and Dmowski’s views on the Eastern question were diametrically opposed.
Dmowski believed that Germany posed the greatest danger for Poland and saw Russia as 
a potential ally against Germany. He thought that Germans were more efficient at 
assimilating Poles whereas Polish national identity had a chance to survive under the 
Russians. Before the First World War Dmowski’s camp advocated autonomy for Poland 
under Russian rule and not independence.* They believed that Russia would never let 
Poland be independent and that alliance with Russia was too crucial to give up for the 
sake of an independent state. However, as the independence of Poland became a reality, 
Dmowski argued for a unitary Polish state of ethnic Poles and polonised Lithuanians, 
Belarusians and Ukrainians. He thought that these ethnic groups could be polonised by the 
methods of the pre-1772 Polish Commonwealth where Polish culture was successfully 
propagated in the East by the gentry {szlachta). He did not see any cultural affinity
 ^ Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland, Vol. II, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981, p. 398.
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between Poles and their Eastern neighbours. He did not believe in their ability to establish 
their own national states and found such a prospect dangerous for Poland.^ That was 
another reason why he believed in the virtues of Polish-Russian cooperation.
Pitsudski, on the other hand, was a federalist who had dreamt of uniting the territories of 
the Polish Commonwealth under Polish leadership. He toyed with the idea of a federation 
of free nations from the Baltic to the Black Sea, so called Miqdzymorze. He was a 
supporter of the Prometheist idea, which aspired to free nations and countries under 
Russian (and later Soviet) sovereignty, and supported national irredentist movements in 
order to weaken the Russian Empire.® Unlike Dmowski, he believed that Russia was the 
most dangerous enemy of Poland, and that Germany was a natural ally against Russia. 
Pitsudski envisaged Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Belarusian states which would be a buffer 
against the Russian danger but at the same time would be politically and economically 
reliant on and culturally connected with Poland.
Pitsudski and his party assumed the leadership of independent Poland after the war. 
However, Pitsudski’s notion of a Central East European federation did not materialise. 
Neither could the Second Polish Republic become the sponsor of independence for 
Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Belarusians. During the Polish-Soviet War it became clear 
that these nations were not necessarily interested in any federative arrangement with 
Poles. The first blow to the federalist idea was dealt when the forces of Simon Petlura’s 
Polish-sponsored independent Ukrainian state failed to recruit soldiers and most 
Ukrainians showed no interest in fighting the Red Army."* Besides, Polish support for 
Petlura’s state was dependent on the condition that Ukraine would give up its claim to 
Eastern Galicja (or Western Ukraine) and recognise Polish rule over these Ukrainian 
inhabited lands. Wary of Polish colonialism, most Ukrainians were not interested in a 
potential puppet state subservient to Poland. Pitsudski’s dream of a federation came to an 
end when Poland signed the Treaty of Riga in 1921, retaining one third of Ukraine and 
Belarus and accepting the soviétisation of the remaining halves. Like the Ukrainians, 
Lithuanians were unwilling to join any Polish-led federation. They demonstrated this by 
fighting Polish forces on the side o f the Red Army during the Polish-Soviet War. Poland 
took back WIIno region by force in October 1920 and the Lithuanians had little reason to 
trust Poland after they attained statehood which lasted until the Second World War.®
 ^Eugeniusz Mironowicz, "Mniejszoscl narodowe w polskiej mysll polltycznej przed II wojnq.swlatowq", 
Bialoruskie Zeszyty Historyczne, 1999, No, 12. http://www.kamunlkat.net.llg.pl/ 
www/czasoplsy/bzh/12/12art_mlranovlcz.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
 ^For an assessment of Pitsudski’s Prometheism see Wtodzlmlerz Bq^czkowskl, O wschodnich problemach 
Polski (texts selected by Jacek KloczkowskI and Pawet Kowal), Krakdw: Osrodek Mysll Polltycznej Ksiçgarnia 
Akademlcka, 2000, pp. 135-156.
'* In April 1920 Poland signed an agreement with Ukrainians to recognise the newly established Ukrainian 
Peoples’ Republic led by Simon Petlura who marched with his forces to Kiev.
® Konefat states anther reason why the federalist Idea failed was the opposition of Western powers to the idea 
as their economic Interests In the area would be better served If the states In question were Independent. Jan
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The interwar years further exposed the difficulty of implementing the romantic Pitsudskiite 
notion of peaceful coexistence of Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Belarusians within a 
Commonwealth-like state. Ethnic tensions and irredentism posed serious problems and 
the National Democrats’ policies of polonising ethnic minorities aggravated the situation. 
Neither the Russians nor the Germans became allies to Poland in the end and Poland was 
invaded by both of these powers when the war broke out.
4.1.2 Post Second World War period; Émigré intellectuals and 
Kultura
After the war, the intellectual debate about EP was carried on in emigration. Among the 
émigré publications the journal, Kultura, undertook the most intense intellectual effort to 
propose an EP concept.® Kultura was the journal of Instytut Literacki which was 
established by Jerzy Giedroyc in Rome in 1946. The institute moved to Paris in 1947. In 
the interwar period Giedroyc was active in publishing in Poland while he was working at 
the Ministries of Agriculture and afterwards Industry and Trade. His interest in the lands 
and peoples east o f Poland was reflected In the publications he edited, like the quarterly 
Wschôd or Bunt MIodych (later Polityka). The journals published articles proposing 
autonomy for Eastern Galicja and criticising the government for its treatment of the 
Ukrainian minority.'' He was a supporter of Pitsudskiite federalism and of the Prometheist 
movement.® He believed that the Soviet Union would disintegrate one day and that an 
independent Ukraine would play an important role for Poland.® He also advocated the 
importance of the nations living in Miçdzymorze in shaping the future of the European 
continent. During the interwar years he made the acquaintance of many likeminded 
Polish, Ukrainian and Russian intellectuals with whom he would collaborate under Kultura 
after the war.
Kultura began elaborating its line on EP in early 1950s and discussion on these issues 
among émigré intellectuals followed. An article by Jozef tobodowski published in 1952 
reflected on the debate which was started after he wrote an article in Kultura about the 
importance of Ukrainian independence for Poland.*® Lobodowski supported the idea of an 
independent Ukraine as a neutralising force against the Russian danger and a weakening
Konefat, "Koncepcja federalistyczna Jôzefa Pitsudsklego” in Lech Maiiszewski (Ed.), Zarniepodlegfosd. 
Miqdzynarodowe aspekty zycia I dzialalnosci Jôzefa Pilsudskiego, Lublin: Norbertinum, 2004, p. 63.
®.For a detailed analysis of Kultura's coverage of and activities related with Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine and 
Russia see Iwona Hofman, Ukraina, Litwa, Biatorué wpublicystyce paryskiej "Kultury", Poznan: Wydawnictwo 
Forum Naukowe, 2003.
 ^Marek Figura, "Dialog Polsko-Ukrainski w Dziatainoéci Jerzego Giedroycia”, Przeglgd Zachodni, Vol. 306, 
2003, No.1, pp. 128-129.
® Andrzej Stanislaw Kowalczyk, Giedroyc i “Kultura", Wroclaw: Wydawnictwo Dolnoélq^skie 1999, pp. 30-31.
® Kowalczyk, Giedroyc / “Kultura", p.31.
Jôzef tobodowski, "Przeciw upiorom przeszlosci”, Kultura, 1952, No, 2-3, pp. 14-66.
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factor in a possible future Berlin-Moscow alliance. He also tried to deconstruct the myth of 
Poles and Ukrainians being each other’s enemies and the recent history written under the 
influence of propaganda. His critics among the Polish émigré Intellectuals argued that an 
independent Ukraine would be the death knell for Poland as it might cooperate with 
Germans to destroy Poland, or Polish support for Ukraine might provoke Russia against 
Poland. Others thought that Ukraine could not survive without Russian control for more 
than a few months. On the other hand, Ukrainian émigrés were still cautious about any 
initiatives by Poles as anti-Polish sentiment was fresh due to the wartime atrocities in 
Galicja and the deportation of Ukrainians under Akcja Wisla (Action Vistula).**
Polish émigrés in the West were not unlike the Ukrainians in terms of having strong 
sentiments connected with the events of the Second World War and the interwar period. 
As the majority of émigrés in the West were originally from the Eastern borderlands of 
Poland (Kresy), the issues of territorial losses of Poland in the East as well as the 
domination of Soviet controlled regimes over these lands struck a deeper chord with 
them.*^ The Polish government in exile, formed in London during the war, based its 
political programme on the revival of the Polish Second Republic. Besides the withdrawal 
of Soviet forces and holding free elections, that meant the annulment of the Yalta system 
and the reinstatement of interwar borders.*® However, the government in exile also argued 
for keeping the so-called recovered lands {ziemie odzyskane), the German territories 
annexed to Poland after the war, arguing that they were historically Polish.*"*
The floodgates of émigré sentiment were let open when Kultura published a letter sent by 
Jôzef Majewski, a priest from South Africa.*® Quoting Churchill’s words, "Poles have every 
virtue, except political sense” , Majewski criticised the claim of Poles in the West to the 
territories east o f Poland as well as the recovered lands and accused Poles of looking at 
current realities through a 19*® century perspective. He reminded that Poles actually went 
to the Kresy as colonisers themselves. He said that Ukrainians and Lithuanians had the 
right to claim Lwow and Wiino as much as Poles had the right to claim Gdansk and 
Wroclaw. He added that Poland’s Eastern neighbours would trust Poland and cooperate
** Akcja Wisia was an operation to resettle the Ukrainian population from Galicja and South-eastern Poland. 
The Polish government wanted to root out the locai support given to the Ukrainian Insurrection Army, UPA. 
Ukrainians claim that the reai aim was ethnic cleansing. This subject is covered in Chapter Six.
Grazyna Pomian (Ed.), Wizja polski na lamach kultury 1947-1976, Lubiin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii 
Curie-Skiodowskiej, 1999, p. 174.
Ratal Habielski, Polski Londyn, Wroclaw; Wydawnictwo Dolnosiqskie 1999, pp. 89-90.
*'* Most of the émigré circies connected with the Polish government in exiie and those of National Democrat 
predisposition continued to hold a similar stance until the end of PRL in 1989.There were periods when the 
London émigré government took steps to cooperate with Ukrainian émigrés, such as in 1979 when the 
"president in exile" Edward Raczyhski signed a Poiish-Ukrainian declaration with the members of the émigré 
Ukrainian Nationai Assembly. He was accused of selling out to the Ukrainians by nationalist circles. Even after 
the faii of PRL, the ex-government in exile in London harshly criticised the new government in Poiand for 
abandoning territorial claims in the East. Hofman, Ukraina, Litwa, Biaiorus, pp. 19-23 and p. 93.
^^"Listy do Redakcji", Kultura, 1952, No.11, pp. 157-158.
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with it only if Poland decided to rebuild itself within its current borders and give up any 
territorial aspirations in the East.
After the publication of Majewski’s words, Kultura was flooded by protest letters and 
cancellations of subscription.*® Giedroyc responded to the letters by an editor’s note, 
reiterating the stance of Kultura on Eastern territories:*^ Ukraine and Belarus had the right 
to an Independent statehood within the future Europe as much as the states which were 
independent before the war. Reinstating the pre-war border arrangements was impossible 
and undesirable. Ukrainian independence was a priority for Poland in the face of current 
and historical Russian imperialism. Giedroyc also repeated that Lobodowski’s article on 
Ukraine represented the policy line of Kultura’s editorial team.
Despite the barrage of criticism. Kultura consolidated its stance on EP and gained new 
readers, especially among the more pragmatic Polish and Ukrainian émigrés, who 
appreciated the realistic approach to EP.*® Kultura had made active gestures towards the 
nations east of Poland. In 1958 Giedroyc protested the French TV for showing a 
documentary which depicted Simon Petlura as a pogrom perpetrator. From then on a 
delegation from Kultura held commemorations annually at Petlura’s grave in Paris.*® In 
1976 a Ukrainian-Polish friendship association was established under the auspices of 
Kultura and this body handed an award annually to émigrés from both communities for 
their contributions to improving Polish-Ukrainian relations.^®
In 1977, upon Kultura's initiative, a declaration about Ukraine was signed by Polish, 
Russian, Hungarian and Czech intellectuals. The declaration appealed to all opposition 
inside or outside Soviet Union to support Ukrainian independence and criticised the current 
soviétisation and russification of Ukraine.^* Ukrainian émigré intellectuals responded 
positively by publishing a declaration of solidarity in Ukrainian in the Russian émigré 
journal, Kontinient, and stated that they were ready to leave history behind and cooperate 
with neighbours in an atmosphere of trust and friendliness.^® The Kultura team initiated yet 
another declaration in 1979: A Russian-Ukrainian declaration drawing on the initial Kultura 
declaration on Ukraine, voicing support for décommunisation and liberation of nations and 
appealing for the formation of a united front of nations in the Soviet Union at whose core 
would be Russian and Ukrainian cooperation.®®
Kowalczyk, Giedroyc i "Kultura", p. 150,
“Nota Redakcji- Nieporozumienie czy tani patriotyzm?”, Kultura, 1953, No. 1, pp. 83-87.
Kowalczyk, Giedroyc I "Kultura", p. 150.
Figura, “Dialog Polsko-Ukrainski", p. 136.
Bogusiaw Bakuta, “Polska i Ukraina w dzialalnosci kultury", Eurazja, 1995, No.1, p. 130.
"Deklaracja w sprawie ukrainskiej", Kultura, 1980, No. 11, pp. 66-67.
“Deklaracja solidarnoéci", Kontinient, No. 11, pp.401-402 quoted in Bakuta, “Polska i Ukraina", p. 127. 
"Oswiadczenie rosyjsko-ukrairiskiej", Kultura, 1980, No. 11, pp. 59-61 and Figura, "Dialog Polsko-Ukrainski", 
p. 137. 79
Kultura's approach to EP was criticised especially by émigré journals like Wiadomoéci, 
Mysl Polska and Zycie, published in London.®"* Even though some London journals and 
authors followed the Pitsudski line and others the National Democrat line, they were in 
agreement about restoring Poland to its pre-1939 borders. London-based Kultura writer 
Juliusz Mieroszewski, the most prominent contributor on EP, accused the London émigrés 
of “mummifying” both Pitsudski and Dmowski, failing to interpret their doctrines in the light 
of the political and territorial changes that had taken place since 1939.®® Being a neo- 
Pitsudskiite, however, Mieroszewski found the arguments of the National Democratic camp 
most disagreeable.
Besides Kultura, Instytut Literacki published many books written by Ukrainian, Belarusian, 
Lithuanian and Russian writers and some of these works were smuggled to the Soviet 
Union, just as Kultura and the Institute’s Polish books were regularly taken to Poland. 
These activities had symbolic value than anything else, bearing in mind the impossibility of 
having any impact on actual policies of the Soviet Bloc. However, most of the émigré 
intellectuals believed that nations dominated by the Soviet Union would sooner or later 
attain independent statehood. That is why they kept up the intellectual exercise of 
preparing the conceptual background for future policies.
Kultura's concept of EP was developed by Giedroyc and elucidated by the writings of 
Mieroszewski.®® Kultura's EP was about establishing the conceptual framework on which a 
future independent Polish state would base its foreign policy actions. Mieroszewski’s 
writings were criticised in émigré circles for being too presumptuous about the course 
history would follow.®*  ^ His EP concept was deemed futile, as neither the émigrés nor PRL 
would have any power in the foreseeable future to implement the proposals. Mieroszewski 
argued that Poles should have a unified and strong EP ready to be implemented when 
Poland became independent. Failing to be ready for that historic moment would be, in his 
opinion, fatal. The proposed EP would set the grounds for normalisation of Poland’s 
relations with its neighbours and securing Poland a future.
The main lines of Kultura's EP concept can be set out in relation to four main issues;
1. The Soviet Union: Mieroszewski considered any attempts to engage in dialogue 
with the Soviet government as disrespect for national liberation movements in the
®'* On Wiadomoéci see Rafat Habielski, Nieztomni Nieprzejednani. Emigracyjne ‘'Wiadomoéci" i ich krgg. 1940- 
1981, Warsaw: Panstwowy Instytut Wydawnicy. 1991.
®® Juliusz Mieroszewski, Materiafydo refleksji i zadumy, Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1976, p. 116.
The following are some of the articles published in Kultura by Mieroszewski for that set out the EP concept: 
Juliusz Mieroszewski, "O miçdzynarodowsibrygadq^europejskq”, 1951, No. 11, pp. 75-82, “Listy z Wyspy: 
Prywatne inycjatywy polityczne", 1952, No. 10, pp. 99-104, “Rosyjski Commonwealth", 1961, No. 6. pp. 61-69, 
"Moze zdarzyé siç i tak", 1970, No. 4, pp. 47-53 (part I) and No. 5, pp. 61-67 (part II), "Polska ‘Ostpolitik’",
1973, No. 6, pp. 68-79, ""Rosyjski "kompleks polski" i obszar ULB", 1974, No. 9, pp. 3-15.
Mieroszewski, Materialy do refleksji, pp. 110-122.
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Eastern bloc. He criticised the National Democrats for their willingness to talk to 
any Russian establishment, regardless of its socio-political attributes. Geopolitics 
was a factor condemning Poland to be a satellite but It was also the Achilles heel of 
the Soviet Union which would find itself sandwiched between a nationalist China 
and budding nationalist movements in Central Eastern Europe. Mieroszewski saw 
the Soviet Union as an anachronism which would certainly collapse sooner or later.
2. Russia and Russians: The Soviet Union was not the same thing as Russia. 
Russians were one of the nations which had lost their Independence to the Soviet 
Union and their culture was also under assault by the Soviet regime. Both Poles 
and Russians viewed each other as potential imperialists who, given the chance, 
would enlarge.at the expense of the other. Compared to Russians, Poles were in a 
better position to grasp the changes of conjuncture as recent history only confirmed 
the strong position of Russia but brought defeat and political, territorial and ethnic 
transformation for Poland. Therefore, Poles should start a dialogue with the anti­
imperialist and democratic Russian opposition within and outwith the Soviet Union. 
As Poland would never have the chance to be stronger than Russia, it should find a 
way to quell the imperialistic tendencies in Russia by assuring the latter of its 
unquestioned abandonment of its own imperialistic tendencies.
3. ULB: Kultura’s most acclaimed contribution to Polish EP thinking was the ULB 
concept, which stands for Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus. Mieroszewski argued that 
the ULB region was the "bone of contention" between Poland and Russia and 
would determine the future shape of Polish-Russian relations.®® Accordingly,
Poland had to recognise ULB’s right to independent statehood and territorial 
sovereignty. This meant giving up all claims on the lands lost by Poland after the 
Second World War. Second, Poland had to build a strong dialogue with the nations 
of ULB and assure them that Polish imperialism, territorial or cultural, was a thing of 
the past. Historically, Poles were regarded as more effective cultural assimilators 
than Russians. The Polish political elite had a tradition of assuming the superiority 
of Poles over the Eastern nations. It would be hypocritical for Poland to fight 
Russian imperialism under the banner of Polish imperialism. Poland should 
especially communicate to Ukrainians and Lithuanians that it would never lay any 
claim to Lwow and Wiino, even if one day it had the opportunity to do so. 
Mieroszewski believed in the merits of a Miçdzymorze federation formed by the 
independent states o f Central and Eastern Europe which would be on equal footing 
with each other. A strong ULB region was essential for this united front to struggle 
with any possible imperialist attempt.
Mieroszewski, Materiafy do refleksji, p. 179-180.
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4. Ukraine: According to Kultura’s EP concept, the biggest country of the ULB, 
Ukraine, held the key to Polish independence. There could be no independent 
Poland without an independent Ukraine. If Poles and Ukrainians could not manage 
to foster dialogue and understanding among each other, they might as well be 
facing each other with arms on the Przemysl Bridge when both Poland and Ukraine 
achieved independence.®® Historically, enmity between Poles and Ukrainians has 
given Russia the opportunity to expand towards the West. By this token, if Ukraine 
and Poland could create peaceful relations based on mutual trust and interest, 
Russian imperialism could be curtailed.
Kultura’s EP concept was pragmatic as it took into account power and security 
considerations in the region and based its arguments for Polish cooperation with ULB on 
national Interest. It also rejected Polish historical revanchism towards its Eastern 
neighbours. However, having been formulated in emigration, far away from any chance of 
actual implementation, it was highly theoretical and its applicability depended solely on the 
assumption that the Soviet Union and the bipolar world order would collapse and incoming 
ULB governments and societies shared the same vision. It was highly courageous at the 
time to claim that the postwar international order was ephemeral. Kultura. d\6 not prescribe 
a time scale about when the changes would happen. Even though the events of 1989-91 
might seem like a vindication of Kultura’s basic assumption, it was actually the post­
communist period which put Kultura’s EP notion to the test.
4.1.3 Opposition in PRL
Until the 1970s Poland-based contributors to Kultura (sending contributions thanks to 
excellent smuggling networks) focused exclusively on pressing matters like domestic 
politics in Poland or the effects of Soviet domination, and it was the émigrés who 
discussed issues concerning the independent Poland of the future.®® However, in the mid 
1970s, opposition to PRL within Poland had gradually become more organised and efforts 
to formulate a political programme intensified. In terms of political thought, the intellectual 
elite In Poland carried home the concepts developed in emigration. EP issues like Poland’s 
relations with Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus and assessment of federalist and nationalist 
doctrines on the Eastern question entered the programmes of opposition groups and 
featured in their samizdat publications.®*
Juliusz Mieroszewski, "Listy z Wyspy: Prywatne inycjatywy polityczne", Kultura, 1952, No. 10, pp. 99-104. 
Pomian (Ed.), Wizja polski, p. 171.
®* Fora detailed survey of how the Ukrainian question featured in Polish opposition publications see Taras 
Kuzio, “The Polish Opposition and the Ukrainian Question”, Journal of Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 12, 1987, No. 2, 
pp. 26-58.
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One of these opposition groups, the Polish League for Independence {Polskie 
Porozumienie Niepodlegioéciowe - PPN), issued its programme in May 1976.®® It was the 
first comprehensive party programme of its kind and for the first time problems of foreign 
policy were given consideration. The programme asked Poles to support independence 
movements in ULB. It maintained that even though the loss of Lwow and Wilrio was still 
traumatic for Poles, Poland should renounce territorial revisionism towards the lands in the 
East.®® The programme was actually published in Kultura (and a London journal, Tydzieh 
Polski) before it appeared in Poland. PPN activists also published articles on EP related 
matters. In an article about the Eastern borders of Poland, Andrzej Albert (pseudonym of 
Wojciech RoszkowskI) gave an account of Polish history in the East from the fifteenth 
century onwards.®"* He argued that by being better informed about how the Eastern border 
was shaped throughout history and by correcting the misperceptions created through 
propaganda and diversion, Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Belarusians could 
understand each other better' He concluded that the demand to return to pre-1939 borders 
was an anachronism and, as a result of the brutal ethnic policies of Germans and Soviets, 
the lands In question were neither exclusively Polish nor Ukrainian, Lithuanian or 
Belarusian. He said that the problem could be solved only if ULB became independent 
democratic states where ethnic groups would have the freedom to retain their identities 
and cultures.
Other opposition organisations such as the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civic 
Rights {Ruch Obrony Praw Czlowieka I Obywatela - ROPCiO) and Confederation for 
Independent Poland {Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej -KPN), which was established in 
1979 by some members of ROPCiO, also dealt with EP and ULB. Despite the fact that 
these and other opposition groups differed in their views about domestic politics, they had 
parallel views about EP. They were all closer to the Pitsudskiite tradition and had similar 
opinions to those of Kultura on EP. For instance, during the sixtieth anniversary of the 
Pilsudski-Petlura agreement in 1980, KPN Issued a declaration protesting against Soviet 
rule over Ukraine and repudiating any territorial claims against Ukraine in the name of the 
Polish state.®® KPN stated that the creation of a strong, independent Ukrainian state was in 
the interests of Poland.
The programme was issued anonymously but it was actually written by Zdzistaw Najder, the founder of PPN 
in 1976 and a contributor to Kultura.
PPN: Polskie Porozumienie NIepodleglosciowe, Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1978, pp. 18-19. English translation 
can be found in Peter Raina, Political Opposition In Poland, 1954-1977, London: Poets' and Painters' Press, 
1978, pp. 477-478,
®'* Andrzej A lbert, ‘‘Wschodnie granice Polski" in Polskie Porozumienie Niepodlegioéciowe: Wybôr Tekstôw, 
London: Polonia, 1989, pp. 288-325, The article was originally published in March 1980.
®® Pawet Kowal, "Za wolnoéc naszq. i waszq. Ukraina, Litwa i Biatorus w myéli polskich srodowisk opozycyjnych 
wlatach 1976-1980", Studia nad polskq myélq politycznq, Osrodek Myéli Politycznej. 
http://www.omp.org.pl/index.php?module=subjects&func-viewpage&pageid=168 (accessed 29 November 
2006)
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Kultura’s EP programme was also reflected by oppositionists within the Workers' Defence 
Committee {Komitet Obrony Robotnikow  - KOR) movement, the intellectual precursor of 
the Solidarnoéc movement. In an article published in the journal, G/os, Jacek Kuron, Adam 
Michnik and Antoni Macierewicz took up the Kultura line on ULB and argued that Polish 
sovereign statehood and democracy as well as freedom in Russia could only be 
guaranteed by the sovereignty of Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus.®® They said that Poles, 
Russians and ULB nations should struggle against mutual enmity, xenophobia and 
chauvinism fostered by the totalitarian system. They stressed that the historic slogan “For 
your freedom and ours” was the only realistic programme for Polish sovereignty and 
appealed to the Russian democratic opposition to support the independence movements 
in Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus for their and Poland’s freedom.
As mentioned above, EP perceptions of opposition groups in Poland were similar to each 
other and parallel to Kultura line. While this is true for attitudes towards ULB, there were 
varying views about relations with Russia and Russians. For instance in the right wing 
samizdat publication Niepodlegloàc (Warsaw), Leszek Morfeusz (pseudonym of Jerzy 
Targalski) disagreed with Mieroszewski about Russia ever giving up its imperialistic 
attitude.®’’ He argued that the Russian intellectuals whom Mieroszewski proposed as allies 
were too few in number and nothing short of a defeat, such as the one suffered by 
Germans after the Second World War, could persuade Russians to change. Hence, Poles 
should support national liberation movements in ULB even when they were anti Russian. 
While Russian democrats could be allies with Poles against the Soviet regime, a real 
partnership could only established with Russian groups that respected the right of 
constituent nations to independence. Morfeusz even proposed that ethnic Russians that 
had emigrated to ULB should be made to leave after these countries gain independence.
A.H (Aleksander Hall) wrote in Polityka Polska (publication of Ruch MIodej Polski, a 
splinter o f ROPCiO movement) in a similar vein about the difficulty of reaching a 
consensus with Russians. However, Hall disagreed with the idea of actively supporting 
ULB independence. Hall pointed out the impossibility of Poland reaching any 
understanding with Russians while envisaging a Poland which would act as a Piedmont for 
anti Russian national movements.®® Like most commentators of the time. Hall did not see 
the end of the Soviet Union coming soon and believed that the Polish opposition should
Jacek Kurort, Adam Michnik and Antoni Macierewicz, "Sprawa polska -  Sprawa rosyjska”, (Gtos, No.1, 
October 1977), G/os, Paris: instytut Literacki, 1980, pp. 242-244.
Leszek Morfeusz, “Polacy wobec kwestii wschodniej", Niepodlegfosc, 1983, No. 18-19. Leszek Morfeusz, 
"Polacy wobec kwestii wschodniej (c.d.)", Niepodleghsô, 1983, No. 20 (reprinted in 
Niepodlegfoàô. Miesigcznik polityczny, [wybor z pierwszych 28 numerôw], London: Polonia, 1985, pp. 182- 
192.) Also see Artur Wieczysty (pseudonym for Adam Chajewski), "Kwestia Rosji", Niepodlegioéô, 1985, No.
39. Scanned copies of original Niepodlegtosrt can be found at
http://www.nlepodieglosc.org/Polish/Archiwum/ArchiwumJndeks.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
A. H., "Czynnik Staly -  Rosja” in Przeglqd Polityki Polskiej, London: Odnowa 1985, p. 75. English translation 
in Adam Bromke, The Meanings and Uses of Polish History, Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1987, pp. 
209-220.
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not antagonise Russians by interfering in nationality Issues in the Soviet Union or provoke 
them by overplaying their hand (as Solidarity did according to him). Accordingly, Poland 
should not sacrifice its independence for the sake of overthrowing Soviet rule.
In the 1970s and 80s, EP issues were dealt mainly by intellectuals and have not become 
central to the programmes of mass movements like Soiidarnosc. As at the time the 
possibility of collapse of the communist regime and dismemberment of the Soviet Union 
were not considered likely in the short term, discussions on foreign policy or EP were 
confined to theoretical deliberations and on the basis of setting out possible scenarios.
4.2 EASTERN POLICY DEBATES DURING THE THIRD REPUBLIC
4.2.1 Evolution and intensification of the Polish EP debate
4.2.1.1 The Background
Even though Polish foreign policy had an Eastern dimension from the very beginning of the 
Third Republic, the formulation of a unified “Eastern policy” concept commenced from 
1994 on. Parallel to this EP began to be discussed on its own right and its merits even 
though it was still debated whether a Polish EP existed or not.
From 1989 to the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1992 Polish foreign policy 
towards its East was described as “dual-track” {dwutorowosc) as Poland recognised the 
sovereignty and independence of Soviet republics and established direct relations with 
them but at the same time maintained relations with the central Soviet authorities and kept 
a low profile in relations with republics so as not to provoke the Soviet administration. This 
prudent policy, implemented by the Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, proved 
successful. Poland managed to avoid conflict in this precarious period and negotiated an 
agreement with the Soviet Union on the withdrawal of the latter’s troops from Polish 
territory on 26 October 1991.
Having served its purpose, the dual-track policy was replaced by a more active approach 
towards Poland’s Eastern neighbours. The new strategy was to establish the legal basis of 
bilateral relations by signing the necessary agreements such as those concerning border 
issues, economic cooperation and defence. Treaties on good neighbourly relations were in 
place with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus by the end of 1992 and several other agreements 
establishing the framework of political relations were signed by the end of 1993. 
Negotiations with Lithuania were protracted because of disputes over ethnic minorities and 
the bilateral treaty on good neighbourly relations was signed by April 1994.
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By the end o f 1993, Polish foreign policy was re-evaluated and reformulated. The most 
important factor was the gradual crystallization of the new geopolitical situation in the post- 
Soviet sphere and the emergence of new security challenges. By 18 September 1993, the 
last Soviet troops left Poland. At the same time Poland declared NATO membership a 
foreign policy priority. Meanwhile, Russia started to voice objections to a possible NATO 
eastward enlargement. Even though Ukrainian, Belarusian and Lithuanian statehood were 
internationally confirmed, their course of transformation was still unpredictable and prone 
to Russian pressure.
The reformulation of foreign policy and the ascendance of the new EP concept was 
connected not only to international developments but also to domestic political events in 
Poland. First, the success of post-communist parties at the October 1993 elections and the 
formation of an SLD-PSL coalition government brought about a new approach to relations 
with Russia, Even though the coalition partners did not intend to change the main 
directions of Polish foreign policy, they indicated a desire for a closer dialogue with Russia 
about NATO enlargement and regional security. Accordingly, relations with Russia should 
have priority over those with Ukraine and Belarus. Especially, PSL emphasised the need 
for Poland to rejuvenate its ties with the Russian and Eastern markets and criticised 
previous governments for incurring the country huge losses by reorienting Polish trade 
towards West.
Second, Andrzej Olechowski took over the post of Foreign Minister from Skubiszewski In 
October 1993. Olechowski stressed the need to formulate an EP concept which would 
produce more energetic and assertive policies. In his statement to the Foreign Affairs 
Committee in Senate on 17 February 1994 Olechowski set out the new aims of Polish 
EP.®® He stressed the need to extend economic relations with the Eastern neighbours and 
to develop regional cooperation. He underlined the strategic importance of Ukraine for 
Poland and repeated Poland’s commitment to the independence of Soviet successor 
states. He stated the need for “a clear warming of the climate” with Russia but added that 
the “rock-bottom condition” for friendliness with Russia was the letter's respect for Poland's 
integration into Western institutions like EU, NATO and WEU. He warned about the threat 
of a neo-imperialist option in Russian foreign policy and added his concerns about the 
"special interests” of Russia in Ukraine. Even though both the government and Olechowski 
foresaw changes in EP, their approaches were not based on similar premises. It should be 
kept in mind that at the time the foreign minister was appointed by the President, Lech 
Walçsa, and not by the government.
"Wystqpienie Minlstra Spraw Zagranlcznych RP Andrzeja Olechowsklego na Posledzenlu Komisji Spraw 
Zagranlcznych Senatu RP na Temat Glôwnych Elementôw Polskiej Polityki Wschodniej", Zbiôr Dokumentôw, 
1994, No. 1, pp. 42-54.
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Following these developments, academic, political and journalistic debates on foreign 
policy gave more attention and space to EP. Almost all contributors to the debate agreed 
on the fact that EP should be improved or reformed but they sharply disagreed about 
whether so far the foreign policy line of Skubiszewski and pre-pctober 1993 governments 
served Poland's interest in the best way. Similarly, policies proposed by Olechowski and 
by the SLD/PSL coalition government were contentious. Debate revolved around the EP 
concept, relations with Russia (especially in connection with NATO enlargement), relations 
with Ukraine, Belarus and Baltic states and economic ties with the East.
We can discern three main positions in the debate notwithstanding the variety of 
comments and proposals within each camp: The first one -let us call it pro-Russian for the 
sake of brevity- advocated that Poland’s vita! political and economic interest was to 
improve its relations with Russia and Poland needed to take into account Russian 
sensitivities about the ex-Soviet republics and NATO. The second, pro-Western camp, on 
the other hand, argued that good relations with Russia were not necessarily the key to 
having good relations with the West and that Poland had to have a more active policy in 
Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltics. The third one comes from Kultura which continued 
promotion of its own EP programme formulated by Mieroszewski-Giedroyc. These three 
positions will be explained below by reference to the arguments put forward by some of the 
main proponents of the camps.
4.2.1.2 Pro-Russian Camp
Longin Pastuslak, SLD MP and professor of political science and American studies, was 
among the ranks of the pro-Russian camp. He supported the Giedroycian idea that the 
better Polish relations with its East, the better Poland’s stance in the West."*® Accordingly, 
Poland had to seek a deeper dialogue with Russia, especially on security Issues.
Pastusiak proposed the creation of a Polish-German-Russian permanent consultation 
mechanism, “Warsaw triangle” , in order to supplement the Weimar Triangle, the Polish- 
French-German cooperation.'** He argued that Russia and Germany would develop their 
own dialogue and Poland should be a partner in this dialogue in order to have an influence 
on vital issues concerning its fate. He accused his critics, who claimed that Pastusiak 
wanted to revive the Warsaw Pact or to destroy the Weimar mechanism, of demonstrating 
their unwillingness for cooperation with Russia. Pastusiak also questioned the merits of
Longin Pastusiak, "Stac nas na consensus", Rzeczpospolita, 05 November 1994.
Longin Pastusiak, Informacja rzqdu o glôwnych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski, Sprawozdania 
stenograficzne, 2 Kadencja, 20 Posledzenie, 2 Dzieti, 12 May 1994. All parliamentary debates from the First 
Sejm on can be searched at http://ks.sejm.gov.pl:8009/forms/kad.htm (accessed 06 November 2006).
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NATO membership in terms of creating security in Europe. He advocated a Euro-Atlantic 
collective security system with international armed forces under international command.
Another SLD heavyweight, Marek Siwiec, wrote that anti-Sovietism of the pre-1989 period 
had been replaced by anti-Russianism and pointed to the similarity between the uncritical 
appraisal of the West by the post-Solidarity cadres and the same attitude of the pre-1989 
Polish United Workers Party {Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza-PZPR) elite o f the 
East.'^^ He argued that "the worse the relations with Russia, the better the opportunities in 
the West" logic did not apply anymore. Accordingly, if integration with the West was the 
primary task for reinforcing security, good relations with Russia and other Eastern 
neighbours should be the next.
Not all proponents o f the pro-Russian option came from the post-communist camp. The 
Dmowskiite tradition of a cooperative attitude towards Russia and scepticism towards 
Germany survived in the thinking of right wing circles. The arguments of Marian Pitka, one 
of the founders of Christian National Union {Zjednoczenie Chrzeécijansko-Narodowe -  
ZChN), demonstrates this. He sharply criticised the Western orientation by stating that the 
current foreign policy concept was based on swapping the Soviet protector for a Western 
one.'*^ He maintained that Poland and Russia could form a community of mutual interests. 
However, such cooperation was possible if Poland respected Russia’s national interests. 
He criticised Skubiszewski’s foreign and Balcerowicz’s economic policies for Poland’s 
surrender of Eastern markets to Western countries such as Germany and the US. 
Rejecting the "myth" that the low trade turnover with the East was due to economic 
breakdown in Russia, he advocated creating a free trade area with Russia, Belarus and 
Ukraine, parallel to association with the EU. Accordingly, this would strengthen Poland’s 
negotiating position vis-à-vis the West. Pitka argued that NATO enlargement would 
automatically isolate Russia and make Poland a “front country" in the new division. Having 
hindered Polish economic expansion towards East, Poland would become a hostage to 
Germany.
Adam Bromke, an émigré professor of political science, approved the neo-Dmowskiite 
rhetoric for emphasising the importance of relations with Russia but disagreed with their 
arguments about Germany.'*'^ He also criticised the proposals o f some neo-Pilsudskiite 
circles of establishing a Polish-Ukrainian alliance against Russia. That would be against 
Polish interests, and a Russian-Ukrainian conflict so near Polish borders would endanger 
European security and the West would do anything to prevent it. Besides, the anti- 
Russian, nationalist Ukrainians were at the same time anti-Polish so such an alliance was
Marek Siwiec, "Czas pragmatyzmu", Rzeczpospolita, 23 July 1994.
uary 1994,
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Marian Pitka, "Dwubiegunowa integracja", Rzeczpospolita, 21 Jan  
Adam Bromke, " Na wirazu”, Rzeczpospolita, 08 July 1994.
not realistic. In the same vein with Siwiec, Bromke argued that anti-Sovietism was 
succeeded not only by anti-Russianism but also by Polish megalomania, which hampered 
the establishment of relations between Poland and Russia and the development of 
economic ties. Bromke’s main criticism of post-Solidarity governments was that they 
belittled the role of the East and failed to understand the change of Western stance vis-à- 
vis the East, namely Washington’s new priority of establishing good relations with Moscow. 
Poland’s “megaphone diplomacy" of loudly campaigning for NATO membership in 
international fora gave Russia the impression that Poland aimed to extend NATO’s sphere 
of influence to the Bug and to isolate Russia. That was not received well in the West and 
Polish demands of a swift entry into NATO were turned down.
4.2.1.3 Pro-Western Camp
The contributors from this camp came mostly from post-Solidarity circles. Even though 
there was a nominal consensus between the different camps on the need to improve 
relations, political or economic, with the East, each had different assumptions about the 
attitude of the East towards Poland and the policy Poland had to pursue.
Henryk Szlajfer, an academic (though best known as Adam Michnik’s comrade during the 
1968 student protests) and director of Foreign Ministry’s Department of Strategic 
Research, hailed the foreign policy achievements of the post-Solidarity governments.'*® In 
his opinion Polish foreign policy was subtle and flexible, as evidenced by the shift from the 
two-track policy to bilateral relations with ex-Soviet states and the recognition of Ukraine. 
Moreover, not only governments but also civil society groups with Solidarity background 
contributed to establishing good relations with Ukraine. He maintained that the pro- 
Russian camp slogan “wasted opportunities in the East" could not be easily verified. He 
accused government politicians of complaining about relations with Russia with the 
intention of condemning post-Solidarity circles (or people previously forming opposition 
against them) for their foreign polipies. Szlajfer recalled that Russia was not the only 
neighbour in the East and Poland had to be active in Kiev and Minsk as much as in 
Moscow but without any intention of building a cordon around Russia. He dismissed the 
idea that a great Russian market was there to benefit from and criticised Pastusiak for his 
childish “geopolitical-geometric” constructions and the SLD-PSL for similar half-baked 
ideas.
Another criticism to Pastusiak came from Tadeusz Chabiera, an academic and an expert 
at the Centre for International Studies {Oérodek Studiow Miqdzynarodowych - OSM) at the
Henryk Szlajfer, "Myslec nie tylko o Rosjl", Rzeczpospolita, 03 September 1994.
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Senate.'*® Chabiera interpreted Pastusiak’s arguments as regret for the downfall of the 
Warsaw Pact and the hasty dissolution of Comecon. He criticised Pastusiak for not 
admitting the distorted nature of Poland’s pre-1989 trade with the East. Besides, 
Pastusiak’s "Warsaw Triangle” project could only serve to ensure Poland’s partnerly 
presence "between the hammer and the anvil”. Chabiera also accused Pastusiak of a 
hidden agenda: Pastusiak refrained from openly saying that the new security system he 
was proposing was actually CSCE. It was exactly the Russian plan to use CSCE as the 
main European security forum and to sideline NATO or WED. In Chabiera’s opinion the 
Giedroyclan logic was open to interpretation, based on political choice: Pastusiak read it as 
“the better relations with the East, the better Poland’s position in the West” but the reverse, 
i.e. “the better relations with the West, the better Poland’s position in the East” could as 
well hold the real meaning.
Radek Sikorski, ex-Deputy minister of defence in the Olszewski cabinet, declared his 
preference for the “reverse reading” of Gledroyc by arguing that Poland would not have 
much of an option in terms of its EP before it anchored itself solidly in Western 
structures.'*^ Without economic power or a say in the international arena, Poland was not 
an attractive partner for either Russia or Ukraine. He, interestingly, thought that the 
Russian objection to NATO enlargement was being used as a pretext for delaying Polish 
accession and accused the Clinton administration of eroding NATO and supporting 
reintegration of CIS.
An interesting approach came from Kazimierz Dziewanowski, one of the Solidarity 
negotiators in the Roundtable talks and Poland’s ambassador to Washington during 1990- 
93. He proposed looking at the matter through questioning what Russia’s policy towards 
Poland was.'*® He argued that Russia did not have any clear-cut foreign policy line towards 
Poland (nor towards the other ex-satellite states, Belarus or Ukraine) and its foreign 
policies were susceptible to domestic political conflicts. Russia’s opposition to NATO 
expansion was proof that Russia still wanted a divided Europe and considered NATO as 
an enemy. Russia also considered vetoing NATO’s decisions and intervening in the foreign 
policy of sovereign states in Central and Eastern Europe as its rights. Dziewanowski also 
wondered whether Russia would attempt to “Finlandize” these countries. He concluded, 
“Russia is a tragic country. We are afraid o f it because history taught us to do so.”
Tadeusz Chabiera, "Kwadratura Trdjkqta", Rzeczpospolita, 12 November 1994. OSM was established In 
1989 as an Institute within the Senate. It was considered by post-communist parties to be a partisan 
organisation supporting post-Solldarlty views of foreign policy and was eventually liquidated In the beginning of 
1995. For more Information see Pawet LIslckI, “Utajony spor o polltykç zagranicznq", Rzeczpospoiita, 30 
January 1995.
Radoslaw Sikorski, “NIe odwzajemnlane zaloty”, Rzeczpospolita, 15 October 1994,
Kazimierz Dziewanowski, "Bez koncepcji”, Rzeczpospolita, 08 December 1994.
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Aleksander Smolar, a political scientist, an émigré until 1989 and adviser to Mazowiecki 
and Suchocka governments, analysed the foreign policy rhetoric o f SLD and PSL'*®: These 
two parties criticised the foreign policies of post-Solidarity governments of antagonising 
Russia, replacing dependence on Soviet Union with dependence on the West and not 
strengthening political and economic ties with the Eastern neighbours. They also opposed 
a hasty entry into NATO and advocated a collective security system based on CSCE (see 
Pastusiak’s arguments). However, SLD and PSL changed their policy line soon after 
coming to power and assumed the pro-Western orientation of the post-Solidarity camp. 
During the discussion in the Sejm on foreign policy SLD MP Jerzy W iatr explained that the 
change in his party’s attitude (especially towards NATO membership) was connected with 
the bloody confrontation between Yeltsin and the Russian parliament in October 1993 and 
this event made the SLD realise the danger posed by the nascent hegemonistic 
tendencies in Russia. Smolar found this explanation unconvincing. In his opinion what 
SLD actually realised was that they could not govern Poland against the society’s 
aspirations and anti-Western policies and that neutrality would isolate Poland in the region. 
Smolar also criticised the government of not giving due importance to Eastern neighbours 
other than Russia. He argued that SLD and PSL’s communist past cast its shadow on their 
rhetoric today even though their world view did evolve after the fall of the communist 
system: Anti-Western thinking was deeply rooted in especially the older generations in the 
SLD and the "socialist utopia” of a Third Way was transformed into neutrality under the 
new conditions. Smolar also underlined a certain inferiority complex lurking in the collective 
psychology as commentators affiliated with SLD and PSL often mentioned Poland’s 
marginal status In the world and ridiculed Poland’s expectations of NATO or EU 
membership. He maintained that contrary to these claims, location and history made 
Poland an important element in any analysis about the future of Europe, in terms of not 
only security but also politics and economic integration. Like Dziewanowski, Smolar 
believed that the basic problem of EP was not the absence of it (as critics suggested) but 
the fact that Russia did not have any Polish policy as a consequence of the collapse of the 
empire and its inability to accept equal relations with smaller states. Accordingly, conflict of 
interest between Russia and Poland would subside only when Russia accepted the 
changes in the political map of Europe.
Smolar also questioned whether choosing a Western orientation would cause a permanent 
loss of Poland’s historical identity which had been formed under the influence of close ties 
with Ukraine, Belarus. Lithuania and Russia. He conceded that such a choice brought 
about certain losses but added that integration with the West would also increase 
opportunities for developing ties in the East. He found the German experience relevant:
Aleksander Smolar, "Polityka zagranlczna t jej przeciwnicy”, Rzeczpospolita, 26 November 1994.
Jerzy Wiatr, Informacja rzqdu o gtôwnych klerunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski, Sprawozdania 
stenograficzne, 2 Kadencja, 20 Posiedzenie, 2 Dziert, 12 May 1994.
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IWest Germany could develop a dynamic Ostpolitik only when its integration into the West 
became Indisputable whether by the West or the East.
4.2,1.4 Kultura Camp
Even though the collapse of the communist system ended Kultura’s role as the sole 
proponent o f an alternative EP, the relevance of its programme increased. Kultura 
continued to give extensive coverage to Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania in the early 1990s 
when the debate on EP revolved predominantly around Russia. Kultura continued to 
debate issues concerning Poland’s Eastern neighbours. It had a regular section called 
"Sqsiedzr (neighbours) devoted to reports and analyses about Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania 
and Russia.
It is difficult to classify the views of Kultura authors under the two camps examined above 
because they were, in terms of political sympathy, much closer to post-Solidarity circles. 
But at the same time they criticised post-Solidarity governments harshly for their inactivity 
towards the Eastern neighbours. Like the post-communist camp they advocated better 
relations with Russia, even though their reasons for this were fundamentally different.
Jerzy Pomianowski, a Russianist and one of the émigré contributors to Kultura, claimed 
that an EP did exist but it was one of inactivity caused by good will: Not talking to 
Ukrainians to avoid upsetting the Russians (and vice versa) caused a paralysis in Poland’s 
relations with its Eastern neighbours.®^ He noted that the “whatever happens in our Near 
East is their domestic problem” attitude was based on the mistaken belief that the Soviet 
Union still survived in some form and on the failure to distinguish between the Soviet Union 
and Russia (which in his opinion should be one of the main tasks of Polish EP).®  ^
Pomianowski named Skubiszewski’s foreign policy towards Ukraine and Belarus 
“désintéressement doctrine” and added that this policy did not win any friends among 
Poland’s neighbours.®® He argued that Polish entry into NATO would be desirable for the 
latter only when Poland became free of conflict with Russia and of its own insecurity 
towards it. He criticised both the left wing, i.e. the post-communists, and the right wing:
The Left lost the chance of distancing itself from its communist past and starting relations 
with the Eastern neighbours afresh when at the end of 1994 left wing MPs voted in the 
Sejm for giving combatant status to Polish NK’\/D officers who had taken part in the 
pacification of Ukrainian countryside after the Second World War. He also criticised the 
right wing for its suspicions about Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania and accused them of
----------------------------------------
Jerzy Pomianowski, Ruski miesiqc z hakiem, Wroclaw: Wydawnlctwo Dolnoslq^skle, 1997, p. 133. (reprint of 
“Jak rozmawlaéz Rosjq.", îyc ie Warszawy, 17 March 1994.)
Pomianowski, Ruski miesiqc, p. 20. (reprint of “Ruskl mlesiq^c”, Kuitura, 1994, No. 7-8, pp. 12-25.) 
Pomianowski, Ruski miesiqc, p. 40. (reprint of "Ruskl mleslq^c w Warszawle", Kultura, 1995, No. 1-2, pp. 3- 
19.)
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visiting these three countries only to provoke the local Polish minority against their hosts. 
These tactics were reminiscent of Dmowski’s efforts of gaining Russian support by helping 
it suppress the nations between Poland and Russia.
Pomianowski believed that Poland had the chance to implement the Kultura programme 
right after the collapse of the Soviet Union but had wasted it. According to Kultura logic 
Poland could develop friendly bilateral relations with Russia only if the latter was non­
imperialist and ULB’s independence was guaranteed. Prospects for the future was not 
bright given the recent rise of neo-imperialist tendencies in Russia. Pomianowski touched 
on a very important subject, which would prove to be a major bone of contention between 
Russia and Poland and a major source of camaraderie between Ukraine and Poland in the 
2000s: He wrote about Russian efforts to erode Ukrainian sovereignty by exploiting 
Ukrainian dependence on Russian gas. He reckoned that the agreement on the new 
Yamal gas pipeline project signed between Russia and Poland during the Russian PM 
Chernomyrdin’s visit to Poland in February 1995 was another means by which Russia 
could threaten Ukraine. He wondered whether any Polish politician thought of reaching an 
agreement on the issue with the Ukrainians before signing the agreement with the 
Russians.
Andrzej W. Pawluczuk, an essayist, agreed with Pomianowski that for the previous fours 
years no one benefited from the Kultura programme and under Skubiszewski the East was 
treated as if "a deep black hole existed between Bug and Vladivostok”.®'* The only part of 
the Kultura programme, which was the most straightforward, carried out so far was giving 
up any claims to Wiino and Lwow but apart from that no real effort for supporting the new 
republics was undertaken. Pawluczuk entertained no illusions about good relations 
between Poland and Russia. He maintained that Poland and Russia had conflicting 
interests because Russia was the only European power which tried to impose on its 
neighbours its own understanding of international order. He did not mince his words:
As long as Russia fails to solve its basic civilisational problem, which is productivity in order 
to ensure wealth and internal prosperity, the only way it will demonstrate its power and 
realise political interests will be an expansive foreign policy. ... If Russia does not 
modernise quickly, it will remain a great big skansen [an open air museum], inhabited by 
two hundred million citizens, living with feelings of injustice and resentment towards the 
world for its sordid fate.
Pawluczuk’s brusque words actually demonstrate an attitude towards Russia widespread 
among post-Solidarity and right wing circles.
Andrzej W Pawluczuk, “Daleko t blisko Rosjl", Rzeczpospolita, 10 December 1994.
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4.2.2 Diversification of the debate
4.2.2.1 The Background
In January 1995 the differences between Olechowski and the Prime Minister Pawlak 
concerning EP intensified.®® Olechowski was wary of initiatives towards Russia undertaken 
by Pawlak and the PSL-controlled Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, without 
consultation with the Foreign Ministry. In return, Pawlak accused Olechowski of not doing 
enough to improve economic relations with Eastern neighbours. The rift was not only about 
organisational matters but also about ideological stances. While Olechowski believed in a 
more active EP, his priority was strengthening ties with the West and ensuring Poland’s 
NATO membership. Pawlak, on the other hand, had his electoral base to please. Pawlak’s 
PSL was the only party in Poland that represented the interests of a specific socio­
economic class: the farmers. PSL saw Russian markets as a saviour for plummeting 
profits from agriculture and Pawlak tried to pay his due to his electorate by trying to foster 
trade with Russia. Meanwhile, he created "two-headedness” in foreign policy: He was 
seen as single-handedly giving too many concessions to Russia by his initiatives which 
contradicted with the current foreign policy doctrine. SLD were also accused of using the 
same "backdoor tactics” to change the priorities of Polish foreign policy.®® The standoff 
came to an end with Olechowski resigning in January 1995, and Pawlak could survive as a 
PM only until March 1995 when was ousted by a no-confidence vote in the Sejm.
Relations with Russia were still the focal point of EP debates in 1995. During Russian 
Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin’s visit to Warsaw on 17-18 February 1995, economic 
relations were discussed. A protocol on the proposed Yamal gas pipeline was signed and 
negotiations on weapons production and fishing were carried out. Even though the 
Russian side stressed the “pragmatic and economic character” of the visit, its political 
significance was obvious, especially due to the repercussions of the pipeline project.®^ 
Throughout 1995 Russian government officials reiterated their objections to Poland’s entry 
into NATO. Tensions between the two countries were exacerbated by the actions of Polish 
NGOs on the subject of the Chechen conflict: Russia accused the Polish Humanitarian 
Action aid convoy of violating norms of aid distribution in conflict zones and reacted 
strongly against the establishment of a Chechen Information Centre in Krakow. While the 
Russian government perceived these incidents as the acts of "certain circles” in Poland 
which stood to gain from the worsening of Polish-Russian relations, some diplomatic
®® Sarah Meiklejohn Terry. "Poland's foreign policy since 1989: the challenges of Independence", Communist 
and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 33, 2000, No.1, pp.28-29.
® Marek Janusz Catka , "Polska polityka wschodnia w latach 1989-1997. Prôba oceny, nowe wyzwania I 
perspektywy” In Rocznik PolskieJ Polityki Zagranicznej 1998, Warszawa: Zarzq^d Obstugl MSZ, 1998, 
http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/ (accessed 01 April 2006)
Stawomir PopowskI, “Normalna wlzyta", Rzeczpospolita, 20 February 1995.
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circles in Moscow commented that Russia’s strong reaction was a message to the West, 
suggesting that if they accepted Poland into NATO, they would end up with a member that 
would easily spark conflict with Russia.®® Initiatives to establish a Radio Free Caucasus in 
Krakow added fuel to the fire, and the Polish Foreign Ministry responded to the protests of 
its Russian counterpart by refusing to intervene, as control over broadcasting was not 
within the ministry’s competence.®®
A further incident to spark discussion was the attendance of the Polish PM, Jozef Oleksy 
of SLD (who replaced Pawlak), at commemorations in Moscow on the 50**^  anniversary of 
the victory over fascism in May 1995.®° Oleksy’s decision was perceived by many as 
unpatriotic and a rubber stamp of Oleksy’s allegiance to Russia dating back to communist 
times when he was a senior communist party member. The end of the Second World War 
and the subsequent division of Europe into spheres of Influence was (and still is) a 
sensitive topic.
Domestic events continued to dominate the agenda. In November 1995, the presidential 
elections were won by Aleksander Kwasniewski, the leader o f SLD and an ex-Minister in 
the last communist cabinet In addition, Oleksy’s allegiances became a topic of debate 
once more in December 1995 when outgoing Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej 
Milczanowski (minister in Walesa’s Chancellery) alleged that he had documents proving 
that Oleksy had collaborated with the Soviet intelligence and had continued to serve the 
Russian intelligence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Oleksy resigned in January 
1996.
Another Important development of 1995 was the signing of several agreements between 
Russia and Belarus, which made the prospect o f Belarusian reintegration into Russia 
probable. Agreements on friendship and cooperation, customs regulations and joint border 
protection were signed between the two countries in February and were ratified by the 
Belarusian parliament in A p r il.B e la ru s  also joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
Programme in January 1995 but declared that it would keep its participation in the 
programme at a minimal ievel.®^ This was a confirmation that Belarusian objections to 
NATO enlargement were due to the threat the Belarusian leadership perceived from
®® stawomir Popowski, ''Moskwa: ostra reakcja byta potrzebna Warszawa: nie choemy zaostrzac sporu", 
Rzeczpospolita, 03 March 1995.
Piotr Jendroszczyk, ‘‘Andriej Kozyriew wqtpi w przyjazne stosunki", Rzeczpospolita, 17 May 1995.
®° "Premier: targowisko, a nie targowica", Rzeczpospolita, 22 April 1995.
"Yeltsin And Lukashenka Sign Accords", Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (hereafter RFE/RL 
Newsline), 22 February 1995 and "Belarusian Parliament Agrees to Referendum, Ratifies Russian Treaty", 
RFE/RL Newsline, 14 April 1995.
“  "Belarusian Foreign Minister In Brussels”, OMRI Daily Digest, 10 January 1995.
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NATO, This was, as Burant noted, unlike the Ukrainian opposition which stemmed from 
the fear that such a move would consign Ukraine to Russia's sphere of influence.®®
While relations with Belarus were set to sour, Poland undertook some Initiatives towards 
Ukraine to foster closer ties. The Presidential Consultative Committee (established in 1993 
but dormant since summer 1994) was reactivated and a decision was taken to create a 
joint Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion in October iggs.®'* Poland also supported 
Ukraine’s inclusion in regional fora such as Central European Initiative (CEI) at its October 
meeting and Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) at its September 
summit.®®
By 1995 EP debate was in full swing. However, the “camps" were far from consolidating. 
The domestic and international events of 1995 signalled the increasing complexity of 
issues concerning EP. In addition, being in government tempered the views of most 
adherents of the “pro-Russian camp". As a result, the debate ceased to be an exchange 
between camps and became much more diversified. Therefore, most commonly discussed 
issues will be presented here and, the main arguments, highlighted.
4.2.2.2 Eastern Policy and ULB
The resignation of Olechowski and public consternation about the domestic strife over EP 
sparked the debate at the beginning of 1995. Dziewanowski wrote a newspaper article 
called “An extensive debate is needed" on 24 January 1995 where he expressed his 
frustration over the recent fight between Olechowski and Pawlak.®® He argued that the 
public was alarmed over this fight at the top of the state. He emphasised the necessity to 
leave aside internal differences and unite against external threats. He wrote that fears 
about external threat from the East were well founded and warned against indifference to 
the signals coming from the East. In his opinion there was need for a "vivisection” of the 
different concepts and ideas floating around in the country.
Dziewanowski’s proposal was taken up by Antoni Kamihski, a professor at the institute of 
Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, in an article titled “Why Poland does not 
have an Eastern policy” .®^  Kamihski drew attention to the Russian-Belarusian 
rapprochement and Belarusian President Lukashenko’s decision in February 1995 to
Stephen R. Burant, “Foreign Policy and National Identity: A Comparison of Ukraine and Belarus", Europe- 
Asia Studies, Vol. 47, 1995, No.7, p. 1134.
®'* Stephen R. Burant, Poland, Ukraine and the Idea of Strategic Partnership, The Carl Beck Papers, 
Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh, 1999, p. 19.
®® Kataryna Wolczuk and Roman Wolczuk, Poland and Ukraine: A Strategic Partnership in a Changing 
Europe?, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002, pp. 15-16.
®® Kazimierz Dziewanowski, "Potrzeba wielkiej debaty", Rzeczpospolita, 24 January 1995.
Antoni Kamihski, “DIaczego Polska nie ma polityki wschodniej", Rzeczpospolita, 08 March 1995.
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suspend all arms reduction under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
(CFE). He saw this move as a gesture by Belarus towards Russia and argued that 
economic ties between these two countries should give no reason for concern while 
military ties should. Poland did not react to this recent Belarusian decision and Kaminski 
identified two reasons for this: First, due to the lack of a functioning government, Foreign 
and Defence Ministries and a responsible PM, Poland could not be expected to give 
proper reactions to external events. Second, some politicians and commentators believed 
that the evolving Russian-Belarusian relations would be in Poland’s interest as the bigger 
the threat in the East, the better Poland’s chances of joining NATO (yet another 
interpretation of Giedroycian logic). Kaminski argued that this approach was mistaken 
because Poland actually had not one but two strategic security interests, namely 
integration into Western structures and maintaining the beneficial geostrategic position in 
the region created after 1991 by supporting the independence of Ukraine, Belarus and the 
Baltic states. He complained that currently foreign policy was built on only the former 
priority. The fact that the latter was totally neglected was down to the intellectual laziness 
of policy makers and one-dimensional thinking, reminiscent of the communist times. 
Implementation of both priorities at the same time would present many difficulties such as 
souring of relations with Russia. However, Poland did not have much dialogue with Russia, 
anyway, except on technical issues like pipelines or mutual debt. Russia bypassed Poland 
and talked about vital issues like NATO expansion directly with the West. By not having a 
clear EP, Poland would only aid Russian expansionism in the region.
A response to Kamihski came from Dziewanowski who argued that the two foreign policy 
priorities proposed by Kamihski could not be on equal footing as the actions necessitated 
by either might conflict and one had to take priority over the other.®® It was not possible to 
base Polish security on integration with the West and not raise any suspicions In the East. 
Ukraine and Belarus would react to Polish entry into the NATO but Poland could not afford 
to give up this Ideal in order to appease its neighbours because staying in the “buffer zone" 
or the “grey zone" would be beneficial neither to itself nor to Its neighbours. Dziewanowski 
agreed with Kamihski about the necessity to have better relations with Belarus, Ukraine 
and the Baltics but argued that the Western option should have priority over EP.
Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, a commentator on international affairs and the director of OSM, 
agreed with Kamihski about the absence of an EP concept.®® He believed that unclear and 
conflicting signs from Poland concerning EP damaged Poland’s relations with its East as 
they enhanced the Polish stereotype of a backstabbing, "treacherous and dishonest Lach" 
in the eyes of Russians and gave Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania the impression that 
Poland was ready to pay Russians with désintéressement in ULB in exchange for Russian
Kazimierz Dziewanowski, "Podyskutujmy o polskiej polityce wschodniej", Rzeczpospolita, 15 March 1995. 
Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, "Rozprawa z mitami", Rzeczpospolita, 20 May 1995.
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approval of Poland’s NATO accession. In his opinion, Poland had to ensure that ULB could 
sustain their independence and sovereignty so that they would be in a position to choose 
between a Western and Eastern orientation based on free will. He also expressed his total 
disagreement with Russian-friendly policies, exhibited especially by government circles, 
as, according to him, a friendly Russian neighbour was a myth. Poland and Russia had 
conflicting strategic interests in Miçdzymorze and Poland should not pretend otherwise:
For Poland independence of the countries in the Mi^dzymorze region was a condition for 
its stability and development whereas for Russia, this region was its natural sphere of 
influence.
In another article Kamihski dwelt on the Belarusian situation and Its significance for 
Poland.^® He wrote that Poland had failed to ask the vital question of why Russia was 
expanding its military sphere towards the West now that the Cold War was no more. He 
stated that Russia was quiet on that issue whereas Belarus was spilling the beans: 
Subsequent Belarusian governments had been telling their citizens for the last two years 
that Poland constituted a threat, hence the need fo ra  military union with Russia. Kamihski 
maintained that Belarus’s real objective was getting economic concessions from Russia, 
which, in his opinion, would not be enough to sustain the Belarusian economy in the long 
term. However, he foresaw a worsening of Polish-Belarusian relations as the Lukashenko 
regime would portray Poland as the enemy In order to legitimise itself, would accuse 
Poland of intervening in its domestic affairs and would put pressure on the Polish minority 
in Belarus (as no dictatorship liked minorities). He reckoned that Polish-Belarusian border 
might suddenly become the new axis of division in Europe, and the tension between the 
two countries would benefit no one but Russia, who would pretend to play the role of a 
mediator. He added that Ukraine was also increasingly pressurised by Russia to follow the 
Belarusian way. He criticised Polish foreign policy for not doing anything to correct the 
wrong perceptions of Poland created in the minds of Belarusians. What’s more, Belarusian 
domestic opposition would seek moral support from Poland but Kamihski believed that 
they would not get any as, in his opinion, Poles “get furious when the world is indifferent to 
Polish suffering, but fail to be moved by others’ suffering.”
Kamihski also commented on relations with Ukraine.^'' He dismissed the SLD argument 
that only special relations with Russia could strengthen Poland’s position vis-à-vis the 
West. Intensification of relations with Ukraine or Belarus would alienate Russia, risk 
Poland’s stability by bringing it closer to unstable countries and prompt the West to see it 
as a sign of Poland’s lack of interest in the West. Kamihski repeated the 
Giedroycian/Pilsudskiite maxim that Ukrainian independence guaranteed the security and 
stability of Poland. He dismissed sceptics’ claim that Poland had nothing to offer Ukraine:
Antoni Z. Kaminski, "Wzajemne i sprzeczne interesy", Rzeczpospolita, 26 June 1995.
Antoni Z Kamihski, "Potrzebna strefa stabiinosci", Rzeczpospolita, 13 November 1995.
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Even though Poland could not afford to offer material help, it could still extend moral, 
organisational and technical help which were not less important. After all, Poland was only 
a poor cousin for the West but an equal partner for the countries in its region. Kamihski 
argued that Poland had to start efforts at home in order to have good relations with 
Ukraine and tackle the problems of its Ukrainian minority and work for reconciliation 
between the two countries about historical conflicts.
4.2.2.3 Russia
An important intellectual contribution to the debates on Russian-Polish relations was a 
book titled Polska-Rosja. Czas przewartosciowan, a collection of papers presented in late 
1994 at a conference at the University of Warsaw and published In 1995.^^ Even though 
the contributors to the volume were academics, un affiliated with any of the post-communist 
(or neo-Dmowskiite) parties, the book included opinions reminiscent of those advocated by 
the “pro-Russian camp”. This demonstrates that the arguments o f the "Pro-Russian camp" 
in 1994 were not momentarily fashionable ideas spurred by the electoral victory of the 
post-communists.
One of the contributors, Andzej Drawicz, a professor of Slavic philology, criticised 
governments, former and current, for basing their foreign policy towards Russia on faulty 
premises.^® First, governments presumed everlasting enmity between Poland and Russia. 
As that would inevitably lead to conflict, they pretended to have friendly relations with 
Russia while trying by every possible means to enter Western defence structures, which 
was the only aim that counted. Second, governments thought that when Poland faced the 
inevitable security conflict with Russia, it would prevail thanks to its membership in the 
Western alliance. Drawicz called the first approach “incompetent hypocrisy" and warned 
that history taught Poles not to rely on any alliance in times of crisis. He added that for the 
West relations with Russia, and not with Poland, was a priority and anti-Russian 
sentiments in Poland (especially when expressed overtly through what he called "a festival 
of anti-Russian commemorations" like the 50**’ anniversary of Warsaw Uprising) caused 
dismay in the West. Drawicz also wrote that it was not sensible o f Poland to demand 
apologetic gestures from Russia for the wrongs the Soviet Union had done and to treat 
historical injustices done to it as exclusive. The majority o f sufferers were actually the 
citizens of ex-Soviet countries and Russia and Poland had to be in solidarity with them. In 
an interview he gave to Rzeczpospolita daily, Drawicz opined that Russia was ready to 
accept Polish entry into NATO but was trying sell its approval at the highest price
Stanisiaw Bielen (Ed.), Polska-Rosja. Czas przewartosciowah, Warszawa: Centrum Badart Wschodnich, 
1995. (hereafter Po/s/fa-Rosya)
Andrzej Drawicz, ‘'Przewartosclowania wstosunkach polsko-rosyjskich" in Polska-Rosja, pp. 10-15.
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possible/'* It was the West and Poland that gave Russia this opportunity by acknowledging 
Russia's right to have a say in this matter.
The editor of the volume, Stanistaw Bieleh, a political scientist at the Institute of 
International Relations of Warsaw University, also referred to the anti-Russian sentiment 
among Poles and argued that Russophobia could only be eliminated in the long term as a 
result of the continual cooperation of government agencies, mass media and public 
institutions and not by sporadic and extravagant proposals like the one put forward by 
Geremek and Jerzy Mi lews ki (a close aid to Walçsa) outlining a popular education 
programme against Russophobia.*'® Bieleh criticised the foreign service for not making 
enough effort to convince Russians that Poland’s integration with the West was not 
directed against Russia or any other neighbour.
In the same volume Bogumit Rychtowski, a political scientist, argued that if NATO 
enlargement proceeded without the creation of a new security structure with the 
participation of Central and East European countries, Russia would perceive this 
expansion as a breach of the political settlement it had reached with the West and a direct 
threat at its borders.*'® This would strengthen neoimperialist political tendencies in Russia. 
Rychtowski, like commentators affiliated with the government, maintained that it was in 
Poland’s interest that Russia participated in the same security system that Poland aspired 
to take part in through membership in NATO. He also criticised the missionary activities of 
Polish clergy in Russia, which was perceived by Russians as "Polish expansionism”. This 
issue was set to poison bilateral relations on many occasions In the future.
The Western option was as robust as the pro-Russian one: The book was criticised by a 
Rzeczpospo//fa journalist, Stawomir Popowski, in his review titled “The discreet beauty of 
dependence”.*'*' He criticised the contributors for suggesting that partnership with Russia 
might be an alternative to a Western orientation. He argued that regardless of whether 
Russia was democratic or not, it did not offer a viable alternative to NATO and other 
Western structures. Joining the West was not only about security but also about political 
and civilisational progress. Polish and Russian geopolitical interests were fundamentally 
irreconcilable. Popowski also found the criticisms levelled against Polish governments and 
diplomats unfair. He maintained that even if they had had a much more active policy 
(bilateral, economic or social) towards Russia, they would not have changed anything as 
for Russia security concerns dominated over every other aspect. Popowski accused the
*''* stawomir Popowski, Interview with Andrzej Drawicz, Rzeczpospolita, 20 May 1995.
Stanistaw Bielen, “Oczeklwania Polski wobec Rosjl" In Poiska-Rosja, pp. 31-51.
Bogumit Rychtowski, "Stosunki polsko-rosyjskle w warunkach transformacjl systemowej" In Polska-Rosja, 
pp. 16-30.
Stawomir Popowski, "Dyskretny urok zaleznoscl", Rzeczpospolita, 10 May 1995.
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authors of trying to absolve Russia of its wrongs and interpret all its moves as the natural 
right o f a great power.
Like Popowski, Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska, a former Solidarity activist and Charge 
d'Affaires of the Polish Embassy in Moscow, and Nowakowski levelled their critique 
against the pro-Russian rhetoric and debated the signals given by the SLD-PSL coalition 
government’s foreign policy to Russia. They argued that blame for the worsening of 
relations with Russia did not lie In the foreign policies conducted by post-Solidarity 
governments as first, the current coalition declared itself for the continuation of the main 
policy line formulated after 1989 and second, relations with Russia broke down after the 
current coalition was established and not before. They explained how some of the signals 
given by this government were perceived by Russia and pointed out the consequences: 
The SLD-PSL government gave the impression that first, they were more open to 
suggestions and demands from Russia than post-Solidarity governments were; second, 
they would consider any positive gesture by the Russian government as a success; third, 
they put economic success and strategic political interests on the same footing. Fourth, the 
Russian government was led to believe that they would conduct negotiations, especially on 
economic matters, with cadres who used to conduct them with the Soviet Union before 
1989, and an atmosphere would be created whereby any reaction to Russia would be 
interpreted as unjustified phobia. Fifth, the Polish political scene was presented as one 
which was divided into two: cooperative coalition members and the uncooperative rest.
In a different article Magdziak-Miszewska examined the weight historical issues bore on 
Russian-Polish relations.*'® According to her, the Russian elite considered the pro-Western 
orientation of Poland as treason. The removing of statues and monuments 
commemorating the Soviet liberation of Poland during the Second World War were seen 
as “historical amnesia” and utmost ingratitude on the part of Poles. The Russian elite 
accepted themselves as the rightful successors of the Soviet Union but not of its crimes 
as, in their opinion, Russians were the first and foremost victims of these crimes.
Therefore, Russia had no reason to extend any apology to Poland for incidents like Katyn. 
Magdziak-Miszewska argued that this attitude stemmed not from ill will but from Soviet 
historiography and propaganda. This created a major problem, however, as for Poland a 
full explanation of the Katyn Incident was essential in order to have amicable relations in 
the future. Magdziak-Miszewska also pointed out that the adverse effect of Yeltsin’s 
absence at the commemoration of the 50**’ anniversary of Warsaw Uprising and at Katyn 
memorial, and Walesa’s absence in Moscow on the 9*” of May (which was interpreted as a 
demonstration of anti-Russian attitude).
Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska and Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, “Rosja i jej przyjaciele", Rzeczpospolita, 12 
October 1995.
Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska, “Partnerstwo, ale regionalne’’, Rzeczpospolita, 16 November 1995.
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4.2.2.4 Eastern Markets
Even though more concrete and objective data was available about trade and economic 
trends than about foreign policy, Eastern markets had not ceased to be a contested 
subject. Debate centred on Russian trade and markets and the linkages between choices 
in economic policy and foreign policy orientation. Trade with ULB featured much less often, 
not only because of the limited volume of bilateral trade compared with Russia but also 
due to high uncertainty about the trajectories of economic and political transformation in 
these countries.®® The latter was also true for Russia but Poland’s dependence on Russian 
energy and raw material Imports and the sheer size of the Russian market guaranteed a 
predominant position for Russia within the debate.
Michat Dobroczynski, a professor in the Department of Economic Sciences and Director of 
Centre for Eastern Markets, had faith In the progress of economic relations among Central 
and East European countries whose trading patterns were disrupted due to po litica l. 
systemic change and trading anomalies of the communist period.®* He argued that trade 
between these countries should develop faster than their trade with the economically and 
politically stable Western countries. He stated that the reform process in the ex-Soviet 
states was progressing, contrary to the sensationalist stories in the press, and similar 
reform trajectories in Poland and its East and geographical proximity made intensification 
of economic ties a natural process. In this sense, it was no coincidence that Polish exports 
to Russia Increased by about 60% In the first half of 1994. Dobroczynski argued that 
Pollsh-Russian economic exchange would intensify regardless of each countries' relations 
with the EU or with other international organisations. However, the crucial factor In whether 
the economic ties would deepen or not would be the nature of processes of "civilisational 
change ”. If both countries maintain similar paths to transformation, it would accelerate not 
only economic exchange but also political and cultural proximity.
Poland's foreign trade turnover with ULB and Russia in 1993-95 was as follows:
Year 1993 1994 1995
C ountry (In thousand US Dollars)
Lithuania Exports 45,634 113,313 189,401
Imports 90,459 78,571 66,704
B elarus Exports 103,208 136,582 240,634
Imports 114,093 165,514 238,397
Ukraine Exports 187,717 280,394 742,620
Imports 201,126 204,892 290,760
ULB C om bined Exports 336,559 530,289 1,172,655
Imports 405,678 448,977 595,661
R ussia Exports 644,583 934,588 1,274,249
Imports 1,271,338 1,453,096 1,959,786
Data from Rocznik Statystyczny Handiu Zagranicznego, 1995 and 1996, Warszawa: Giowny Urzad 
Statystyczny, 1995 and 1996.
MIchat DobroczyrtskI, "Polska jako partner gospodarki rosyjskiej” in Polska-Rosja, pp. 69-104.
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Another professor at the Centre for Eastern Markets and the Department of Management 
at Warsaw University, Marek Kostrzewski, agreed with Dobroczynski and mentioned 
Poland's and CEFTA countries' dependence on Russian raw materials: In 1994 Poland's
trade with CEFTA (including Slovenia) amounted to 1,844 million USD but trade with 
Russia to 2,369 million USD. Kostrzewski pointed out that Poland should develop 
cooperation not only with the EU, CEFTA or Baltic Council countries but also with its East. 
He maintained that Russian propositions for economic cooperation were often ignored by 
CEFTA countries as they perceived political motives and a possible demand for 
concessions behind each initiative. He opposed claims that close economic ties with 
Russia would harm Poland's reliability in the West and delay Polish accession to European 
structures. He said “Let us not be ‘whiter than white’. Association agreements with the EU 
or CEFTA do not prohibit Poles, Czechs or Hungarians from entering another free trade 
area or customs union, let alone having normal trade relations.” He reminded that the EU 
itself had signed a partnership and cooperation agreement with Russia In 1994 which 
mentioned the possibility of beginning negotiations in 1998 on creating a free trade area 
between the two parties. He believed that CEFTA should start membership talks with 
Russia as soon as possible. If Belarus, who applied to join CEFTA, was accepted, Russia 
and Kazakhstan would automatically be a part of the organisation's territory as Belarus 
had signed a customs union treaty with the latter on 1 June 1995. This was similar to 
Liechtenstein's indirect accession to the EU but bearing in mind Russia's size and 
potential, direct negotiations should be preferred over entry “through the back door”. 
Kostrzewski believed that Poland for the first time in history had captured an opportunity to 
have good relations with the East and had to, consequently, avoid wasting it.
Magdziak-Miszewska was not as optimistic as Kostrzewski or Dobroczynski.®® She 
disagreed with the argument that Poland had lost the Eastern markets. In her opinion 
Poland never lost the Eastern markets because It had never functioned as an independent 
actor in a competitive free market environment. It was a mistake to think that Poland would 
have a privileged position in the Russian market and that Russians would be willing to 
exchange their oil with Polish potatoes instead of hard currency. She doubted that the 
improvement of the political climate between Russia and Poland would effect sudden 
changes in economic relations. Nor would it compel the Russian government to exempt 
Polish produce from competition. The only way to develop trade would be to lift 
unnecessary barriers burdening the entrepreneurs. She mentioned the opposing school of 
thought, whose argument was demonstrated by Arkadii Volskii of the Russian Union of 
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE) at a meeting of Polish and Russian businessmen 
in February 1995. Volskii, as Magdziak-Miszewska cited, said that Western markets were 
not easily accessible to Polish and Russian goods so a return to forms of cooperation.
Marek Kostrzewski, "Nie przegrajmy Wschodu”, Rzeczpospolita, 06 November 1996. 
Magdziak-Miszewska, "Partnerstwo. ale regionalne", Rzeczpospolita, 16 November 1995.
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which had been tried out in the past, was advisable. Magdziak-Miszewska left it to the 
reader to make out the political agenda behind Volskii's speech where he openly stated 
that the reintegration of CMEA countries was unavoidable and the electoral victory of 
socialists in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Kyrgyzstan was evidence of that.
4.2.3 The Debate on Minimalism
4.2.3.1 The Background 1996-2001
Throughout the 1990s Poland’s foreign policy went through a process of stabilisation and 
consolidation (in contrast with the constant fragmentation In domestic politics). The 
Western orientation, already the main pillar of Polish foreign policy since the early 1990s, 
brought about concrete developments as Poland became a member of NATO in 1999, 
having been invited to join In 1997 and the EU opened negotiations with Poland in 1998 
which led to full membership in 2004. Consolidation was also aided by the 1997 
constitution which clarified the appointment procedures and competences of state organs 
responsible for foreign policy. The absence of a large-scale conflict on the main directions 
of foreign policy between the President, Foreign Ministry and offices working on EU 
accession was evident despite the replacement of the post-communist coalition 
government with a post-Solidarity one towards the end of 1997.
In contrast to the steady progression of integration with the West, Poland’s relations with 
its East remained troublesome. Relations with Russia remained tense and bilateral trade 
was hit by the 1998 financial crisis in Russia. Poland froze its political contacts with 
Belarus and limited relations to economic and cultural contacts. Relations with Ukraine, on 
the other hand, developed steadily, notwithstanding ongoing conflict about historical 
issues, such as the controversy surrounding the restoration of the Orlqt Cemetery in Lwow, 
“Strategic partnership” with Ukraine became even more emphasised by Polish politicians 
after Ukraine withdrew its objections to Poland’s NATO membership in 1998.®'* Ukraine 
adopted a pro-Western rhetoric as well even though it had certain reservations about 
Poland’s accession to the EU, especially the possible adverse effects of implementation of 
Schengen regime on Polish borders. Meanwhile, within the atmosphere of ever-closer 
“strategic partnership”, Poland claimed to be the main advocate o f Ukraine in the West and 
the EU. During a visit to Ukraine, Kwasniewski said that Poland would support Ukraine’s 
efforts to sign an association agreement with the EU and criticised the West for having 
double standards towards Ukraine and not supporting the reform process.®® Poland’s 
gestures towards Ukraine were not limited to declarations of support. Foreign Minister
®'* Mirostaw Cieélik, “Stosunki z Ukrainq '^ In Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 1999, Warszawa: Zarzqd 
Obstugi MSZ, 2000, http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/(accessed 01 April 2006)
"Przeciwko podwôjnej mierze”, Rzeczpospolita, 16 January 1999.
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Geremek also promised Ukraine that Poland would work towards maintaining the visa-free 
regime on the Polish-Ukrainian border.®® This was at best an empty gesture and at worst 
clear hypocrisy as Poland did not even request any derogations from the Schengen treaty 
from the beginning o f the negotiations and committed itself in its position paper for 
negotiations on Justice and Home Affairs to implement fully the Schengen acquis.®*' Such 
bold promises by a country which was itself in the waiting room of the EU caused dismay 
among EU politicians.®®
Yet another example of Poland’s gestures towards Ukraine was Poland’s rejection in July 
2000 of a Russian proposal to build a second natural gas pipeline from the Yamal 
peninsula through Belarus (bypassing Ukraine) on the grounds that such a project would 
harm the strategic interests of Ukraine.®® This triggered intensive debate in the media and 
among academics.®® However, the gesture proved to be empty yet again as by 2001 
Poland quietly withdrew its objection to the building of the second pipeline through Belarus.
Despite tensions in relations with Russia and Belarus and a rather incomplete “strategic 
partnership” with Ukraine, Poland seemed to entertain high aspirations for its EP. Geremek 
gave in his annual expose in 1999 clear signs of Poland’s intention to play a part in 
determining the future EP o f the EU by suggesting that the Weimar Triangle could become 
a forum to discuss EU strategies towards Russia and, especially, Ukraine.®* Geremek and 
his successor Wtadystaw Bartoszewski reiterated, in 1999 and 2000, Poland’s ambitions of 
active participation in the making of EP of the EU and NATO by means of its knowledge of 
and experience in the region.®^
Piotr Kosciftski, “Wizyjak najpôzniej", Rzeczpospolita, 16 September 1998.
®*' Poland’s negotiation position in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (adopted by the Council of Ministers of 
the Republic of Poland, 05 October 1999)
http://www.negocjacje.gov.pl/neg.nsf/xml/stne2 (accessed 06 November 2006)
®® See "Polish Policy vis-à-vis Ukraine and How it is Perceived in EU Member States
(Transcript of a Debate)”, Reports & Analyses, No. 2/00, Warsaw: Center for International Relations, 2000.
® Jan Maksymiuk, "Politicians Express Concern over Gas Pipeline Project Bypassing Ukraine”, RFE/RL 
Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report, Vol. 2, 25 July 2000, No. 26.
For instance a conference was held at the Centre for International Relations in Warsaw on 11 December 
2000 on the EU-Russian strategic partnership and its effects on Polish foreign policy where one of the subjects 
covered was Russian energy imports to Europe, For transcript of debates see "Unia Europejska a Rosja- 
strategiczne partnerstwo? Wyzwania dia polskiej polityki zagranicznej”, Warszawa 11 grudnia 2000 r. Materiaty 
z konferencji Centrum Stosunkôw Miçdzynarodowych", Reports & Analyses, No. 2/01, Warsaw: Center for 
International Relations, 2001.
Bronislaw Geremek, Informacja rzq^ du o podstawowych klerunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski. 
Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 3 Kadencja, 47 Posiedzenie, 1 Dzieh, 08 April 1999.
Bronislaw Geremek, Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o podstawowych klerunkach polityki 
zagranicznej Polski, 3 kadencja, 78 posiedzenie, 1 dzieh, 09 May 2000) and Wladyslaw Bartoszewski 
Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o podstawowych klerunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski and 
Informacja rzq,du o stanie negocjacji Polski z Uniq, Europejskq.. Sprawozdania stenograficzne,V kadencja, 110 
posiedzenie, 2 dzieh, 06 June 2001.
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4.2.S.2 The debate
The 2000-2001 debate on EP was precipitated by ambitious declarations by policy makers 
about Poland’s new, leading role in the region and by discussions surrounding the valiant 
(but empty) gestures of the government towards Ukraine. The debate was triggered by an 
article titled “ In Praise of Minimalism" by Bartfomiej Sienkiewicz, an expert on Russia at the 
Centre for Eastern Studies {Osrodek Studiow Wschodnich - OSW), in the weekly Tygodnik 
Powszechny on the last week of December 2000.®® Sienkiewicz wrote that subsequent 
governments after 1989 had pursued an EP that was loyal In essence to the Giedroyc- 
Mieroszewski EP concept. Even though integration with the West and the Kuitura EP 
concept were the only doctrines in Polish foreign policy, many commentators, especially 
those affiliated with Kultura, complained that the Third Republic had neglected ULB. 
According to Sienkiewicz, growing dissatisfaction with the policy outcomes of Poland’s EP 
(especially towards ULB) was a result not as much of objective underachievement but o f 
unrealistic expectations (delusions) among the political elite concerning Poland’s role in 
the Miçdzymorze region. He listed three of these delusions;
That Poland was a viable adversary for Russia in Miçdzymorze: In fact Russia saw 
Poland as a servant o f Western policies in the region and not an independent foreign 
policy actor
That Poland had a duty to cultivate civil society in ex-Soviet states: Such an attempt at 
“social engineering” could not succeed. Social transformation in post-Soviet states were 
fundamentally different from those in Central Eastern Europe. It was unrealistic to expect 
the ex-Soviet states to rid themselves of vestiges of their Soviet past.
That ex-Soviet states were considered to have democratic governance but in practice they 
were far from being democracies. The communist party nomenklatura were still in key 
political positions and the democratic opposition, whom the Polish elite had much faith in, 
had no political clout
Sienkiewicz went on to propose a more realistic diagnosis o f the situation. Accordingly, 
Russia was the key political and economic factor for Poland's EP. Poland could expect to 
have a predictable foreign policy only towards Lithuania and Ukraine as Belarus had 
subordinated itself to Russian policies. In contrast, Ukraine managed to uphold its 
sovereignty in the face of Russian onslaught but a civilisational chasm still divided Poland 
and Ukraine. Poland had no real economic or political instruments to influence Ukraine's
Barttomlej Sienkiewicz, “Delusions and Dilemmas of Poland's Eastern Policy: In Praise of Minimalism", The 
Polish Foreign Affairs Digest (hereafter PFAD), Vol. 1, 2001, No.1, pp. 227-237. (translation from Tygodnik 
Powszechny, 24-31 December 2000, No. 52-53)
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transformation. Neither could it bolster Ukrainian economic autonomy by competing with 
Russian capital In the Ukrainian privatisation market. Sienkiewicz argued that the recent 
issue of rerouting the second Yamal pipeline was the first occasion where Poland could 
make a significant impact in the region.
Sienkiwicz’s main message was that for an effective foreign policy in Miçdzymorze loyal to 
the Kultura EP concept, Poland should have a realistic perception of its capabilities.
Poland should not expect to influence relations between Russia and ex-Soviet countries, 
accelerate their nation building processes, further their democracies or make choices on 
their behalf about political orientation or cultural affiliation. Sienkiewicz argued that such 
minimalism would bring about a realistic appraisal of Poland’s interests and capabilities in 
the region, preventing disappointment caused by not fulfilling long-cherished “historical 
ambitions’’.
The first reaction to Sienkiewicz came from Wojciech Maziarski, a journalist at the daily 
Gazeta Wyborcza and the former editor of Obôz, who advocated a visionary attitude 
towards EP.®"* Maziarski referred to solidarity between the intellectuals in Central Europe 
(including Ukraine and Belarus) in the 1980s and argued that such cooperation was 
regrettably no longer considered, in his words, “cool”. He wrote that Poland should not 
budge under the EU’s pressure and, following the Kultura programme of cultivating closer 
ties with ULB, continue to maintain an open border for its Eastern neighbours. He 
expressed his belief in the cultivation of pro-Ukrainian and pro-Belarusian opinion in 
Poland in order to enhance the civilisational unity of Central and Eastern Europe against 
the threat of Russian imperialism.
Sienkiewicz retorted with an article in Tygodnik Powszechny where he called Maziarski’s 
views “daydreaming” only to be countered by a new article by Maziarski in the same 
paper.®® Polemics turned into a full-fledged debate carried on mainly in Tygodnik 
Powszec/?ny throughout 2001 as well as In other publications. Two camps could be 
discerned in the debate: The Realist/Pragmatic/Minimalist camp, who agreed with 
Sienkiewlcz’s opinions and the Idealist/Romantic/Prometheist camp, who, like Maziarski, 
disagreed.
Wojciech Maziarski, “Gdzie jest môj sqsiad?”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 06 January 2001.
®® Bartfomiej Sienkiewicz, “Dispute on Poland's Eastern Policy: Daydreaming is Detrimental’’ (translation from 
Tygodnik Powszechny, 21 January 2001, No.3) and Wojciech Maziarski, “Harmful Views” (translation from 
Tygodnik Powszechny, 04 February 2001, No.5), PFAD, Vol. 1, 2001, No.1, pp, 238-245 and pp. 247-248.
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4.2 3.3 Reaiist/Pragmatic/Wlinimalist Camp
Kazimierz Wôycicki, an expert in German history and director o f the Institute of Germany 
and Northern Europe in Sczczecin, supported the minimalist approach and argued that the 
gap between East and West Europe would widen but this would not necessarily be fatal for 
Poland as long as there was no threat to Poland's vital interests from the East.®® He 
maintained that Poland's future would no more depend on the events happening in its East 
or its EP. Poland had insufficient means to implement an independent EP but could still 
contribute towards an EU EP and offer the West know-how about contacts with the East.
Klaus Bachmann, a German journalist specialising in Poland, pointed to another reason for 
disappointment about the transformation in Poland’s Eastern neighbours: Public opinion, 
experts and politicians tried to analyse politics in the East with Western parameters and 
wrongly believed that there were only two alternatives for Ukraine, Russia or Belarus: 
either a Western liberal democracy and market or a return to the Soviet system.®*  ^He also 
criticised empty gestures towards Ukraine, like advocating its accession to the EU, which 
actually contradicted Poland’s interests as such an eventuality would produce a much 
weaker and unstable EU.
Darlusz Rosatl, former Foreign Minister, repeated the need to replace the romantic 
approach towards Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania with realism.®® In his opinion, the 
Giedroyc-Mieroszewski EP concept played an important role in Polish political thought. 
However, it was formulated at a time of different circumstances and did not entirely suit 
current realities. The concept presumed the creation of fully independent Belarus and 
Ukraine which would be anti-Russian. Rosati argued that given the lack of an alternative, 
these states found it difficult to completely break away from Russian domination. Even 
though it could advocate a pro-European model, Poland did not have the means to provide 
an alternative to these countries.
Tadeusz Olszanski, an expert on Ukraine at the Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, 
further questioned Giedroyc’s EP and pointed out that some of his views might be 
outdated.®® Referring to the Kultura programme on Miçdzymorze he wrote that “after the 
collapse of communism one had to part ways with make-believe ideas on post-communist 
states’ potential and capabilities, face Poland’s weakness and that o f her neighbours...”.
He argued that the Pitsudskiite historical maxim, much cherished by Kultura, of “There may
Kazimierz Wôycicki, “Nasz los nie decyduje siç za Bugiem", Rzeczpospolita, 27 January 2001.
®*' Klaus Bachmann, “Minimalizm czy konieczludzen?”, Unia&Polska, 16 April 2001.
“Polska polityka wschodnia, petny zapis debaty zorganizowanej przez Fundacjç im. Stefa na Batorego oraz 
redakcjq Tygodnika Powszechnego’ w dniu 21 marca 2001", Warsaw: Batory Foundation, 2001, pp. 15-16. 
(http://www.batory.org.pl/ftp/program/forum/ppw.pdf (accessed 21 February 2006)
Tadeusz Andrzej Olszanski, “Dispute on Poland's Eastern Policy: State interest Comes First", (translation 
from Tygodnik Powszechny, No.11,18 March 2001), PFAD, Vol. 1, 2001, No.1, pp. 263-267.
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be no free Poland without a free Ukraine” could become detrimental to Polish interests as 
It inherently implied an inevitable conflict with Russia. He noted that Ukrainians might be 
more conscious of Poland’s need to have good relations with Russia than the Polish 
political elite. Olszanski argued that the Ukrainians no longer needed Polish support to 
consolidate their statehood, and the Eastern orientation that dominated Ukrainian policies 
was a “sovereign choice” that Poland had to respect. Like Sienkiewicz, he stated that 
Polish NGOs might try to assist the growth of civil society and democracy in the East but 
that the Polish state should stay clear of such a patronising mission itself and not make it a 
foreign policy objective. There was one aspect o f Sienkiewicz’s article that Olszanski 
disagreed with; its title. He found It unsuitable as Poland was hardly a great power and use 
of such grand phraseology obscured the more down to earth issues like visas, regional 
cooperation which foreign policy should address.*°°
4.2.3.4 Idealist/Romantic/Prometheist Camp
Polish Nobel laureate and contributor to Kultura, Czeslaw Milosz, challenged Sienkiewicz’s 
claim about bringing a new interpretation to EP and argued that there had been 
proponents o f disengagement in Ukrainian and Belarusian affairs for a long time.*®* Milosz 
thought that Sienkiewicz overestimated the Westernness of Poland and, therefore, argued 
that there was a civilisational gap between Poland and its Eastern neighbours that made 
dialogue hard to sustain. He concluded by saying
... the minimalism advocated by ... Sienkiweicz is reminiscent of familiar slogans of national 
realism, or rather national self interest. While Sienkiewicz finds fault with foreign policy 
inspired by the ideas of Gledroyc and Mieroszewski, his own precepts do not seem likely to 
produce any salutary innovations.
Another commentator who criticised the realist camp for betraying the Giedroyc- 
Mieroszewski school of EP was Bogumila Berdychowska, a Ukrainian expert and Deputy 
Director of Radio Polonia.*®^ She dismissed the three "delusions" listed by Sienkiewicz: 
First, the fact that Russia considered Poland the servant o f the West did not automatically 
mean that Poland had no independent EP. Berdychowska asked, "Since when have 
beliefs held by Russians been a measure of reality?” Second, the development of civil 
societies in ULB was not a delusion but an actual ongoing process. There were already 
well-established civil society organisations in the region which even the Lukashenko 
regime could not destroy. Berdychowska agreed with Sienkiewicz about the third delusion
interview with Tadeusz Olszanski, 29 May 2002, Warsaw.
Czeslaw Milosz, “Against Minimalism" (translation from Tygodnik Powszechny, 04 March 2001, No.9),
PFAD, Vol. 1, 2001, No.1, pp. 249-250.
Bogumila Berdychowska, "Gledroyc Still Relevant" (translation from Tygodnik Powszechny, No. 9, 04 March 
2001), PFAD, Vol. 1, 2001, No.1, pp. 251-257.
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and admitted that democratic institutions in Ukraine and Belarus were weak. However, in 
her opinion, Poland still had to foster good relations with these countries and try to 
influence developments, regardless of how democratic transformation fared. Besides, 
there were significant political forces in these countries, advocating democracy and the 
free market.
Jerzy Pomianowski provided Kultura's reaction to the debate*®®: He argued that the 
minimalist approach was not a novelty. He gave examples of criticism directed at Kultura's 
EP in both neo-Dmowskiite publications like Mysl Polska and the daily Nasz Dzlennik and 
publications like Przeglq_d and the daily Trybuna, affiliated with post-communist circles. He 
claimed that the arguments of these critics were “antiquated and discredited” and they 
“ ignor[ed] new historical circumstances." In effect Gledroyc and Mieroszewski’s ideas 
remained unchallenged. Pomianowski stated that Sienkiewicz’s minimalism was in reality 
passivism and argued that if Gledroyc had followed minimalism 55 years earlier, there 
would be no Kultura which impacted on many people’s thinking in the East. He reiterated 
the traditional Kultura claim that post-1989 Polish governments were far from implementing 
the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski EP doctrine in their foreign policies. The facts listed by 
Sienkiewicz, such as Poland’s weakness in the ULB region or stunted democracy in these 
countries, were not caused as a result of the inadequacy of the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski EP 
doctrine, but of the passivity of Poland’s foreign policy. Pomianowski argued that Poland’s 
current foreign policy was minimalist enough and there was no need for further 
encouragement.
Pomianowski criticised Sienkiewicz’s and Olszahski’s opinions on Ukraine. He rejected the 
argument that there was a large cultural gap between Ukraine and the West (including 
Poland) but proximity between Ukraine and Russia and that Ukraine itself did not want 
independence. Pomianowski argued that Turkey had staunch pro-Western policies despite 
that fact that there was a wider gap between Turkey and the “Christian Europe”.*®"* He 
observed that 91% of Ukrainians had voted for independence and that the rise of an anti­
independence tendency was ephemeral. He wrote "... when Pitsudski's brigade liberated 
Kielce in 1914, its welcome were closed window shutters. The Congress Kingdom of 
Poland was praying for the Tsar. Luckily, moods tend to pass.”
Pomianowski maintained that Russia could either give up its expansionism and build a 
modern economy based on advanced technology or pursue its traditional policy of 
“appropriation of other nations’ land and natural resources". He argued that Russia’s
*®® Jerzy Pomianowski, “The Debate on Eastern Policy: Ail Possible Mistakes Have Already Been Made” 
(translation from Tygodnik Powszechny, 25 March 2001, No. 12), PFAD, Vol. 1, 2001, No.1, pp. 268-279.
Pomianowski seems to forget that the Ottoman Empire (considered as the predecessor of modern Turkey) 
had been a player in European diplomacy since the 15th century and the westernisation process started at a 
time when Ukraine was nowhere to be found on the map.
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profits from exploitation of Its natural energy resources discouraged it from developing 
other economic sources for income and supported the inclination to resort to traditional 
policies. An independent Ukraine was the main obstacle to Russian encroachment, which 
might spill over into other regions if the Ukrainian obstacle was removed. Pomianowski, a 
faithful believer In Poland’s grand mission in the East, argued that Poland could stop 
Russian expansionism and make Russia realise that "there is only one viable road which 
leads to development and peace” by supporting Ukraine. And continued, “Whoever thinks 
this goal can be achieved by cultivating minimalism and passivism plays a dangerous 
game which may have dire consequences."
4.3 CONCLUSION
The Polish EP debate developed in the 20*” century within a conceptual framework 
supported by continued reference firstly to the Pitsudskiite and Dmowskiite traditions and 
secondly to precepts developed under Kultura and systematised by Gledroyc and 
Mieroszewski. Many aspects under discussion became obsolete due to political, economic 
and systemic changes. For instance, the issue of possible Polish territorial claims 
concerning WiIno and Lwow, which was the crux of the émigré disagreement following the 
war, were by 1980s no more on the agenda of mainstream debate. Similarly, Poland’s 
prospective NATO membership had become a foregone conclusion by 1995 despite much 
ado about its desirability.
Despite changing international and domestic circumstances and relevance of specific 
issues under debate, the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski EP doctrine proved to be the most robust 
conceptual reference point for both foreign policy makers of the Third Republic and 
participants in intellectual debates. The doctrine enjoyed such high acclaim that it almost 
became a dogma. The 2000-01 debate on minimalism demonstrates the widespread 
acceptance o f the concept as a cornerstone of Polish foreign policy. Sienkiewicz’s and 
other “realists’" critical approach towards the concept was considered almost as heresy by 
many high profile commentators.
Polish foreign policy’s largely undisputed Western orientation achieved its main objections 
of Poland’s membership in NATO and the EU. Polish EP, on the other hand, will have to 
go through a period of reappraisal and adjustment as Poland tries to consolidate its place 
in the newly enlarged EU. Poland’s ambitions of influencing the EU Eastern Dimension will 
be a test case not only for the applicability of its EP agenda but also for the longevity of 
Giedroyc-Mieroszewski EP doctrine.
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This chapter aimed to give an outline of intellectual and academic debates that contributed 
to the conceptual development of Polish EP. The debate has evolved throughout the 
1990s, with the pro-Russian, pro-Western and Kultura camps at the outset and the 
diversification of the debate and blurring of camps. By the end of 1990s the existence of 
EP was no longer discussed but the debate intensified, questioning the aims and means of 
EP. While the minimalism debate set the tone for future appraisals of EP, with Poland’s 
imminent entry into the EU, Poland’s possible contribution to a common European policy 
towards Its East featured increasingly as a focal point of discussions. The following three 
chapters on Poland’s bilateral relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus will examine the 
events and policies that facilitated this conceptual evolution.
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C h a p t e r  F i v e
P o l a n d ’ s R e l a t i o n s  w i t h  R u s s i a
This chapter will present relations between Poland and Russia in the post-1989 period. It 
will be divided into thematic sections covering the most important issues that dominated 
bilateral relations. The first section will deal with the Impact of NATO enlargement on 
bilateral relations. Even though the issue of Poland’s accession to NATO ceased to be 
high on the foreign policy agenda following a reluctant Russian acceptance, the process of 
negotiations for NATO enlargement give important insight into the Polish perceptions of 
Russia and how Polish Eastern policy (EP) was rendered irrelevant when Russia chose to 
negotiate directly with the West. The second section will cover economic relations. A brief 
account of settlement of mutual debt will be given as weii as of the effects of EU 
enlargement on bilateral trade and Poland’s attempts to expand its exports into Eastern 
markets. The section will also present a recent scandal on the privatisation of a large 
Polish refinery and oil supply contracts. In both cases the allegations were made about 
murky relations between Polish politicians, businessmen and Russian oil giants and their 
designs on the Poiish energy market.
The third section will follow on the theme of the second and will study the circumstances of 
and controversies about the most important commodity in Polish-Russian trade, natural 
gas. It will highlight the politics surrounding gas supply contracts and the building and 
ownership of pipelines. The fourth section will explain security, economic and transport 
issues arising out of Poiand’s sharing a border with Russia’s Kaliningrad region. And the 
fifth section will cover historical and emotional issues that create controversies in bilateral 
relations. Although issues are many in number and large in scope, the section will highlight 
only the Katyn problem and Polish involvement in the Chechen problem. The chapter will 
not cover issues related to the Russian minority in Poland and Poles in Russia. The former 
is relatively small as a population and the issues relating to the latter are often surpassed 
in importance by more high profile agenda items relating to security policy or economic 
relations. It should also be mentioned that Poles in Russia are quite dispersed in terms of 
geographical location (unlike those in Ukraine or Belarus) so they do not play a significant 
role in regional or national Russian politics compared to their counterparts in Ukraine or 
Belarus.
5.1 THE IMPACT OF NATO ENLARGEMENT ON POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
NATO accession, considered by the Polish establishment as their biggest foreign policy 
success in the 1990s, was at the same time a thorn in the already troubled Polish-Russian
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relations. The issue was, however, far from a bilateral one and Poland, even though a 
subject of the NATO enlargement issue, was often not even considered by Russia as an 
opponent or an influential actor in the conflict. Russia saw it as a case between itself and 
the West (mainiy the US) and Poland as only a willing participant, without much say over 
the final decision. Accordingly, enlargement was a strategic plan devised primarily to 
safeguard Western interests by encroaching on Russian ones rather than to provide 
security for Central Eastern Europe. Consecutive Polish governments complained about 
Russia talking to the West over their heads and ignoring Poland’s role in the NATO 
enlargement issue. However, the gravity of the issue surpassed Poland's self image 
problems. Despite the fact that NATO enlargement was very much a US and the West 
versus Russia affair, its implication and expected consequences cast a shadow over 
Polish-Russian relations.
5.1.1 Early 1990s
Poland established relations with NATO as early as 21 March 1990 when Foreign Minister 
Krzysztof Skubiszewski paid a visit to NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Soon after that, in 
July 1990 NATO invited aii Warsaw Pact states to establish regular diplomatic relations 
with the alliance.^ On 26 November 1990 the North Atlantic Assembly gave observer 
status to MPs from Poland and other Warsaw Pact countries. In his address to the 
Assembly Skubiszewski argued that the Warsaw Pact was defunct as a defence 
organisation and “a system of collective security, including possibly collective defence, 
embracing the whole of Europe”, which benefited from the institutional capabilities of 
CSCE with the participation of NATO was needed. Skubiszewski ruled out a “broadening 
of the obligations resulting from the North Atlantic Alliance” or “an expansion of the area 
where it is competent to act” and added that “nothing should be done to create a sense of 
apprehension or suspicion on the part of the Soviet Union.”  ^At that point neither Poland 
nor NATO had any incentive to initiate radical changes in their security and defence 
policies. For Poland, which was pursuing a two-track policy, angering the Soviet Union was 
too risky while talks on withdrawal of Soviet troops were under way. For NATO and the 
West, extending the alliance’s capabilities to a new area under circumstances of high 
uncertainty was not reasonable.
However, following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact on 1 July 1991 and the failed 
Moscow coup in August, Poland, alongside other Visegrad states, took a bolder line and 
expressed its intention to join NATO in October 1991. NATO’s answer was the
 ^ London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, North Atiantic Council, London 05-06 July 
1990, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm (accessed 11 March 2007).
 ^"Polska a bezpieczenstwo europejskie - przemowienie ministra sprawzagranicznych RP Krzysztofa 
Skubiszewskiego, do Zgromadzenia Pdlnocnoatlantyckiego, Londyn, 29 listopada 1990 r.’’, Zbiôr Dokumentow, 
Vol. 526, 1991, No. 4, pp.7-17.
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establishment o f the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) with the participation of 
not only the Visegrad countries but also Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
the Soviet Union. Poland, alongside Visegrad states, was disappointed with NACC as it 
put all ex-Warsaw Pact countries on an equal footing in terms of relations with NATO. As 
Kobrinskaya put it, "it did not satisfy their ambitions to get a special regard of the West as 
the ‘pioneers’ of the velvet revolutions.’’  ^ Poland’s disappointment with NACC was 
reflected in Lech W atçsa’s brainchild, NATO-bis, a proposed regional defence organisation 
which was supposed to fill in the security vacuum in Central Eastern Europe and form a 
stepping stone towards NATO membership. The idea was floated by Poland at a Visegrad 
summit in September 1992 but failed to garner any support.
At this stage even though the Polish government, made up of post-Solidarity parties, was 
trying to make NATO membership a foreign policy priority, there was no consensus on 
what direction Polish security policy would assume. Competing proposals ranged from 
cooperation of Miçdzymorze states to establishing a new military balance in Europe (by 
the Confederation for Independent Poland, Konfederacja Polski Niepodlegfej ~ KPN) to 
relying on a national army strong enough to guarantee sovereignty (Christian National 
Union, Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko-Narodowe - ZChN).'’ The largest opposition party 
(Democratic Left Alliance, Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej - SLD) was also against NATO 
membership, mostly due to fears of harming Polish-Russian relations. The SLD believed 
that NATO and the W est’s policy towards Poland was Inevitably a function of their policies 
towards Russia so Poland could not rely on Western security guarantees and hence 
should create a security system based on bilateral agreements and regional pacts created 
within the OSCE® framework (the organisation on which Russians proposed building the 
new European security architecture).® SLD conceded that Poland might join NATO but not 
before NATO redefined its own strategy within the new geopolitical context. Besides,
Polish entry into NATO would stretch the alliance’s borders to Bug, and worsen Poland’s 
relations with Russia.^
 ^ Irina Kobrinskaya, "Implications of the PfP Program and Perspectives of NATO Enlargement on the Reform of 
the Military in the Central Eastern European States and Impact on Russian Domestic and Foreign Policy”, 
NATO Research Fellowship Final Report, 1998, pp. 7-8. http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/ (accessed 07 
March 2007).
Jadwiga Stachura, "Partie polityczne a polska polityka zagraniczna” in Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 
(RPPZ) 1992, Warszawa: Zarz^d Obstugi MSZ, 1992, http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/(accessed 01 
April 2006)
® Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) changed its name to Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) at its Budapest summit in December 1994. For reasons of consistency 
OSCE will be used in the text even when referring to the period prior to December 1994.
® Piotr Mickiewicz, “Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej a NATO 1990-1999. Pomiçdzy polityk^a 
rzeczywistosciq^' (published on 05 March 2002)
http://bezuprzedzen.pl/poglady/nato1.shtml (accessed 21 February 2006).
 ^See Tadeusz Iwihski and Jozef Oleksy (SLD) at the discussion in Sejm on foreign policy, Sprawozdania 
stenograficzne, 1 Kadencja, 43 Posiedzenie, 2 Dzieh, 30 April 1993. All parliamentary debates from the First 
Sejm on can be searched at http://ks,sejm.gov.pl:8009/forms/kad.htm (accessed 06 November 2006).
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Meanwhile, Russian objections to NATO enlargement was becoming more vocal after 
Central European states openly sought membership. However, Russian President 
Yeltsin’s visit to Warsaw in August 1993 brought a surprise when the joint declaration of 
the Polish and Russian presidents included the following words on the subject of Poland’s 
NATO ambition:®
President Lech Watçsa explained Poland's well-known position on this issue, which was 
received with understanding by President Boris Yeltsin. In perspective, a decision of this 
kind by sovereign Poland aiming at all-European integration is not contrary to the interests 
of other States, including also Russia.
It Is not known exactly how Yeltsin agreed to such a declaration that did not concur with 
Russia’s stance on NATO enlargement at that time. One explanation, put forward by 
journalist Tomasz Lis, is that Watçsa managed to persuade Yeltsin by careful word play 
and diplomatic bargaining.® Another, offered by Terry, is Yeltsin intended to prevent a 
Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement by offering Warsaw its approval for NATO membership in 
return for Warsaw adopting a “hands off policy” towards Ukraine.''® Whatever the real 
reason, Yeltsin soon made a U-turn by sending letters to France, Germany, US and the 
UK in which he warned them about NATO enlargement and proposed giving joint security 
guarantees to Central East European countries. Poland reacted to the letter by a 
statement by the Foreign Minister as well as letters written to NATO and to governments of 
16 NATO member states. It was emphasised that Poland had “unhappy experiences” of 
security guarantees in the past and a Russian security guarantee would mean 
dependence.'"
5.1.2 Partnership for Peace
The response o f the US to Russian objections and to the expectations of Polish and other 
Central East European states (CEEs) was the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP) 
launched on 10 January 1994 at NATO’s Brussels summit. The programme was intended 
to be a compromise solution offering CEEs participation in NATO on a larger scale, while 
refraining from antagonising Russia by not offering them full membership. Another 
disappointment for CEEs caused by PfP was that the programme was open to all 
participants of NACC and OSCE countries, therefore not giving any preferential treatment
® "Wspôlna Deklaracja Polsko-Rosyjska, Warszawa, 25 slerpnia 1993 r.", Zbiôr Dokumentow, Vol. 533, 1993, 
No. 3, pp. 57-64.
® Tomasz Lis, Wielkifinaf, KuHsy wstqpowania Polski do NATO, Krakôw: Znak, 1999, pp. 34-41 and 48-49.
Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, "Poland's foreign policy since 1989: the challenges of independence". Communist 
and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 33, 2000, No.1, p.23.
"  "Wypowiedz ministra sprawzagranicznych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Krzysztofa Skubiszewskiego dotycz^ca 
polityki Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej wobec NATO, zwiaszcza w zwi^zku z listem prezydenta Rosji Borysa 
Jelcyna z 15 wrzeénia 1993 r. do przywôdcôw Francji, Niemiec, USA i Wielkiej Brytanii, Warszawa, 4 
pazdziernika 1993 r.", Zbiôr Dokumentôw, Vol. 534, 1993, No. 4, pp. 14-17.
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to CEEs. Even though the Polish government officially welcomed the programme and 
joined it in February 1994, they criticised it for "failing to set a time period and criteria for 
membership" and "making membership dependent on the degree of preparation of 
candidates and on the assessment of the overall situation of European security."^^
By 1994 mainstream political parties in Poland had reached unanimity on the issue of 
adopting Poland’s NATO accession as a foreign policy priority. This was no doubt thanks 
to the electoral victory of SLD in October 1993 and the tempering nature of government 
responsibility on ideological stances. This unanimity facilitated the formation of the main 
Polish arguments for NATO enlargement and against Russian objections. Consecutive 
Polish governments, echoing the US arguments, reiterated that they sought NATO 
membership not because of a perceived threat from Russia but because NATO would fill in 
a security vacuum and help bring stability that was necessary for political and economic 
transformation in the region. Despite the fluffy rhetoric, it was obvious that Warsaw 
perceived threats to its security from Russia. Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski stated 
that talk of “special interests” or of a “special role" of Russia in its near abroad was 
worrisome and unacceptable for Poland and would harm regional stability.^® A 1995 report 
on Poland and NATO, written by post-Solidarity politicians who had served high level 
positions in Foreign and Defence Ministries, talked about the Russian elites’ Intentions of 
"restoring a European order around a classic balance of power, not integration”. "  it added
Policy towards Poland and Central Europe is subordinated to a Russian blueprint for 
Europe's future geopolitics. The maximum plan is preservation of a belt of militarily, 
politically and economically weak states and gradual expansion of Russia’s presence In this 
area until its effective power enables it to re-draw spheres of influence in this region.
Another Polish rhetoric was its readiness for cooperation with Russia on European 
security ." It was soon demonstrated that such words had no substance: In 1996 the 
newspapers reported that during a visit to Moscow in April Defence Minister Stanistaw 
Dobrzahski proposed Russians to create a Polish-Russian jo int battalion to take part in UN 
peacekeeping operations." This was found to be most controversial in Poland. Politicians 
from the Freedom Union {Unia W olnosci- UW) thought this might amount to dissonance 
between the declarations of successive governments for NATO entry and the actual
"  “Przemôwlenie ministra sprawzagranicznych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Andrzeja Olechowskiego 
wygtoszone w Sejmie RP na temat aktualnej sytuacji miçdzynarodowej i wynikaj^cych z niej zagrozert dia 
Polski, Warszawa, 21 stycznia 1994 r.", Zbiôr Dokumentôw, Vol. 535, 1994, No. 1, pp. 19-28.
"  "Prezentacja polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 1994 roku - Wystqpienie ministra spraw zagranicznych 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Andrzeja Olechowskiego w Sejmie , Warszawa, 12 maja 1994 r.", Zbiôr 
Dokumentôw, Vol. 536, 1994, No. 2, pp. 37-62.
"  Andrzej Ananicz et al., Poiand-NATO Report, www.msz.gov.pl (accessed 02 May 2000) (Also published by 
Institute for Public Affairs (Warsaw), 1995 and Polish version appeared in Rzeczpospolita. Jan SkorzyrtskI, 
“Przeciw wojskowej i politycznej samotnosci (Raport Polska-NATO)", Rzeczpospolita, 23 October 1995.
"  See for instance Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, "Building Poland's security: Membership of NATO a key 
objective", NATO Review, Vol. 44, 1996, No. 3, pp. 3-7.
"  Maria Wqgrowska, "Jak wspôlpracowac z Rosj^", RzeczpospoHta, 23 May 1996.
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practice. Bronistaw Komorowski of the National Defence Committee (CBN) at Sejm said 
that a joint military exercise with Russia might be interpreted as a return to the past relation 
between Poland and Russia and was, therefore, undesirable. The controversy also 
concerned Dobrzartski’s negotiations in Moscow concerning procurement of spare parts 
for weapons. Komorowski commented that even though stopping technical cooperation 
with Russia was impossible (given the fact that the bulk of weaponry in Polish army was 
Soviet made), Poland should strive to purchase necessary parts from other post­
communist countries such as Ukraine or Slovakia. He added, "Entering into deep 
cooperation with Russia is unsafe.’’"
Kobrinskaya argued that the shadow cast by NATO expansion over Polish Russian 
relations and Poland’s urge to reorient its weapons system to that of NATO (thus offering a 
lucrative market for Western suppliers), hindered Poland from keeping its armed forces 
e ffective ." She argued that Russia was also reluctant about sales to Poland as Poland 
tried to obtain licences for future sales (onward sales to third parties). Quoting Polish 
military experts, she wrote that Russian-Polish military technical cooperation was at a level 
lower than what was necessary in terms of meeting the demand.
The NATO expansion issue also plagued the already troubled bilateral relations on several 
occasions when unnecessary tension was created by a war of words. One such instance 
was in autumn 1995 when Defence Minister Zbigniew Okohski declared Poland’s interest 
in having NATO troops and nuclear weapons stationed on its territory after becoming a 
m em ber." A response came in the shape of "leaked" information that Russia was 
contemplating countermeasures to NATO enlargement which included stationing of 
nuclear weapons in Belarus, Western Russia and Baltic Sea.^°
5.1.3 NATO negotiates with Russia
Following the disappointment of PfP and the equally noncommittal 1995 Study on NATO 
Enlargement, Poland was given a guarantee by the re-elected US President, Bill Clinton, 
that it and the other CEEs would not be kept in NATO’s waiting room forever. In a speech 
at Detroit on 22 October 1996, he announced that the "first group of countries should be 
full-fledged members” of NATO in 1999 during NATO's 50th anniversary.^^ On 8 July 1997 
at NATO’s Madrid summit Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were invited to join 
the alliance and Poland started accession talks in September of that year.
"  Maria W^growska, “Jak wspôlpracowaô z Rosj^”, Rzeczpospolita, 23 May 1996.
"  Kobrinskaya, "Implications of the PfP Program", p. 13.
"  "On Deployment of NATO Troops, Nuclear Weapons in Poland”, OMRI Daily Digest, 04 October 1995. 
Sherman W. Garnett, “Poland: Bulwark or Bridge?”, Foreign Policy, 1996, No. 102, pp. 71-72.
Bill Clinton, "Remarks by the President to the People of Detroit”, Fisher Theater, Detroit, Michigan, Office of 
the Press Secretary (Detroit, Michigan), 22 October 1996. http://clinton6.nara.gov/1996/10/1996-10-22- 
president-speech-on-foreign-pollcy-in-cletroit-mi.html (accessed 05 January 2007)
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Meanwhile, Moscow had not wavered its stance against NATO enlargement. On 18 
December 1996 during the NACC Defence Ministers’ meeting in Brussels the Russian 
Defence Minister, Igor Rodionov, warned NATO that^^
...we’ll have to take certain, appropriate measures and we cannot exclude the following 
measures. In fact, today we should not describe them, but of course they will involve the 
political, economic and military relations between Russia and NATO countries. We can’t 
rule out that NATO enlargement will stall implementation of certain existing treaties and will 
make it much more difficult to ratify new agreements and treaties.
He added that Russia could not trust the assurances given by the NATO Secretary 
General about foreign troops and nuclear weapons not being stationed in the territories of 
new members. He referred to the time when Mikhail Gorbachev negotiated with the West 
on Soviet troop withdrawals from CEE and said “Verbal assurances were given by many, 
many leaders that there will never be any talk about NATO enlargement to the East. 
Nevertheless, it is happening." He asked for “official guarantees to these verbal 
assurances." In addition during the negotiations in 1997 between the US, NATO and 
Russia for defining a new framework for NATO-Russia relations, high ranking Russian 
officials declared that they demanded the right to veto NATO decisions.^®
Poies were alarmed at the prospect of a written commitment by NATO to Russia about 
giving any veto rights to Russia or imposing limits on stationing troops or weapons on 
Polish soil which would undermine Poland’s defence.^'' Earlier Moscow proposed the 
concept of "political membership" for Poland and other CEEs, which would mean that the 
new members would not participate in any military aspect of the alliance. Foreign Minister 
Dariusz Rosati warned NATO against “appeasing" the Russians.^® Deputy Defence 
Minister Andrzej Karkoszka made another reference to history by saying that “The smell of 
Yalta is always with us.’’^ ®
"Press Point of Mr. Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General and Minister Igor Rodionov, Russian Defence 
Minister. Meeting of the North Atiantic Council in Defence Ministers Session NATO HQ Brussels, 18 December 
1996. http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s961218a.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
“Russia still wants veto, not just voice in NATO", RFE/RL Newsline, 28 March 1997.
Poles were not alone in getting alarmed over NATO’s deal with Russia. Henry A. Kissinger had also voiced 
his concerns about giving Russia too much of a say in NATO. However, he remained a supporter of 
enlargement and of Poland's NATO accession, He was reported to have said that Poland “was so pro- 
American that it would help insure that the United States remained embedded in the Atlantic alliance” and 
would “never exclude the United States from European policy." Jane Perlez, "Blunt Reason for Enlarging 
NATO: Curbs on Germany", New York Times, 07 December 1997.
Lis, Wielki finai, pp. 286-87.
Paul Goble, “NATO: Analysis from Washington-'The Smell of Yalta"', RFE/RL Features, 18 March 1997.
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5.1.4. NATO-Russia Founding Act
NATO’s negotiations with Russia culminated in the signing of a NATO-Russia Founding 
Act in Paris on 27 May 1997.^^ The Act established a Russian-NATO permanent joint 
council, ruled out any intention of deploying nuclear weapons on the territories of 
prospective members but gave Russia only a ’’voice" rather than a right of veto. The act 
was technically not an international agreement, either.
The Paris deal did not have much of a positive impact on Polish-Russian reiations as it 
failed to temper Russian objections to NATO enlargement. First, it intensified opposition to 
Yeltsin’s policy from within Russia.^® The Head of the Communist Party Gennadii 
Zyuganov called it “an act of unconditional surrender” and a “betrayal of Russia’s interests’’ 
and former Security Council Secretary Aleksandr Lebed said that Russia was “the losing 
side, signing an act on its own capitulation.’’^ ® Second, the Act denied Russia a real say in 
the workings of NATO so there was no incentive for Russia to lift its objections to 
enlargement. There was no incentive for Moscow to be more conciliatory towards Poles, 
either. Moscow hoped, as Terry argued, that by keeping relations with Poland cool, it could 
delay enlargement, counting on NATO’s membership requirement for an applicant to have 
no serious tension with their neighbours.®® Third, Warsaw’s advocacy of enlargement of 
NATO further east than Poland irritated Moscow about potential troubles Poland’s active 
EP might cause. The Polish government reiterated its commitment to press for Lithuanian 
(and eventually other Baltic states’) inclusion in NATO (even before Poland itself was in). 
During a visit to Vilnius on 13 November 1997 Geremek said "Lithuania can expect that 
when Poland becomes a member of NATO and the EU, she will become a motor pushing 
for Lithuania’s entry.’’®^ Russia had warned the West repeatedly against any incursion 
beyond the “red line’’, into ex-Soviet states. Poland’s emphasis on the strategic partnership 
with Ukraine was also viewed by Russia with suspicion.
Russian suspicion of Poland’s budding EP was also reflected in the Russian media’s 
coverage of the issue. There were comments ranging from those accusing Poland of 
challenging Russian interests in the ex-Soviet territories by trying to become a regional 
leader to more speculative ones talking about a conspiracy whereby Warsaw was trying to
"Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation”, 
Paris, 27 May 1997. http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/fndact-a.htm (accessed 05 January 2007)
Irina Kobrinskaya argued that Russian unease about NATO enlargement had to do primarily with Russian 
domestic politics and foreign policy. She wrote that the issue was used as a weapon within government 
departments as well as in presidential election campaign, which in turn threatened to make Russian foreign 
policy more ideological and also push more important issues as the economy or regional development to the 
backburner. Irina Kobrinska, "Uzyteczne narzçdzie", Rzeczpospolita, 15 April 1997.
“Communists respond to attacks on Duma", RFE/RL Newsline, 30 May 1997 and "Lebed slams Yeltsin for 
signing accord...", RFE/RL Newsline , 27 May 1997.
Terry, "Poland's foreign policy", pp. 42-43.
Lietuvos Rytas, 13 November 1997, quoted in Antanas Valionis, Evaldas Ignatavicius and Izolda 
Brickovskiené , "From Solidarity to Partnership: Lithuanian-Polish Relations 1988-1998", Lithuanian Foreign 
Policy Review, 1998, No. 2, p.22.
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build a super state made up of itself, Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania and extend Its 
influence to "the district o f Moscow itself."®^
5.1.5 NATO enlargement and after
It was suggested that after NATO’s invitation of CEE in July 1997, Russia changed its 
opposition tactics. Realising that the first wave of enlargement was inevitable, it focused on 
stopping a possible second wave.®® Russian’s acceptance was also claimed to be the 
reason why the issue of NATO enlargement completely disappeared from Polish Russian 
bilateral talks.®'  ^Another claim was that there was no incentive for Russia to respond to 
Polish initiatives after the prospect of NATO enlargement became a reality and the debate 
subsided.®® It should also be stated that Russia was not the only hurdle in front of NATO 
enlargement. An equally vocal opposition was forming in the US and Western academic, 
political and media circles.®® Anti enlargement arguments ranged from the prohibitive 
financial costs of integrating poorly funded armies in NATO to creating unnecessary 
tensions between the West and Russia by letting into NATO inherently anti-Russian, small 
countries.®^ This opposition from the West was considered such a big blow by the Warsaw 
political elite that Rosati, in a lecture he gave in 1999, listed two serious opponents of 
Poland’s NATO entry: Russia and the New York Times.®®
It is true that NATO enlargement vanished from bilateral talks but Russia never wanted to 
negotiate directly with Poland on that matter, nor had Poland ever agreed to open Poland’s 
NATO aspiration up for discussion.®® However, this does not mean that the issue of NATO 
altogether stopped casting a shadow over relations, even after Poland became a full 
member of NATO in April 1999. As Primakov allegedly told Geremek, "We know we can't 
prevent you joining NATO but don't expect us to enjoy it.’"'®
®® Jerzy Malczyk, "Conspiracy-What conspiracy?", Warsaw Voice, 05 April 1998.
®® Marek Menkiszak, "Relations between Russia and NATO before and after the 11th of September". Prace 
Osrodek Studiôw Wschodnich, 2002, No. 4, p.35.
Artur Michalski, "Stosunki z Rosjq”, RPPZ, 1999, Warszawa: Zarzqd Obsfugl MSZ, 1999, 
http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/ (accessed 01 April 2006)
®® Elzbieta Stadtmuller, "The Issue of NATO Enlargement in Polish -  Russian Relations", NATO Research 
Fellowship Final Report, 2000-01, p. 34. http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/f99-01.htm (accessed 21 
February 2006)
A few examples of anti-enlargement literature are Peter Shearman, “Russia and NATO Enlargement: The 
Case Against", in Mike Bowker and Cameron Ross (eds), Russia After the Cold War, London: Longman, 2000, 
pp. 299-318, Amos Perlmutter and Ted Galen Carpenter, "NATO's Expensive Trip East: The Folly of 
Enlargement”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, 1998, No.1, pp. 2-6 and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, “The Unheard Case 
Against NATO Enlargement", Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 44, 1997, No. 3, pp. 52-62.
George Kennan, a seasoned US foreign policy analyst and diplomat, declared his opposition to NATO 
enlargement and warned that the decision of enlargement might act as a catalyst for the resurgence of 
nationalist and anti-Western forces in Russia and bring back the Cold War atmosphere. George F. Kennan, “A 
Fateful Error", New York Times, 05 February 1997.
Dariusz Rosati, "System brukselski, W strong nowego porzq^dku europejskiego" in Polska i NATO. Materiaiy 
z konferencji, Warsaw: Instytut Problemôw Bezpieczehstwa. Fundacja Naukowa, 1999, pp.45-57.
®® As Walgsa said during the Russian premier Viktor Chernomyrdin's visit to Warsaw in February 1995, "You 
know our stance: We want to join NATO and we are not going to ask Russia", Chernomyrdin preferred to dwell 
on economic issues. Jacek Czarnecki, “Do NATO bez pytania", Rzeczpospolita, 18 February 1995.
Jarosfaw GiziriskI, “Polska marka", Wprost, 09 January 2000.
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With the first wave of NATO eniargement already finalised and Russia assuming a more 
cooperative attitude towards especially the US after Vladimir Putin became the president in 
May 2000, it was hoped that there would be one conflict less between Poland and Russia. 
Articles appearing in Polish newspapers during high profile visits of Kwasniewski to 
Moscow on 10 July 2000 and premier Mikhail Kasyanov’s visit to Warsaw on 25 May 2001 
talked about “breaking the ice” or “a new dawn” in bilateral relations. Poland’s entry into 
NATO was Indeed perceived by some commentators to be an opportunity for Poland to 
engage in a genuine partnership with Russia. For instance Grzegorz Gromadzki, an 
Eastern Europe analyst at the Batory Foundation, maintained that with Poland in NATO, 
anchored securely in the West, Polish political elite rid themselves of the pervading 
historical fear that Russia might once again dominate Poland.''^ Russia, accordingly, also 
reevaluated its position towards Central East Europe and the Baltics. A similarly optimistic 
view (and a reflection of the official stance) was voiced by Prof. Genowefa Grabowska 
(former head of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and MEP at the time of writing) who 
argued that Russia stopped perceiving Poiand’s NATO accession as an anti-Russian 
decision. This happened through a process of Russia cultivating its own relations with 
NATO and becoming a member of the “coalition against terror” after 9/11. Grabowska 
noted the new, more "pro-European” rhetoric of Russian policymakers she observed 
during Russian-Polish visits and pointed out that there was no threat whatsoever Poiand 
perceived from Russia.
Such expectations were high especially after bilateral relations hit an all time low in 
February 2000 when a group of protesters demonstrated against Russian invoivement in 
Chechnya and attacked the building of the Russian Consulate in Poznan while the police 
reportedly did not intervene. Moscow reacted by recalling its ambassador and canceliing 
the pianned visit of Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to Warsaw. Nezavisimaya Gazeta 
commented that Poles had let their anti-Russian sentiment soar after coming under the 
protective umbrella of NATO and that Polish-Russian relations took a negative turn after 
the visit o f NATO Secretary Générai George Robertson to Moscow (eariier in February 
2000) where NATO expressed eagerness to improve bilateral relations.''® Events in 
Poznart were also denounced (and the NATO bombing of Serbia in March 1999 
commemorated) by demonstrations in Moscow in front of the Polish Embassy in March 
2000. During one such demonstration organised by the Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation, participants protested against Poland’s membership in NATO and called 
Poland “the prostitute of NATO”."'' Such flare-ups concerning Poland’s membership in
Interview with Grzegorz Gromadzki, 17 July 2002, Warsaw 
Interview with Genowefa Grabowska, 10 May 2002, Warsaw.
Stawomir Popowski, "Zgoda wtadz na antypolskie demonstracje”, Rzeczpospolita, 07 March 2000. 
"Flaga za flagg”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 25 March 2000.
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NATO became more rare after NATO’s decision to enlarge further east in 2004, including 
Baltic states and Russia-NATO relations evolved without Poland having any significant 
effect.
5.2 ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN POLAND AND RUSSIA
The disruption caused by the 1989-91 period of regime change in CEE, the dissolution of 
CMEA and the Soviet Union hit established economic relations in the region but none 
suffered more disruption than Polish Russian trade and investment. A reorientation of 
Polish trade towards the OECD and especially EU countries (as seen in Figure 1) might be 
a political success but such a rapid change proved disastrous for many Polish enterprises 
which concentrated on the Eastern markets.
Figure 1: Reorientation of trade: Poland's trade with Soviet Union/Russia 
versus Federal Republic of Germany/Germany 1970-2002  
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Whereas one third of Polish foreign trade was with the Soviet Union in 1985, by 1990, it 
was reduced to one fifth, following the economic crisis in the latter country.
For information on reorientation of Poland's foreign trade and development of Poland’s economic relations in 
the 1990s see  George Blazyca, “Poland’s  Place in the International Economy” in George Blazyca and Ryszard 
Rapacki (Eds), Polandinto the New Millennium, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2001, pp. 249-273.
^  Data from Handel Zagraniczny, Years 1991-1992 and Rocznik Statystyczny Handiu Zagranicznego, Years 
1993-2002, Warsaw: Gfôwny Urzq^d Statystyczny.
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Table 1: Poland: Foreign Trade Turnover with the Soviet Union 1989-199147
1989 1990 1991
(million zfoty) % in 
total
(million zloty) % in
total
(million zloty) % in 
total
Imports 2,688,802 18.1 15,369,501 19.8 23,193,059 14.1
Exports 4,048,255 20.8 19,767,703 15.3 17,311,671 11.0
Balance 1,359,453 +4,398,202 -5,881,388
The system by which Polish-Soviet economic exchange was managed changed drastically 
in 1991. A sharp fall in turnover was caused by switching to a hard currency clearing 
system and to trade by means of market type contracts signed between enterprises 
instead of multi-annual, multi-product contracts or intergovernmental protocols/^
Poland established economic relations with the Russian Federation and signed a trade 
protocol on 3 September 1991, while the latter was still a part o f the Soviet Union. The 
protocol foresaw for 1992 a turnover of up to 2.8 billion USD but this proved to be 
unrealistic.'*® Besides, the protocol itself was still not ratified by Duma. In addition to 
stagnating trade, several disputes started surfacing during negotiations on economic 
matters.
5.2.1 Settlement of mutual debt
Even though Poland managed to settle its debt issue with Western lenders (Paris and 
London clubs) and even negotiated a second round of substantial reduction by 1994, the 
problem o f mutual debt between Poland and Russia arising from the Soviet period dragged 
on through lengthy negotiations. There was disagreement between the parties as to the 
actual amount of debt, how to calculate it and the currency the debt will be served in 
(transferable roubles -TR or hard currency). At the beginning Poland argued for a 
settlement on the basis of a "zero option". Even though the Russian side agreed with this 
in principle during Russian Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar’s visit in October 1992, no 
settlement was reached and a joint commission was formed to look into the matter.®® 
Putting the “zero option” into practice was complicated by debts arising out of unpaid trade 
balances which were accumulated in 1991-92 by Soviet importers. Many Polish 
enterprises which traditionally traded with the Soviet market kept on sending their exports 
(theoretically In exchange for hard currency) despite the fact that no payments were
Data from Handel Zagraniczny, Years 1991 and 1992, Warsaw: Gtôwny Urzqd Statystyczny.
Michal Dobroczyfiskl, "Polska jako partner gospodarki rosyjsklej" in Stanlslaw Bielen (Ed.), Polska-Rosja. 
Czas przewartoâclowah, Warszawa: Centrum Badan Wschodnich, 1995, p. 96.
Wojciech Zajq^czkowski, "Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie", RPPZ 1992, Warszawa: Zarzqd Obslugi MSZ, 1992, 
http://www.sprawymledzynarodowe.pl/ (accessed 01 April 2006)
"In Poland, Gaidar agrees to zero-sum debt settlement", RFB^RL Newsline, 05 October 1992.
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forthcoming.®^ A solution was found in 1995 and a framework agreement was signed in 
January when both sides agreed on a "zero plus option” :®^ A zero option would be applied 
to debts accrued from trade before the end of 1990 when convertible currency settlements 
replaced roubles. The plus option would concern the outstanding payments arising from 
trade in 1991-92. Accordingly, an estimated 4.4 billion TR and 2 billion USD of Polish debt 
and 7 billion TR and 366 million USD of Russian debt would be annulled and the Russian 
side would pay 20 million USD in cash whereas the Polish side would transfer to Russians 
securities worth 150 million USD.®® The debt issue was finalised in November 1996 when a 
full agreement based on the 1995 framework agreement was signed and went immediately 
into force.®'*
5,2.2 Trade
Economic exchange between Poland and Russia declined sharply in the period 1990-92 
and relations were reduced to trade as non-trade forms of economic exchange were 
almost obliterated. There were efforts by governments to establish a legal framework for 
economic relations. A trade and economic cooperation treaty was signed on 25 August 
1993 during Yeltsin’s Warsaw visit. It contained provisions such as a commitment of both 
parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules, which included the 
granting of most favoured nation status and safeguards against excess imports. The treaty 
was not ratified until 1995 and trade turnover did not reach the desired volume despite the 
reversal of downward trend. (See Table 2)
Table 2 .Poland: Foreign Trade Turnover with Russia 1992-1995
/ i r i  f KÏw / / o m  55
1992 1993 1994 1995
Imports 1,351,002 1,271,338 1,453,098 1,959,786
Exports 723,298 644,583 934,588 1,274,249
Balance -627,704 -626,753 -518,510 -689,537
Trade between Poland and Russia was imbalanced In terms of both the composition of 
commodities and of the high deficit to the disadvantage of the former. Poland’s imports 
from Russia were dominated by energy products like gas and oil and Russia’s imports
Ben Slay, The Polish Economy: Crisis, Reform, and Transformation, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1994, pp. 173-74.
“  Bronislaw Sulimierski, “International debt problems and agreements with creditors" in Polish Foreign Trade 
in 1994, Warsaw: Foreign Trade Research Institute, 1995, pp. 214-25.
“Polish-Russian debt settled", Rzeczpospolita, 02 February 1995 and Lidia Oktaba, "Zadtu^enie na zero z 
plusem", Rzeczpospolita, 31 January 1995.
"Porozumienie miçdzy rzqdem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a rzqdem Federacjl Rosyjsklej w sprawie 
uregulowania wzajemnego zadtuzenia Moskwa, 13 listopada 1996 r.", Zbiôr Dokumentôw, Vol. 534, 1996, No. 
4 pp. 16-20.
® Rocznik Statystyczny Handiu Zagranicznego, Years 1993-1996, Warsaw: Giôwny Urzqd Statystyczny.
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from Poland were dominated mainly by foodstuffs, followed by chemical goods and 
machinery (see Table 7 below).
A  deficit was inevitable as Poland was highly dependent on gas and oil imports from 
Russia and could not easily find alternative sources which would offer the same prices and 
easy delivery. A drastic increase in Polish exports to Russia to offset the imbalance was 
not a realistic option. The development of Polish exports was hampered by the lack of 
adequate banking and insurance services, frequent changes in customs regulations and 
high payment risk from the Russian side. Russia’s not being a member of the World Trade 
Organisation was another obstacle.
Despite the existence o f objective conditions obstructing development of Polish exports to 
Russia, the issue was perceived by certain post-communist and groups close to the 
farmers’ party, the Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe - PSL), as a matter 
of political choice rather than economic necessity. As explained in Chapter Four, the 
proponents o f the so-called Russian option in foreign policy believed that Polish exporters 
were losing out on the enormous trade potential of Russian markets for the sake of 
reorienting Polish trade towards the West. This divergence of opinion was also behind the 
1994 conflict between the Foreign Ministry (headed by the Walçsa appointee Olechowski) 
and the Ministry o f Foreign Economic Relations (headed by PSL’s Lesfaw Podkahski) over 
economic relations with the East.
Poland’s trade with Russia had not undergone any radical change in terms of structure or 
volume from 1992 to 1998. The aforementioned problems that affected trade negatively 
were not solved. However, new avenues for economic cooperation were sought. In 
addition to initiatives like the Economic Forum in Krynica, which promoted dialogue among 
CEEs and post-Soviet states after 1992, specific Russian-Polish Initiatives like the Polish- 
Russian Chamber of Trade and Industry were launched. The chamber was established in 
1993 to promote Polish exports to Russia and provides product certification services.®® 
Another development was the initiation of economic cooperation with Russian regions. 
Poland signed a trade and economic cooperation agreement with the Republic of 
Tatarstan in October 1996.®^
Border/bazaar trade must also be mentioned as a flourishing sector. Thanks to visa-free 
travel between Russia and Poland until 2003, millions of Russians (alongside other East 
Europeans) were trading in the bazaars in Poland. Many small companies sprang up in the
See http://www.prihp.com.pl/ (accessed 06 November 2006)
"Z regionôw/obwodôw Federacjl Rosyjsklej. Republika Tatarstan", Biuletyn Ekonomiczny, No. 57, 
http://www.polweh.ru/be/be57/be5708.htm (accessed 21 February 2006).
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bordering regions to cater for this sort of trade. As most of this trading activity was 
unregistered, it is difficult to know how much of it was carried out by Russians only.
The most drastic change in bilateral trade was caused by the Russian financial crisis of 
August 1998. Many Polish exporters, especially small and medium ones, were wiped off 
the Russian market as the demand for import goods fell and Russian importers lacked 
capacity for payment. For these companies finding new markets in the East was not an 
option as the whole region suffered from the Russian crisis and reorienting towards the EU 
was not possible as their goods would not live up to EU norms.®®
Table 3: Poland: Foreign Trade Turnover with Russia 1996-1999
1996 1997 1998 1999
Imports 2,525,849 2,685,489 2,372,279 2,675,722
Exports 1,653,799 2,154,695 1,597,263 710,237
Balance -872,050 -530,794 -775,016 -1,965,485
Trade deficit with Russia rose from 775.5 million USD in 1998 to 1,965.5 million USD in 
1999 due to the collapse of Polish exports. In 2000 it jumped to 3,757.7 million USD, this 
time due to a surge in gas and oil prices which caused Polish imports from Russia to go up 
from 2,675.7 million USD in value in 1999 to 4,619.4 million USD. Polish government took 
several measures in the following years to promote exports to Russia. The Russian crisis 
was a second blow to bazaar trade after Poland introduced voucher and invitation 
requirements for Russian and Belarusian citizens in early 1998 (See Appendix).
5.2.3 Regaining the Eastern markets
The Ministry of Economy attempted to remedy the problems created by the crisis as well 
as the long term trade imbalance. Together with the Export Credit Insurance Corporation 
{Korporacji Ubezpieczeh Kredytôw Eksportowych SA - KUKE) and the Polish Embassy in 
Russia, it prepared a programme called “Russia -  Our commercial partner" to promote 
exports to Russia by providing credit insurance for trade transactions. The programme 
aimed to address the problem of finding loans for exporters as so far Polish banks were 
not willing to give credits to traders who did business with Russia as the Russian market 
was considered high risk, lacking any guarantee of payment.®® A draft bill of 7 July 1994 
which allowed the state treasury to guarantee the insurance of export credits was ratified 
by the Sejm on 16 November 2000 and went into force on 1 January 2001, allowing KUKE
Dariusz Styczek, “Grey Eastern Clouds", Warsaw Voice, 15 November 1998.
Rocznik Statystyczny Handiu Zagranicznego, Years 1997-2000, Warsaw; Glowny Urzqd Statystyczny. 
Wanda Jelonkiewicz, "Russia -  Our commercial partner", Warsaw Voice, 19 November 2000.
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to offer a programme called “Export credits to the Russian Federation”.®^ It offered export 
credit insurance to Polish exporters or Polish companies active in the Russian market for 
contracts worth up to 10 million USD with a payment period of one to five years.®^ KUKE 
would also provide credit insurance to selected Russian banks for loans to Russian buyers 
interested in Polish export goods. KUKE became the only company to offer products 
tailored for the Russian market as other insurers, among them the major ones like PZU or 
Warta, kept away from the high risk Russian market.®®
Promotion o f bilateral trade was also the purpose of the Polish-Russian Economic Forum 
established by Polish and Russian businessmen in July 2000 during Kwasniewski’s 
Moscow visit.®'* The Forum met again during Putin’s visit to Warsaw in January 2002 and 
cooperation started giving fruit as four major business contracts were signed.®®
Yet another initiative was the “Programme for regaining the Eastern markets” issued by the 
Council of Ministers on 4 February 2003. The programme endorsed KUKE’s insurance 
packages for Russia and proposed several other pro-export measures.®® It announced, 
among others, the establishment of a specialist unit in Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego 
which would deal with export credits and services. Subsidies for export of agricultural 
products would be given (within the limits allowed by the WTO). The government pledged 
assistance in certification of export goods and financial support for services catering to the 
export market. Although it is difficult to ascertain the full impact of those measures in the 
short term, an increase of about 46% was observed in 2004 in Polish exports to Russia.
Table 4: Poland: Foreign Trade Turnover with Russia 2000-2004
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Imports 4,619,449 4,422,276 4,407,432 5,214,710 6,390,629
Exports 862,052 1,331,827 1,331,827 1,512,330 2,842,669
Balance -3,363,581 -3,075,605 -3,075,605 -3,702,380 -3,547,959
Share of Poland in Russia’s trade remained low. Percentages of Russian import in Polish 
trade figures made Russia a significant partner thanks to the large volume of purchases of 
energy from Russia. Share of imports from Russia reached a high of 9.4% by 2000.
"Ustawa z dnia 16 listopada 2000 r. o zmlanie ustawy o gwarantowanych przez Skarb Partstwa 
ubezpieczenlach kontraktow eksportowych", Dziennik Ustaw, No. 114, Pos. 1190, 20 December 2000.
KUKE Raport Roczny 2000 (Annual Report), pp. 17-18 
www.signaart.com.pl/signa_proj/pliki/RaportKUKE2000.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006).
®® Mariusz Przybylski. "Cisza poza KUKE", Rzeczpospolita, 14 January 2002.
Anita Btaszczak, "Potrzeba gwarancji, kredytôw i reklam", Rzeczpospolita, 11 July 2000.
®® “Gesty rosyjskiego prezydenta", Rzeczpospolita, 18 January 2002.
®® Zaloienia polityki handiowej wobec rynkôw wschodnich na lata 2003 -  2004. Program Odzyskania Rynkôw 
Wschodnich, Ministerstwo Gospodarki, Pracy i Polityki Spotecznej, Warsaw, February 2003, 
http://www.mpips.gov.pl/pllkLdo_pobrania/rynki_wschodnie.doc (accessed 09 November 2006)
Rocznik Statystyczny Handiu Zagranicznego, Years 2001-2005, Warsaw: Glôwny Urzqd Statystyczny.
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Table 5: 1993-2004 Poland: Foreign Trade Turnover with Russia
/ r *  / - \ f  I  y-\  W-  ^  M  jtJ  M  6 8
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
imports 6,8 6.8 6.7 6.8 6.3 5.1 5.9 9.4 8.8 8.0 5.2 7.2
Exports 4.6 5.4 5.6 6.8 8.4 5.6 2.6 2,7 2.9 3.2 3.0 3.8
Table 6: 1993-2004 Russia: Foreign Trade Turnover with Poland
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Imports 1,2 1.9 2.2 1.5 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.4
Exports 2.4 1.6 2.0 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.4 4.2 4.1 3.5 3.4 3.1
The commodity structure of trade between Poland and Russia remained largely 
unchanged, with Russia’s mineral exports constituting an overwhelming 88.4% of its total 
exports to Poland by 2003.
Rocznik Statystyczny Handiu Zagranicznego, Years 1994-2005, Warsaw: Glowny Urzqd Statystyczny. 
Data for 1993-2003 calculated on the basis of data from Rossiia v tsifrakh : kratkii statisticheskil sbornik 
(years 1996,1998 and 2004), Moskva: Goskomstat Rossii. Data for 2004 from the website of the Russian 
Federation, Federal State Statistics Service http://www.gks.ru /bgd/regl/B05_12/lssWWW.exe/Stg/d000/25- 
02.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
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Table 7, j70
Poland’s Export to Russia M  
by commodity groups B Poland’s Import from Russia by commodity groups
1999 2003 H 1999 2003Commodity
groups MillionUSD %
Million
USD Bi% ^ MillionUSD % MillionUSD %Agricultural and 
food products 277.43 39.06 358.40 23^9 0 39.52 1.48 37.03 0.71Mineral products
3.40 0.48 6.22 0.41 p 2,203.11 82.33 4,609.76 88.40Chemical industry 
products and 
plastics 137.27 19.33 301.74 19.94 6 133.00 4.97 213.89 4.10Light ind. products 
(textiles, footwear, 
hides and skins 
etc) 40.68 5.73 59.51 3.93 E 20.91 0.78 12.30 0.23Wood and paper 
products 68.27 9.61 246.73 15.3f E 62.75 2.35 48.71 0.93Stone, plaster, 
cement, glass 
products 18.18 2.56 89.19 5.89 ^ 2.83 0.11 3.56 0.07Base metals
30.73 4.32 90.84 8.0f II 135.86 5.08 219.06 4.20Machinery, 
electrical, transport, 
optical equip. 90.21 12.70 296.36 19.58 i 71.26 2.66 59.48 1.14Other
manufactured 
products (furniture, toys etc) 43.39 6.11 63.59 4.20 0.58 0.02 7.15 0.14Arms and Ammunition 0.03 0.01 ~0 0 E 5.47 0.20 3.64 0.07Others
0.64 0.09 0.60 0.040 H 0.43 0.02 0.13 0.01
Total 710.23 100 1,513.18 100 B 2,675.72 100 5,214.71 100
5.2.4 Effects of EU enlargement
Poland’s accession to the EU and the consequences of EU enlargement on Russia’s trade 
with the union became the subject of a bitter dispute in 2003 over the extension of the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PGA). The PC A had been signed by Russia and 
the EU in order to regulate political and economic relations and trade with a view to 
establishing a free trade area in the future. It entered into force on 1 December 1997. The 
EU expected Russia to extend the PCA automatically to the new members of the EU as of 
1 May 2004. Moscow refused to do this, arguing that this would harm its economic 
interests as it would lose many trade concessions gained by earlier bilateral treaties with 
these countries and the current exporters to EU candidate countries would have difficulty 
adapting their goods to EU norms which would be required if PCA comes into force in the 
new members. Moscow gave a list of 14 demands which it wanted fulfilled before it could
Data from Rocznik Statystyczny Handiu Zagranicznego, Years 2000 and 2004, Warsaw: Glôwny Urzqd 
Statystyczny.
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accept the extension of PCA. One of the demands was compensation for an estimated 
loss of 150 million USD due to EU enlargement.^^ EU officials ruled out any compensation 
as Russia was not a WTO member and argued that Russia would actually benefit from the 
enlargement as new EU members would have to bring down tariffs. Poland, for Instance, 
would have to reduce its tariffs on steel products from 10.3% to the EU norm of 1.7%.^^
The EU claimed that even though there might be limited disadvantage to Russia caused by 
EU agricultural subsidies extended to new members, within the broader context benefits 
would outweigh the disadvantages.^®
The prospect of PCA not being extended to Poland (and other future EU members) 
brought about the threat of a total breakdown of bilateral trade as Poland renounced the 25 
August 1993 trade treaty on 1 November 2003 (in time for the agreement to run out on 1 
May 2004, the date of Polish entry into the EU, following a prescribed six month 
cancellation period.)^'* The Polish media commented that Russia was trying to blackmail 
the EU into giving concessions on non-economic matters (like visa free travel for 
Kaliningrad inhabitants) by using the PCA agreement as an excuse.^® On the other hand, 
the Russian ambassador to Poland, Nikolai Afanasievsky, warned that the extension of 
PCA would harm Polish enterprises as customs duties on Polish imports from Russia, 
such as aluminium, would increase and those on Polish exports to Russia would go up 
twofold or more.^® He urged the Polish government to enter into negotiations with Russia 
on a new bilateral trade treaty independent of the PCA.
After tough negotiations involving implicit threats, the EU and Russia reached an 
agreement on 27 April 2004 in Luxembourg. Russia agreed to extend PCA to cover EU 
enlargement after the EU made some concessions on trade matters and assured Russia 
to preserve its existing exports to the new EU member countries. Concessions included 
the promise to raise the quota of Russian steel exports to the EU, to increase customs 
duty on Russian aluminium exports gradually and to reduce tariffs on Russian imports to 
the new EU members from 9 to 4%.^^
"Nie wyklucza sankcji przeciw Rosji w sporze o rozszerzenie”, Europap, 17 February 2004.
Françoise Le Bail (Director for Russia, DG Trade), “Enlargement of the European Union; Good news for 
Russia". Presentation given during the visit to Moscow of the Trade Delegation of the European Commission 
on 11 April 2003. http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/cis_7.htm (accessed 05 October 2004)
Website of the Delegation of the European Commission in Russia, "Russia and EU Enlargement: Selected 
Issues" http://vww.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/images/pText_pict/447 /enlargement.doc (accessed 06 November 
2006)
Mariusz Przybylski, “Zgoda bçdzie w ostatniej chwili", Rzeczpospolita, 10 April 2004.
Anna Slojewska et al., "Rosja szantazuje, Polska moze stracic", Rzeczpospolita, 21 February 2004.
Jçdrzej Bielecki, "Moze nie bye preferencji dIa Polski", Rzeczpospolita, 08 March 2004.
Joint Statement on EU Enlargement and EU-Russia Relations, Brussels, 27 April 2004. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/russia_docs/js_elarg_270404.htm. Text of the Protocol to 
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement may be found at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/russia_docs/protocol_0404.htm (both links accessed 06 
November 2006).
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5.2.5 Economie relations and domestic politics: The Orlen affair
As mentioned above, minerals such as gas and oil constitute almost 90% of Poland’s 
imports from Russia, and Poland is dependant on Russian sources for energy/® Poland 
buys around 95% of its crude oil from Russia/® Given the level o f dependence, high 
monetary value of imports and tensions between Poland and Russia, the effects of the 
issue of energy imports transcend the sphere of economic and foreign relations, and creep 
easily into domestic politics. The Orlen affair that was kick-started by allegations about 
crude oil supply contracts in the beginning of 2004 soon snowballed into a fully-fledged 
scandal concerning the sale of Polish oil refineries to Russians and the degree of alleged 
collusion by Polish politicians and businessmen with Russian oil giants and secret 
services.
The interview that started the investigation into the affair was given in April 2004 by 
Wieslaw Kaczmarek, the Minister of Treasury in the SLD-UP government from October 
2001 to January 2003, to Gazeta l/Vyborcza, where he made allegations about the arrest 
and consequent sacking of Andrzej Modrzejewski, the CEO of the biggest Polish oil 
refinery, PKN {Polski Koncern Naftowy) Orlen, in February 2002.®® Kaczmarek, now a 
member of the newly formed Social Democratic Party of Poland {Socjaldemokracji Polskiej 
-  SDPL), a splinter from SLD, claimed that Modrzejewski was arrested on trumped up 
charges upon the request o f the Polish Intelligence service {Urzqd Ochrony Panstwa -  
UOP) which was acting on the orders of Prime Minister, Leszek Miller. Accordingly, Miller 
was trying to block a huge oil delivery deal Modrzejewski was going to sign the following 
day with a company called J&S which operated from Cyprus under the ownership of two 
Ukrainians with Polish citizenship and acted as an intermediary firm buying crude oil from 
Russian companies (mainly Lukoil) and selling it to Polish (and other) refineries.®'' A 
parliamentary commission was formed to investigate the matter. As the inquiry progressed, 
many revelations were made about secret dealings of politicians, businessmen and 
representatives of Russian oil interests and the scope of the scandal extended 
enormously. It is impossible (and unnecessary) to present all the ins and outs of the
Energy policy of Poland until 2025 (Document adopted by the Council of Ministers on 04 January 2005), 
Ministry of Economy and Labour, Energy Policy Team
http://www.mgip.gov.pl/GOSPODARKA/Energetyka/Polityka+energetyczna+Polsi<i+do+2025+roku.htm 
(accessed 06 November 2006).
® Rocznik Statystyczny Handiu Zagranicznego, 2005, Warsaw: Gtôwny Urzqd Statystyczny.
Dominlka Wielowieyska, "Miller, Orlen i UOP " (Interview with WIesfaw Kaczmarek), Gazeta Wyborcza, 02 
April 2004. See also Katarzyna Kolenda-Zaleska, "Wiestaw Kaczmarek: NIe widzç powodu, zeby clqgle 
przyszywano ml kolejnq brodç” , Poranek radia TOK FM, 02 April 2004, 
serwisy.gazeta.pl/tokfm/1,54125,2001932.html, accessed 24 October 2004.
In June 2002 UOP was abolished and two new offices replaced It: Foreign intelligence Agency {Agencja 
Wywiadu ~ AW) and Internal Security Agency {Agencja Bezpieczebstwa Wewngtrznego -  ABW).
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scandal here. The two threads (out o f many) Investigated, namely the privatisation of 
Rafineria Gdanska (RG) and oil supply contracts will be summarised below.®^
As mentioned above, the sacking of Modrzejewski and the subsequent change of board 
members of PKN Orlen was at first linked to the renewal of the 14 billion USD crude oil 
supply contract with J&S for another five years. However, soon it appeared that the 
incident was also linked with the privatisation of RG. Discussions on the privatisation of RG 
had been ongoing since 2001. A British company called Rotch had tried to buy RG, having 
teamed up with the Hungarian MOL first and Russian Lukoil next but the sale was not 
permitted. It was alleged that during the meeting in Warsaw o f PM Miller with the President 
o f Lukoil, Vahit Alekperov, the latter urged the PM to let the sale go ahead.®® However, the 
sale did not go ahead. Later in 2002 Rotch formed a consortium with PKN Orlen and tried 
to buy RG again after the Council of Ministers declared that the fusion of Poland’s biggest 
two refineries would be acceptable.®'*
However, Nafta Polska, the state company that owned RG and handled its privatisation on 
behalf of the Treasury, did not allow the sale. According to reports written by the Sejm 
Inquiry Commission members and testimonies given to the Commission, two interest 
groups were in competition with each other to make a profit out o f the sale of RG.®® The 
first group consisted of PM Miller, President Kwasniewski and the richest businessmen in 
Poland and owner of about 5% of shares at PKN Orlen, Jan Kulczyk, and their supporters 
among politicians and intelligence services. Accordingly, they wanted the PKN Orlen- 
Rotch consortium (where Rotch would acquire half the shares of Orlen) to buy RG. Rotch 
was acting as an intermediary for Lukoil and would be transferring its shares to the latter 
as soon as the sale of RG was completed. By this way, Lukoil would not only control RG 
but also Naftoport o f Gdansk, the only non-Russian owned crude oil delivery port, in which 
RG and PKN Orlen had together the majority share. According to intelligence reports, 
Kulczyk, acting as the representative of this group and allegedly sanctioned by 
Kwasniewski, had met an ex-KGB officer (then dealing with Russian oil interests) Vladimir 
Alganov in Vienna in July 2003 (right after the sale of RG was stopped by Nafta Polska). 
Kulczyk claimed, Alganov told him that the president o f Nafta Polska, Maciej Glerej and 
Kaczmarek had received five million USD in bribes to let Lukoil to get hold of RG but could 
not deliver their promise. It was claimed that Kulczyk was trying to convince Alganov that 
he would succeed In facilitating RG’s takeover by Lukoil.
From June 2003 on Rafineria Gdanska was renamed Grupa Lotos when a few smaller refineries were 
merged with it. For consistency the new name will not be used here.
®® "...As Lukoil, Yukos make their own overtures", RFE/RL Newsline, 06 September 2002 and "Still no answer 
to Lukoil's offer to buy into Polish refinery", RFE/RL Newsline, 05 September 2002.
Roman Giertych, “Kuiisy afery Orlenu", Rzeczpospolita, 14 December 2004.
Roman Giertych, "Kuiisy afery Orlenu", Rzeczpospolita, 14 December 2004. Wojciech Czuchnowski and 
Andrzej Stec, "Raport Aumiilera”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 23 July 2005. Wojciech Czuchnowski, “Jest raport komisji 
ds. Orlenu", Gazeta Wyborcza, 27 September 2005. Jakub RzekanowskI, "Bzdury Miodowicza", Trybuna, 04 
December 2004.
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The second group formed by Kaczmarek, Gierej, Piotr Czyzewski (Minister of Treasury 
from April 2003 to January 2004), a shady lobbyist called Marek Dochnal, it was claimed, 
were also trying to mediate the sale of RG to Lukoil but their plan was to sell RG directly 
rather than through a merger of RG and PKN Orlen. Kaczmarek, Gierej, and Czyzewski all 
lost their jobs after attempting to block the PKN Orlen-Rotch consortium buying RG. 
Although members of both groups claimed that they were acting with the intention of 
"blocking Russian imperialism” (in the words of Kaczmarek), the commission had the 
impression that there was a competition between the two groups for possible provisions 
and favours from the Russian oil companies as well as the Russian government.®®
Another important thread in the Orlen affair was the previously mentioned crude oil supply 
contract that was blocked following the change in the Board o f PKN Orlen (allegedly 
orchestrated by the Miller-Kulczyk group). In 1997 PKN Orlen®'' signed a five-year contract 
with J&S for the delivery of 70% of its crude oil demand, which J&S bought mostly from 
Lukoil, and pumped through the main pipeline carrying Russian oil, PERN Przyjazn 
{Przedsi^biorstwa Eksploatacji Rurociqgow Naftowych "Przyjazb").^^ The new 
management did not extend the contract with J&S and reduced J&S’s delivery share to 
42% while signing a contact with Petrova I, a company registered in Switzerland and owned 
by Yukos, for 40% of its crude oil.®®
See Biuletyn Komisji èledczej (do zbadania zarzutu nieprawidiowoéci w nadzorze Ministerstwa Skarbu 
Pahstwa nad przedstawicielami Skarbu Partstwa w spôlce PKN Orlen SA oraz zarzutu wykorzystania stuzb 
specjalnych (d. UOP) do nielegalnych naciskow na organa wymiaru sprawledllwosci w celu uzyskania 
postanowlen stuzqcych do wywierania presjl na cztonkôw Zarzqdu PKN Orlen SA) (SORN), No. 18, 3781/IV,
27 October 2004. All commission bulletins from 1993 on are searchable at http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Biuletyn.nsf 
(accessed 06 November 2006). See also Agata Nowakowska, Bartosz Wçglarczyk and Wojciech Olkusnik, 
“Rosyjska ofensywa”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 23 November 2004.
PKN Orlen was called Petrochemia Piock until 2000. Following the merger of Petrochemia Ptock and a 
motor fuel vendor CPN In 1999, It changed its name to PKN Orlen.
Maciej Wolyrtski, "W pracy nie polltykujemy", Trybuna, 06 May 2004. Piotr Skura, "Bôl Wassermanna”, 
Trybuna, 25 September 2004.
Biuletyn Komisji èledczej SORN, No. 25, 3878/IV, 20 November 2004. See also "Lewica kontratakuje”, 
Rzeczpospolita, 18 November 2004.
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Figure 2: Russia’s main oil export infrastructure and Druzhba pipeline^
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When Modrzejewski testified to the Sejm commission, he claimed that the Russian 
monopolist for crude oil delivery Transneft preferred to sell the oil through intermediaries
Russia Energy Survey 2002 (International Energy Agency), Paris: OECD/IEA, 2002, p. 12. Also available at 
www.iea.Org/textbase/nppdf/free/2000/russia2002.pdf (accessed 21 January 2007)
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rather than selling it directly to Polish refineries and that J&S was the most economical and 
reliable partner.®^ However, Zbigniew Siemiqtkowski, the head o f UOP and AW  until June 
2002, who also testified due to the involvement of UOP in the detention of Modrzejewski 
as well as monitoring and investigation of main actors of the scandal, claimed that blocking 
the contract with J&S was necessary in the name of protecting state interests from 
"Russian economic imperialism" by achieving diversification in the field of oil delivery.®^
Theories about the oil delivery contract abounded and most commentators suggested that 
it had to do with corruption and managers of PKN Orlen and Nafta Polska soliciting bribes 
from companies such as J&S and Petroval. Another explanation was that oil delivery 
contracts were offered to facilitate total domination of the Russian government on Poland’s 
oil supply. Perhaps there was an element of judging by hindsight due to the bankruptcy of 
Yukos and rumours of Gazprom acquiring Yukos’s assets in 2004. One theory for why the 
Russian government might have wanted to get rid of J&S was offered by Antoni 
Macierewicz, a member of the commission and the leader of a small right wing nationalist 
party called the Catholic Nationalist Movement {Ruch Katolicko-Narodowy - RKN): J&S 
was founded by people connected with the Russian secret services under the Yeltsin 
administration. When Putin came to power in 2000, he wanted to eliminate J&S from the 
market.®® This was also in the interest of the fuel mafia associated with SLD and the Miller- 
Kwasniewski group had carried out Putin’s strategy In Poland.®'*
The commission failed to find out the answers to the questions it had set itself. None of the 
theories mentioned above were proven to be the fully factual or fully fictional.®® The inquiry 
process soon turned into political bickering between the right wing members of the 
commission and the left wing and into a witch-hunt against the post-communist political 
elite, with Kwasniewski and Miller aggressively targeted.®® The inquiry was also bogged 
down in private vendettas when commission members turned on each other and tried to 
start separate parliamentary inquiries about each others’ suspicious dealings.®^ The 
commission’s already shaken credibility was further damaged when the SLD decided to
Biuletyn Komisji èledczej SORN, No. 5, 3547/lV, 31 August 2004. Andrzej Rudnicki, “Kasa rzqdzi", Trybuna, 
12 November 2004.
Piotr Stasinski, “Czy naduzywac wtadzy w obronie pabstwa?’’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 28 October 2004.
®® Matgorzata Subotlô, “PrzyspawanI do Rosji", Rzeczpospolita, 17 January 2005.
®‘* Presidential advisor, Stanislaw Ciosek, one of the many people ranging from the President’s wife to ex- 
Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz’s assistant, also testified. He told the commission that Lukoil representatives 
openly told him that they were adamant about pushing J&S out of the market. Wojciech Czuchnowski, "Minister 
Ciosek i niedzwiedzie", Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 April 2005.
Piotr Stasinski, “Nowy Atak Teczkami”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 June 2005.
Miller called this “Polish style Maccarthyism". Biuletyn Komisji èledczej SORN, No. 25, 3878/IV, 20 
November 2004,
Wojciech OIkuénik, “Polowanie na sledczych", Gazeta Wyborcza, 22 November 2004. At one point the 
commission was at risk or turning into a lustration court when the National Remembrance Institute {Instytut 
Pamiqci Narodowej - IPN) was asked to submit the pre 1989 intelligence files of people who were asked to 
testify to the commission (including Kwaéniewski). Agnieszka Kublik et al., "Giertych chce teczek", Gazeta 
Wyborcza, 14 January 2005.
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pull its representative out of the commission arguing that they would not want to be a party 
to a right wing campaign to destroy the left/®
The Orlen affair was first and foremost a case about the misuse of political power and 
corruption that permeated the highest echelons of the state. It also demonstrated the 
political effects of being dependent on oil. However, a very interesting aspect of the affair, 
for our purposes, was the perception of Russia and the use of Russian threat in the 
rhetoric employed by the politicians. As mentioned above, the two groups claimed to be in 
competition with each other over the sale of RG both argued that they were protecting 
Polish interests from Russian economic Imperialism. The main function of the commission 
itself was to shed light on dodgy deals which would make Poland even more vulnerable to 
Russia in terms of energy security (as the right wing members saw it). It is a fact that the 
perception of Russia as an enemy and the Polish post-communists as Russia’s henchmen 
is prevalent among right wing and post-Solidarity politicians, and reflection of this 
perception onto any kind of relationship Poland has with Russia is inevitable. However, 
economic realities dictate much of this anti-Russian rhetoric to be confined to political 
discourse and domestic political bickering.
As is evident from the Orlen affair, regardless of the amount and style of corruption 
involved, Poland would still continue to buy its crude oil from Russian sources and the so 
called "diversification of supply" in effect meant diversification of intermediaries which were 
either owned or were dominated by Russian oil concerns. As for the sale of RG, it 
appeared that only the big Russian oil companies were capable of and willing to buy it. No 
other foreign bidder managed to come up with an acceptable proposal or a big enough 
budget to acquire RG. To assess whether the sale of RG to Lukoil would be profitable and 
preferable is outside the scope of the chapter and the capacity of the writer. However, it 
seems that the economic reality o f Poland’s almost total dependence on Russian energy 
and the EU’s willingness to purchase more of it will determine political decisions about the 
Polish energy sector, including future oil supplies and delivery contracts. Any claims of 
protecting the country from Russian economic imperialism or achieving diversification of oil 
supplies would be used for domestic consumption only.
The issues and controversies highlighted by the Orlen affair also featured in Poland’s 
purchase of natural gas from Russia. The next section will elaborate on politics concerning 
natural gas and pipelines.
Wojciech Czuchnowski, "Postowle Sojuszu opuscill sejmowq komisjç éledczq", Gazeta Wyborcza, 08 July 
2005.
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5.3 CASE STUDY: GAS AND PIPELINES
One of the most controversial commodities in Polish-Russian trade is natural gas. Supply 
and transport of this strategic import has implications for Poland beyond the economic 
sphere. For industrial and economic development, Poland had to secure a continuous and 
affordable gas supply but at the same time avoid becoming dependent on a sole supplier. 
Given the fact that the only feasible supply was Russian gas, any issue related with 
purchase or transport of gas became a topic of political debate. Besides, as gas is 
Poland’s main import commodity from Russia (see Figure 3), private capital and corruption 
also featured in the ensuing clash of interests.
Figure 3: Poland’s import of natural gas and other hydrocarbons. 
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5.3.1 Securing gas supplies: The 1993 Agreement with Russia
Within the programme of reorienting Polish trade towards the West in early 1992, Polish 
governments were searching for ways to diversify the import of gas to end complete 
dependence on Russia. In December 1992 a programme adopted by the Council of 
Ministers Economic Committee put forward a proposal to sign multiannual contracts with 
Russia on gas purchase and to build a pipeline carrying Russian gas through Poland to 
Western E u ro p e .P u rc h a s in g  gas from Denmark or Norway was also suggested. Given
Data from Rocznik Statystyczny Przemysiu, Years 1993-2005, Warsaw: Gfôwny Urzaid Statystyczny. 
Andrzej Cylwik, “Charakterystyka rozwoju gazownictwa polskiego w latach 1970-1998" in Barbara 
Bfaszczyk I Andrzej Cylwik (Eds), Charakterystyka wybranych sektorôw infrastrukturalnych i wrailiwych w 
gospodarce polskiej oraz moiiiwoéci ich prywatyzacji, CASE Reports No. 27, Warsaw: Centrum Analiz 
Spoteczno-Ekonomicznych, 1999, p. 43. http://www.case.com.pl/strona—ID-publikacje_raporty_case,ROK- 
1999,TID-1445,nlang-19.html (accessed  06 November 2006)
138
the fact that Russia offered the cheapest gas and transporting facilities, any other option 
than the Russian one was highly unrealistic.
The Polish government worked around the supply problem by signing an agreement with 
Russia during Yeltsin’s visit to Warsaw on 25 August 1993. With this agreement Poland 
and Russia agreed in principle on building a transit pipeline through Poland (and Belarus) 
for Russian gas to reach Germany. Russia pledged to increase the amount of gas it 
supplied to Poland gradually to 14 billion m^ annually by 2010.^°^ As foreseen by the 
agreement a company called EuRoPol GAZ Transit Gas Pipeline System {System  
Gazociqgôw Tranzytowych EuRoPol GAZ) was established on 23 September 1993 by 
Gazprom  (holding 48% of the share) and the Polish energy monopoly, Polish Mining, Oil 
and Gas Company {Polskie Gôrnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo - PGNiG), (48%). With a 
last minute decision a third partner, Gaz Trading (4%) had to be included. A provision of 
the Polish commercial code requiring a third partner to establish a jo int stock company was 
put forward as the reason. EuRoPol GAZ were to be the owner o f the 4000 km long 
pipeline extending from Kondratki on Polish-Belarusian border to Gorzyca on Polish- 
German border. The pipeline would carry gas from the reserves in the Yamal peninsula in 
Siberia and was, therefore, called the “Yamal pipeline”.
A protocol specifying the duties of Russian and Polish sides regarding the pipeline and 
deadlines for construction was signed on 18 February 1995 during Chernomyrdin’s visit to 
Warsaw and approved by the Council of Ministers on 18 August 1995. Following that, on 
17 October 1995, the government adopted a policy document laying down Poland’s energy 
strategy until 2010. An increase in the volume of gas purchased from Russia, the building 
of the Yamal pipeline alongside new gas compression and storage facilities and 
geographically diversifying supply were to be the priorities of Polish energy policy.''®^ On 25 
September 1996 a long term contract based on the 1993 agreement and 1995 protocol 
was signed by Gazprom and PGNIG in Warsaw. The so-called “contract o f the century” 
stipulated that starting from 1997 Poland would buy a total of 250 billion m^ of gas within 
the following 25 years. It was a "take or pay” contract which forbid the reexport of gas in 
case demand in Poland would fall below the supply. The details of the contract, which was 
formally a trade agreement between two companies, were kept confidential.
"Porozumienie mlçdzy Rzq^dem Federacji Rosyjskiej a Rz^dem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej o budowie 
systemu gazociqgôw dia tranzytu gazu rosyjsklego przez terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej I dostawach 
gazu rosyjsklego do Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej" http://www.europolgaz.com.pl/ firma_geneza.htm (accessed 06 
November 2006)
Official Statement of Council of Ministers Economic Committee, 25 September 1995. 
http://www.kprm.gov.pl/1937_3446.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
139
5.3.2 The pipeline debate
The long term agreement with Russia for gas supplies and the pipeline project became the 
subject of a heated debate. Those strongly in favour of the agreement with Russians were 
the governing SLD-PSL coalition. Their main arguments for the pipeline and the long term 
gas contract and pipeline were:
• The existing pipelines which ran through Ukraine, Slovakia and Czech Republic 
(Orenburg pipeline) and through Finland (Jamburg pipeline) did not have sufficient 
capacity to deliver the amount of gas needed by Europe or Poland. Russia blamed 
earlier gas cuts to irregularities in' Ukraine so the new pipeline would eliminate that 
excuse.
• The current gas storage capability in Poland was not enough to sustain demand in 
case the gas supply was cut. However, capacity would be increased alongside 
construction of the pipeline.
• Sources other than Russia were unviable. The most probable among all options 
(importing gas from Algeria, Iran, UK or Central Asia), Norway, would still be too 
costly. Norway could deliver Poland at most 5-6 billion m^ of gas annually but the 
infrastructure investment needed to realise this would be around 3 billion USD which 
would be better spent for increasing storage capacity.
• The pipeline would afford Poland independence from the provider, i.e. Russia. As 
Western Europe would become the end user, Poland would not be alone in case 
political pressure needed to be applied on Russia.
• A  long term contract creates the necessary conditions for attracting Investors in 
Polish industry which would be assured that gas supplies would not be subject to 
fluctuation.
• Having a sole supplier was not all that bad. Countries like Slovakia, Austria or Turkey 
bought only Russian gas and they did not have fears associated with this. The 
contract would not have an adverse effect on Poland’s EU quest, as the EU had not 
raised any objections about it.
The opponents, meanwhile, suggested that
Undersecretary at the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Roman Czerwihski’s comments, Biuletyn Komisji 
Systemu Gospodarczego i Przemysiu, 09 May 1995, No. 1513/11.
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• There was no guarantee that Russians would not blackmail Poland over gas supplies 
in the future. Overdependence on Russian gas would make Poland vulnerable and 
“once again Polish economy might be subordinated to foreign interests.
• There were many loopholes in the agreement and the state budget would have no 
income from transport of gas as EuRoPol GAZ would collect the fees as the owner of 
the pipeline.
• The contract term of 25 years was too long and it was impossible to estimate 
accurately how much gas Poland would need in that distant of a future. If the demand 
was overestimated, the take or pay format, with no reexport option, would be highly 
disadvantageous.
• A more radical criticism directed at the government by right wing parties such as KPN 
was that they were favouring certain importers by trying make gas the main energy 
source. This would bring destruction to the coal mining sector in Poland and also 
make Polish industrial goods more expensive and less competitive as the energy 
costs would increase.
5.3.3 AWS-UW come to power
After the change of government from the post-communist SLD-PSL to AWS-UW coalition 
in 1997, the political dimension of the gas issue came to the fore. The parliamentary club 
of AWS ordered an expert report on the pipeline and asked for the contract to be 
renegotiated. The report argued that the 1993 agreement (and the 1995 protocol) were null 
and void as they had been ratified only by the president and not also by the Sejm as 
prescribed by the Little Constitution that was in force at the time.^°® Also, the agreements 
were in contradiction with a law dated 1919 which provided that only the state could build, 
regulate and use pipelines,^°^ Objections were also raised regarding the 1996 contract.
Luiza Zalewska, “Protokol rozbieznosci wsprawie gazoci^u jamalskiego i 'kontraktu stulecia"’, 
Rzeczpospolita, 20 March 1998.
During the parliamentary debate on the contract it was even Implied by an MP (of AWS but representing the 
KPN parliamentary group) that West might be pushing Poland to buy more and more gas from Russia, thus 
supplying the country with necessary funding needed to support Western backed reforms. See Janina Kraus, 
^rawozdania stenograficzne, 2 kadencja, 91 posiedzenie, 3 dzien, 25 October 1996.
 ^ Luiza Zalewska, "Inkasent ze Wschodu", Rzeczpospolita, 20 March 1998.
In addition to this point, right wing and farmers’ political organisations had reservations against the methods 
EuRoPol GAZ used to secure permission from farmers on whose land pipeline would pass. An interpellation 
submitted by MPs from NK, KPN-Ojczyzna, Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland {Ruch Odbudowy 
Polski - ROP) and PSL about the heavy-handed methods used mentioned press reports claiming that 
Gazprom president Rem Viakhirev said that they would "beat to death" those who obstructed the construction 
of the pipeline. Michal Janiszewski et al., Interpelacja nr 1191 do prezesa Rady Ministrôw w sprawie 
nieprawidlowosci wystçpujXcych przy realizacji budowy gazoci^u tranzytowego z Rosji do Niemiec przez 
spôlkç EuRoPol GAZ, 10 December 1998, 2 kadencja, 38 posiedzenie. Fuli text of interpellations and replies 
can be retrieved from the third term onwards. http://ks.sejm.gov.pl;8009/forms/iz.htm (accessed 06 November 
2006)
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MPs from AWS argued that securing the energy supplies of a country was an issue that 
should not be delegated to two corporate entitles and accused PGNIG of distorting the 
reality by claiming that they were working on diversifying the gas supply.
Even though many in the AWS-UW government were anxious to renegotiate the gas deals 
the SLD-PSL government had made with Russia, this proved to be difficult not only 
because of Poland’s need for gas but also because it was risky for the government to 
strain the already tense relations between Poland and Russia, not the least due to 
Poland’s NATO accession. Signals from Russia were explicit; The president o f Gazprom, 
Rem Viakhirev, said during his visit to Warsaw concerning Poland’s gas debt to Russia 
“[Poland] should not be afraid of Russia or Gazprom. We are friends and we would like to 
have good relations with all our partners. However, we can also kick [you] in the teeth if 
need be.”''°®
5.3.4 The elusive second pipeline
Meanwhile talks with the Norwegians for diversifying gas supplies were renewed and a 
contract was signed on 28 April 1999 by which Norway would sell 0.5 billion m^ of gas to 
Poland from 2001 to 2006.” ° By then Poland was already buying small amounts of gas 
from Germany. Although gas supplied by West European sources increased to about 12% 
of the total in 1999 from 0.3% in 1992, it was still dwarfed by the supply from Russia, which 
constituted about 75%.”  ^ Besides, the government was criticised by left wing circles about 
the gas deal with Norway. The left wing daily Trybuna accused the government of ignoring 
economic realities by taking purely political decisions and stated that Norwegian gas cost 
20-30% more than Russian gas.” ^
See comments by Czeslaw Sobierajski and Janina Kraus of AWS, Biuletyn Komisji Gospodarki, No. 291/111, 
17 March 1998.
Luiza Zalewska, "Inkasent ze Wschodu", Rzeczpospolita, 20 March 1998.
"Poland, Norway End Talks on Norwegian Gas Supplies to Poland ", Poiish Daiiy News Bulletin, 29 April 
1999. http://www.msz.gov.pl/start.php?page=103Q601001 (accessed 10 October 2004}
Rocznik Statystyczny Handiu Zagranicznego, Years 1993-2002, Warsaw; Glowny Urz^d Statystyczny. 
Maciej Wotynski, "Wpuszczeni w gazowct rurç”, Trybuna, 10 October 2000.
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Figure 4: Existing and planned natural gas pipelines from Russia to Europe^^^
\
Construction of the first Yamal pipeline was completed in 1999 and gas started to flow to 
Germany, supplying Poland on the way. Before the dust settled on the conflict about the
Russia Energy Survey 2002 (International Energy Agency), Paris: OECD/IEA, 2002, p. 15. Also available at 
wvw.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2000/russia2002.pdf (accessed 21 January 2007)
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pipeline and the gas contract, a new dispute broke out, this time over the planned second 
Yamal pipeline. According to the 1993 agreement two pipeiines to carry a totai o f 67 bitiion 
m® of gas annuaily were to be built.'*’®'* The details for the proposed second pipeline were 
not yet negotiated. At the end of 1999 Viakhirev wrote a letter to Kwasniewski asking for 
support to build the second pipeline which was to go southwards from Warsaw and 
connect to the Slovak pipeline network (so called intersystem connection or pieremychka). 
This meant that Gazprom could cut gas transit from Ukraine and send gas instead along 
both pipeiines to Western Europe through Belarus. This would give Gazprom and the 
Russian government a free hand to pressurise Ukraine, which was dependant on the 
transit revenue In exchange for which it received Russian gas. in 2000 about 90 billion m^ 
of the total 120 billion m®* of Russian gas transited through Ukraine to Western Europe.” ® 
Ukraine had been a troubled customer for Gazprom as it had a huge debt and had also on 
occasions resorted to extracting gas from the transit pipelines without consultation with 
Gazprom or offering payment. Gazprom also demanded that it took control o f Ukrainian 
pipelines in payment o f the debt.
Apart from creating pressure over Ukraine, there were also economic arguments to the 
proposed pipeline: First, as the pipeline would have a long stretch on Poiish territory, it 
would bring about 900 million USD a year in transit fees.” ® Second, EU countries were 
anxious to increase gas supplies from Russia in an attempt to lessen their dependence on 
increasingly expensive oil from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) countries. Third, delivery of some of the Yamai gas through southern pipelines 
was more convenient for Germany than receiving all 67 billion m® in one station on the 
Polish border.” ^
The Polish government went through a period of hesitation about the Gazprom proposal. 
Kwasniewski asked the Ministry of Economy and PGNiG to study the matter. The Vice- 
minister Jan Szl^zak reportedly wrote to Gazprom in April 2000 declaring the 
government’s interest in the project. Even though the PM and Minister of Economy denied 
the existence of the letter, Szlqzak resigned a few weeks later, according to the media, in 
connection with the letter.” ® Meanwhile, Gazprom made an announcement on 17 June 
2000, stating that indecisiveness of “East European countries” about the pipeline could
** See Article 1 of the agreement. “Protokôt miçdzy rz^dem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a rzqdem Federacji 
Rosyjskiej w sprawie przedslçwzlçé organlzacyjnych zmierzaj^cych do zapewnlenia realizacji porozumienia 
miçdzy rzqdem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a rz^dem Federacji Rosyjskiej o budowie systemu gazoclqgow dIa 
tranzytu gazu rosyjsklego przez terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej I dostawach gazu rosyjsklego do 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 25 slerpnia 1993 r. - Warszawa, 18 lutego 1995 r.". Zbior Dokumentôw, Vol. 
541, 1995, No. 3, pp. 23-30.
Konrad NIklewIcz, "WIdzlane z ParyZa", Gazeta Wyborcza, 31 October 2000,
Plotr Andrzejewski et al., “Brori gazowa", Wprost, 06 August 2000.
Andrzej Krzysztof WrôblewskI, "Wysokle cisnlenie", Polityka, No. 22, May 2000.
"Co leZy w interesie Polski", Rzeczpospolita, 12 June 2000 and Jan Dzladul, "W oparach gazu”,
Polityka, November 2000, No. 45.
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hasten the construction of the North European Pipeline (which was planned to pass either 
through Finland and Sweden or along the Baltic Sea floor to Germany).” ®
The Poiish government decided to make a gesture to Ukraine and announced that it could 
not agree to the pipeline as the project undermined the interests o f Ukraine, Poland’s 
strategic partner. This decision delighted the proponents of an active EP with Ukraine at 
the heart of it. However, it soon became obvious that Poland was playing Don Quixote as 
not only Gazprom but also the EU snubbed Poland’s decision. The spokesman for the EU 
Energy Commissioner said that If the Poiish government did not want to be involved in the 
new pipeline, it would be built elsewhere.'*^® Gazprom announced on 19 October 2000 that 
a consortium made up of Ruhrgas (Germany), Wintershaii (Germany), Gaz de France and 
SNAM (Italy) began working on a feasibility study on the project of the pipeline which 
would bypass Ukraine.*^* One Poiish commentator called this “a bitter lesson in reaipoiitik” 
as the EU looked after its own interest in reducing reliance on oil and negotiated with 
Gazprom without taking Poland’s concerns into account.*^^ The EU-Russia summit at the 
end of October 2000 also confirmed the EU position that securing gas supplies was 
paramount.
Another reason why the Polish gesture towards Ukraine proved to be ineffectual was 
Ukraine’s handling of the issue. Soon after the Poiish government’s and president’s hearty 
declarations in defence of Ukraine’s sovereignty and energy security, the Ukrainian 
president Leonid Kuchma struck a deal with Putin during a meeting in Sochi on 17 October 
2000. Kuchma proposed that in order to settle Ukraine’s debts Gazprom took part in the 
privatisation of Ukrainian gas transit system and Ukraine would stop tapping gas liiegaliy, 
and in return Russia would assist Ukraine in upgrading the existing pipeiines to increase 
carriage capacity.*^® At the beginning of December Ukraine and Russia arrived at an 
agreement settling Ukraine’s gas debt and methods of payment.'*^'* Even though Ukrainian 
state officials praised Poland’s support, they nevertheless made it clear that they preferred 
to settle their problems with Russia on their own. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoli Zienko 
stated that Kiev would not oppose a new pipeline that was economically justified, even if it 
bypassed Ukrainian territory.*^® During a meeting with Kuchma in Odessa on 18 December 
2000 Kwasniewski said, referring to the pipeline problem, "there are economic interests 
that should not be politicised.’’*®®
“Zdecyduj siç Polsko”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 19 June 2000.
Jçdrzej Bielecki, “Rurociqg ominie Ukralnç", Rzeczpospolita, 05 October 2000.
Artur Morka, "Gazoci% ominie Ukraine", Rzeczpospolita, 19 October 2000.
Krzysztof Bien, “Interesy wygraty z polityk^", Rzeczpospolita, 19 October 2000.
“Russia to accept more lOlJs from Ukraine for gas", RFE/RL Newsline, 17 October 2000. 
“Ukraine, Russia reach 'breakthrough' deal on gas debt”, RFE/RL Newsline, 04 December 2000. 
Zofia Jôzwiak, “Wazne porozumienie", Zycie, 02 December 2000.
Eliza Olczyk et al,, "Gazety piszq, Kwasniewski milczy", Rzeczpospolita, 19 December 2000.
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Having realised the difficulty of their position, Poiish leaders made attempts to gracefully 
get out of the impasse Poland put itself in. While sticking in rhetoric to being sensitive 
about Ukrainian interests, they started opening the way to negotiations with the Russians 
about the pipeline. The Poiish authorities started talks with both the Russian government 
and Gazprom on the new pipeline in February 2001. The talks, however, dragged on 
without an outcome. There were three reasons for this, none of which was to do with 
Poland’s strategic partnership with Ukraine.
First, the AWS government was anxious to renegotiate the 1993 and 1995 agreements, 
especially with reference to the financing of the new pipeline. This was one of the 
conditions for negotiations set out by the Polish government in a memo handed to the 
Russian PM Kasyanov’s team during the PM’s Warsaw visit on 25 May 2001 Another 
condition was the Russian side’s help in changing the administration of EuRoPoi GAZ and 
returning the 4% of its shares held by Gas Trading to PGNiG and Gazprom so that each of 
these two companies would become a 50% shareholder in EuRoPoi GAZ as originally 
provided by the 1993 agreement, (see below for details). Kasyanov promised that they 
would respond to the conditions by 8 June 2001 but failed to do so.*®®
Second, PGNiG was negotiating at the same time with Norwegian and Danish gas 
companies in a bid to diversify Poland’s gas supply and to have a stronger hand at 
negotiations with the Russians on the new pipeline project. PGNIG did sign an agreement 
with the Danish gas company DONG on 2 July 2001 on the construction of an underwater 
pipeline from Denmark to Poland and sale of 16 billion m® of gas to Poland over 6 years.*®® 
This was followed by a deal reached with Norway’s Gas Negotiation Committee (GFU) 
according to which Statoil would supply Poland with a totai o f 74 billion m® of gas over 16 
years starting from 2008.*®° The implementation of the agreement depended on the 
approval by the Council of Ministers of both sides.
Agreements with Norway and Denmark were sharply criticised by the SLD. Leszek Miller, 
leader of the SLD, stated that, if successful in the upcoming September 2001 elections, 
they would study the contracts signed for diversification of the gas supply, and possibly 
cancel them.*®* Bronislaw Lagowski, a columnist in the pro-SLD weekly, Przegl^d, called
*®^ Pawet Reszka, "Stanowcze pro memoria w sprawie gazu", Rzeczpospolita, 04 June 2001.
*®® Joanna Pienczykowska, “Liscik do Rosjan", Zycie, 05 June 2001,
*®® Bronislaw Wildstein, "Pod gazowq^kuratelq^“,Rzeczpospo//fa, 06 July 2001 and "Poland, Denmark Signed 
Danish Gas Supply Deal", Polish Daily News Bulletin, 03 July 2001. 
www.msz.gov.pl/flleJlbraries/45/8264/ANG03.doc (accessed 12 October 2004)
*®° Michael Lelyveld, "Poland's gas deal with Norway offers relief to Ukraine", RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and 
Ukraine Report, 04 September 2001.
*®* Aneta Stabryafa, "Gaz wci^z dia nas”, Zycie, 29 August 2001.
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the deal an example of “Polnische wirtschaft” as it meant buying the same gas at highly 
inflated prices.*®®
Third, it was alleged that the Russian side were happy with the delay as they were anxious 
for a change of government after October 2001. The SLD were tipped as the victors.
5.3.5 Problem  o f shares
The AWS-UW government was in for a cold shower when Gazeta Wyborcza publicised in 
November 2000 the existence of a fibre optic communications cable running alongside the 
Yamal pipeline connecting Russia to Germany.*®® The Ministry o f Communications had 
not given permission for such a cable as the law required. In accordance with the 1993 
agreement, such a cable could be installed to be used exclusively for communications 
regarding technical aspects of pipeline construction. However, Gazprom subsidiaries had 
already signed huge telecommunication deals with West European companies such as 
Alcatel and Pirelli, which announced that data transfers would be done over the cable 
going through Poland. In effect the cable was de facto an “extraterritorial corridor” .
The government formed a commission to investigate the problem. The report produced by 
this commission in January 2001 concluded that the government had virtually no control 
over the cable or the pipeline.*®'* Even though the installation of the cable was legal, the 
way it was used was not. The owner of the pipeline, EuRoPol GAZ, leased the cable to a 
company called Pol Gaz Telekom. Even though PGNiG was supposed to be the sole 
operator o f both the pipeline and the cable according to the 1993 agreement, it lost control. 
The report argued that the reason for that was Gas Trading, the company which held 4% 
of EuRoPol GAZ. The make up of Gas Trading (as of 1998) and Pol Gaz Telekom’s shares 
(after it was established in 1999) was as follows (Table 8):
Gas T rading Pol Gaz Telekom
% O wned by M H ii % O wned by
43.41 Bartimpex
36.17 Gaztelekom (Gazprom 
subsidiary)
15.88 Gazexport Moskva 32 
(Gazprom subsidiary) H & f f l
EuRoPol GAZ
4.54 (Wçglokoks and
Bronislaw Lagowski, "O co chodzi?”, Przeglqd, No.37, 03 September 2001.
*®® Andrzej Kublik and Marcin Bosacki, “Kabel Gazpromu", Gazeta Wyborcza, 17 November 2000. 
*®* "Rura bez kontroli”, Zycie, 17 January 2001.
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The key shareholder in both companies, Bartimpex, belonged to a Polish businessman 
called Aleksander Gudzowaty, who was considered as the “Russians’ man” In Warsaw. He 
established the company In 1992 having made a "food for gas” barter agreement with 
Russians, benefiting from several intergovernmental agreements between Poland and 
Russia endorsing barter trade. Gudzowaty amassed a fortune In the gas trade with Russia. 
Gas Trading, a company with Bartimpex and Gazprom as majority shareholders, was used 
by Gazprom as an intermediary for gas sales and by 1997 50% of the Russian gas bought 
by PGNIG went through this company.*®® It was alleged that In 1993 Gas Trading was 
forced upon the Polish side by Gazprom as a third shareholder o f EuRoPol GAZ by using 
an obscure legal provision which was brought up at the last minute.*®® In practice handing 
4% of shares to Gas Trading was contrary to the 1993 agreement which gave PGNiG and 
Gazprom 50% o f the shares each. With the entry into force the new company law on 1 
January 2001, the requirement for having a third partner was abolished.*®'' A public lawsuit 
was filed against the Minister of Industry at the time of EuRoPol GAZ’s creation, Wactaw 
NiewiarowskI, and two PGNiG managers for exceeding their powers and violating the 1993 
agreement.*®® The total weight o f Gazprom and Bartimpex in both EuRoPol GAZ and Gas 
Trading was more than PGNIG. Hence, the hijacking o f the pipeline and cable, concluded 
the commission report
There were also financial Improprieties Involved. EuRoPol GAZ was heavily indebted to 
Gazprombank, having borrowed 257 million USD In 1999.*®° W hat’s more PGNiG kept 
making losses while Gudzowaty’s firms were thriving.*'*® All these prompted the 
government to push for a change in EuRoPol GAZ board of directors and liquidation of 
Gas Trading In order to regain PGNIG’s control over EuRoPol GAZ and, in effect, over the 
pipeline.
Perhaps a more important reason for the government’s quest to reduce Gudzowaty’s hand 
In the gas deal was that he was an open supporter of the SLD.*'** Most of the directors in 
companies owned by him were ministers or key civil servants under the SLD-PSL 
government. Curiously, most of them were Involved In the 1993 and 1995 agreements and 
the “contract of the century” In one way or another. The support was mutual as SLD
*®® Luiza Zalewska, "Inkasent ze Wschodu", Rzeczpospolita, 20 March 1998.
*®° Michal Matys and Pawet SmolenskI, "Stajnl'e Gudzowatego", Gazeta Wyborcza, 20-21 January 2001,
*®^ Kodeks spôtek handlowych. Dziennik Ustaw, No. 94, Pos. 1037, 08 November 2000 replacing the law dated 
27 June 1934 (with amendments), Dziennik Ustaw, No. 57, Pos. 502,
*®® “Podejrzany NiewiarowskI”, Rzeczpospolita, 30 May 2001 and "Byty minister ma towarzystwo”, 
Rzeczpospolita, 15 June 2001.
*®^ Bronislaw Wlldstein, “Pod gazow^ kuratelq^ ", Rzeczpospolita, 06 July 2001.
*'*° PGNIG made losses of 415.6 million zloty In 2000. By May 2001 It owed Bartimpex 156.3 million zloty. See 
"Informacja o wynlkach kontroli klerunkôworganizacjl Importa gazu do Polski", Najwyzsza Izba Kontroli, 
KGP/DG/41100/01, N o /17/2002/801002/KGP, 25 February 2002. 
http://www.nlk.gov.pl/wynlkl_kontroll/dz__gospodarka.html (accessed 21 February 2006)
*'** It should be borne in mind that Gudzowaty’s motives for supporting the SLD may not be all to do with 
Ideological inclination. Gudzowaty’s donation of a large sum to Walçsa's 1995 presidential campaign Is an 
evidence to that.
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politicians as well as publications associated with the left wing rose to Gudzowaty’s 
defence. Trybuna ran a story in January 2001, following the commission report, accusing 
the right wing government of harming the interests of a purely Polish company which 
contributed to the Polish economy.*'*® Post-communists supported Gudzowaty on other 
occasions. One of these was when his project of constructing a 100 km. pipeline from 
Szczecin to Bernau in order to supply gas from Germany was blocked by the government 
in favour of the gas deal with Norway. SLD MPs bombarded the government with 
interpellations, questioning the government’s motives for preferring Norwegian gas and 
demanding an explanation for discriminating against Gudzowaty’s firms. These were 
submitted by 12 different SLD MPs within only two months.*'*®
5.3.6 2001 elections and turning of the tide
With the formation of SLD-UP/PSL government in October 2001, a reversal of policy was 
evident. During Polish-Russian talks in Moscow in December 2001, dominated by 
economic issues, Vice PM Marek Pol stated that Poland wanted to have such relations 
with Russia that would secure Poland’s energy supply and make it an attractive country for 
transit. *'*'* The government also signalled that they would not pressurise Russia about the 
EuRoPol GAZ problem.
However, it became imperative for the government to renegotiate the 1993 gas agreement 
as it was clear that Gazprom was changing its mind about the second Yamal pipeline.
First, during a CIS summit in Kishinev in October 2002, Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukrainy 
signed a 30 year agreement that created an international consortium to upgrade and 
manage pipelines running through Ukraine.*'*® That meant more gas could be carried via 
Ukraine and Gazprom had fewer and fewer reasons for avoiding the Ukrainian route. 
Second, Gazprom started putting more emphasis on buiiding a pipeline under the Baltic 
Sea and the project was endorsed by the European Commission in 2002.
With the second pipeline project ruled out, Poland had to renegotiate the 1993 gas 
agreement. The Russian side could not object to this either, as without the second pipeline 
it was impossible for them to fulfil their obligations and supply the agreed amount to 
Poland. As o f 2002 Poland received only 2.88 m® of gas from the first pipeline and gas was 
also delivered to Poland by other means at two points on the Polish-Belarus border 
(Jarostaw-Drozdowicze and Siemiatycze-Wysokoje). In addition, the estimates about
*'*® Maciej Wotynski, “Polskie piekto", Trybuna, 22 January 2000.
*'*® See interpellation Nos 2412, 2383, 2389, 4504, 4505, 4509, 4676, 4586, 4813, 4912, 4953 sent from 
August to October 2000.
*'*'* “O gazie bez szczegôtôw”, Rzeczpospolita, 13 December 2001 and Stawomir Popowski, “Minimalnie o 
gazie", Rzeczpospolita, 14 December 2001.
Stawomir Popowski, “Gazocis^g ominie Polskç", Rzeczpospolita, 23 October 2002.
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Poland’s gas demand proved to be too high, especially given that the economic growth 
slowed down in 2000-01, reducing demand for energy supplies.
The Polish government managed to sign an agreement with Russia on 23 January 2003 
according to which Poland would buy 161 billion m® until 2020 instead of 218.*'*® This 
would save the budget around 5 million USD. However, even after these reductions, there 
would still be an oversupply of gas as extra supplies would come from Denmark and 
Norway {and Germany), thanks to the previous government’s efforts at diversification.*'*^
This was the reason given by the government to defer the Danish and Norwegian gas 
contracts in December 2003 (by simply withholding approval by the Council of Ministers).
The government also gave a go ahead to PGNiG to start talks about the Szczecin-Bernau 
pipeline construction, blocked by the previous government.*'*®
It must be noted that even though the SLD-UP/PSL governments reversed certain energy 
policy decision of the previous government, they by no means aimed to cancel gas 
contracts with suppliers other than Russia. Efforts at diversifying supplies continued and 
Poland did achieve a degree of diversification by 2004, especially with the purchase of gas 
from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan from 2003 on. According the trade values from 2004,
Poland bought about 37% of its natural gas from Western European countries. Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan. However, with Poland buying nearly half of its gas from Russia, Russia 
remained the biggest supplier.
*‘*® Krzysztof Biert, "Kompromis po roku", Rzeczpospolita, 24 January 2003.
*'’*' For figures on prognosis of gas demand see “Ocena realizacji i korekta ZatoZen poiityki energetycznej
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Polski do 2020 roku", Ministerstwo Gospodarki, 02 April 2002. A copy can be found at 
http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki4ka.nsf(Druk No. 427, 18 April 2002) (accessed 06 November 2004). 
Mniej gazu, mnlej problemôw", Rzeczpospolita, 12 February 2003.
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Figure 5: Change in Poland’s natural gas imports in percentages^^^
(West Europe includes Germany. Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, Denmark, Belgium,
Holland and France)
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5.3.7 Conclusion
Poland’s relations with Russia regarding gas and pipelines presented Poland with a 
dilemma between the necessity of securing affordable energy and exposure to the 
dominant partner by way of dependence. Such dependence caused much controversy in 
Poland because the country in question was Russia. The debate included not only 
economic calculations versus strategic risks, it also brought about the questions of the
Data from Rocznik Statystyczny Przemysiu. Years 1996,1999, 2002 and 2005, Warsaw: Gtôwny Urz^d 
Statystyczny.
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limits of Poiand’s EP, the security Poland hoped to find by being a member of the EU and 
the consequences of Poland’s post communist economic transformation.
The second pipeline problem and Poland’s hasty move in defence o f Ukraine’s interests 
(despite Ukraine itself) was a good test case for Poland’s budding EP. Not only has it 
exposed a certain lack of substance in EP but also brought about a realisation that Poland 
did not possess the necessary Instruments and strength to carry it out. The limitations of 
Poland’s claim to be a regional leader and a locomotive leading Ukraine (and maybe 
Belarus in the future) to join the West became clear. This episode also gave impetus to the 
minimalism debate of 2000 covered in Chapter Four by which Polish intellectuals spent 
much mental exercise about the means/ends of EP, the place of Ukraine and Russia and 
realism vs. idealism.
Another important consequence of the energy issue was that it was a “lesson in 
reaipoiitik”. The Polish phobia about the West dealing with Russia over their heads (hence 
the maxim of “nothing about us, without us” - nic o nas bez nas) lay at the root of the 
controversy in Poland created by the EU countries’ pragmatic decisions about their energy 
security. This also ties in with the lack of a realistic assessment o f what EU candidacy (and 
eventual membership) would bring Poland.
Last but not least, the controversy around the gas trade exposed the shortcomings of the 
process by which private capitai was created within Poland’s post 1989 economic 
transformation. The relations cultivated during the Soviet era by those who became 
Poland’s post communist economic elite (like Gudzowaty) laid the ground for unhealthy 
state-private business relations, as also highlighted by the Orlen affair. Many right wing 
commentators in Poiand saw sale and transport of Russian gas to Poland as a post­
communist plot to serve the interests of their Russian masters and even to make Poland 
once again fully dependent on Russia. SLD’s support for Gudzowaty and the gas contract 
with Gazprom were seen as evidence. As explained in Chapter Four, It is true that the 
majority of intellectuals and politicians who supported the pro-Russian option in EP were 
post-communists or of left wing orientation and often affiliated with the SLD. However, as 
we can see in the pipeiine exampie, the motives behind the actions of the post-communist 
governments were based also on economic interests rather than pure ideological 
orientation.
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5.4 KALININGRAD
Kaliningrad is the only Russian region that shares a border with Poland and none with 
mainland Russia. The region is defined as an “exclave” in relation to Russia and an 
“enclave” after EU enlargement to Poland and the Baltics.*®® The East Prussian 
Kônigsberg was named Kaliningrad in 1946 after the Soviet Union took over the territory at 
the end of the Second World War. Soviets used the region as a military base, populating it 
with army personnel after its German inhabitants were deported en masse. The break up 
of the Soviet Union and independence of Baltic states geographically detached Kaliningrad 
from Russia and rendered unnecessary maintaining such heavy military presence in the 
region as the Cold War ended. The region was faced with economic stagnation.
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Throughout the1990s Kaliningrad gradually ceased to be an exclusively hard security 
issue for Poland. New aspects such as economic contacts, soft security issues and the 
wider issue of status of the region following the EU enlargement were added to the agenda 
of bilateral relations regarding Kaliningrad.
5.4.1 Hard security issues
The agreement on Soviet troop withdrawals from ex-Warsaw Pact countries in 1992-93 
brought a relief to Poland as it signalled the diminishing of an immediate military threat 
from Russia. The concentration of armed forces in Kaliningrad (especially after the 
stationing of some troops withdrawn from Central Europe) was still a cause for concern.*®®
For a discussion on the definition of the term s “enclave” and “exclave” see  Pertti Joenniemi, “Appendix 1 ; 
Kaliningrad -  Enclave or Exclave?” in Pertti Joenniemi and Jan Prawitz (Eds), Kaliningrad: The European 
Amber Region, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, pp. 261-265.
*®* Source: http:/Awvw.calguard.ca.gov/ia/konigsberg/Events-Kaliningrad.htm (accessed 15 November 2004) 
*®® Zdzislaw Lachowski, “Kaliningrad as  a Security Issue: An Expert View from Poland” in Joenniemi and 
Prawitz (Eds), “Kaliningrad”, p. 134.
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However, Poland did not perceive a direct threat due to this situation.*®® Russian officials 
declared their readiness to reduce armaments in the region. Realistically it was difficult to 
expect the region to be demilitarised as first, it was physically impossible to transfer troops 
and weapons elsewhere in Russia, given that CFE limits meant cutting down on numbers 
in the mainland (except for flank areas). Second, it would mean a mass exodus from the 
region, where population indicators were already low, as the army was the sole reason for 
more than a quarter o f the inhabitants to be there. Third, there was no reason for Russia to 
give up its military presence in this major ice-free port with close proximity to Central and 
Northern Europe, especially while discussions for NATO enlargement were underway.
Poland approached the Kaliningrad security issue pragmatically throughout the 1990s by 
not making it an item on the agenda of bilateral relations and reiterating that it perceived 
no aggressive intent behind military concentration in Kaliningrad. This level headed 
approach was also necessitated by Poland’s efforts against the portrayal o f the country as 
a potential troublemaker by the opponents o f NATO enlargement.*®'* It was argued that 
encircling of Kaliningrad by NATO states after enlargement would provoke Russia to step 
up its military concentration in the region and rely on nuclear capabilities in case of a war.
The arguments of proponents of NATO enlargement prevailed over those of Its opponents. 
However, the issue o f nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad was to create a controversy in 2001 
when The Washington Times published a report on 3 January 2001, alleging that Russia 
deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad.*®® The initial reaction of Polish officials 
was to demand an international inspection of weapons in Kaliningrad, voiced by the 
government spokesman, Krzysztof Luft and Kwasniewski.*®® The Russian Ambassador to 
Poland, Sergei Razov, categorically denied the allegations and Putin called them “absolute 
nonsense".*®*' There were voices of reason, like Defence Minister officials, who reminded 
the public that where weapons were deployed was not that important as Poland was 
already within the range of nuclear weapons.*®® It was also stated that Russia would not be 
violating any international agreements if it decided to place nuclear weapons in 
Kaliningrad. It was assumed that there were no nuclear weapons in the region based on 
declarations in early 1990s by Yeltsin about Russia’s intention to keep the Baltic Sea area 
nuclear free. Foreign Minister Wtadystew Bartoszewski also tried to calm the situation via a 
press statement that there was no change in Poland’s security situation and Poland did not
i:
*®® See comments by Defence Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk, Biuletyn Komisji Obrony Narodowej, No. 47/11, 09 
November 1993.
*®"* See Stanley Kober, "NATO Expansion Flashpoint No. 3 Kaliningrad", Cato Foreign Policy Briefing, No. 46,
11 February 1998. http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-D46es.html (accessed 06 November 2006).
*®® Bill Gertz, "Russia transfers nuclear arms to Baltics”, The Washington Times, 03 January 2001.
*®® “Government Wants International Inspection Team in Kaliningrad" and “Kwasniewski Wants international 
Inspection in Kaliningrad”, Polish Daily News Bulletin, 05 January 2000 and 08 January 2000. 
http://www.msz,gov.pl/start.php?page=1030601001 (accessed 18 October 2004)
157 “przegj^d prasy kaliningradzkiej”, Obwôd Kaiiningradzki, Vol. 2, February 2001, No. 78, p. 9.
*®® See comments by Stanislaw Koziej, Director of Defence Systems Department, Ministry of Defence, 
Katarzyna Bartman, "W cieniu rakiet", Zycie, 05 January 2001.
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demand a special inspection but just a regular one facilitated by international agreements 
{i.e. CFE).*®®
Despite the conflicting statements about inspection and a minor nuisance to which Putin 
had to react, the government managed to temper its reaction and to avoid provoking a 
crisis in relations with Russia. Internal debates, on the other hand, bordered on the 
hysterical. Dissonance in threat perception was clear from the statements made during the 
discussion on the problem at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sejm on 10 January 
20001 .*®° Krzysztof Kaminski, an AWS MP, argued that the situation could be a test for 
ascertaining how NATO allies would react to a threat directed against Poland. He 
proposed a draft resolution which provided that the Sejm should ask the Russian Duma 
whether Russia was planning to station nuclear weapons in the Baltic region (the 
committee rejected the resolution). Another AWS MP, Mirostaw Styczen, took things 
further and argued that, as a front country, Poland should reconsider stationing of nuclear 
weapons on Its soil. Fully supporting Styczen's proposal, an independent right wing MP, 
Antoni Macierewicz, suggested that Poland was faced with political blackmail, referring to 
a Russian-German rapprochement, stationing of nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad and new 
Russian military doctrine which did not rule out the use of tactical weapons. The 
participants from SLD and the Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, argued against creating 
an unnecessary controversy based only on a report by a foreign newspaper.
5.4.2 Economic relations
The economic importance of Kaliningrad was recognised by Polish policy makers who 
signed an agreement with Russia on cooperation between Poland’s North-eastern regions 
and Kaliningrad on 22 May 1992. At the time there were already 111 Polish-Russian joint 
ventures registered in the region.*®* Poland was the first country to open a consulate 
(January 1994) in the region and Polish regions and cities close to Kaliningrad signed 
economic cooperation agreements by 1993. Various meetings o f an economic nature were 
organised to enhance mutual trade.
The reason for increasing interest in Kaliningrad was due to the decision of the Russian 
authorities to change the exclusively military character of the region and prevent economic 
stagnation by attracting investment and developing trade. A special economic zone called 
“Yantar" was established on 21 September 1991 and customs duties and tax concessions 
were granted to investors by a presidential decree on 7 December 1993. The hope that
*®® “Oswiadczenie rzecznika prasowego MSZ ws. dyskusji o broni j^drowej w Kaliningradzie”, 08 January 
2001. http://msz.gov.p[/index.php?page=4474&!angJd=pl&bulletinJd=9&portlet =biuletyn%2Fpokaz 
(accessed 06 November 2006)
° See Biuletyn Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych, No. 3882/111, 10 January 2001.
*®* Zajqczkowski, "Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie", RPPZ 1992.
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Kaliningrad would become the Baltic “Hong Kong”*®® came to nothing as due to constant 
changes in corporate, customs and tax laws and bureaucratic and infrastructural problems, 
Yantar never reached the desired level o f economic activity.*®®
Trade with Poland, nevertheless, developed, albeit slowly, and turnover increased from 64 
million USD in 1994 to 292 in 1998 and 370 in 2002.*®'* By 2003 Kaliningrad was receiving 
15.3% of Poland’s total exports to Russia.*®®
Table 9: Kaliningrad trade figures 1998-2001 (in million USD/®®
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001
Kaliningrad’s 
total trade 
turnover
Turnover \Mth 
Poland
1500.2 292.7 1132.9 209.8 1291.6 295.1 1443.0 281.2
Kaliningrad’s 
total exports
Kaliningrad’s 
exports to 
Pdmnd
351.3 99.7 322.3 106.9 475.2 154.3 455.3 l W
Kaliningrad’s 
total imports
Kaühfngrad’s 
imports from 
P o#d
1148.9 193.0 810.6 114.6 816.4 140.8 987.7 1 # ,0
Polish direct investment in the region had also grown, surpassing that of Germany by 
1999.
Table 10: FDI Inflow into Kaliningrad 1995-2001 (in million USD) 167
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Poland 0.3 0.5 0.2 2.4 1.3 2.9 1.9
Germany 3.5 1.6 2.0 5.0 0.8 0.5 0.2
Total 12.7 21.5 10.6 9.2 4.1 6.6 3.2
Although insignificant in terms of total trade turnover with Russia (only around 1.1% of total 
imports to Poland in 2003), trade with Kaliningrad became an important source of income
*® Many different geographical analogies were drawn when questioning the future of Kaliningrad, some of 
which were Guantanamo (given the military concentration), Kuril Islands (due to the fact that it was a post \war 
gain), Alaska (after allegations in the Sunday Times in January 2001 that Russia was planning to hand over 
the economic control of Kaliningrad to Germans in exchange for debt reduction) and Hawai (drawing parallels 
between the coexistence of US military with substantial Japanese investment vis-à-vis Russian military and 
German investment),
*“  Grzegorz JôZwiak, “Wspôtpraca Obwodu Kaliningradzkiego I regoinôw pôtnocno -  wschodniej Polski w 
latach 1992-1998" in Krystyna Gomôtka (Ed.), Problemy transformacji gospodarczej w Estonii, Litwie, Ukrainie, 
Biahrusi i Federacji Rosyjskiej w latach dziewiçôdziesiqtych X X  wieku. Gdartsk: Politechnika Gdartska, 
\%dziat Zarzqdzania i Ekonomii, 2002, pp. 177-202.
* Iwona Trusewicz, "Trampolina do Rosji”, Rzeczpospolita, 05 June 2003.
*®® Data from the first 11 months of 2003. Federacja Rosyjska. Przewodnik dia przedsigbiorcôw, Warsaw; 
UNIDO, 2004, p. 190
*®® Itogi ekonomicheskogo razvitiya oblasti za 2001 god, http://www.gov.kaliningrad.ru/stat.php3 (accessed 07 
November 2004)
*®^ Natalia Smorodinskaya and Stanislav Zhukov, “The Kaliningrad Enclave in Europe:
Swimming against the Tide. Diagnostics of the State and Potential of Economic Development” (Paper 
submitted to East-West Institute (New-York), Transfrontier Cooperation program), Moscow, 2003. 
http://www.inst-econ.org.ru/english/publish/smorodin1.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
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for many people living close to the border on both sides.*®® The so called “ant trade”, i.e. 
people crisscrossing the border, mostly carrying goods to local bazaars, dominated 
economic exchange. The introduction of travel restrictions In 1998 (together with the 
Russian financial crisis) reduced the volume of this trade (see Appendix for a case study 
about the Podlasie region) and implementation of visas in October 2003 dealt a further 
blow.
5.4.3 The corridor problem
The biggest headache in Polish Russian relations regarding Kaliningrad was caused by 
the EU enlargement and the prospect of the region becoming an enclave within the EU. 
The problem of isolation was an issue for Russia since 1991, aggravated by voices from 
Germany and Lithuania questioning the status of the region. Officially neither German nor 
Lithuanian (nor Polish) governments raised any doubts about Russian control over 
Kaliningrad. However, revisionist rhetoric by high profile politicians like Vytautas 
Landsbergis fuelled suspicions.*®® Consecutive Polish governments were consistent in 
reiterating that Poland recognised Kaliningrad as an integral part of Russia.
Since 1991 the main transport route between Kaliningrad and Russia had been through 
Lithuania. Air and sea connections were sparse and given the low incomes in the region, 
expensive. Russia was looking for alternative routes in order to avoid dependence on the 
Lithuanian link. This became a necessity especially after the Lithuanian government 
increased transit fees in 1995. In February 1996 during a Yeltsin-Lukashenko meeting in 
Moscow, the Idea of a “transit corridor”, which would be a highway and railroad linking 
Kaliningrad and Grodno through Suwafki region, was discussed. Although building 
transport links between the latter two regions was already foreseen by a transborder 
cooperation and transport agreement signed in 1995, the name “corridor” caused an 
allergic reaction. Press was quick to draw analogies between Hitler’s demand for a corridor 
to Danzig in 1939 and the proposed Kaliningrad link. The Polish Foreign Minister rejected 
the proposals on ecological grounds (i.e. mentioning Suwatki's fragile environment) and 
argued that Lithuania was a simpler route.**'®
The Kaliningrad problem once again became a subject o f intensive debate in 2001 when 
the European Commission issued a communication which discussed potential 
complications o f EU enlargement (especially the Schengen regime) on the region and
44.9 million USD in the first 11 months of 2003, Federacja Rosyjska. Przewodnik dia przedsi^bioncôw, 
pp. 190-191
 ^Landsbergis, leader of opposition at the time, said that Russian sovereignty over Kaliningrad was debatable 
as it was only due to Moscow’s power and West’s weakness that made the region a part of Russia. Maja 
Narbutt, “Mapa Europy do dyskusji?", Rzeczpospolita, 07 August 1995.
Konrad Niklewicz and Witold Laskowski, "Slamming The Door On Russia's ‘Corridor"’, Warsaw Voice, 10 
March 1996.
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gave recommendations. The document proposed further meetings attended by Polish, 
Lithuanian, Russian and EU officials.**"* There was resentment in Poland due to the fact 
that the first two countries were not consulted during the preparation of the new strategy. A 
commentator on the right wing daily Zycie questioned whether the maxim of "Nothing 
about us without us" {Nic o nas bez nas) applied any more, given that the EU chose to 
consult only Russia about policies which first and foremost affected Poland and 
Lithuania.**^®
As negotiations between the EU Commission and Russia intensified in 2002, the issue of 
“corridors" was again on the agenda. Moscow insisted that the EU gave a special status to 
Kaliningrad, ensured visa free travel for its inhabitants to Poland and Lithuania and 
concessions for transport corridors carrying goods and people. The EU rejected all these 
demands. Warsaw followed a similar line and declared that visa procedures would be 
implemented fully in 2003. The Polish reaction to the demand for a corridor was to 
categorically rule It out.**"®
Russia kept up the pressure about implementing visa free travel arrangements for 
Kaliningrad inhabitants. The Russian PM Kasyanov tried to qualify the word “corridor", 
arguing that it merely meant enhanced transport connections and not extraterritorial 
links.**"* Besides, a counter historical analogy was drawn by Kaliningrad’s governor, 
Vladimir Yegorov, who said that even during Cold W artim es West Berliners could travel 
visa free to the German Democratic Republic.**'® Still, Poles vehemently voiced their 
opposition to the idea at every opportunity.
The corridor problem was solved for Poland when Foreign minister Ivanov stated that the 
problem of transit between Kaliningrad and Russia concerned only Lithuania. The EU, 
Russia and Lithuania reached an agreement in November 2002 on introducing special 
transit documents for Kaliningrad inhabitants travelling through Lithuania.
5.5 HISTORICAL/EMOTIONAL ISSUES
The key aspects of relations between Poland and Russia are undoubtedly economic or 
strategic/defence policies such as NATO enlargement. However, it should be noted that 
emotional issues stemming from history were influential in setting the atmosphere in which 
relations were conducted and societies formed attitudes towards each other. Not only have
**'* Communication from the Commission to the Council: The EU and Kaliningrad, COM (2001) 26, Brussels, 17 
January 2001.
**® Krzysztof Rak, “Kaiiningradzki wçzet", Zycie, 21 January 2001.
**® See among others reaction by Foreign Minister CImoszewicz and PM Miller. “Cimoszewicz: rzqd wyklucza
korytarz do Kaliningradu", Gazeta Wyborcza, 13 May 2002.
**'* Maja Narbutt and Katarzyna Wypustek, "Nie ma zgody w kwestii wiz", Rzeczpospolita, 07 March 2002.
**'® Waclaw Radziwinowicz, "Kaliningrad niezgody", Gazeta Wyborcza, 30 May 2002.
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they caused tensions on the intergovernmental level but also acted as a reinforcement of 
mutual stereotypes of “ imperialist Russian implicitly approving Soviet methods” and “back 
stabbing, mercenary Pole, ungrateful to Russian (and Soviet) sacrifice for its liberation”. 
Although historical and emotional issues that divide Russia and Poland abound, this 
section will elaborate two of them: Katyn and the Chechen issue.
5.5.1 Katyn
Nazi forces occupying Russia announced on 13 April 1943 that they had found mass 
graves of Polish officer POWs killed by the Soviets three years earlier near the Katyn 
forest (Smolensk region). Even though world public opinion took Nazi accusations against 
the Soviets with a pinch of salt, most Poles had no doubts that the Soviets could carry out 
such a crime. The Soviet authorities vehemently denied the accusation and did not have to 
spend too much effort to convince the Allies to hold the Nazis responsible. After the war 
the issue was hushed up in the PRL as well as in the West even though the Polish 
government in exile and émigrés raised the issue of Soviet responsibility for the massacre. 
Katyn became the symbol of Poland’s loss of independence and was seen an evidence of 
the extent Soviet Union was ready to go to in order to “destroy” the Polish elite which 
would be an obstacle to taking over Poland.**'®
The silence (and denial) on the part of the Soviet Union ended on 13 April 1990 when 
official Soviet press agency TASS announced that the Katyn massacre had been carried 
out by the NKVD. Following that Gorbachev sent a letter to Jaruzelski containing the 
names of officers killed by NKVD and a committee made up o f Russian and Polish 
historians started research into the so called white spots {biale plamy) o f history. However, 
a complete explanation of the incident was to be offered by Russia when the Director of 
Central Archives, upon Yeltsin’s request, handed Wafçsa on 14 October 1992 the copy of 
a decision on shooting captive Polish officers signed by Stalin and Politburo members in 
March 1940 and a note sent by the KGB chief to Khrushchev in 1959 informing him that 
21,857 files o f Poles arrested and shot by the NKVD had been destroyed. The Polish 
officer corps captured by the invading Soviet army in 1939-40 were taken eventually to 
camps named Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov and from there sent near Katyn, 
Miednoje (Kalinin/Tver) and Kharkov (Ukraine) to be executed. A judicial investigation into 
the incident began.
Another important aspect of the massacre and the cover up that followed was highlighted by George 
Sanford In his book Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940. Truth, Justice and memory, BASEES Series on 
Russian and East European Studies, No. 20, London: Routledge, 2005, which Is the most authoritative account 
and analysis of the Issue published In English. Sanford analysed the "management of truth" exercised by 
Americans and the British and how their mishandling of the Issue distorted the facts further and deepened the 
feeling of Injustice on the part of those who suffered.
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Even though the admission of responsibility for the massacre by the Russian authorities 
was welcome, it did not fully satisfy the Poles. Yeltsin’s gesture was perceived to be a 
consequence of the internal conflict between him and Gorbachev rather than a quest for 
reconciliation and the declarations were insufficient to explain and to own up to Soviet 
Union’s policies towards Poland in the 1930s and 40s.**'*' Yeltsin undertook a further 
gesture when he visited Warsaw in August 1993. He paid his respects to the victims of the 
massacre by visiting the Katyn memorial in Powqzki cemetery in Warsaw and publicly 
apologised to one of the survivors.
A decision was taken in March 1995 to build cemeteries in Katyn and Miednoje for both 
Polish and Russian victims of the massacre and the site was visited by the Polish PM and 
President during their visits to Russia. The cemeteries were opened in 2000 during the 60**’ 
anniversary of the massacre. Also, Putin informed Kwasniewski that new graves had been 
discovered and invited Polish prosecutors to take part in the investigation.*^®
Despite the aforementioned gestures from the Russian side (albeit welcomed by the Polish 
government), dissatisfaction dominated the Polish side. First, the fact that Russia had 
admitted that the massacre was a crime perpetrated by the Soviet government, the issue 
of compensation was inevitably raised. This upset the Russian side which categorically 
ruled out any claims as compensation for such an event, as it would set a precedent for a 
thousand others. In addition to being an obstacle towards reconciliation, compensation 
claims also gave rise to counterarguments from Russian historians about historical crimes 
perpetrated by the Second Polish Republic against Russian POWs. Russian historian Yuri 
Ivanov (among others) argued that between 60 to 130,000 Red Army POWs had suffered 
“barbaric cruelty" and died in Polish captivity during the 1919-1920 Polish-Soviet War.**^® 
Only in one camp in Tuchola 22,000 POWs died and even though Polish calculations put 
the total figure killed at 18-20,000, the Polish authorities did not deny the death of a large 
number of Russian POWs. Ivanov argued that the attitude of the Polish state (which 
declared itself as the legal successor of the Second Polish Republic) was reminiscent of 
that o f Soviet Union towards Katyn.
Second, the Polish side was unhappy about the fact that the investigation led by Russian 
military prosecutors took a very long time and none of the perpetrators were brought to 
justice. During the Moscow visit of the head of the institute o f National Remembrance 
{Instytut Pamiçci Narodowej - IPN), Leon Kieres, in August 2004, a divergence between 
the two sides on how to handle the_Katyh issue became more apparent. The Polish side
Zajqczkowskl, “Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie”, RPPZ 1992,
“Polish President receives call from Putin over Katyn massacre”, RFE/RL Newsline, 13 April 2000.
Jurij Iwanow'Tragedia polskiej niewoli”, Niezawisimaja Gazieta, 16 July 1998 in Przedruk z prasy rosyjskiej, 
20 July 1998, Oérodek Studiôw Wschodnich. www.osw.waw.pl (accessed 11 December 1999)
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demanded that the act be defined as genocide or a crime against humanity which would 
mean that about 2,000 people, from those who actually shot the POWS to those who aided 
their transport, had to be brought to justice.*®® Besides, the case would not be allowed to 
lapse. The Russian side, however, treated the case as ordinary murder and argued that 
the case could be closed, as none of the perpetrators was alive.*®* Reactions in the Polish 
press {especially on the right wing) were strong. “How many people should one shoot in 
the head so that it becomes genocide? Is 25,000 officers too little? Our future relations 
with Russia should depend on the answer to that" wrote Zycie and referred to Russia as 
the “last confines of Yalta” .*®® Right wing Nasz Dziennik argued that Soviets had 
committed genocide as they planned and systematically carried out the murder of Poland’s 
intellectual elite with the aim of "destroying the Polish Nation.”*®® Many articles were 
published (especially in the right wing press) calling for the matter to be taken to the 
European Court of Human Rights (Russia acceded to the European Human Rights 
Convention in 1998) by relatives of the victims, with the help o f the Polish government. 
Calls were also made for the Polish government to bring the problem to the International 
Court o f Justice.*®'*
The Polish government’s reactions to the controversy was more rational and calculated.
On the one hand, officials gave the message to the public (voters) that they cared for their 
concerns and at the same time sent signals to Russia that they had no wish to spoil 
relations. Marek Borowski of SLD said that there was no need for “sabre rattling” but 
dialogue and his party colleague, Krzysztof Janik, added that while preventing 
confrontation with neighbours, they would not avoid facing bilateral problems.*®®
Meanwhile, Kwasniewski called for naming the crime by its name, "calling a genocide a 
genocide” , but was careful to add that Katyn was only one of the crimes perpetrated in 
“those horrible years” and that under Stalinist terror millions of Russians had also been 
persecuted.*®®
It is fair to say that Russian gestures to Poland (especially those of 1990 and 1993) 
regarding Katyn put the process of reconciliation on a solid footing. Some commentators 
believed that tensions on the issue subsided and, like Kobrlnskaya, argued that
*®° Marcin Wojciechowski, “Rosja nie uzna zbrodni w Katyniu za ludobôjstwo", Gazeta Wyborcza, 05 August 
2004.
*®* On 21 September 2004 the Russian military prosecutor officially stopped the investigation.
*“  Maciej Lçtowski, “Krôtka pamiçô Kremla", Zycie, 05 August 2004.
*®® Zdzistaw Jastrzçbiec Peszkowski, "Wtôrne kfamstwo katyiiskie”, Nasz Dziennik, 01 October 2004. 
Peszkowski was the Katyh sun/ivor to whom Yeltsin apologised in 1993.
*®'* It should also be mentioned, however, that there were voices of reason. In the left wing Trybuna an author 
whose uncles were killed in Katyrt argued that "an atmosphere of revenge" dominated Poland and questioned 
why Poles are still pursuing the perpetrators of Katyh, who were already dead, and worsening the atmosphere 
between Poland and Russia. Maria Szyszkowska, "Wstronç przesztosci", Trybuna, 14 August 2004.
*®® “Rosyjskie akta ws. Katynia udostçpnione IPN?", Informacjyna Agencja Radiowa (lAR), 03 October 2004.
*®® “Chtodna wizyta Kwasniewskiego w Moskwie", Gazeta Wyborcza, 29 September 2004.
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reconciliation had already taken place.*®*’ One may argue that there is some truth in this as 
the public opinion figures demonstrate that only 43% of Poles disliked Russians in 2003 
compared to 56% in 1993 (and the figures for Poles who liked Russians were 17% and 
22% respectively).*®® However, as Jedlicki put it, “should Russia be perceived as a threat 
once again, the spectres of the past would undoubtedly revive.”*®®
5.5.2 The Chechen problem
Katyn was at least a chapter belonging to Polish-Russian history. How is the Chechen 
problem relevant, one might ask. Poles had no significant current or historic ties with 
Chechens but nevertheless were overtly concerned about their plight following the armed 
conflict in their region.
When an aid convoy belonging to the Polish charity, Polish Humanitarian Action {Polska 
Akcja Humanitarna), headed towards Chechnya in March 1995, the Russian Foreign 
Ministry protested in very strong terms against what they claimed to be breaches of 
principles governing the distribution of humanitarian aid. Polish Russian relations already 
suffered a bout o f heightened tension when in October 1994 there was a scandal where 
Warsaw transport police maltreated Russian train passengers who asked for help after 
being robbed by a Russian gang. Russian PM Chermomyrdin postponed his scheduled 
visit to Warsaw in protest.
The Polish press read the issue as Russians unnecessarily harassing a charity convoy. It 
is hard to know whether this was the case. Perhaps the Russian reaction was related to a 
Polish Council of Ministers statement of 10 January 1995 where the Foreign Ministry was 
asked to facilitate bringing humanitarian aid to the victims of the conflict in Chechnya 
through NGOs.*®° Even though the government was careful about not giving the 
impression o f interfering in Russian affairs, the Russian government became increasingly 
wary of statements issued by parliamentary bodies as well as street protests regarding the 
Chechen problem.
Establishment of a Chechen Information Bureau in Krakow worsened the tensions, and the 
Russian Embassy reacted with a démarche in February 1995 arguing that the permission 
o f Krakow city authorities to such organisations was contrary to the spirit o f the good
*®* Kobrlnskaya quoted In Peter Cheremushkin, "Russian-Pollsh Relations: A Long Way From Stereotypes to 
Reconciliation", Intermarium (Columbia University online journal), Vol. 5, 2003, No 3, p. 11. 
http://www.columbla.edu/cu/sipa/REGIONAL/ECE/vol5no3/ruspol.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006)
*®® Michal StrzeszewskI, “Sympatia I niechçé do Innych narodow". Centrum Badania Oplnil Spotecznej (CBOS) 
Komunlkatz Badah, No. BS/184/2003, Warsaw, December 2003.
*®® Jerzy Jedlicki, "Historical memory as a source of conflicts In Eastern Europe", Communist and Post- 
Communist Studies, Vol. 32, 1999, No. 3, p.227.
*®° Komunikat po Radzie Mlnlstrow, Warsaw, 10 January 1995. http://www.kprm.gov.pl/1937_3538.htm 
(accessed 06 November 2006)
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neighbourliness treaty o f 1992. Later in May the announcement that a Radio Free 
Caucasus was to be established by the aforementioned bureau added fuel to the fire. The 
Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev maintained, given these deveiopments, it was difficult to 
define Polish Russian relations as friendly.
Demonstrations and protest activities of the Free Caucasus Committee {Komitet Wolny 
Kaukaz), made up of people belonging to marginal radical groups like anarchists, 
continued to the distaste of Russia and even though the Polish government tried hard not 
to provoke Russian authorities, interest in the Chechen conflict grew among MPs and 
public opinion. Whereas most of the press would consider this as humanitarian concern for 
civilians, there were commentators with a more realistic point of view. For instance, Ludwik 
Stomma, a columnist at the weekly Polityka, wrote that the media did not care about 
humanitarian tragedies anywhere but as soon as someone rebelled against Russia, they 
took up the cause with pleasure, spurred by national feelings and complexes.’'®^
in 2000 the disruption caused by the protests regarding Chechnya to bilateral relations 
reached serious proportions. On 24 February 2000 members of the Free Caucasus 
Committee held a demonstration in front o f the Russian Consulate in Poznan and a group 
went into the consulate gardens, took down and stepped on the Russian flag while the 
police refrained from intervention (as previously mentioned). This could not come at a 
worse time as relations were strained after Warsaw expelled nine Russian diplomats in 
January 2000 on allegations of spying. Moscow expelled nine Polish diplomats in 
retaliation.^®®
Regarding the Poznan demonstration, the Russian Foreign Ministry accused the Polish 
government o f not doing anything to prevent the activities of extremist organisations which 
threaten the security of Russian diplomats in P o la n d .R u s s ia n  Foreign Minister, Igor 
Ivanov, cancelled his planned visit to Warsaw in March and the Russian ambassador was 
recalled to Moscow. It was impossible that Poznan events would not affect bilateral 
relations, not to mention political relations, stated Ivanov, and added that he held the 
Polish government responsible for the event.’’®® The Russian Duma repeated the 
accusation in a resolution, criticising Warsaw for tolerating an organisation aiding the 
Chechen separatists. Nezavisimaya Gazeta argued that having NATO's protective 
umbrella, Poland felt strong enough to openly demonstrate its anti-Russian complexes.’’®®
The Russian Vice-Consul in Poznan, Igor Oshchepkov, reflected, if not exactly the official
Piotr Jendroszczyk, “Andriej Kozyriew w^tpi w przyjazne stosunki", Rzeczpospolita, 17 May 1995. 
Ludwik Stomma. "Donoszq.2 Czeczenil", Polityka, August 1999, No. 35.
Piotr Jendroszczyk, "Polscy dyplomaci niepoz^danl", Rzeczpospolita, 22 January 2000.
"Z Oéwiadczenia MSZ Rosji", Gazeta Wyborcza, 25 February 2000.
Siawomir Popowski, “Duma oskarza polskie wladze", Rzeczpospolita, 26 February 2000.
Siawomir Popowski, "Zgoda wtadz na antypolskie demonstracje”, Rzeczpospolita, 07 March 2000,
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stance, the feeling that dominated public opinion: "That was perhaps revenge for the years 
o f partition and communism. When a lion is sick, even a monkey can kick him. But when 
the lion recovers, what happens then?"^®^ Several demonstrations were held in Moscow 
and St. Petersburg in front of Polish consulates where protesters called Poles a disgrace 
to ail Slavs and called for a boycott of Polish goods.’’®® The Polish government and Sejm 
quickly realised the potential damage the events could do to relations and sent conciliatory 
messages to Russia.’’®® However, no action was taken against the pro-Chechen 
organisations.
Polish interest in Chechnya dampened down thanks to the atmosphere created by the 
"anti-terror crusade” that was started by the American President George Bush and 
supported by Putin after the attacks of 11 September 2001 In New York. However, Russia 
become convinced that Warsaw was guilty, if not by commission, by omission of pro 
Chechen activities in Poland as well as the provocative coverage of the issue by the Polish 
media. Historical prejudices (or experiences) were again at play: Whereas the Poles, 
thought they were the nation to lead all others rising against Russian imperialism and to be 
the carrier o f European ideals and norms into the East, the Russians became convinced of 
the treacherous character of Lach following the principle that a weakened Russia was a 
prerequisite for Polish independence.
5.6 CONCLUSION
The balance sheet o f Poland’s relations with Russia in the post-Soviet period is by no 
means a straightforward one. The fact that Poland managed to stick (if only in rhetoric at 
times) to the official line of Russia as an important partner was a success. Despite several 
scandals and conflicts, channels of political dialogue were kept open. And after the initial 
objection of Russia was overcome, Poland succeed in joining NATO and sorting out 
problems its EU accession could cause for bilateral relations and at the same time manage 
to keep at worst nominally amicable relations with Russia throughout.
Failures should also be mentioned. Polish governments has never really undertaken 
efforts to fight historical prejudices against Russia that lurk among the public and 
politicians who at times resorted to manipulating fear and dislike o f Russia for domestic 
political or electoral purposes. The Orlen affair is a prime example to that. Reconciliation 
between the two nations has also not yet been completed. Some Polish governments
“Flaga pod but", Gazeta Wyborcza, 25 February 2000.
Siawomir Popowski, “Dobry Polak to DzierzyPski", Rzeczpospolita, 08 March 2000.
The Foreign Relations Commission at Sejm issued a resolution expressing their regret about the Poznan 
incidents and hope that these incidents would not affect bilateral relations. Biuletyn Komisji Spraw 
Zagranicznych, No. 90, 2517/111, 25 February 2000. Also Siawomir Popowski, "Duma oskarza polskie wladze", 
Rzeczpospolita, 26 February 2000.
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(especially post Solidarity ones) overlooked the fact that even as a member of the EU and 
NATO, Poland had to have sustainable economic and political relations with Russia. The 
section on gas imports from Russia tried to explain how the AW S-UW  governments 
between 1997 and 2001 tried too hard to reverse the pattern of an inevitable dependence 
instead of working towards managing its effects by diplomatic and political negotiation. The 
same section, alongside the section on NATO enlargement, also demonstrated that 
Poland’s policy towards Russia or its EP could easily be rendered irrelevant when the 
issues at stake concern key economic, political or strategic relations between Russia and 
the West.
Competing visions o f EP in Poland assign Russia a different place in their strategies. 
Whereas one puts Russia at the heart of it (as a country having much larger power, 
resources and clout in the region and world affairs), the other advocates Ukraine (and 
maybe Belarus one day) as the key to Poland’s success in the East. Balancing these two 
visions seems to be the only rational option.
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C h a p t e r  S i x  
P o l a n d ’ s R e l a t i o n s  w i t h  U k r a i n e
This chapter wili dwell on Poland’s relations with what Poland calls its "strategic partner", 
Ukraine. Relations with Ukraine have always been perceived by the Polish political elite as 
the main focus of Eastern policy (EP). Ukraine and its stance vis-à-vis Russia has been 
ascribed different meanings by Poles such as Ukraine’s independence as a guarantee of 
Poland’s, a pro-Western Ukraine blocking Russian expansionism and a pro-Polish Ukraine 
enhancing Poland’s claim to dominate the EP of the EU. However, it has proven difficult to 
translate rhetoric into policy. This chapter aims to explain the constraints on building a 
strategic partnership with Ukraine as well as the processes such as historical reconciliation 
that helped enhance dialogue and exchange.
The first section will evaluate bilateral relations within the context of EU and NATO 
enlargement and asses whether a strategic partnership had been achieved. The second 
section wili cover economic relations and the privatization of Huta Czestochowa, which 
was perceived as a test case for how deep Poiish-Ukrainian partnership and trust went. As 
with Russia, a key element in bilateral relations is energy. The third section will explain the 
politics surrounding the building of the Odessa-Brody-Gdahsk pipeline and the constraints 
imposed by the Russian factor and economic realities on projects that aim to curb Russian 
Influence in the region. The fourth section will dwell on attempts at reconciliation on 
historical matters which had poisoned mutual perceptions for many decades. A brief 
historical background to the events was given and contending perceptions on the events 
will be examined. The last section will deal with minorities. Historical reconciliation and 
minority issues had a bigger resonance among the peoples of Poland and Ukraine than on 
policy makers on both sides. However, these issues constitute an important part of the 
debate on EP and Poiish-Ukrainian bilateral relations so they are well worth elaborating.
6.1 POLAND’S RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE IN THE CONTEXT OF NATO AND EU 
ENLARGEMENT
Bilateral relations between Poland and Ukraine were initiated before the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The opportunity to establish ties came following the declaration of 
sovereignty by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on 16 July 1990. Foreign Minister 
Skubiszewski paid a visit to Kiev where he signed a declaration on the principles and
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directions of progress in bilateral relations.’’ The provisions of the declaration were 
comprehensive despite the fact that Poland was following a careful policy of not alienating 
Soviet Moscow while having relations with the constituent republics, i.e. the two-track 
policy. The declaration ruled out any territorial claims (Article 3), foresaw the establishment 
o f consulates (Article 4), the protection of minorities (Article 8) and cooperation in the fields 
of economy, culture, science, ecology, border issues and disarmament.
The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declared independence on 24 August 1991 and Poland 
became the first state to recognise Ukraine on 2 December 1992 following the referendum 
in Ukraine on independence on 1 December. Kataryna and Roman Woiczuk state that this 
should not be overstated (as is the inclination on the part o f many Polish commentators). 
They argue that Poland was not willing to support Ukrainian independence unconditionally 
before the referendum and this was due to "Poland's readiness to defer to Moscow’s 
anticipated reaction to events" and to "the undefined nature of its policy towards Ukraine’’.^
6.1.1 Beginnings of a “strategic partnership”?
The two-track policy gave way to increased bilateral ties with Ukraine. The basic state 
treaty was signed on 18 May 1992 (and came into effect on 30 December 1992).® Another 
treaty on the legal aspects of the Polish Ukrainian border was signed on 21 January 1993.'* 
In April 1993 a Polish Ukrainian Presidential Consultative Committee was established 
(protocol signed on 12 January 1993) and held its first meeting in May. in 1993 there were 
many high level visits from both sides to each other’s capitals and several treaties were 
signed. Poland also gave support to Ukrainian aspirations for joining CEFTA in 1992, even 
though these were not fuifiiied due to objections of other Visegrad group members.®
However, it would be a mistake to assume that this meant the full implementation of the 
much touted Poiish-Ukrainian “strategic partnership", a term used since 1993 to define the 
Importance of bilateral relations.® There were reasons why this was the case. First, even 
though there was awareness in Poland about the importance o f Ukrainian independence,
’ "Deklaracja o zasadach I podstawowych kierunkach rozwoju stosunkow polsko-ukratnskich, Kijôw, 13 
pazdzlernika 1990 r.”, Zbidr Dokumentôw, Vol. 526, 1991, No. 4, pp. 25-30.
Kataryna Woiczuk and Roman Woiczuk, Poland and Ukraine: A Strategic Partnership in a Changing 
Europe?, London; Royal Institute of International Affairs, November 2002, p. 9.
® “Traktat miçdzy Rzeczpospolita Polsk% a Ukraine o dobrym spiedztwie, przyjaznych stosunkac i 
wspolpracy, Warszawa, 18 maja 1992 r.", Zbior Dokumentôw, Vol. 530, 1992, No. 4, pp. 76-87.
“‘Agreement between the Republic of Poland and Ukraine on the Legal Relations on the Poiish-Ukrainian 
State Border and the Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Border Related Matters, Kiev, January 12, 1993 
(Agreement came into effect on 21 December 1993)’’, 1993, No. 4, pp. 55-87.
Stephen R. Burant, Poland, Ukraine, and the Idea of Strategic Partnership. Carl Beck Papers in Russian and 
East European Studies, No. 1308. Pittsburgh: Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of 
Pittsburgh, 1999, pp. 12-13.
® Ian Brzezinski writes that it was the Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Boris Tarasiuk, who defined Polish Ukrainian 
relations as "strategic partnership” in February 1993 as he thought that European stability would be based on 
two principal axes, first German-French, second Poiish-Ukrainian. Ian Brzezinski, "Poiish-Ukrainian Relations: 
Europe’s Neglected Strategic Axis", Survival, Vol.35, 1993, No.3, p. 28.
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this was coupled with doubts about how much sovereignty Ukraine would retain in the 
future given both the economic and political instability in Ukraine and the process of CIS 
formation.
Second, by 1994 Poland had already determined as its goals joining the EU and NATO 
whereas Ukraine declared itself as non-aligned. The issue of nuclear weapons stationed in 
Ukraine had still not been settled and Ukraine voiced fears about possible adverse effects 
of NATO enlargement on its security, although did not categorically object to it. Given the 
divergent orientations and Poland’s absolute foreign policy priority of joining Western 
organisations, a truly strategic partnership with Ukraine was not an option. This was one of 
the reasons why Poland objected to Ukrainian president Kravchuk’s proposals in May 
1993 of establishing a "zone of stability” extending from Baltic to Black Sea including the 
Baltic states, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the Visegrad states, Romania and Austria.^ in 
fact, this plan was very similar to Walesa’s failed NATO-bis idea of April 1992 which 
proposed forming a halfway, pre-NATO security organisation together with Poland’s 
Central European neighbours.® Wafçsa proposed the idea as he doubted the possibility of 
Poland’s entry into NATO.®
Third, Russia was (and continued to be) the main security consideration for Poland and at 
this stage no Polish government could yet be willing to jeopardise relations with Russia for 
the sake of making Ukraine a priority, in addition to the uncertainty about NATO’s 
willingness to take on new members and the time frame for the European integration 
process, there were other important considerations such as the ongoing withdrawal of 
Soviet troops and Poland’s dependence on Russian military supplies and energy 
sources.''® Poland’s signing of the agreement on building a gas transit pipeline through 
Belarus with Russia on 25 August 1993 was received with dismay in Ukraine, the main 
beneficiary of transit revenues from Russian gas imported to Europe.^' NATO’s offer of 
PfP to Poland as well as Ukraine did not open a window of opportunity for cooperation 
among these countries, either. First, because of its noncommittal nature, Poland was not 
offered a security guarantee. Second, being lumped in the same group with laggards like 
Ukraine was perceived as a let down by Poland.
Another development that raised doubts about possible changes in Poland’s attitude 
towards Ukraine was the October 1993 parliamentary elections in Poland after which a
 ^Roman Woiczuk, "Ukrainian-Pollsh Relations Between 1991-1998. From the Declarative to the Substantive", 
European Security, Vol. 10, 2000, No.1, pp. 134-135.
® Roman Kuiniar, “Cztonkostwo w NATO w polskiej polityce zagranicznej" in Roman Kuzniar and Krzysztof 
Szczepanik (Eds), Poiityka Zagraniczna RP 1989-2002, Warszawa: Askon, 2002, p. 108.
® Agnieszka Kasiiiska Metryka, Prezydenci Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1989-1999, Kielce: Wydzia! Zarz^dzania i 
Administracji Akademii éwiçtokrzyskiej w Kielcach, 2000, pp. 141-142.
Roman Woiczuk, "Ukrainian-Polish Relations Between 1991-1998", 2000, p. 139.
Burant, Poland, Ukraine, and the Idea of Strategic Partnership, p. 15.
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coalition government o f post communist Left Democratic Alliance {Sojusz Lewicy 
Demokratycznej ~ SLD) and Polish Peasants’ Party {Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe -  PSL) 
was formed. The foreign policy rhetoric of both parties advocated that ties with Russia 
should have priority over relations with other ex-Soviet states in the region, as previously 
discussed in Chapter Four. Especially the PSL criticised the former governments for the 
loss of the Russian market and stressed the need to avoid alienating Russia further. These 
views sparked a lively debate on EP in Poland but no drastic change in the direction of 
Polish foreign policy ensued. The difference between rhetoric and practice was somewhat 
similar to Ukraine’s experience after the 1994 presidential elections. Leonid Kuchma, 
elected on a pro-Russian platform, did not in practice rule out cooperation with the West 
and did not align Ukraine’s foreign policy completely with Russia (although it must be kept 
in mind that there were fundamental differences between Poland and Ukraine in terms of 
constraints imposed on their foreign policies and the room for manoeuvre they had vis-à- 
vis Russia). Under Kuchma, Ukraine continued its so called "multivector’’ foreign policy of 
maintaining relations with both Russia and the West without a total commitment to either. 
Ukraine’s foreign policy under Kuchma’s first term in office (1994-99) has even been 
described by Kuzio as pro-Western.^^ He mentioned Kuchma’s need for Western financial 
support for his reform programme and his unwillingness to participate in CIS processes 
other than economic ones as evidence.
Most commentators on Poiish-Ukrainian matters agree that relations between the two 
countries improved gradually after 1994. This was facilitated by both Ukraine’s above 
mentioned policies and evolution of Poland’s foreign policy. O f course, the most influential 
factor was the gradual crystallisation of Western policies towards the region. Followed by 
Kuchma’s reform programme, Ukraine’s accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty on 5 
December 1994 solved the problem of Ukraine’s nuclear weapons and eliminated doubts 
about the shaping of how Ukraine’s security policy. The US praised Ukrainian efforts and 
took a more proactive policy towards it, promising financial aid and credits in 1995.''® Also, 
the Ukrainian attitude to NATO enlargement became more moderate, and throughout 1996 
Ukrainian officials declared that despite still having reservations about the possibility of 
becoming a “buffer zone” between an enlarged NATO and Russia, they would not oppose 
NATO enlargement and would seek special relations with NATO. Meanwhile, Ukraine also 
declared EU membership as a strategic objective.
Relations between Poland and Ukraine intensified after 1994 on many levels. With Ukraine 
gradually toning down its objections against NATO enlargement, defence cooperation 
between Poland and Ukraine gained momentum. Following several high level meetings of
Taras Kuzio, EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?, ISS-EU Occasional Paper No. 47, Paris: Institute for 
Security Studies-EU, 2004, pp. 8-9.
Piotr Koécinski, "Poszukiwanie nowego partners", Rzeczpospolita, 24 August 1995.
169
Defence Ministers and General Staff, a Ukrainian unit took part in the “Cooperation Bridge 
94” military manoeuvre staged in Poland in September 1994 under the PfP programme.'"'
And on 5 October 1995, Polish and Ukrainian Defence Ministers announced their plans for 
establishing a joint Poiish-Ukrainian battalion (POLUKRBAT) which would participate in 
international peacekeeping missions.'®
intensifying political cooperation, especially in regional fora, was also evident. During a 
visit to Warsaw on 25-26 June 1996, Kuchma asked for Poland’s support for Ukraine’s bid 
to join the Weimar triangle, the EU, the West European Union and CEFTA. A declaration 
stressing the willingness to develop two countries’ “strategic partnership” was signed by 
both presidents.'® From 1995 on Ukraine also paid more attention to regional cooperation 
in Central and East Europe."' With the support o f Poland and other GEEs, Ukraine joined I
the Council of Europe on 9 November 1995 and the Central European initiative (CEI) on 1 , |
June 1996. |
The fast pace o f progress in Polish Ukrainian cooperation gave the Prime Ministers of
both sides the courage to declare during Cimoszewicz’s visit to Kiev on 10 October 1996
that “Ukrainian-Polish relations have attained a level of strategic partnership”.'® Of course, i
not much should be read into this declaration, keeping in mind that Ukrainian officials used |
the term “strategic partner” not only for Poland but also for Russia, the US and Uzbekistan.
it is a term at best indicating willingness to cooperate. Another rhetorical reflection of
Polish Ukrainian rapprochement was the more frequent use of the Pitsudski slogan, much
loved by Kultura circles, o f "There may be no free Poland without a free Ukraine” by
Ukrainians. For instance, the Ukrainian head of the Polish Ukrainian Presidential
Consultative Committee, Vladimir Horbulin, used it during an interview with a Polish i
newspaper before Kuchma’s visit and Kuchma repeated the saying in his address the i
Polish Sejm.'®
Jaroslaw Bratkiewicz, “Stosunki z Rosj% Ukraine i Biatorusiq.”, (RPPZ) 1993-94, Warszawa: Zarzq^d Obstugi 
MSZ, 1994, pp. 129-138.
'® Ustina Markus, "Ukraine, Poland to Set up Joint Battalion", OMRI Daily Digest, 06 October 1995.
"Wspôlne oéwladczenie premiera Ukrainy Pawto tazarenki I prezesa Rady Ministrôw Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej Wtodzlmlerza Cimoszewicza, Kijôw, 10 pazdzlernika 1996 r.” , Zbiôr Dokumentôw, Vol. 546, 1996, No. 
4, pp. 41-45.
' See Oleksandr Pavliuk, "Enlargement and Ukraine's Relations with Other Central and Eastern European 
Countries", 1998-2000 NATO-EAPC Fellowship Final Report, 2000. www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98- 
00/pavliuk.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006).
“Wspôlne oéwladczenie premiera Ukrainy Pawto tazarenki I prezesa Rady Ministrôw Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej Wtodzlmlerza Cimoszewicza, Kijôw, 10 pazdzlernika 1996 r.", Zbiôr Dokumentôw, Vol. 546, 1996, No. 
4, pp. 41-45.
“Razem do Unii Europejskiej”, Rzeczpospolita, 19 June 1996 and "Ukrainian President In The Polish 
Parliament", RFE/RL Newsline, 27 June 1996.
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6.1.2 Ukraine and NATO
The momentum of progress in bilateral relations was kept up and alongside frequent 
declarations of friendship and cooperation, more concrete steps such as the May 1997 
agreement on the liberalisation of trade were taken. The US and NATO’s support for 
Ukraine’s “pro-Western” orientation also reinforced Poland’s efforts. The Poiand-America- 
Ukraine Cooperation Initiative (PAUCI) was established on the basis of a joint trilateral 
statement in Kiev on 29 October 1998.^° PAUCI channels USAID (United States Agency 
for International Development) money to Poiish-Ukrainian projects in order to “strengthen 
the emerging cooperative relationship between Ukraine and Poland and to take advantage 
of acquired expertise and lessons learned in Poland’s successful transition to free market 
democracy.”^' Meanwhile, NATO, by signing a Charter on Distinctive Partnership with 
Ukraine on 9 July 1997 (and inviting Poland for membership at the same time), intended to 
allay the fears of Ukraine that it would be left in a security vacuum after NATO 
enlargement. The National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine decided at a meeting 
on 23 May 2002 to pursue membership of NATO. On 22 November 2002, a NATO-Ukraine 
Action Plan was introduced in order to intensify NATO-Ukraine relations acknowledging 
Ukraine’s goal of NATO membership in the long term.^^ in addition, POLUKRBAT became 
operational in 1999, the year when Poland became a NATO member, and in July 2000 
Joined the NATO led KFOR peacekeeping operation in Kosovo.
Ukraine’s relation with NATO and US also developed steadily, despite hitches such as the 
Kolchuga affair.^® Ukraine joined the US's anti-Iraq coalition in March 2003 by sending a 
battalion to Kuwait and in June 2003 Ukraine’s parliament, Verhkovna Rada, decided in 
favour of sending troops to join the US-British invasion of Iraq, to be stationed under Polish 
command. Ukraine became the fourth largest contributor to the allied occupation forces. 
Russia’s amiable relations with the US after Putin’s election, especially following the 
events of 11 September 2001 and its tacit acceptance of NATO’s Baltic enlargement 
relieved Ukraine of the fear of Russia’s ire and allowed it to pronounce its ambition of 
NATO membership openly. At the same time, Russia-US rapprochement brought about 
the possibility that Ukraine would lose its strategic importance for NATO. Sherr argues that 
such a drastic decision as sending 1,600 soldiers to Iraq was taken in order to prevent the 
ebb of Ukraine’s importance in the eyes of the US.^"'
“Wspôlne oswiadczenie w sprawie inicjatywy wspôlpracy polsko-amerykahsko-ukrainskiej, Kijôw, 29 
pazdzlernika 1998 r.", Zbiôr Dokumentôw, Vol. 553, 1998, No. 3-4, pp. 7-8.
' See http://www.pauci.org/en/about/about (accessed 06 November 2006).
Text of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan can be found at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122a.htm 
(accessed 06 November 2006).
® The affair was caused by the allegations that Kuchma authorised the sale of Kolchuga radar systems to Iraq 
in 2000 violating US sanctions.
James Sherr, “Edging erratically forward”, NATO Review, Istanbul Summit Special, May 2004, p.46.
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6.1.3 Ukraine and the EU
In contrast to Ukraine’s developing relations with NATO, there was not much progress in 
terms of its relations with the EU. Until 2001 the main document regulating relations 
between the EU and Ukraine was the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) 
signed in 1994 but entered Into force in 1998 after ratification by national parliaments. 
However, the PCA failed to provide the basis for either harmonising Ukrainian laws and 
regulations with those of the EU or bringing Ukraine closer to European integration 
process. Despite Ukraine’s declarations of EU membership as a foreign policy objective 
and the 11 June 1998 Strategy for Ukrainian integration into the EU (issued by a 
presidential decree), Ukraine failed to take any meaningful steps to pursue EU 
membership and to fulfil the requirements of the PCA. Woiczuk and Woiczuk argue that 
Ukraine pursued the goal o f EU membership solely in order to reverse its economic 
backwardness and uncompetitiveness due to prospective financial and economic gains 
associated with closer relations with the EU. They doubt that there was a genuine will to 
fulfil EU political and economic criteria and add that most o f the Ukrainian bureaucracy and 
society was indifferent towards the EU.
At the same time, the EU was on the one hand interested in some degree of cooperation 
with Ukraine but on the other unwilling to give Ukraine any perspective of future 
membership, which is the main instrument available to the EU to ensure a positive 
response. This stance was confirmed by the December 1999 Helsinki European Council 
where only a common strategy for Ukraine was drawn up. The document acknowledged 
Ukraine’s European aspiration and welcomed its pro-European choice and encouraged 
closer cooperation as Ukraine would share an external border with future EU member 
states.^® Membership, associate or full, was not listed as one of the strategic goals. The 
EU pledged support for Ukraine on issues such as countering the negative effects of EU 
enlargement (e.g. visas) and Ukraine’s WTO application. EU-Ukraine summits, held in 
Yalta on 11 September 2001 and Copenhagen on 4 July 2002, focused on strengthening 
the existing “strategic partnership” rather than considering any new status for Ukraine. The 
W ider Europe initiative o f March 2003 brought no progress in the eyes of Ukraine, either. 
Its aim was to offer “the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further 
integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement o f -  persons, goods, services 
and capital” to not only Ukraine but all Western ex-Soviet states, Russia and South 
Mediterranean countries.^'' Even though the document mentioned “differentiation” between
Woiczuk and Woiczuk, Poland and Ukraine, pp.93-96.
European Council common strategy on Ukraine. European Council, Helsinki, 11 December 1999. 
Luxembourg; Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000, p. 8.
“Wider Europe— Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours”, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2003)
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the countries falling in its scope as the basis of action, it also made clear that the aim was 
“to provide a framework for the development of a new relationship which would not, in the 
medium term, include a perspective of membership or a role in the Union’s institutions.” ®^ 
Kuchma reacted to this proposal at the European summit in Athens in April 2003 and said 
that Ukraine would not accept any substitutes for a full membership in the EU. Although he 
always cited membership of the EU as a main foreign policy goal, this time he said: “Kyiv is 
not interested in forcing membership in the EU. Today the tasks of integration into the 
WTO and adaptation of our internal legislation to EU’s standards are more important.” ®^
A few months later, during the CIS Yalta summit on 19 September 2003, Kuchma signed 
the agreement creating a Single Economic Zone between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Ukraine and hinted that disillusionment with the EU was a reason for this decision. He 
said "Under the present conditions, when European markets are closed for us...it's better 
to have a real bird in the hand than two in the bush.”®® And following NATO’s Istanbul 
summit of 28-29 June 2004, where NATO postponed decisions about opening up 
membership talks with Ukraine and stepped up the pressure on Ukraine to get its domestic 
politics in order, Kiev took a similar action.®' On 26 July 2004, a new Ukrainian defence 
doctrine omitting EU and NATO membership as foreign policy objectives was issued.®^
The doctrine made only a vague reference to Ukraine’s aim of Euro-Atlantic integration.
According to the EU its reluctance to give Ukraine any membership perspective was 
legitimised by domestic political developments in Ukraine during the second term of the 
Kuchma presidency, increasing authoritarian tendencies in Ukraine and lack of progress in 
economic and political reform were often criticised by the EU. Serious allegations such as 
stifling o f the media and blocking the judiciary (Gongadze murder in 2000), high level 
corruption (Lazarenko affair), illegal arms trade (Kolchuga scandal) elicited a strong 
reaction from the West. The Kuchma administration found itself shunned by the West and 
tried to counterbalance this by pursuing a more Russia friendly policy and taking more 
active part in the CIS.®® Domestic political improprieties and Ukraine’s inadequate reform
104 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003, p. 4. http://www.delukr.cec.eu.int/data/doc/pr_030311 c_eng.pdf (accessed 
06 November 2006)
"Wider Europe— Neighbourhood", pp. 5 and 14.
"Address by President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma at the European Conference "New Neighborhood of the 
EU" (17.04.03)", Ukrainian Monitor, 18 April 2003,
http://wvw.foreignpolicy.org.ua/eng/topic/index.shtml?id=1503 (accessed 11 February 2005)
Jan Maksymiuk, "Kuchma signs accord on CIS Single Economic Zone with 'reservations’", RFE/RL Poland, 
Belarus and Ukraine Report, 23 September 2003.
Vladimir Socor, "NATO summit takes stock of Ukraine's performance” . Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 1, 06 July 
2004, No. 45, http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php7articleJd=2368197 (accessed 06 November 2006) 
Ahto Lobjakas, "EU shrugs off Kuchma's strategic manoeuvrings", RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report, Vol. 
6, 3 August 2004, No, 27 and Roman Woronowycz, "Ukraine no longer lists membership in NATO and EU as 
foreign policy goal", The Ukrainian Weekly, Vol. 72, 01 August 2004, No. 31.
®® When asked by a Polish newspaper whether West or East was more important for Ukraine, Kuchma said 
“Our policy is neither pro-Western nor pro-Russian, it is pro-Ukrainian, ... Please show me one state which 
would knowingly have a univectoral policy without harming its development." Wiestaw S. Dçbski, “Jesteémy 
proukraihscy” (interview with Leonid Kuchma), Trybuna, 26 June 2004.
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performance coupled with conflicting signals given by its foreign policy contributed to the 
intensification of “Ukraine fatigue” in the West.®''
6.1.4 Poland’s attitude and debates
By the end of 1990s, Poland’s commitment to a democratic and pro-European Ukraine 
became the cornerstone of Polish EP. Multiparty consensus was secured on Poland’s 
strategic partnership with Ukraine and Ukraine’s importance for Poland’s security, 
alongside Poland’s commitment to support Ukraine’s quest for EU and NATO accession. 
Regular dialogue between Polish and Ukrainian governments was ensured by bilateral 
structures such as the Presidential Consultative Committee, Permanent Conference on 
European integration and Poiish-Ukrainian Parliamentary Group. There were also NGOs 
such as the Poiish-Ukrainian Forum dealing exclusively with promoting cooperation in both 
political and non-political areas. Others like the Batory Foundation started giving closer 
attention to the place of Ukraine within Poland’s EP.
Even though there was near unanimity among politicians and intellectuals as to the 
importance of Ukraine for Poland, there was also dissent about what policies should 
actually be Implemented. The subject of Ukraine within Poland’s EP was a major thread in 
the 2000-01 EP minimalism debate, started by an article by Sienkiewicz who argued that 
Polish EP was based on unrealistic assumptions and premises and lacked the capacity to 
succeed in the tasks it set.®® (This debate was presented in Chapter Four). Sienkiewicz 
argued that even though Poland might have had a more stable foreign policy towards 
Ukraine (than for example towards Belarus), it had had no capacity to influence the 
domestic political and economic transformation there.®® In the ensuing debate many 
authors criticised the current foreign policy rhetoric on Ukraine and pointed to the 
limitations imposed by realities. One of these authors, Olszariskl, criticised the previously 
mentioned Pitsudskiite slogan of “There may be no free Poland without a free Ukraine” as 
this implied that conflict with Russia was inevitable and assumed that Poland had to have 
good relations with Russia in order to secure its standing in the West.®^ He argued that 
Ukrainian statehood was already consolidated and it made a sovereign choice of being 
allies and partners with Russia. He wrote that Ukraine “need not take stock of our 
interests... given that for 10 years we have failed to define, let alone viabiy implement 
them.”
Kuzio, EU and Ukraine, p. 10.
Bartlomiej Sienkiewicz, “Delusions and Dilemmas of Poland's Eastern Policy; In Praise of Minimalism", The 
Polish Foreign Affairs Digest (hereafter PFAD), Vol. 1, 2001, No.1, pp. 227-237.
®® Sienkiewicz maintained that Warsaw’s decision on building a second gas pipeline through Belarus for the 
transport of Russian gas to Europe was crucial. He argued that this was the first time in the last 10 years that 
Warsaw's decision was “pivotal" for Ukraine. We can say now with hindsight how wrong he was. (See Chapter 
Five, section on gas and pipelines)
^^Tadeusz Andrzej Olszahski, “Dispute on Poland's Eastern Policy; State Interest Gomes First”, (translation 
from Tygodnik Powszechny, 18 March 2001, No. 11), PFAD, Vol. 1, 2001, No.1, pp. 263-267.
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Even though it is difficult to ascertain the effects of an essentially intellectual exercise such 
as the minimalism debate on the mindset of policy makers, one could observe some 
realistic approaches in attitudes towards Ukraine. For instance, Jerzy Osiatyhski, an MP 
from Freedom Union {Unia Wolnosci ~ UW), a partner in the ruling coalition, noted the 
discrepancy between Poland’s foreign policy goals regarding Ukraine and its capacity to 
attain these goals and added that a more modest policy should be adopted. He said during 
the first session of the Poiish-Ukrainian forum on 19 February 2000 “We are not able to 
take Ukraine into our arms and carry her to the EU.”®®
It should also be noted that one of the biggest gestures extended to Ukraine by Poland in 
2000 ended in a spectacular let down. The Polish government announced in summer 2000 
that it could not agree to the building of a second gas pipeline which would go through 
Belarus, avoiding Ukraine, as this would harm the interests of Ukraine (See Chapter Five 
for details). It soon became obvious that neither the EU nor Ukraine agreed with Poland’s 
selfless defence of Ukrainian interests. The episode was aptly called "a bitter lesson in 
realpoiitik” by a newspaper commentator.®®
Kwasniewski was to tread more carefully into Ukrainian affairs in March 2001 when he was 
about to meet Kuchma in Kazimierz Doiny. Meanwhile demonstrations against Kuchma 
were taking place in Ukraine and the opposition demanded that Kuchma step down. The 
Ukrainian opposition appealed to Kwasniewski to cancel the meeting and were supported 
by the Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc - AWS) and Conservative- 
People's Party {Stronnictwo Konserwatywno- Ludowe -  SKL), a grouping within the ruling 
AWS, which argued that such a meeting would mean approval by Poland of tactics used 
against political opposition in Ukraine.''® Kwasniewski met both representatives of the 
opposition and Kuchma and encouraged them to engage in a dialogue. However, he 
refrained from becoming a mediator. The Polish government, similarly, sustained a 
dialogue with the Kuchma administration until 2004 elections and did not bandwagon with 
the West in the latter’s increasing tendencies towards isolating Kuchma, Kwaéniewski said 
’’Strategic partnership is not a fair weather policy. ...We should not lose even a day in our 
cooperation with Ukraine.”'"
The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a document in June 2001 containing 
Poland’s proposals on how the future EP of the EU should be shaped, it demonstrated
®® Jan Maksymiuk, “Poiish-Ukrainian Forum holds first session", RFE/RL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report, 
Vol. 2, 22 February 2000, No.8.
Krzysztof Bieii, “Interesy wygraty z politykei", Rzeczpospolita, 19 October 2000.
Piotr Koscit i^ski, “Aresztowanych demonstrantôw czeka sqd", Rzeczpospolita, 13 March 2001 and “Czy 
prezydent Kwasniewski powinien spotkaô siç z prezydentem Kuczmq?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 13 March 2001. 
“Dialog ze ‘zdrowymi sitami’", Rzeczpospolita, 16 March 2001.
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Warsaw's ambitions of gaining a say in EU foreign policy after enlargement.'*^ It was a bold 
attempt, given the fact that Poland itself only got the green light from the EU a few months 
earlier at the Nice European Council. However, it was also a sign of the realisation on the 
part of Polish foreign policy makers that Polish EP could have a chance of success only if 
its postulates could be introduced into the EU EP and if Poland could utilise the structures 
and resources of the EU in its implementation. The document contained words of restraint 
regarding Ukraine. While it called for the security dialogue with Ukraine to be made a 
priority and stressed the importance of Ukrainian independence for regional stability, it 
formulated most of the cooperation proposals for the whole region and not only Ukraine. 
And it said 'W hile sharing with Ukraine its own experience gained in the process of 
preparation for EU membership, Poland takes care to avoid assuming vis-à-vis Ukraine 
any obligations whatsoever in respect of its future institutional links with the EU".
Even though more realistic tendencies were observed in the Polish government’s plans 
and action, it had by no means changed the ambitious foreign policy aim of bringing 
Ukraine into NATO and the EU. Polish government representatives lobbied for securing 
Ukraine’s participation in the NATO Prague summit in November 2002 as tense relations 
between the West and Ukraine had brought about the possibility that Ukraine would not be 
invited. Polish government also lobbied the EU to give Ukraine associate member status. 
The Ministry o f Foreign Affairs prepared a set of proposals in January 2003 and advocated 
the foundation of an “Eastern Dimension” , similar to the existing Northern Dimension and 
suggested that Ukraine (and Moldova) be given associate member status “to reflect the 
increased significance of relations with these countries after the forthcoming EU 
enlargement as well as their aspirations”.'*® The document also argued that a full 
membership perspective should be offered to Ukraine in the long term and market 
economy status be given as soon as possible.
The Polish commitment to Ukraine became more vocal as first, doubts about Poland’s own 
accession to the EU gradually diminished; second, from Poland’s viewpoint domestic 
political conflicts in Ukraine and Kuchma regime’s relations with Russia gave rise to 
worries about the direction Ukraine’s transformation would take; third, the EU and NATO’s 
reluctance to give Ukraine a clear perspective for the future and the West’s isolation of the 
current Ukrainian administration carried the risk of further alienating Ukraine from the path 
Poland would have liked it to follow.
“The Eastern policy of the European Union in the run-up to the EU’s enlargement to include the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe -  Poland's viewpoint", Warsaw, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 June 2001.
'*® "Non-paper with Poiish proposais concerning policy towards new Eastern neighbours after EU enlargement”. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 2003.
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The same concerns were shared by various Polish NGOs and think-tanks which stepped 
up their activities on Ukraine. One of them, the Batory Foundation, published its own policy 
proposals for integrating Ukraine into the EU.'*'* it suggested that first the EU should 
declare its political will for Ukraine’s integration. This would be followed by the granting of 
associate membership in the medium term and full membership in the long term. Support 
for Ukraine’s integration into the EU was also the subject of an open letter to the President 
(also sent to the PM, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Speaker of Sejm) by an NGO called 
Grupa Zagranica which was made up of 28 different NGOs with an interest in foreign 
affairs.'*® Among them are prominent think tanks like the Centre for international Relations 
{Centrum Stosunkow Miqdzynarodowych - GSM), Batory Foundation and Institute of Public 
Affairs {Instytut Spraw Publicznych - ISP) and humanitarian organisations like Helsinki 
Human Rights Foundation and the Polish Humanitarian Action {Polska Akcja 
Humanitarna)A^ The letter dated 23 June 2004 appealed to Polish leaders to propose 
together with Visegrad countries an initiative for the European Council to produce a 
political declaration which included a realistic road map leading to Ukrainian membership.
However, not everyone was in favour of the Poiish governmental and non-governmentai 
campaign of pulling Ukraine into the EU. Zdzistaw Najder warned that Poles tended to 
forget that Poland itself was a big challenge to the EU and that pushing for Ukraine’s 
inclusion in the EU was a disservice to both Poland’s and Ukraine’s interests. He argued 
that such an approach "can only perpetuate the impression that Poland wants to join the 
Union as a maiden with a baby bigger than herself.'"*’' The EU Commissioner for 
Enlargement, Gunther Verheugen, proved Najder’s point when he acknowledged Poland’s 
will to propose EP related initiatives in Brussels but at the same time warned Poles about 
not promising EU membership to Eastern neighbours.'*®
intellectual debate about whether Poland should support Ukrainian membership did not 
cease after Poland became a member of the EU on 1 May 2004. Reacting to PM Marek 
Beika’s recent appeal to the Lithuanian PM Algirdas Brazauskas to support Ukrainian 
membership in the EU, Krzysztof iszkowski, a junior commentator on political affairs, wrote 
an editorial in Rzeczpospolita, criticising this policy.'*® He argued that Ukrainian 
membership in the EU was against Polish interests for four reasons.®® First, as Ukraine 
was poorer than Poland, any funds extended to it in case of EU membership would also
'*'* Grzegorz Gromadzki et ai., More than a Neighbour- The Enlarged European Union and Ukraine: New 
Relations, Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 2003.
'*® "Poparcie dia europejskich asplracji Ukrainy”, Rzeczpospolita, 13 July 2004.
See Grupa Zagranica’s website, http://www.zagranica.org.pl/.
'*'' Zdzistaw Najder, "Poland’s Role in Ukraine's Integration with the EU and the Possibilities of Creating the 
"Eastern Dimension" in Pawet Kowal (Ed.), The EU’s "Eastern Dimension"- An Opportunity for or Idée Fixe of 
Poland’s Policy?, Warsaw: Centre for International Relations, 2002.
Jçdrzej Bieieckî, “Granica pozostanie na Bugu", Rzeczpospolita, 11 June 2003.
'*® “Bardzo interesuje nas polityka wschodnia Unii Europejskiej - Spotkanie premierow Polski i Litwy w Purtsku
(Woj. Podlaskie) 22,05.2004". http://www.kprm.gov.pl/2130_11543.htm (accessed 22 February 2006) 
° Krzysztof Iszkowski, "Wiçcej realizmu", Rzeczpospolita, 07 July 2004.
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corne out o f Polish coffers. Second, Ukraine’s accession wouid accelerate the creation o f a 
two (or more) speed Europe, where Poland would find itself not with the hard core but with 
the periphery, together with Ukraine. Third, with Ukrainian membership the influence of 
Russia on the EU’s internal affairs would increase and a stronger Russian lobby would be 
established in Brussels. Fourth, it was wrong to see a pro-Western Ukraine as a security 
guarantee for Poland. Poland’s security depended more on Western structures than on 
Ukraine. Iszkowski received many responses to his arguments, the majority of them highly 
critical and supporting Ukrainian integration in EU and NATO.®' iszkowski was also 
accused o f betraying the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski EP doctrine. In this sense, Iszkowski took 
one step further than the minimalists/realists and said openly that it would be in Poland’s 
(as well as Ukraine’s and the EU’s) interest to formulate foreign policy on a realistic basis 
and not on “good wishes, historical sentiments and respect for dead authorities.”®^
6.1.5 Conclusion
Poland’s entry into the EU poses certain challenges to Its relations with Ukraine. First, 
given the low likelihood that Poland wouid lead the EU’s Eastern Policy anytime soon, it 
will have to follow the EU foreign policies regarding Ukraine and wili not be able to 
undertake unilateral initiatives that might not be in line with the general policy. It will also 
have to accept the realistic approach of EU towards Russia and its prioritisation in areas 
such as energy cooperation. Second, Poland wili lose some o f the policy instruments at its 
disposal which it has been using as a sign of goodwill and as an incentive for economic 
cooperation towards Ukraine. The main example is the implementation of the Schengen 
acquis and the imposition of visa requirement for Ukrainians travelling to Poland (see 
Appendix).
However, it would be wrong to assume that the consequences of Poland’s EU membership 
would severely hamper its bilateral relations with Ukraine. We have already seen that even 
before the EU enlargement there were obstacles, both domestic and external, for 
achieving “strategic partnership” and the EP debate in Poland was successful at raising 
concern over these obstacles. One of the key concerns raised was economic relations, 
which are a key (if not the most important) element in any strategic partnership. The next 
section will look at how far Poiish-Ukrainian cooperation succeeded at bolstering economic 
ties.
®' For polemics see Boguslaw M. Majewski (Rzecznik Prasowy MSZ), “Mentalnoéc Kalego " (dot; artykutu
"Uderzajqcy anachronizm" autorstwa Krzysztofa Iszkowskiego, Rzeczpospolita, 01.06.04), 04 June 2004 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/index.php (accessed 13 February 2005). Wojciech Maziarski, “Miçso i geopolityka”, 
Newsweek Polska, 07 June 2004. Bogumita Berdychowska and Henryk Wujec, “Uderzajq^cy brak wyobraini”, 
Rzeczpospolita, 24 June 2004. Siawomir Popowski, "Strachy na Lachy", Rzeczpospolita, 01 July 2004. 
Krzysztof iszkowski, "Uderzaj^cy anachronizm”, Rzeczpospolita, 01 June 2004.
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6.2 ECONOMIC RELATIONS
6.2.1 Trade and Investment
Poland and Ukraine signed the first agreement regulating economic relations on 4 October 
1991, a few months after Ukraine declared its independence. Trade turnover between 
Poland and Ukraine was around 350 million USD in 1992 (turnover with Russia was about 
2 billion USD), Economic crisis in Ukraine and structural transformation measures, such as 
giving up the transfer rouble system and CMEA trading regulations, were the obvious 
obstacles on the Ukrainian side and reorientation of trade from East to West were those on 
the Poiish side.
From 1992 to 1997 trade turnover between Poland and Ukraine increased steadily, despite 
recurrent problems of lack of regulation and growing incompatibility of economic systems 
between the two countries. Turnover increased from 350 million USD in 1992 to 1.6 billion 
USD in 1997.
Table 11: Poland: Foreign Trade Turnover with Ukraine, 1992-1997
/V t i  (T* \63
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Imports 161,893 201,126 204,892 29,0760 418,458 415,528
Exports 188,170 187,717 280,394 74.2620 977,827 1,206,750
Balance +26,277 +13,409 +75,502 +45,1860 +559,369 +791,222
Even though treaties on prevention o f double taxation (1993), investment (1993), trade 
liberalisation (1997) and various regional cooperation agreements were signed and 
institutions and fora such as Poiish-Ukrainian Chamber of Industry (1992), Economic 
Forum in Krynica (1992), Poiish-Ukrainian Economic Summit (1997) were established, 
bilateral trade did not reach the desired level. Olszanski finds it normal because, as he 
argued, the two economies were not complementary, could not offer any strategic goods to 
each other and, therefore, economic cooperation was only widespread at the level of 
SMEs and shuttle trade (which boomed thanks to a visa free agreement in 1996 and 
generated trade close to the volumes of official, registered trade).®'* He also pointed out 
that the increasing gap between the socioeconomic systems of Poland and Ukraine was 
an obstacle for the development o f economic relations, and unnecessary red tape, 
corruption, organised crime and lack of legal guarantees in Ukraine put off potential Poiish 
investors. As a result investment levels remained low, with Poiish FDI in Ukraine at 13.1 
million USD in 1995, which constituted about 2.7% of total FDI into the country. Although
Rocznik Statystyczny Handiu Zagranicznego, Years 1993-1998, Warsaw: Gfôwny Urzq^ d Statystyczny. 
Tadeusz A. Olszanski, "Stosunki z Ukrainq", RPPZ 1998, Warszawa: Zarzqd Obsfugi MSZ, 1999, 
http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/ (accessed 01 April 2006)
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this figure almost quadrupled to 45.7 million USD in 1999, the relative percentage in total 
fell down to 1.6%.®®
Table 12: Polish FDI in Ukraine, 1995-1999
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Total FDI 483.5 896.9 1438.2 2063.6 2810.7
Polish FDI 13.1 20.5 25.4 37.1 45.7
% of Polish FDI 2.7 2.3 1.7 1.8 1.6
in million USD)
The Russian financial crisis of August 1998 changed the upward trend of Poiish-Ukrainian 
trade turnover. Turnover decreased from 1.62 billion USD in 1997 to 1.46 billion USD in 
1998 and declined further to 1.04 billion in 1999.The devaluation of the Ukrainian currency, 
the hyrvna, by 65.7% in the second half of 1998 and by a further 52.2% in 1999 resulted in 
a fall in demand for Polish goods that now became expensive and prompted a rise in 
demand for Russian goods which became much cheaper thanks to the rouble 
devaluation.®  ^Polish exports to Ukraine fell by 9.9% from 1997 to 1998 and by 35.2% from 
1998 to 1999. The fall in Polish imports from Ukraine over the same period was somewhat 
less at 9.2% and 10.2% respectively.
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Statistichniy shorichnik za 2000 hk, Kyiv: Vidavnitstvo Konsultant, 2001. FDI figures a s  of the beginning of 
each year.
“  Statistichniy shorichnik za 2000 rik, Kyiv: Vidavnitstvo Konsultant, 2001.
Diana Hnatiuk, “Wspôfpraca handlowa miçdyz Polsksi a Ukraine w aspekcie wejécia Polski do Unii 
Europejskiej” in Krystyna Gomôfka (Ed.), Probiemy transformacji gospodarczej w Estonii, Litwie, Ukrainie, 
Biakjrusi i Federacji Rosyjskiej w latach dziewiçôdziesiqtych X X  wieku. Gdartsk: Politechnika Gdartska, 
Wydziaf Zarz^dzania i Ekonomii, 2002, pp. 99-100.
Rocznik Statystyczny Handiu Zagranicznego, Years 1998-2005, Warsaw: Gfôwny Urzg^d Statystyczny.
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Table 13: Poland: Foreign Trade Turnover with Ukraine, 1997-2004
/ ! ^  4‘ t ^  I r \ r \  t
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Imports 415,528 377,190 338,535 475,374 449,299 491,547 744,600 1,038,456
Exports 1,206,750 1,086,445 703,105 798,222 1,002,691 1,180,510 1,561,200 2,023,387
Balance +791,222 +709,255 +364,570 +322.848 +553,392 +688,963 +816,600 +984,930
The Polish government took some measures to counter the loss of trade with Ukraine 
caused by the 1998 crisis. Among them was providing state guarantees for export credits 
through KUKE insurance company for Polish exporters selling to Ukraine (See Chapter 
Five for details about KUKE). Measures for encouraging exports to Ukraine were also 
proposed in the 2003 “Programme for regaining the Eastern markets” produced by the 
Ministry of E conom yP o iish -U kra in ian  trade started to recover from 2000 on. By 2001 
Ukrainian exports to Poland reached the levels of 1997 and by 2002 Polish exports to 
Ukraine surpassed 1997 figures. By 2003 total turnover reached 2.3 billion USD. Ukraine 
became the 9**^  biggest market for Polish exports (22'^ '^  for Polish imports), and Poland, 7*“^ 
for Ukrainian exports (4^  ^for Ukrainian imports).®''
As for investment, Poland’s contribution to FDI into Ukraine increased from 54.5 million 
USD in 2000 to 98.4 in 2003. By the end o f 2003 there were 837 enterprises with Polish 
capital active in Ukraine (8.9% of all enterprises with foreign capital).®^ The biggest annual 
rise was recorded in 2004, where Polish FDI increased more than 60% to 152.7 million 
USD in 2004. However, the share of Polish FDI in Ukraine’s total still remained low, 
reaching its high of 2.2% in 2004.
Table 14: Polish FDI in Ukraine, 2000-2004, (in million USD) 63
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total FDI 3,281.8 3,875.0 4,555.3 5,339.0 6,794.4
Polish FDI 54.5 62.1 69.3 98.4 152.7
% of Polish FDI 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.8 2.2
Poland’s FDI in Ukraine remained much lower than those of West European countries 
such as Germany and Netherlands (whose share in total fluctuated about 16% and 9%
Rocznik Statystyczny Handiu Zagranicznego, Years 1998-2005, Warsaw; Glôwny Urzc^d Statystyczny.
See Zafozenia polityki handlowej wobec rynkôw wschodnich na lata 2003 -  2004. Program Odzyskania 
Rynkow Wschodnich, Ministerstwo Gospodarki, Pracy i Polityki Spolecznej, Warsaw, February 2003, 
http://www.mpjps.gov.pl/pllki_do_pobrania/rynkLwschodnie.doc (accessed 06 November 2006) 
"Polsko-ukraihskie stosunki gospodarcze w 2003 r.", Rynek- Wschodni Partnerzy, Vol. 96, 2004, No. 6, pp. 
6-7.
® “Polsko-ukraihskie stosunki gospodarcze w 2003 r.”, Rynek - Wschodni Partnerzy, Vol. 96, 2004, No. 6, p. 8.
Ukraine in Figures 2002, Kyiv: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2003 and Statistichniy shorichnik za 
2004 rik, Kyiv: Vidavnitstvo Konsultant, 2005.
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respectively) and was at a similar level with that of Hungary, which had a smaller economy 
than Poland.
Figure 8: Foreign Direct Investment in Ukraine by selected countries, 1995-2004
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Ukrainian investment into Poland also remained negligible at an average of 300,000 USD 
annually since 1995 and constituted less than 1% of Ukrainian FDI abroad.®® Its share in 
Poland’s FDI was even less. In 2003 Ukrainian FDI into Poland was 330,100 USD 
whereas total FDI into Poland was 72.7 billion USD.®®
As for commodity structure, almost half of Poland’s imports from Ukraine in 2003 were 
mineral products. Poland bought 89.8 million USD worth of natural gas and 83.8 million 
USD worth of petroleum oil and natural gas condensate from Ukraine but these were only 
6.1% and 2.8% of Poland’s total imports of these commodities.®  ^ It should also be added 
that Ukraine itself is highly dependent on imports in this sector from Russia. Only one kind 
of commodity where imports from Ukraine dominated the Polish market was iron ore and 
steel, which constituted 69.7% of Poland’s imports of those commodities. When we look at
Data from Statistichniy shorichnik za 2000 rik, Ukraine in Figures 2002 and Statistichniy shorichnik za 2004  
rik.
Ukraine in Figures 1998, Kyiv; State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 1999.
Rocznik 2003, Polska Agencja informacji i Inwestycji Zagranicznych S.A., Warsaw: PAIZ, 2004, p. 9 and 
“Handel polsko -  ukrairtski i polskie inwestycje w Ukrainie w I pôfroczu 2004 r.”, 
http://users.adamant.net/~wehamb/ (accessed 21 February 2005)
“Polsko-ukraihskie stosunki gospodarcze w 2003 r.", Rynek - Wschodni Partnerzy, Vol. 96, 2004, No. 6, p. 8.
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Poland’s exports to Ukraine, the commodity with the highest percentage in Ukraine’s total 
imports was sugar with 39%. It is followed by cars at 8.3%.
Poland’s Export to Ukraine g  
by commodity groups H
Poland’s Import from Ukraine 
by commodity groups
1999 2003 Ü 1999 2003Commoditygroups MillionUSD %
Million
USD % ■  USD %
Million
USD %Agricultural and 
food products 135.8 19.4 160.7 10.3 H  11.8 3.5 41.9 5.6Mineral
products 23.4 3.3 44 2.8 H  197.7 68.4 389.4 52.3Chemical Ind. 
products 165.6 23.6 317.2 20.3 B  29.5 8.7 91.8 12.3LIgth Ind. 
products
(textiles,footwear) 84.2 12 151.1 1.5 12.8 1.7Wood and paper 
products 66.1 9.4 146.8 9.4 B  13.3 3.9 29.1 3.9Stone, plaster, 
cement products 15.6 2.2 59.1 3.8 B  1.2 0.4 0.9 0.1Base
metals 49.9 7.1 160.3 10.3 H  67.8 20 154.7 20.8Machinery and 
electrical equip. 84.6 12.1 441.8 28.3 H  9.9 2.9 22 3Furniture and 
lighting products 75.8 10.8 78.9 0.4 1.6 0.2Others
0.4 0.1 1.2 0,1 B  0.9 0.3 0.3 0.1Total 701.4 100 1561.1 100 m  338.5 100 744.5 100
The Polish and Ukrainian governments reiterated at every opportunity that they had a 
strategic partnership in terms of economic relations as well but the figures tell us that this 
was hardly the case. The share of trade with Poland in total Ukrainian trade hardly 
surpassed the 3% mark in either exports or imports. Although Poland’s position in 
Ukrainian trade seems to be stable, the volumes were not large enough to create a 
considerable dependency. Ukraine’s share in Poland’s trade was expectedly even less. 
Imports from Ukraine constituted about 1% of total, falling down to a 0.1% low with the 
influence of 1998 crisis and exports also fell from 4.7% in 1997 but recovered only up to 
about 3% in 2004.
Data from the website of the Polish Embassy in Kiev, Department of Economy and Trade. 
http://users.adam ant.net/~weham b/ (accessed 28 February 2005)
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Table 16: Poland: Trade with Ukraine. 1996-2004 (percentages of total export and
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Imports 1.1 1.0 0.1 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.2
Exports 4.0 4.7 3.8 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.7
Table 17: Ukraine: Trade with Poland, 1996-2004 (percentages o f total export and
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Imports 2.9 3.2 3.3 2.1 2.2 2.8 3.1 3.4 3.3
Exports 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 2.8 3.3 2.9
Bilateral trade has faced additional problems after EU enlargement on May 2004. After 
Poland’s entry into the EU Ukraine’s exports of agricultural products to Poland was 
expected to be affected as the tariffs would rise and additional ecological and sanitary 
standards would be introduced.^^ More importantly, Poland would have to abide by the 
import quotas imposed on steel {and other metallurgical products) which might adversely 
affect imports from Ukraine. In 2004 the EU wide limit o f steel imports from Ukraine was 
185,000 tonnes, which was less than half of Poland’s annual of steel imports from that 
country.^^ Although the EU agreed to increase steel quotas for Ukraine to 606,800 tonnes 
by the end o f 2004, the increase was still not sufficient to sustain current levels of steel 
imports from Ukraine to Poland.^®
6.2,2 Privatisation of Huta Czçstochowa
Polish governments has for years been emphasising the need to increase mutual 
investment between Poland and Ukraine, especially given the low level o f Ukrainian 
investment into Poland. An opportunity to change the situation came up when Ukraine’s 
leading metallurgy and mining corporation, the Industrial Union o f Donbas {Industrialnii 
Soyuz Donbassa - lUD), tendered for the privatisation of Huta Czestochowa steel mill in 
2003. This was a strategic move by the lUD not only in terms of increasing Ukrainian 
investment in Poland but also circumventing the threat posed by the application of EU 
steel import quotas after Poland’s accession to the EU as mentioned above. lUD was the 
second biggest company in Ukraine after Naftogaz Ukrainy and its turnover for 2002 was
® Rocznik Statystyczny Handiu Zagranicznego, Years 1997-2005, Warsaw: Gtôwny Urz^d Statystyczny.
Calculated on the basis of data from Ukraine in Figures (years 1998, 2000, 2003), Kyiv: State Statistics 
Committee of Ukraine. Data for 2001 from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/databases.htm and for 2001 and 2004 
from http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ and (accessed 27 March 2006)
“Polsko-ukraihska wspôlpraca po 1 maja 2004 roku", Rynek - Wschodni Partnerzy, Vol. 94, 2004, No. 4, p.
5.
 ^Taras Kuzio, “Poland lobbies EU membership for Ukraine”, Eurasia Dally Monitor, Vol. 1,11 June 2004, 
issue 29. http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?articie_id=236B085 (accessed 06 November 2006) 
“Ukraine's representative to EU Roman Shpek authorized to sign Ukraine - EU agreement on exports of 
Ukrainian steel", 23 September 2004, Press Release, website of the Ukrainian Mission to the EU. 
http://wvw.ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/eu/en/publication/content/2255.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
184
2.8 billion USD.^'* It was also the base of the so-called Donetsk clan as many politicians In 
Kiev had ties with the company which dominated the region it was located in. For instance, 
the Ukrainian PM Viktor Yanukovich had been a governor of the region from 1997 to 2002 
and had close ties with lUD.^®
lUD was one of the two companies alongside the indian-British steel giant LNM (later 
renamed Mittal Steel) that passed the first stage of the tender. However, in February 2004, 
it was announced by the Ministry of Treasury that lUD had lost the tender even though its 
offer was bigger than that of LNM. This caused an outrage in Ukraine. Kuchma ordered the 
Ukrainian government to look into the process and prior to a meeting with Miller regarding 
the matter PM Yanukovich said "We will consider the issue and build our relations taking it 
into account.” ®^ He said that the decision discriminated against Ukrainian national interests 
and would create new divisions in Europe.^^ He also referred to lUD’s recent purchase of 
almost 80% of shares of the Hungarian steel mill, Dunaferr, during its privatisation and 
added “Now Hungary says: let us be your representative to the EU instead of Poland, [as] 
Poland discredits Ukraine.” ®^
The reason why LNM was preferred even though lUD offered more money was explained 
as follows:^® The decision about the winner was taken by the Ministry of Treasury, which 
was assured, orally and in writing, by the LNM that they would pay more than the highest 
bid offered. LNM was a more trustworthy partner in terms of payment ability. The main 
argument against UID was that it proposed increasing the production capacity of Huta 
Czestochowa and this would be in breach of Poland’s accession treaty with the EU, which 
requires a reduction of steel production within the restructuring of that industry.
These arguments were dismissed by both lUD’s lawyers and Polish opposition MPs. First, 
the price guarantee was made by LNM after the bidding closed which was against the 
rules.®® Second, lawyers argued that because Huta Czestochowa was not listed in the 
government’s restructuring programme and received no public subsidies, the accession
“Ukrainians Want to Buy Czestochowa Steel Mill", Economic Bulletin (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 
No.29 (575), 21 July 2003. www.msz.gov.pl (accessed 23 March 2005)
See Roman Kupchinsky. "The clan from Donetsk”, RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report, (Part 1) Vol. 4, 26 
November 2002, No. 45, (Part 2) Vol. 4, 10 December 2002, No. 47.
“Poland, Ukraine PM Discuss Huta Czestochowa Tender Row", Ukrainian Monitor, 27 February 2004.
Konrad Niklewicz, "Donbas domaga siç Huty Czçstochowa", Gazeta Wyborcza, 02 March 2004.
"Poland, Ukraine PM Discuss Huta Czestochowa Tender Row", Ukrainian Monitor, 27 February 2004. 
Sekretarz Stanu w Ministerstwie Skarbu Pahstwa Andrzej Szarawarski, Sprawozdania stenograficzne ,4 
kadencja, 69 posiedzenie, 3 dzieh , 15 punkt, 04 March 2004, http://ks.sejm.gov.pl:8009/forms/kad.him. 
(accessed on 22 February 2006)
MP Rafat Zagorny’s comments, Biuletyn Komisji Skarbu Pabstwa, No. 2914/IV, 09 March 2004. All 
commission bulletins from 1993 on are searchable at http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Biuletyn.nsf (accessed 06 
November 2006).
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treaty requirements on the reduction of production did not apply. It was also mentioned 
that LNM also proposed to almost double the production.®^
What the Ukrainian government objected to the most was the portrayal of lUD as a second 
class investor in comparison with a company that was already established in the West. 
Deputy Minister o f Treasury Andrzej Szarawarski said that Poland wanted to deal with a 
"premier league” company and not an "accidental investor”. Also according to newspapers 
the Agency for Internal Security {Agencja Bezpieczehstwo Wewngtrzne - ABW) wrote In a 
report to the government that lUD had an opaque company structure, its capital was of 
doubtful origin and was suspected of money laundering.®^ Given that lUD is the second 
biggest company in Ukraine, with ties to the government, a strong reaction to that type of 
stereotyping was unavoidable, especially at a time when the Polish government praised 
the strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine. Besides, lUD saw Huta 
Czestochowa as an important opportunity to survive on the EU market. Given the problem 
with EU limits on steel imports mentioned above, lUD was hoping to avoid future quotas by 
buying a production unit in Poland. This was also why some Ukrainian commentators 
stated that the rejection of lUD would hurt the pro-European course o f Ukraine and play 
into the hands of proponents of closer integration with Russia given that the Huta Incident 
showed that Poland could not be trusted as a strategic ally and Ukraine would have more 
difficulty entering European markets after EU enlargement.®®
Even though some argued that the issue was purely economic, it was perceived as a 
political matter both by Poles and Ukrainians. The decision of the Ministry of Treasury was 
devoid of valid economic arguments and the Ukrainian government made it clear that they 
regarded the matter within the wider framework of Poiish-Ukrainian relations. The 
Ukrainian Minister of Economy and European Integration even pointed out the connection 
between the tender and the controversial subject of the Odessa-Brody-Gdahsk pipeline 
{see below). He said “the Ukrainian government sees investment by ... the lUD, as a 
project of strategic importance which, along with the Odessa-Brody-Plock oil pipeline 
project, should become the basis for boosting investment in each other's economies and 
for creating ties of cooperation."®'‘
Following the reaction from Ukraine, the process of privatisation was suspended. The 
Polish government announced that it would consult the European Commission to clarify 
what rules should apply to Huta Czestochowa. Also in May 2004, the regional court in
Interpellation by MP Grzegorz Dolnlak, Interpelacja nr 6935 do mlnlstra skarbu panstwa w sprawie 
prywatyzacji Huty Czçstochowa SA, 16 March 2004. http://ks.sejm.gov.pl;8009/ forms/iz.htm (accessed 22 
February 2006)
Konrad Niklewicz, “Dlaczego Donbas przegraf, Gazeta Wyborcza, 04 March 2004.
Andrzej Michalski, "Przetarg zawleszony czy uniewaèniony", Rzeczpospolita, 01 April 2004.
"...as Ukraine cries foul-play on still mill deal", Ukrayinska Pravda, 05 March 2004 and Konrad Niklewicz and 
Wactaw Radziwinowicz, "Mi§dzy stowami", Gazeta Wyborcza, 02 April 2004.
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Czestochowa, to which lUD applied, ruled that the tendering process was unlawful and put 
a protection order on the property of Huta Czestochowa, prohibiting its sale.®® The tender 
process was repeated in February 2005, with the same applicants, and the new Ukrainian 
government announced that it supported lUD’s bid. In March it was announced that Mittal 
Steel had won yet again. The question of how this second rejection would affect Poiish- 
Ukrainian relations, and especially the future of the Odessa-Brody-Gdahsk pipeline, was 
raised again. Barttomlej Sienkiewicz (of the minimalism debate) called the decision “a 
catastrophe for Polish EP” and reminded that this was the first occasion to translate the 
concept of strategic partnership (prioritised partnership, as he put it) into deeds.®®
6.3 CASE STUDY: THE ODESSA-BRODY-GDANSK PIPELINE
Post-1989 economic transformation has taken different trajectories in Poland and Ukraine 
and as a result “strategic partnership", hailed by both governments, has not been a reality 
in terms of economic cooperation. Trade has not developed to desired volumes and 
investment levels remained negligible. However, there is one key strategic matter where 
Poland and Ukraine found themselves in a vulnerable position: energy. Both countries are 
dependent on Russia for their energy supplies and under pressure to diversify their energy 
resources (especially Poland). Poland’s need for diversification is dictated not solely by 
economic concerns but also by having to harmonise with EU energy policies and concerns 
about real and perceived Russian influence on Poland’s domestic politics (see Chapter 
Five). In the case of Ukraine, the need Is more acute and Russian use of energy imports 
and transport as a carrot and stick more obvious.
Under the circumstances "strategic partnership" would necessitate close cooperation 
rather than total energy dependence. One attempt at this was Poland’s badly planned 
gesture to Ukraine on the subject of the second Yamal pipeline. This gesture failed 
because Poland underestimated the EU’s will to achieve energy diversification by reducing 
dependence on OPEC oil by increasing the supply of Russian gas. Besides, refusing the 
second pipeline meant loss o f transit revenue for Poland itself.
A second occasion for Polish Ukrainian cooperation for tackling energy dependence came 
up thanks to plans for building an oil pipeline through Ukraine and Poland to carry Caspian 
oil to the West. This pipeline would carry non-Russian oil through a route outwith Russian 
control, therefore it would be an ideal way of reducing dependence on both Russian oil and 
transit system. This would be in the interest of both Poland and Ukraine. Poland obtained 
94.5% of its crude oil imports from Russia. The ratio for Ukraine’s imports from Russia was
Andrzej Situszek, “Donbas wraca do gry”, lycie, 11 May 2004.
Konrad Niklewicz, “Huta drazni Ukrainç”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 25 February 2005.
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80%.°^ The EU would also benefit from it as the demand for oil (especially from non-OPEC 
sources) was on the rise.
Table 18 :Forecast for Demand for Oil (in mtoe) until 2030 88
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Poland 9.30 11.82 15.79 16.41 18.30 20.65 23.48 24.92 25.85
Germany 96.02 103.33 97.32 99.24 101.88 103.69 106.92 107.41 107.85
EU-15 391.50 414.10 430.60 445.80 462.20 473.10 489.00 496.50 501.90
The idea of building such a pipeline went back to 1993 when the Ukrainian government 
decided to build an oil terminal in the Black Sea port of Pivdenniy (aka Yuzhniy) near 
Odessa in order to receive Caspian oil by sea from Supsa (end of Baku-Supsa pipeline) 
terminal in Georgia or from Novorossiysk in Russia and transport it to refineries. The 
construction of the second part of the project, a pipeline from Odessa to Brody close to the 
Polish border started in 1996. From there the pipeline would link to the southern arm of the 
Druzhba pipeline which carries Russian oil to Western Europe through Slovakia. The 
Odessa-Brody pipeline would be 674 km long with an initial capacity o f 14.5 million tonnes 
per annum which could be increased to 45 million.®^ Construction was completed on 19 
August 2001.
“Energy policy of Poland until 2025" (adopted by the Council of Ministers on 4 January 2005), Ministry of 
Economy and Labour, http://www.mgip.gov.pl/GOSPODARKA/Energetyka/ (accessed 22 February 2005) and 
Roman Kupchinsky, “Ukraine: energy overview (Part 1)", RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report, Vol. 7, 21 
January 2005, No. 3.
Mtoe -  Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent. Data from “Annex 2: Summary energy balances and indicators" in 
European energy and transport- Trends to 2030, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 2003, pp.148-219.
“Peace & stability pipeline. History of Odessa-Brody”, Caspian Energy, No. 20, 01 August 2004. 
http://www.caspenergy.com/framee.html (accessed 22 February 2005)
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Figure 9: Russian oil export routes to Western markets^°
Russia Energy Survey 2002  (International Energy Agency), Paris: OECD/IEA, 2002, p. 13. Also available at 
www.iea.Org/textbase/nppdf/free/2000/russia2002.pdf (accessed 21 January 2007)
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6.3.1 Poland joins the project
In 1997 the Ukrainian government proposed extending the pipeline to the port of Gdansk, 
by extending it to Poland’s biggest oil refinery in Ptock. It expected that state owned 
companies would participate in the project and the Polish government would provide 
credits and guarantees.®  ^Warsaw showed an interest but preferred that an international 
consortium took over the enterprise and declined to give government guarantees.
Figure 10: Odessa-Brody- Piock- Gdansk pipeline
Ruroc’i^ gOdessa-Brody
-  -  Planowan
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IVrurod% ooPlocka 
Irme rumclggi
POLSKA
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Solid maroon: Odessa-Brody pipeline 
Dashed maroon: Planned pipeline extending to Piock 
Solid blue: Other pipelines
Polish officials emphasised that they would take part in the project only if it was 
commercially viable. For that reason a committee of experts was formed to work on 
technological, economic, financial aspects of the pipeline during the meeting of Poland 
Ukraine Mixed Commission on Economic and Trade Cooperation in February 1999.®^  
Experts from the two companies with an interest in the project, Naftogaz Ukrainy (which 
had built the Odessa-Brody sector) and the Polish pipeline company, Przedsiqbiorstwa 
Eksploatacji Rurociqgôw Naftowych "Przyjazh” (PERN), started talks on the project. 
Despite emphasising the commercial aspect of the pipeline, Polish officials were 
increasingly vociferous about its political significance. PM Jerzy Buzek expressed Poland’s 
interest in the pipeline and, referring to the strategic partnership, said that Poland would
Marek Siwiec, “Porozmawiajmy o faktach", Rzeczpospolita, 04 October 2002.
Source: http://gospodarka.gazeta.pI/gospodarka/1,33405,2585640.html from Tom asz Bielecki, “Zielone 
éwiatto dia ruroci%u Odessa-Brody", Gazeta Wyborcza (online edition), 04 April 2005. (accessed 12 January 
2007)
"Odpowiedi sekretarza stanu w Ministerstwie Gospodarki - z upowalnienia prezesa Rady Ministrôw - na 
zapytanie nr 1907 w sprawie realizaqi polsko-ukrairiskiej umowy o budowie rurocieigu naftowego", 12 May 
2000. http://ks.sejm.gov.pl:8009/forms/iz.htm (accessed 22 February 2005)
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take into account Ukraine’s interests when choosing its energy so u rce s .P re s id e n t 
Kwasniewski was also enthusiastic. He visited the Pivdenniy terminai on 17 December 
2000 and expressed his support for the establishment o f an international consortium to 
start the construction of the Brody - Piock sector.
According to the feasibility report prepared by Halliburton Brown & Root at the end of 2001 
the cost o f building the 560 km pipeline from Brody to Piock would be 450 million USD and 
the pipeline would become profitable in the medium term as the volume of oil transported 
through the pipeline gradually increased (up to 25 million tonnes annually).®® it also stated 
that for the pipeline to be feasible the Polish sector of the project had to complement the 
Ukrainian one. However, despite continuous declarations by Polish officials about the 
project’s virtues and pleas for action by the Ukrainian government, no actual steps were 
taken to initiate the construction process in Poland. Concerns about the profitability of the 
pipeline and lack of a business plan were put forward by Warsaw as the reasons for 
inaction.
6.3.2 The Golden Gate Scandal
The Polish side of the project became the subject of a scandal In September 2002 when a 
Polish newspaper, Rzeczpospolita, published a report about the company Golden Gate 
which was supposed to form the consortium to build the pipeline.®^ The report argued that 
the main figures in Golden Gate’s administration were tainted by scandals such as FOZZ 
and had ties with top politicians from both the current and previous governments, who 
involved these characters in the pipeline project.®® it was alleged that they were trying to 
raise finances for the project from public funds. The report maintained that the pipeline 
project was economically unsound and criticised the government for making too many 
promises to Ukraine and failing the strategic partnership by not fuifiiiing them.
Both the government and the president quickly reacted to the allegations and tried to 
distance themselves from Golden Gate (which later pulled out of the project).®® it was also 
said that Poland was committed to the projects, but Ukrainians had not yet submitted a 
business plan and it was not clear where the oil would come from and who would buy that
Maciej Podgôrski, “Partnerstwo zobowi^zuje", Rzeczpospolita, 17 June 2000,
"Robocza wizyta prezydenta RP na Ukralnie, 17 grudnia 2000 roku”, Kronika Prezydenta RP. 
http://www.bbn.gov.pl/?strona=pl_kronika_2000_12_1701 (accessed 06 November 2006).
Maciej Janlec, “Uciekaj^ca szansa”, Rzeczpospolita, 27 September 2002.
Tatiana Setwetnyk, "Ztote wrota z FOZZ w tie" and Igor Janke, "Rura donik^d", Rzeczpospolita, 20 
September 2002.
FOZZ {Fundusz Obslugi Zadtuzenia Zagranicznego) was the Foreign Debt Servicing Fund established In 
1989 to clear Poland’s foreign debt. Its funds, Instead, were embezzled by some companies at a loss of around 
90 million USD to the state.
®® Michat MajewskI et al., "Stuzby sprawdzq^Ztote Wrota", Rzeczpospolita, 21 September 2002 and Michat 
Majewski and Pawet Reszka, "Prezydent odcina siç od Golden Gate", Rzeczpospolita, 25 September 2002.
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oil after transit through the pipeline/®® Besides, as the head of the Presidential Bureau of 
National Security, Marek Siwiec, argued, this investment was perceived by Ukraine as one 
of the attributes of Ukrainian independence, whereas for Poland it was oniy one of the 
alternatives for diversification of oil supplies, hence not as crucial for energy security/®^ He 
added that the President still supported the project “politically”. The contradiction was 
probably a result of the desire to steer clear of the scandal and yet remain faithful to the 
rhetoric o f strategic partnership with Ukraine.
Meanwhile, the allegations caused a negative reaction in Ukraine and the weekly Zerkalo 
A/ec/e//even alleged that it was the provocation of the “monopolists", i.e. the companies 
which control the existing pipelines (meaning Transneft, the Russian operator of the 
Druzhba p ip e lin e ).A c c o rd in g ly , these companies were trying to discredit Golden Gate 
and eliminate the Poles from the project.
The Ukrainian side stepped up its efforts to convince Warsaw about the viability o f the 
pipeline as the project was stalled due to lack of financing. The Ukrainian sector of the 
pipeline, which cost 200 million USD, was idle since 2001. When in March 2003 head of 
the EU Commission Romano Prodi gave his support to the project during a meeting with 
the Ukrainian PM Viktor Yanukovich, hopes were raised about the possibility of raising a 
part of the funding from EU sources.^®® The EU Commission included the pipeline in the list 
of projects to be supported in a communication on energy policy on 12 May 2003.''°'^ 
Following this, on 27 May 2003, a conference on the “Odessa-Brody-Plock Oil 
Transportation Project” took place in Brussels and a joint declaration on the project was 
signed by Polish and Ukrainian Deputy PMs and the EU Commissioner for Energy.”'®® Even 
though the sides pledged to "consider further support of the project through the relevant 
Technical Assistance programmes of the European Community” , which would be TACIS 
and INOGATE, the oniy concrete financial offer was a sum of 2 million Euro for funding a 
preparatory study for the project’s development.^®® The US ambassador to Ukraine also 
expressed support for the pipeline to be extended to Poland.^®^ Formerly the US
®^® "Golden Gate nie ma wyi^cznosci”, Rzeczpospolita, 25 September 2002.
Marek Siwiec, “Porozmawiajmy o faktach”, Rzeczpospolita, 04 October 2002.
Alla Yeremenko, “Fraud or provocation?”, Zerkalo Nedeli. 5 -11  October 2002.
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"Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Development of 
Energy Policy for the Enlarged European Union, Its Neighbours and Partner Countries", COM (2003) 262 final, 
Brussels, 13 May 2003, http://europa.eu.lnt/comm
/energy_transport/euromed_conf3/doc/com_2003_0262„en.pdf (accessed 22 February 2006).
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government was putting its weight behind the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project for the 
transport o f Caspian oii.
6.3.3 Reverse use of the pipeline
Meanwhile, Naftogaz Ukrainy was under increased pressure from Russian companies 
concerning the use of the pipeline. Ukrainian newspapers reported the signing of a deal on 
23 April 2003 between Naftogaz Ukrainy and the Russian Transneft and Tyumen Oii 
Company {Tyumenskaya Neftyanaya Kompaniya - TNK).”'®® This happened shortly after 
the EU Athens summit in April 2003, where Kuchma snubbed the W ider Europe initiative 
by dismissing EU membership as top foreign policy priority. Accordingly, a protocol of 
intention on transporting 9 million tonnes of Russian oil from Brody to Odessa (i.e. in the 
reverse direction) was signed. The plan was to pump more oil through the Southern 
Druzhba pipeline, which passes through Brody, and to divert some of the oii towards 
Odessa. The oil would then be transported to the West from the Pivdenniy terminal by 
tankers through the Turkish straits o f Bosphorus and Dardanelles.
The Ukrainian government denied that any deal had been signed with Russian companies, 
but the reaction to the lack of concrete support from Poland or the EU was growing. The 
Russian option was slowly gaining ground and not oniy the Russian government but also 
certain personalities within the Ukrainian government and Naftogaz Ukrainy were lobbying 
for the reverse use of the pipeline. Even Kuchma seemed to get impatient. He reportedly 
questioned whether there was enough oil in the Caspian to transport through the pipeline 
and complained about lack of interest on the part of suppliers. He said “it is high time that 
we stop playing politics and start thinking about Ukraine lest we wind up with an empty, 
neglected pipeline that no one needs.”''°®
indeed, in the short term the reverse use of the pipeline would be profitable due to the 
transit fees that would be earned. However, in the medium and long term it would deprive 
Ukraine and Poland as well as Western Europe of a viable diversification option.
Another complication it would cause was increasing the oil tanker traffic passing through 
the narrow Bosphorus straits. Turkey had already complained about the high volume of 
traffic and its costs and potential dangers for the country. For West European purchasers 
of oil, the main concern was that this route would become a bottleneck and swift flow of the
Tatiana Sillna, “Whose interests Are Being Piped Up?", Zerkalo Nedeli, 31 May - 06 June 2003.
Borys Biletsky, “Odessa-Brody: Economy should determine politics", Zerkalo Nedeli, 21 - 27 June 2003.
A further implication, suggested by Balmaceda, would be the weakening of the GUUAM cooperation. 
Member countries all stood to benefit from a non-Russian controlled transit system which brought oil from the 
Caspian. Blocking the Odessa-Brody-PJock pipeline would hurt the future prospects of GUUAM. Margarita M. 
Balmaceda, "Explaining the Management of Energy Dependency in Ukraine: Possibiiitles and Limits of a 
Domestic-Centered Perspective”, Working Papers, Mannheimer Zentrum fur Europaische Sozialforschung, 
2004, No. 79. http://www.verwaltung.uni-mannheim.de/i3v/00068900/18285591.htm or http://www.mzes.uni- 
mannheim.de/publications/wp/wp_all_d.php?Recno=2014 (accessed 06 November 2006)
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supplies would be jeopardised. Besides, due to the geographical structure of the straits the 
risk of an accident was very high and if an accident took place, oil traffic might have to be 
stopped for days.^^”'
The Russian government and companies stepped up the pressure in the face of objections 
to the reverse use of the pipeline from Poland and the US. In July 2003 the Russian PM 
Mikhail Kasyanov postponed the signing of a general agreement on transit of Russian oii 
through Ukrainian pipelines between 2004-18 in response to the Ukrainian government’s 
efforts to exclude Odessa-Brody pipeline from the agreement. He said “Russia Is expecting 
that the [oii transit] agreement will encompass all Ukrainian oil pipelines, including the 
Brody-Odesa. When we solve this issue, we will sign the agreement.” ^^  ^ It was also 
reported in the Polish press that some Russian media were running a campaign of 
misinformation, circulating false news about the pipeline, giving the Ukrainians the 
message that Poles were planning to make Ukraine pay for the pipeline extension, yet 
reap the profit themselves.'’''®
6.3.4 Ukrainian zig zag
While Russian pressure mounted, the Ukrainian government was engaged in negotiations 
with its Polish counterpart about the details o f the project. In addition, negotiations with the 
US company Chevron Texaco about the supply of Caspian oil were continuing.
Meanwhile the Polish Treasury, as the owner of PERN, approved the decision to create a 
joint venture with Ukrtransnafta (subsidiary of Naftogaz Ukrainy responsible for the 
Odessa-Brody pipeline) to build the pipeline.''''® On 26 November 2003 the Polish and 
Ukrainian Deputy PMs signed an agreement to extend the Odessa-Brody pipeline to 
Poland, subject to ratification. However, the Polish side repeated that they would take part 
in the project on a commercial basis and no public funds would be a l l o c a t e d . I t  was still 
not clear whether the Russian oil or Caspian oil would flow through the pipeline. The 
Ukrainian Deputy PM complained about the pressure (and even blackmail) exerted by the 
Russian companies, government and media about the reverse use of the pipeline. He said 
that in order to make the final decision about the direction of the pipeline they would need 
to know whether Chevron would supply the oii and European refineries would buy it.^^^
In addition Turkey’s economy would suffer immensely as a result of a large scale accident in the straits, it 
must be noted that many commentators dismissed Turkish governments’ (in the author’s view genuine) 
concerns and argued that this was a ploy to strengthen the case for Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.
Jan Maksymiuk, “Russia wants to pump through Odesa-Brody pipeline ’in reverse’’’, The Ukrainian Weekly, 
Vol. 71, 10 August 2003. No. 32.
Jarostaw Jakimczyk, “Bomba w rurze”, Wprost, 12 October 2003.
Andrzej Kublik, “Kurek po amerykahskiej stronie”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 15 October 2003.
Agnieszka Lakoma, "Pora na ruroci% Brody -  Ptock", Rzeczpospolita, 15 November 2003.
“tiatwiej 0 poparcie nl2 o pieni^dze", Rzeczpospolita, 21 November 2003,
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The Ukrainian and Polish governments ratified the agreement on 16 January 2004 and 
Poland's Deputy PM, Marek Pol, declared the occasion "a great leap forward bringing 
Ukraine closer to the European Union"/''® However, there was stiii no sign of investors 
interested in the project, nor an agreement with Chevron or any European refinery. Asked 
when construction of the pipeline would likely begin, the director o f PERN, Stanistaw 
Jakubowski, said giving a date would be like fortune telling {wrozenie z ft/sow)/'® On 5 
February 2004 the Ukrainian government took a further decision rejecting the Russian 
reversal offer and endorsing the flow of Caspian oil westwards on the Odessa-Brody 
pipeline/^® The decision was hailed by Poland and the Western governments. However, 
experts warned that Moscow would not be giving up soon.'^^
As time went on other factors hindering the project were added onto the inactivity of the 
Polish and EU side and Russian pressure, in February 2004, as explained above, relations 
between Poland and Ukraine suffered a heavy blow after the Ukrainian steel giant Donbas 
was ousted from the privatisation of Huta Czestochowa under doubtful circumstances. 
Kuchma suggested that deliveries of Caspian oii to Poland might be th r e a t e n e d . T h e  
Ukrainian government was furious with the decision and perceived it as an ultimate 
betrayal to the strategic partnership, in addition, another alterative route for the transport of 
Caspian oil through Bulgaria and Greece, that had been proposed in 2002, was made a 
priority investment by the Bulgarian government and decision to start the construction of 
the Burgaz-Aiexandropoulis pipeline was t a k e n . R u s s i a  was a party to the original 
intergovernmental agreement proposing this pipeline.
6.3.5 Final decision
By May 2004, the tide seemed to be turning against the proponents of the pipeline 
extension. At the end of April Kuchma criticised Poland over its inaction about the funding 
or the construction of the pipeline. He said "...today there is neither a Caspian oii seller or 
its buyer. As for Russian oii, it does exist, and we can earn $90 million in [annual] profits 
from the reversed [use of the pipeline]”. K u c h m a  also dismissed a number of supporters 
of the Caspian oii to flow through the pipeline (such as Ukrtransnafta director Oieksandr 
Todiychuk and the Minister of Energy, Serhiy Yermiiov).'^®
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Finally, on 4 July 2004, the Ukrainian government altered its decision of February to allow 
for the reverse use of the pipeline. The decision came at a time when Ukraine was being 
increasingly isolated by the West, and had just recently been refused a membership 
perspective by NATO at its June 2004 Istanbul summit. Besides, the Impending elections 
in November 2004 put Kuchma and Yanukovich under pressure to hand more concessions 
to Russia in exchange for support. The agreement between TNK'^® and Ukrtransnafta was 
finalised during the 26 July 2004 meeting of Kuchma and Putin. Consequently, 9 million 
tonnes of Russian oii would flow from Brody to Odessa for the next three years on a "pump 
or pay” basis.
6.3.6 Conclusion
The reversal contract could in theory be terminated by either side giving three months 
notice and the Odessa-Brody-Gdahsk pipeline project is still going ahead in principle. 
However, the bottom line, that the project that could substantiate Poiish-Ukrainlan strategic 
partnership, had to be shelved for the time being. The pipeline Incident yet again exposed 
the fact that the rhetoric of Polish EP has always been bigger than its deeds.
First, from the start the Polish government gave ail the political support they could to the 
project but failed to come up with the necessary means to carry it through. On this 
occasion the EU had not extended the necessary support, either. But on the other hand, it 
is Poland’s claim there would be no independent Poland without and independent Ukraine, 
not the EU’s.
Second, any success of Poland's policy towards Ukraine (within the EP concept) depends 
on the presence o f a degree of unanimity among Ukrainian institutions and policy makers 
on the subject of strategic choices, in this case even though subsequent Ukrainian 
governments were nominally in favour of resource diversification and the pipeline project, 
there was no unanimity among the institutional actors that steered Ukraine’s energy policy. 
Various lobby groups that operate in favour o f Russia's energy interests in the region exist 
in Poland. However, in Ukraine the size and influence of similar groups are incomparably 
greater than in Poland. What is more, energy dependency is perhaps the Achilles heel of 
Ukraine that stands in the way of any Ukrainian government to making strategic decisions 
that might contradict with the interests o f Russian oil and gas concerns.
By this time the company was called TNK-BP. TNK signed a merger accord with British Petroleum on 27 
June 2003.
Alla Yeremenko, “UKRTRansnafta announces entering a contract with TNK-BP meanwhile, the Russian- 
British company continues to ascertain its role in the contract arrangements for filling in the Odessa-Brody 
pipeline", Zerkalo Nedeli, 31 July - 06 August 2004.
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Finally, the issue of energy supply and transit is cruciai not oniy for Ukraine but also for the 
whoie of Europe. And they are perhaps the most important trump card that Russia holds 
for sustaining its position of power in the region and globally. This objective factor would 
for the foreseeable future limit the options of Polish EP and obstruct Polish Ukrainian 
strategic partnership in the most strategic of all areas of economic cooperation, i.e. energy.
6.4 IMPACT OF HISTORICAL MEMORY
Just as in the case of Polish Russian relations, history is a dividing factor for Poland’s 
relations with Ukraine. Contentious historical issues, most of which were deep frozen or 
manipulated during the communist era, began to be discussed freely after 1989 and the 
extent of mutual distrust stemming from historical memory became gradually clear. Just as 
publications on Polish-Ukrainian history proliferated, and debates became intense, the 
question of reconciliation through redressing “past injustices” through acknowledgement 
and apology came to the fore.
Poles and Ukrainians have always had diverging views about the merits of the Polish- 
Lithuanian Commonwealth until partitions of Poland during 1772-1795, burgeoning 
Ukrainian national movement under the Austro-Hungarian partition and, in general, 
relations between Polish aristocratic landowners and administrators with Ukrainian farmers 
and peasants in the Kresy (Eastern borderlands).'^® However, it appeared that the most 
contentious events were the ones that ensued after the First World War, and pre 20'® 
century history issues formed the historical background that had shaped the clash of 
national movements and aspirations In the 20*® century.
6.4.1 Aftermath of the First World War and the Polish Soviet war
The end of the First World War brought about the creation of not oniy the Polish state but 
also two short lived Ukrainian ones. Following the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the 
Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia formed a council in October 1918 with the aim of uniting 
ethnically Ukrainian lands and subsequently established the Western Ukrainian National 
Republic {Zakhidno Ukrainska Narodnia Respublika - ZUNR). in November 1918 Ukrainian 
units took control o f Lwow. The Polish population of the city fought against the Ukrainians 
and by the end of the month Poles were in control of the city but the battle turned into a 
Poiish-Ukrainian war. in July 1919 the army of ZUNR were sent to fight together with the 
armies o f the Ukrainian National Republic {Ukrainska Narodnia Respublika -  UNR), that 
was in established in central Ukraine in January 1918, against the Soviet advance from the
For Polish-Ukrainian issues in history see Peter J. Potichnyj (Ed.), Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present, 
Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1980 and ivan L. Rudnytsky, Essays in Modern 
Ukrainian History, Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987.
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east. Meanwhile, Polish units which were sent to the Eastern front to fight the Soviets 
occupied Eastern Galicia and brought an end to ZUNR.
Facing the Soviet forces, Poland made an alliance with the UNR in April 1920.'^® The 
agreement, signed by Pitsudki and UNR president Petlura, guaranteed Ukrainian 
Independence under Polish protection and in return the UNR would give up territorial 
claims to Eastern Galicia. Pitsudki was entertaining ideas o f an independent Ukraine to 
serve as a buffer against Russia and to join the Miçdzymorze federation (as explained in 
Chapter Four). However, by June the Soviets pushed back the advance of the joint forces 
and the alliance between Poland and the UNR was over by October 1920 when Poles 
signed an armistice with the Soviets. The Treaty of Riga signed between the Poles and 
Soviets in March 1921 divided the territories claimed by the Ukrainians between the 
Second Republic and the Soviet Union.
6.4.2 Ukrainian grievances
For Ukrainians, Poland was a culprit for destroying a nascent Ukrainian statehood 
achieved after centuries of foreign rule. As Rudnytsky put It, "... Polish aggression against 
and occupation of Eastern Galicia ... amounted to the destruction of the very foundations 
on which an independent Ukraine might have been built” .'®®
The interwar period had a connotation no less negative in the Ukrainian collective memory. 
Separatist tendencies among the 4.8 million strong Ukrainian minority (about 15% of the 
population), mostly concentrated in Voihynia and Eastern Galicia, grew stronger in the 
1930s and the Polish government resorted to armed pacification measures.'®' While Poles 
regard this as a necessary self-preservation measure to ensure the territorial integrity of 
Poland, for Ukrainians this was the culmination of Poland’s racist policies against the 
Ukrainian minority and an attempt to further poionise ancient Ukrainian lands.
6.4.3 Controversy over the Eaglets’ Cemetery
The Third Polish Republic established after the regime change in 1989 was to be in certain 
ways a successor of the Second Republic and draw on its statehood experience and 
traditions. The history of the Second Republic, and especially the initial period when the 
Polish state was created, carried a great significance. One of the most important 
monuments of this period was the Eaglets’ Cemetery {Cmentarz Orlqt, a part of the
For the history of the Polish-Soviet war see Norman Davies, White eagle, red star: the Polish-Soviet war, 
1919-20, London: Macdonald and Co., 1972 and Orbis Books, 1983.
'®° Ivan L. Rudnytsky, “Polish-Ukrainian Relations: The Burden of History” in Potichnyj (Ed.), Poland and 
Ukraine", p. 23.
Norman Davies, God's playground: a history of Poland {\/o\ume 2), Oxford: Clarendon, 1981, pp.405-407.
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Lyczakowski Cemetery), where Polish fighters, most of them very young, fallen during the 
battle with Ukrainians for the control of Lwow in November 1918, were buried. It was also a 
resting place for other soldiers who fought for the Polish cause in the conflicts until 1920.
Eaglets’ Cemetery was destroyed during the 1970s but reconstruction work started in 1989 
following the negotiations held by a Polish-Soviet Ukrainian commission dealing with the 
reconstruction of the cemetery. Negotiations with independent Ukraine continued from 
1992 on. Throughout the 1990s several protocols were signed between the Lwow City 
Council and the Polish office responsible for the reconstruction o f historical monuments, 
the Council for the Defence o f the Memory of Struggle and Martyrdom {Rada Ochrony 
Pamiçci Walk I M^czenstwa - ROPWiM) but every time the Ukrainian side came up with 
new demands about the final shape of the cemetery so the date for opening kept being 
postponed. Lwow authorities claimed that the biggest problem was the wording of the 
inscription on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.
The issue became an intergovernmental one after the Lwow authorities kept blocking the 
reconstruction work and the issue was taken up by the mass media. To solve the problem, 
the Ukrainian government signed a protocol with ROPWiM in August 2000 to reconstruct 
the cemetery in its original interwar style. During Kwasniewski’s visit to Ukraine In April 
2002, both presidents declared that the cemetery would be opened on 21 May 2002, on 
the fifth anniversary of the Polish Ukrainian declaration on reconciliation.'®^ But in May the 
Lwow Council blocked the opening by a decision which rejected the wording of the 
Inscription on the tomb which was agreed upon in 2001. The compromise version was “to 
the unknown soldiers who fell in a heroic struggle for Poland, 1918-20” after the Polish 
side agreed to omit the word "independent” before Poland. This time, the Lwow authorities 
objected to the word “heroic” .'®® The Polish government reacted and Kwasniewski said “ it 
would be terrible if the inappropriate and irresponsible decision of Lwow authorities would 
have an impact on the totality of Poiish-Ukrainian relations."'®'' Even though the Ukrainian 
Ministry o f Foreign Affairs expressed dissatisfaction with Lwow’s decision, the damage 
was done and by the beginning of 2005 there was still no firm date for the opening of the 
cemetery.'®®
it would be hard to say that the Eaglets’ Cemetery issue derailed the good relations 
between Poland and Ukraine at the official level. After ail, the Ukrainian government was in 
agreement with the Polish one over the disruptive behaviour o f the local officials in Lwow,
“Termin raczej ostateczny”, Rzeczpospolita, 29 April 2002.
'®® "Lwôw si§ zaciqf. nie jedzlemy”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 18 May 2002.
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a city considered to be the heartland of Ukrainian nationalism, it was exactly because of 
this nationalist outlook that the local councillors blocked the opening of the cemetery. 
Jacek Kuroh explained the reasoning of Lwôw authorities who were accused of creating a 
storm in a teacup'®®:
What we are quarrelling about is not the cemetery. ...We are forcing Ukrainians to accept 
that a pantheon dedicated to Polish armed forces to be erected in a place which they 
consider to be the heart of Ukraine and that [this monument] would remind them of their 
defeat in 1918. In Poland there is no place or city that has a pantheon dedicated to the 
triumph of German or Russian or any other armed forces. Poland would not accept such a 
thing.
Controversy over the Eaglets’ Cemetery not oniy highlighted the weight of historical 
memory that had potential to affect bilateral relations but also the differences within 
Ukraine in terms of approach to historical issues. In the case of The Eaglets’ Cemetery, 
the conflict could be contained and the damage to bilateral relations minimised on the 
basis that one of the root causes was Kiev’s inability to impose its will on Lwôw, hence the 
existence of a centre-periphery relations dimension.'®'' The next section will deal with 
another major controversy over history that likewise exposed differences in opinion In both 
Poland and Ukraine, but culminated into a deeper conflict at the intergovernmental level.
6.4.4 Events of the Second World War: Voihynia and Action Vistula
Following the occupation of Eastern Poland first by the Soviets and then by Nazi Germany 
during the Second World War, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists {Orhanizatsiia 
ukrainskykh natsionalistiv -  OUH) which was established in 1929 for the cause of 
establishing an independent Ukraine, stepped up Its guerrilla activity in 1942. Prior to that 
some factions o f GUN were advocating collaboration with the Nazi regime in the hope that 
Ukrainian independence might be attained under German tutelage but gave up that hope 
by mid-1942.'®® By 1943 different GUN factions were united and armed units with the 
name o f Ukrainian Insurgent Army {Ukrainska povstanska armiia -  UPA) were organised. 
GUN-UPA was not oniy fighting against the Germans but also against local Poles whom 
they saw as a threat to the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state after the war. 
Starting from March 1943 GUN-UPA units started attacking Polish villages in Voihynia 
{Wotyn) in order to force Poles to leave what GUN-UPA regarded as Ukrainian lands. Gn 
some occasions assisted by the local Ukrainian populace, GUN-UPA perpetrated large
Jacek Kuron, “Rozumiem protest Ukraincow", Gazeta Wyborcza, 23 May 2002.
Kasia Wolczuk, ‘'Polish-Ukrainian borderiands and nation-states: the case of Lviv and Przemyéi" in 
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Timothy Snyder, ‘"To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for AH': The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians 
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scale massacres which spread to Eastern Galicia (Galicja) by August. Meanwhile, the 
Home Army {Armia Krajowa -  AK), the Polish underground resistance organisation loyal to 
the government in exile in London, started counter attacks and reprisals where many 
Ukrainian civilians were killed. There are no exact numbers of dead on both sides but it is 
estimated that around 60 to 80,000 Poles and 15 to 20,000 Ukrainians were killed during 
the massacres of 1943-45. in Aprii-May 1945 OUN-UPA and AK, together with the anti­
communist formation, Freedom and Independence {Wolnosc i N iezawishso  - WIN) came 
to an agreement to stop hostilities against each other and fight against the Soviets. Attacks 
did not stop completely but the large scale massacres ceased.'®®
Meanwhile, on 9 September 1944, the Polish Committee of National Liberation {Polski 
Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego -  PKWN), established with Soviet backing, signed an 
agreement with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on the exchange of populations. 
“Repatriations” , forced and voluntary, started in September 1945 and by the end of 1946 
about 780,000 Poles had left Ukraine and 490,000 Ukrainians had left Poland.'"'® However, 
a good number of Ukrainians stiii remained in Eastern Poland (after the Polish border 
moved westwards).
The new Polish government, established after the February 1947 elections, took a decision 
In April 1947 to resettle the remaining Ukrainians and disperse them around the newly 
gained Western territories of Poland. About 140,000 Ukrainians (and another ethnic group 
called Lemkos {Lemki) were forcibly sent to the West within a plan called “Action Vistula" 
{Akcja Wisia) by the Polish armed forces and intelligence services that lasted until 1948.
6.4.5 Contending Perceptions
Polish postwar historiography reflected a skewed interpretation of the above mentioned 
events."" Ukrainians were portrayed as "Slavic counterparts to Nazis” and collaboration of 
OUN-UPA with the Nazi regime was emphasised.'"® The atrocities committed by 
Ukrainians were given extensive coverage. However, the focus was mainly on the postwar 
territories of Poland and not the lands that were annexed to the Soviet Ukraine at 
Potsdam.'"® Action Vistula was, accordingly, undertaken to clear out the reactionary OUN- 
UPA militants that perpetrated mass murder of Poles after the militants moved westwards
Grzegorz Motyka, "Od Wotynia do akcji „Wisia", Wiqz, Vol. 473, 1998, No. 3, pp. 121-122,
'"® Grzegorz Motyka , “Co ma 'Wisia' do Woiynia?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 24 March 2001.
'" ' See Jôzef Lewandowski “Polish Historical Writing on Polish-Ukrainian Relations During World War II", pp. 
231-246 and John Basarab, "Post-War Writings in Poland on Polish-Ukrainian Relations, 1945-1975" in 
Potichnyj (Ed.), Poland and Ukraine, pp. 247-270.
'"® Timothy Snyder, “The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth since 1989: National Narratives in Relations
among Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine", Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 4, 1998, No. 3, p. 6.
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having been defeated by the Soviet army in the Ukrainian SSR.'"" Whereas Poiish 
scholarship on the events enhanced the negative stereotype of Ukrainians, there was 
silence on the part of Ukrainian historians as dealing with these controversial events of the 
war was discouraged.'"®
During the communist period émigré circles also dealt with these issues. While a large 
section of the Poiish and Ukrainian communities mistrusted each other as a result o f the 
wartime events, Kultura started forming the foundations of Poiish-Ukrainian partnership by 
putting the focus on the need to acknowledge Ukrainian national aspirations and support 
Ukrainian independence in the future. For this, reconciliation between the two societies 
about their history was necessary. After 1989, the Poiish state gradually based its EP on 
the Kultura line and argued for reconciliation. For this reason, in 1990 the Senate accepted 
a resolution condemning Action Vistula and in 1997 the presidents of Poland and Ukraine 
signed a joint declaration acknowledging the “dramatic events" including wartime 
massacres in Voihynia and Action Vistula and condemned the perpetrators of these 
crimes.'"®
At the same time wartime events began to be freely discussed and competing 
perspectives were formed. The mainstream perceptions were categorised by Motyka as 
traditionalist and revisionist.'"^ Motyka’s own views reflect the revisionist point of view.'"® 
Accordingly, the traditionalist claim that massacres in Voihynia and Eastern Galicia 
justified Action Vistula was morally wrong as it assumed collective responsibility of 
Ukrainians arising from OUN-UPA’s deeds. There were other similar claims, endorsed by 
the historians of the communist period but now disputed by the revisionists. These were 
the arguments that resettlement of Ukrainians was the only solution to the problem of 
OUN-UPA attacks on civilians and that the government opted for a humanitarian solution 
by rejecting reprisals and moving Ukrainians to more prosperous ex-German lands. 
Accordingly, by 1947 the communist forces in Poland could have easily cleansed the 
marginalised and weakened UPA but instead they diverted ail their forces to ensure full
Tadeusz Andrzej Oiszanski, "All About 'Operation Wisla’", Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol.47,1991, No.3, p.249. 
OlszanskI refers to one of the most famous and sensationalist account of the period, Jan Gerhard, tuny  iv 
Bieszczadach, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo MON, 1969.
'"® Wolczuk and Wolczuk, Poland and Ukraine, p. 40.
'"® "Wspôlne oéwiadczenie Prezydentôw Rzeczypospolitej Polsklej I Ukrainy o porozumienlu I pojednaniu,
Kiiow, 21 maja 1997 r.", Zbidr Dokumentôw, Vol. 548, 1997, No. 2, pp. 49-52.
'" In addition to these. Motyka also mentioned two more categories, namely para-sclentlfic and works written 
by authors belonging to the Ukrainian minority in Poland. The former category encompasses highly emotional 
and methodologically non-sclentific works while the latter tend to be highly biased, vindicating the Ukrainian 
nationalist point of view. See Grzegorz Motyka, "Problematyka stosunkôw polsko-ukraihsklch w latach 1939- 
1948 w polsklej historlografii po roku 1989" in Piotr Kosiewski and Grzegorz Motyka (Eds), Historycy polscy i 
ukraihscy wobecproblemôwXX wieku, Krakow: Universitas, 2000, pp. 166-178. Also fora different 
categorisation see Rafal Wnuk "Recent Polish Historiography on Polish-Ukrainlan Relations during World War 
II and its Aftermath”, Intermarium (Columbia University online journal). Vol. 7, 2004, No. 1. 
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/REGIONAL/ECE/vol7no1/wnuk.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006)
Grzegorz Motyka, "Od Woiynia do akcji „Wisia", Wiqz, Vol. 473, 1998, No. 3, pp. 109-133. Grzegorz 
Motyka, "Co ma 'Wisia' do Woiynia?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 24 March 2001 and "Nic, tylko wstyd", Gazeta 
Wyborcza, 27 April 2002.
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takeover o f power, eliminating the opposition and rigging the 1947 February elections.
The main aim of Action Vistula was to bring a final solution to the Ukrainian problem by 
ensuring the assimilation of the Ukrainian minority and was undertaken in tandem with 
NKVD’s operations in the Ukrainian SSR aimed at clearing out the Ukrainian nationalists. 
The claim of military necessity was refuted by the argument that many Ukrainians were 
deported from areas where OUN-UPA was either inactive or unpopular (such as areas 
inhabited by Lemki). What is more, among the deported were also Poles who were 
deemed to be a threat for the regime. According to the revisionist view, Action Vistula was 
a part of a wider scale operation of asserting communist power in Central Eastern Europe 
and must be condemned.
The traditionalist view, on the other hand, focuses on the 1943-44 events in Voihynia and 
Eastern Galicia, and argues that these constitute “genocide”.'"® Accordingly, the Ukrainian 
nationalist stance was dominated by radical fascism and aimed to cleanse what they 
considered as Ukrainian territory of other ethnic groups. Post 1989 Polish EP was 
detrimental to Poland’s (and Ukraine’s interests) as it was based on underplaying the 
historical truths about the “genocide” in order to secure strategic partnership with Ukraine. 
Action Vistula was justified in the face of atrocities suffered by Poles in Ukrainian hands 
and Poland had nothing to apologise for. Even though most traditionalist arguments are 
tinted with Polish nationalism, not all of them come from right wing or nationalist writers. 
Another strain o f traditionalism, associated with postcommunist circles, continues the 
arguments of the PRL period.'®® Accordingly, Action Vistula was fully justified. Solving the 
OUN-UPA problem by conventional military operations was not possible as it was a 
guerrilla war which was waged thanks to the support o f the civilians. Ukrainians were not 
punished on the basis o f collective responsibility. Vistula was a pragmatic operation devoid 
of any revenge motive. Communists in power at the time did not operate on the basis of 
national prejudices (hence did not aim to fuel anti-Ukrainian sentiment) as they were 
ideologically internationalists and fought against any kind of nationalism.
Conflicting views on the Second World War events also feature in the Ukrainian debate. 
However, the topic gets much les attention in Ukraine than in Poland and a large part of 
the Ukrainian population, especially those living in Central and East Ukraine are either 
indifferent to the debate or unaware of the events. There is, likewise, no unanimity on 
OUN-UPA, the main Ukrainian player in the controversial events. Berdychowska discerns
'"® Ewa Siemaszko, "Prawda przede wszystkim", Rzeczpospolita, 22 February 2003.
Interview with Ewa Siemaszko, "ZbIiZa siç 60. rocznica mordu na Wotyniu", Sygnafy Dnia, Poiskie Radio 
Program 1,11 April 2003, Transcript at http://www.radio.com.pl/jedynka /sygnaly/default.asp?ivlD=1287 
(accessed 10 March 2005), Rafat Zgorzelski, “Kiedy historic piszq_politycy..." (interview with Lucyna Kulinska), 
Mysl Polska, No. 32-33, 08-15 August 2004. Wtadystaw Siemaszko and Ewa Siemaszko, Ludobôjstwo 
dokonane przez nacjonalistôw ukraihsklch na ludnoscl polsklej Woiynia 1939-45 (Vols 1 and 2),
Warszawa: Wyd. von Borowiecky, 2000.
Bronislaw Lagowski, "Akcja ‘Wista’ byta stuszna", Przegiqd, No. 17, 29 April 2002.
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three approaches in the debate.'®' The first one is based on the main perceptions of 
Soviet historiography and regards the post 1991 Ukraine as a continuation of the Ukrainian 
SSR in terms of statehood. It treats OUN-UPA as anti-hero and accuses it o f waging terror 
on the Ukrainian civilians. However, it still stops short of condemning OUN-UPA of crimes 
in Voihynia, keeping the focus instead on the organisation’s struggle with the Soviet forces.
This approach is widespread among the left wing political groupings that dominated the 
government and administration until 2005.
The second approach considers OUN-UPA as a "national liberation movement" struggling 
for Ukrainian independence and statehood and dominates the centre and right wing as 
well as the Ukrainian diaspora.'®^ The events in Voihynia, according to this view, were 
caused solely by the policies of the interwar Polish Second Republic, where Poles first 
occupied and colonised ethnic Ukrainian lands and then oppressed the Ukrainians.'®® Any 
condemnation of the murders is ruled out as the real victims were Ukrainians.
The third approach, which is revisionist, agrees that OUN-UPA was established around the 
idea o f Ukrainian independence but does not endorse all of the methods it employed 
during the war, especially the anti Polish action.
6,4.6 Culmination of the debates
Post 1991 development of Polish-Ukrainian ties, spearheaded mainly by governments and 
the political and intellectual elite, was a product of first and foremost strategic and 
economic concerns. However, it also laid the groundwork for dialogue on the above 
mentioned contentious historical issues. Polish-Ukrainian historical reconciliation had 
already been an area explored by diaspora journals, headed by Kultura and its Ukrainian 
counterpart, Suchasnist and in the 1980 Solidarity activists started raising the issue in their 
samizdat publications.'®" After the regime change in 1989, formerly suppressed issues 
such as the loss of territory and deportations after the Second World War were taken up by 
not only academic research but also burgeoning civil society organisations and think tanks. 
Among them were numerous organisations of Poles originating from the lost territory 
(Kresy) that helped efforts to collect and publish personal memoirs. Most of these
.1'®' Bogumlta Berdychowska, “Spotkanie nad mogilami?”, Rzeczpospolita, 22 February 2003.Kataryna Wolczuk, "The difficulties of Poiish-Ukrainian historical reconciliation", RFE/RL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report, Vol. 5, 04 March 2003, No. 8.'®® For a Polish discussion on this point see Grzegorz Motyka et ai., "Z Ukraihcami po Jedwabnem"
(discussion), Wiqz, Vol. 522, 2002, No. 4, pp. 20-36.
" See Taras Kuzio "The Polish Opposition and the Ukrainian Question', Journal of Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 12,
1987, No.23, pp.26-58.
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publications tended to be highly emotive and reinforced the traditionalist view, and their 
content and arguments were given wide coverage in the press.'®®
Attempts for dialogue with Ukrainians were also undertaken. The Polish NGO KARTA that 
focused on historical documentation, organised a conference called "Poles and Ukrainians 
1918-48. Difficult Questions" in June 1994 in cooperation with the Internationai Union of 
the Home Army Servicemen-Voihynia Region {èwiatowy Zwiqzek 2ioinierzy Armii 
Krajowej- Okrqg Woiyn) and Union of Ukrainians in Poland {Zwiqzek Ukraincow w Polsce - 
ZUwP). The aim was to provide a series of seminars where Polish and Ukrainian historians 
could discuss controversial problems of the period. From 1998 on KARTA published ten 
volumes containing the proceedings of these seminars.'®®
Academic debates, NGO activities and various publications (at least in Poland) were the 
natural fora for the discussion of such highly charged "difficult questions" and immensely 
complex historical events most of which were in living memory. Such issues, however, 
could rarely remain a subject o f purely intellectual discussion as they creep into politics 
and foreign relations. Wartime events in Voihynia and Eastern Galicia and Action Vistula 
were no exceptions. Polish and Ukrainian governments had already tried to address the 
need for reconciliation by the Senate apology for Action Vistula and the 1997 resolution by 
presidents, as mentioned above. However, the power of historical memory over politics 
struck again in 2003 in the run up to the 60'*’ anniversary of the Voihynia events in July.'®^
Polish and Ukrainian presidents decided in February 2003 to participate together in the 
preparation for the commemorations in July. The subject was discussed during a visit to 
Kiev by the Head of Poiish National Security Bureau, Marek Siwiec, on 25 February.
Siwiec was reported to have requested that the Polish side decided about the format of the 
commemorations and that the Ukrainian president apologised for the Voihynia 
massacres.'®® Siwiec said that this would be an appropriate response to Kwasniewski’s 
apology for Action Vistula in 2002. (In a letter sent to a commemoration conference on 
Action Vistula on 18 April 2002 Kwasniewski wrote "In the name of the Polish Republic I 
would like to express my regrets to all those who suffered as a result of those shameful 
actions” .)'®® Siwiec’s demand for an apology caused a negative reaction in Ukraine.
'®® Wolczuk and Wolczuk, Poland and Ukraine, p. 39. For coverage and analysis of the period by Polish and 
Ukrainian press see Bogumila Berdychowska, "Wokôl tego co dzieli" and Mykola Riabczuk “Historia najnowsza 
na tamach ukraihskiej prasy" In Kosiewski and Motyka (Eds), Historycy polscy i ukraihscy, pp. 198-205 and pp. 
206-239.
Polska-Ukraina: Trudne Pytania (Vols 1-9), Warszawa: Fundacja Osrodka KARTA, 1997-2002 and Polska- 
Ukraina: Trudna Odpowiedz: Dokumentacja spotkan historykôw (1994-2001), Warszawa: Naczelna Dyrekcja 
Archiwôw Pahstwowych and Fundacja Osrodka KARTA, 2003.
On 11 July 1943 OUN-UPA attacked simultaneously 167 Polish villages. This was considered to be the high 
point of atrocities and, therefore, the anniversary is held on this date,
® Viktor Zamyatin, "Poiish Delegation Arrives in Kyiv to Discuss the Past and Future", Den, 04 March 2003.
"List prezydenta do uczestnikôw konferencji o akcji 'Wisla'", 18 April 2002. 
http://www.prezydent.pI/x.node?id=1011848&eventld=1507489 (accessed 06 November 2006)
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Commentators argued that Warsaw was trying to take advantage of Kuchma’s weakness 
resulting from international isolation and dictate its own terms.'®® It was claimed that an 
apology would be inappropriate as the Voihynia events were not a result of a decision by a 
Ukrainian state (as there was no independent Ukraine at the time), unlike Action Vistula, 
which was based on an order given by the Polish state.'®' The Polish side was accused of 
trying to impose upon Ukraine the point that only the Ukrainians bore guilt for the wartime 
events.'162
A group of Ukrainian nationalist MPs also showed their reaction by signing an open letter 
in May 2003 about the upcoming commemorations.'®® They stated that it was the Poles 
who had started the hostilities and committed massacres of Ukrainians in Voihynia in 
collaboration with Germans and Soviets and the blame for the tragedy laid in the faulty 
nationality policies of the interwar Polish state. They called on Warsaw to "give up its 
claims as regards unilateral apologies’’ and “revise its anti-Ukrainian prejudices’’ and "give 
up its Ukrainian policy that has been traditionally false for the last 400 years”.
On 10 July 2003 Polish and Ukrainian parliaments passed a jo int resolution on the 
Voihynia events. This was preceded by stormy debates in both parliaments over the 
wording of the resolution. Approval was secured when the final text o f the resolution 
excluded any accusations of one side towards the other.'®" Ukrainian MPs needed 
additional persuasion by Kuchma during the parliamentary session and Kuchma reportedly 
promised them not to say anything that would hurt Ukraine's interests during the 
commemorations he would attend the next day.'®® The resolution acknowledged that 
Ukrainian murder and expulsion of Poles by "armed Ukrainian formations” had occurred at 
the same time with suffering of Ukrainian civilians brought on by Polish armed actions.'®® 
The text focused on reconciliation of two nations for the sake of the future. The next day, 
during the commemorations in the Ukrainian village of Pavlivka, Kwasniewski and Kuchma 
more or less reiterated the same message in their statement.'®'' So far Polish and 
Ukrainian governments managed to keep away from provocation and to avoid distortion of 
the official policy o f "strategic partnership” by attempts to settle historical grievances.
Kataryna Wolczuk, “The difficulties of Poiish-Ukrainian historical reconciliation", RFE/RL Poland, Belarus 
and Ukraine Report, Vol. 5, 04 March 2003, No, 8.
'®' Kost Bondarenko, "The Volyn tragedy: echoes through decades", Zerkalo Nedeli, 15-21 February 2003. 
Taras Kuzio, "Commemorating 1943 events in Volyn", Kyiv Post, 10 April 2003.
"An open letter of MPs of Ukraine on the occasion of celebration of the 60-th anniversary of Volyn tragic 
events of 1943, in Poland", Ukrainian Monitor, 16 May 2003.
Roman Woronowycz, “Parliaments of Ukraine and Poland pass resolution on painful events of 1943-1944", 
The Ukrainian Weekly, Vol. 71, 13 July 2003, No. 28.
'®® "Jednym gtosem", Rzeczpospolita, 11 July 2003.
'®® “Oéwiadczenie Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 10 lipca 2003 r. wzwiqzku z 60. rocznicq tragedii 
wolyhskiej", Monitor Polski, 2003, No, 37, Pos, 516, p, 1904,
Marcin Wojciechowski, “Pierwszy krok", Gazeta Wyborcza, 12 July 2003,
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6.5 ETHNIC MINORITIES
Despite the deportations and migrations of the post war period and redrawing of Poiand’s 
border, ethnic minorities still survived on either side of the new Polish-Ukrainian border. 
According to censuses carried out in both countries in 2002, there are 31,000 ethnic 
Ukrainians in Poiand and 147,900 Poles in Ukraine (both less than 1% of total 
population).'®® The accuracy of the figures was disputed in both cases. According to 
different estimates numbers of Ukrainians in Poiand range from 70,000 to 250,000 and 
Poles in Ukraine up to 220,000. Whatever the real figure might be, the percentage of 
minorities in the total population Is quite small. In addition, the Ukrainian minority is 
scattered around different regions due to Action Vistula and do not form visible majorities 
in any region, in contrast, the Poiish minority in Ukraine is more concentrated in Western 
Ukraine but iikewise iack visibility in towns iike Lwôw, which was considered an intégrai 
part of Poland during the interwar period.
The issue of minorities was dealt with at the interstate levei with the May 1992 treaty on 
good neighbourly relations between Poland and Ukraine. Both parties declared adherence 
to international norms of protection of national minorities who would “have the right, alone 
or in association with other members of that minority, to preserve, express and deveiop 
their ethnic, culturai, iinguistic and reiigious identity without any discrimination and in 
conditions o f fui! equality before the iaw".'®® Education in native ianguage, religious 
freedom and the rights of association and contacts with their motherland were secured.
6.5.1 The Ukrainian minority in Poland
Despite the fact that minorities gained many rights, legai guarantees and governmental 
support for their activities foliowing 1989 in Poiand, various conflicts involving the 
Ukrainian minority stirred bigger trouble than they were actually worth. Given that there 
were no territorial claims between Poland and Ukraine and institutionai discrimination was 
discouraged by the government, the conflicts were mostiy to do with the controversial 
historical issues. One such incident was the dispute over St Theresa Cathedral in 
Przemysl. The cathedrai beionged to Greek Catholic Ukrainians before Action Vistula in 
1947 and after that was used by the Roman Catholic Carmelite order. In 1991 decision of 
a Catholic archbishop to iet Greek Catholics use the cathedral for five years sparked 
furious reaction from right wing groupings, which occupied the church for some weeks until 
it was returned to the Carmelites. In 1996, the Carmelites demolished the dome (kopula)
Raport z wynikôw Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego Ludnosci i Mieszkari 2002, GUS, 
http://www.staLgov.pl/dane_spol-gosp/nsp/spisJud/lud.htm (accessed 07 November 2006) and "Na Ukrainie 
mniej Polakow niz sqdzono", Wspolnota Polska, Vol. 118, 2003, No. 1, pp.25-26.
Article 11, "Traktat mlçdzy Rzeczqpospolitq Polskq a Ukrainq. o dobrym sqsiedztwie, przyjaznych stosunkac 
i wspôlpracy, Warszawa, 18 maja 1992 r.", Zbior Dokumentôw, Vol. 530, 1992, No. 4, p. 82.
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'which symbolised the church's Greek Catholic heritage, despite an official ban which was [
breached by a dubious permission given by a local officer.'^® Although this was a localised 
incidence (and not the iast one from Przemysl), it demonstrated the distrust of many Poies 
of Ukrainians and a need to exert the “Poiishness” of cities such as Przemysi with a |
Ukrainian minority and a historical link to Ukraine.
The Ukrainian minority resented these reactions, as it considered restitution of churches as 
only one of many measures that the Polish government should take given their claim that 
Ukrainians were the most suppressed ethnic group after the war and had suffered greatly 
from PRL’s policies.'''' ZUwP petitioned the Sejm in 1992 to condemn Action Vistula and to 
compensate the Ukrainian minority by means of property restitution and financial 
compensation."'^ The Sejm was unwilling to undertake such a move whose consequences 
might reach farther than just compensating the Ukrainian minority."'® The issue of 
cemeteries for UPA soldiers also created problems for the Ukrainian minority. It took years 
of negotiations between ZUwP and ROPWiM to arrive at a compromise about the 
monuments and inscriptions commemorating Ukrainian and UPA soldiers (similar to the 
case of the Eaglets’ Cemetery). The case concerning UPA commemorations did not cause 
a conflict at the intergovernmental level as in Ukraine there were different opinions of UPA Ï
I
varying from region to region (with Western Ukraine having the highest opinion of it) and 
UPA was not yet rehabilitated In Ukraine itself.
6.5.2 The Polish minority in Ukraine
The Polish minority in Ukraine were also dispersed in such a manner that they did not 
constitute a majority in any town or region. The practical problems they faced were similar 
to the Ukrainian minority in Poland, for Instance restitution of property and access to 
education in their mother tongue. However, the conflicts caused by questions of identity 
and burden of history did not reach similar intensity and media coverage as those in 
Poland. The Soviet administration had been equally distant to the idea of both Poiish and 
Ukrainian nationalism and the religions o f both groups, whereas in Poiand Ukrainians felt 
they were victimised by the majority Poiish nationalism. Besides, Polish cultural influence 
was not perceived by Ukrainians as a priority "threat" given that Russification was a much Ji 
,
::
Michat Wawrzonek, “Polsko-ukrairtskie pojednanie. Potrzeba ksztattowania nowego stereotypu wzajemnych 
stosunkôw” in Wtodzimierz Bonusiak (Ed.), Polska- Niemcy- Ukraina w Europie: Narodowe identyfikacje i 
europejskie integracje w przededniu XXI wieku, Rzeszow: Wydaw. Wyzszej Szkoty Pedagogioznej, 2000, pp. 
181-182.
" '  Timothy Snyder, “The Ukrainian Minority in Poland" in James Clem and Nancy Popson (Eds), Ukraine and 
Its Western Neighbors, Washington DC; Kennan institute and Harvard Ukrainian Research institute, 2000, p. 
71.
President of the Union of Ukrainians in Poiand, Jerzy Rejfs comments, Biuletyn Komisji Mniejszosci 
Narodowych i Etnicznych, No. 181/11, 15 December 1993.
By the end of 2004 Poland still had no law governing restitution of private property. A draft law on restitution 
of private property (reprivatisation) was vetoed by the president in 2001.
208
J:
bigger issue, in addition, public perceptions in Ukraine of post-1989 Poland were in 
general more positive than public perceptions of Ukraine in Poiand.
The Polish government began to build an active policy towards Poionia and ethnic Poles in 
the 1990s."'' The Senate, the parliamentary Commission for Communication with Poles 
Abroad (Komisja tqcznosc i z Polakami za Granicq) and the Polonia department at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs were the main institutions making and executing this policy. The 
Senate financed many needs and activities of the Poiish minority in Ukraine mainly through 
two foundations, the Poiish Community {Wspolnota Polska) and the Foundation for Aid to 
Poles in the East {Pomoc Polakom na Wschodzie). Most o f the budget set aside for Poles 
abroad went towards funding cultural organisations, minority publications and Poiish 
language teaching in schools. The Ukrainian state lacked the means to finance its 
minorities at the level the Poiish state funded its minorities. Especially given the large 
number of people o f Russian origin, the scale of minority funding had to be kept to a 
minimum. Polish governments wisely refrained from demanding reciprocity from their 
Ukrainian counterpart in terms of funding for and, even more importantly, treatment of 
minorities. There have been incessant calls for applying the principle o f reciprocity, 
especially from the right wing parties and organisations In Poland and Poles in Ukraine.
6.5.3 Conclusion
Local and institutional conflicts concerning minorities became the subject of 
intergovernmental talks from time to time but had a limited impact on bilateral relations and 
foreign policy. These conflicts could be considered as corollaries to the wider historical 
issues which have been catapulted onto the foreign policy agenda from time to time as in 
the case of commemorations of Voihynia events. At the risk of generalisation, it could be 
maintained that the actual effects of historical memory on policy orientation and making at 
the governmental level are not high.
Foreign policy is in large part an elite driven process and Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation 
has been a success among the ruling elite and intellectuals whereas it has not yet fully 
penetrated into the social and local level."® The driving force behind the reconciliation at 
the elite level is the pragmatic, strategic need for cooperation between the two countries, 
the conceptual framework for which is provided by the post-1989 EP based on the 
Giedroycian heritage. It is true that reconciliation at the societal levei will take much longer
See Tomasz Gqsowski, Pahstwo polskle wobec Polakôw na wschodzie. Poszukiwanie modelu poHtyki,
Studia i Analizy, Krakôw: Osrodek Wlyéli Politycznej, 2000.
For Poles' and Ukrainians' perceptions of each other see Joanna Konieczna, Polska-Ukraina wzajemny 
wizerunek, Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2001.
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to be realised but the hope lies in the graduai effectiveness of initiatives sparked by this 
top down process.
6.6 CONCLUSION
By 2004, Poland's foreign policy aims regarding Ukraine, I.e. carrying Ukraine into the EU 
and NATO, were not fulfilled. The prospects for the Poiish ambition of co-creating EP for 
the EU have not looked promising, either. In addition, having been shunned by the West 
for its domestic politics, Ukraine started giving many concessions to Russia. What is more, 
after Poland's accession to the EU, constraints over the room of manoeuvre available to 
Poland for determining its foreign policy towards will be even less. A second external factor 
with huge Influence over the shape of Polish-Ukrainian relations is Russia’s relations with 
both countries and with the EU. Regardless of the orientation of the government in 
Ukraine, there are realities of economic (and to an extent political) dependence on Russia 
and neither the EU nor Poland would be able to offer an alternative in the near future. We 
have seen the external and internal constraints over developing economic partnerships 
such as in the case of the Odessa-Gdahsk pipeline and the Huta Czestochowa affairs.
All these might be considered reasons to call Poland’s policy a failure. Perhaps, as 
minimalists and other critics argued, the objectives set for Poland's EP were unrealistic. It 
is true that these objectives were unattainable solely through the efforts of Poiand but the 
process by which Poland operated towards these aims had also positive results. Strong 
channel of communications between the two countries were established and plenty of fora 
for the discussion of bilateral problems were created. Bilateral relations were strong 
enough to withstand pressures created by the conflict between Ukraine and the EU. 
Relations also proved to be more steadfast than expected in the face of conflicts regarding 
historical reconciliation. However, a truly “strategic partnership” is some time away as both 
political and economic relations between the two countries have to progress further 
whereby a degree of interdependence and compatibility is created.
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C h a p t e r  S e v e n
P o l a n d ’ s R e l a t i o n s  w i t h  B e l a r u s
This chapter wili focus on Poland’s relations with Belarus, a country whose foreign policy 
choices presented Polish Eastern policy (EP) with a challenge, it would be unfair to say 
Poland has more problems with Belarus on the bilateral levei than with other Eastern 
neighbours. For instance, there are fewer outstanding historical grievances between the 
two nations than between Poiand and Ukraine. Also despite high levels of poverty and 
social problems, the relative stability o f Belarus (albeit in a form undesirable for Poland and 
the West) and effective state authority prevented the country from becoming an area of 
lawlessness and crime, which Poiand feared Its Eastern neighbourhood would become. 
Belarus, nevertheless, stiii came to be defined as a "black hole of Europe"' for reasons of 
political incompatibility with the Europe west of its borders.
To illustrate how Belarus was perceived by Poiand as a problem neighbour and how B 
became the weakest letter in the Kultura concept of ULB, Polish-Belarusian relations will 
be explained under four sections. The first will look at the development of bilateral political 
relations where Poland’s policies towards Belarus will be considered within the framework 
of and in contrast to EU, NATO and OSCE’s. The second section will deal with economic 
relations, focusing on foreign trade and investment. Poiand’s links with and varying 
opinions of Belarusian opposition will be discussed in the third section and the fourth will 
dwell on minorities on both sides and the role they play in bilateral relations. Although 
memory of historical conflicts between Belarusians and Poles exist, it does not have any 
considerable effect on bilateral relations at a scale compared to those with Ukrainians. 
Such conflicts, therefore, will not be covered in this chapter.
7.1 POLAND’S RELATIONS WITH BELARUS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATO AND EU 
ENLARGEMENT
7.1.1 The Beginning: 1989-1995
Soon after the Belarusian Supreme Soviet adopted a declaration of sovereignty, first steps 
of establishing bilateral relations with Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic were taken by 
Poiand within the spirit of two-track EP. Minister of Foreign Affairs Skubiszewski went to 
Minsk in October (as well as to Moscow and Kiev) with the intention o f signing a 
declaration on establishing bilateral relations. Unlike with Ukraine and Russia, no
' Wojciech Gôrecki, “Czarna dziura Eu ropy", Rzeczpospolita, 20 November 1995, quoting Valeri Karbalevich.
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declaration could be signed with Belarus due to certain reservations about the text on the 
part o f Belarus. The articles in the declaration regarding recognition o f borders on the 
basis of a Soviet-Polish treaty of 16 August 1945 was rejected by the Belarusian 
government which claimed that it was not a signatory to the treaty at the time of signing.^ 
Another contentious point was a request by the Belarusian side to include in the 
declaration a reference to the Biatystok region as ethnically Belarusian.® The declaration 
on good neighbourly relations could be signed a year later on 10 October 1991 after 
Belarus became independent on 25 August and the dissolution of Soviet Union became 
imminent.''
Poland recognised Belarus’s independence on 27 December 1991 a few weeks after it 
recognised Ukraine’s and relations soured by the initial hitch in Minsk started improving.
As uncertainties around Belarusian independence dissipated and Belarus started 
strengthening its attributes of statehood, establishing diplomatic ties with the Western 
institutions, its relations with Poland took off. in 1992-93 many basic treaties were signed 
between Poland and Belarus, high level visits took place and embassies were opened in 
both capitals. According to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by summer 1993 among 
all ex Soviet states Poland had signed the largest number of treaties with Belarus.® On his 
visit to Minsk in June 1993, President Walçsa said that Poiand would never see Belarus as 
an enemy and even claimed that the border between the two countries would practically 
disappear by 2000.®
There was, however, a growing concern in both countries about each other’s choice of 
alliances. Belarus signed far reaching economic and defence agreements with Russia on 
20 July 1992 which, according to Russian Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, was a step in the 
direction of forming a confederation.'' Following a visit to Minsk on 16 November 1992 by 
Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka, the Polish government expressed its disquiet about this 
rapprochement. Suchocka said that she wanted Belarus’s road to Europe to go through 
Poiand and stressed the importance of Belarusian independence for Poiand.® Her 
comments were rebuffed by the Belarusian PM Vyacheisau Kebich who reminded her o f 
the differences between Poiand and Belarus in terms of their geopolitical position.® in 
return Belarus was unhappy about Poland’s quest for NATO membership. In November
 ^Stephen R Burant, '‘international Relations in a Regional Context: Poland and Its Eastern Neighbours- 
Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, 1993, No. 3, p. 406.
® Helena Glogowska, “Biatorué w polityce polskiej miçdzy Niemcami a Rosjq" in Tadeusz Wallas (Ed.), Polska 
miqdzy NIemcamI a Rosjq, Poznart: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 1999, p. 177.
'' “Deklaracja o dobrym sqsiedztwie, wzajemnym zrozumieniu i wspoipracy miçdzy Rzeczqpospolitq. Polskq i 
Repubtikq Bialorus, Warszawa, 10 pazdziernika 1991 r.", Zblôr Dokumentôw, Vol. 528, 1992, No. 2, pp. 16-22. 
® Piotr Koécihski, "Lech Waiçsa jedzie na Biatorué”, Rzeczpospolita, 28 June 1993.
® Piotr Koscinski, "Polska chce suwerennej Biatorusi", Rzeczpospolita, 29 June 1993.
'’ Ann Sheehy, "Russlan-Belarusian agreements: "A step in the direction of confederation". Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 21 July 1992.
® Anna Sabbat- Swidlicka, "Polish-Belarus relations". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 23 November 1992.
® Przemystaw Foligowski, Biaiorus - trudna niepodleglosc, Wroclaw: Atia 2, 1999, p. 93.
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1993 the Belarusian government expressed its opposition to Poland’s membership in 
NATO when the Polish Ministry o f Foreign Affairs consulted them on the issueT
Throughout 1994-95 differences between Poland and Belarus in terms of foreign policy 
orientation gradually crystallised. Belarus signed various treaties with Russia ranging in 
subject from an eventual monetary union (April 1994) to building a customs union and 
deployment of Russian troops in Belarus (January 1995) and mutual collective security 
guarantees (February 1995).''^ Meanwhile, Poland’s prospects o f NATO membership were 
becoming more realistic. Despite the fact that Belarus was consistent about its objection to 
Poland’s entry into NATO, this had not led to the break down of bilateral relations.
Dialogue continued through high level visits. During one of these the speaker of the Sejm 
Jozef Oleksy took part in the ceremony in July 1994 where the newly elected president of 
Belarus Aleksander Lukashenko was sworn in. Oleksy repeated Poland’s will to move 
towards European integration together with Belarus. It must be noted that despite its anti- 
NATO rhetoric and lukewarm approach to the EU, Belarus was still in dialogue with these 
organisations. It became a member to NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme in 
January 1995 and signed the Partnership and Cooperation and interim agreements with 
the EU in March (the latter were not to enter into force as they could not be ratified).
Concern in Poland grew over Lukashenko’s increasingly harsher tone over Western 
influence in Central and Eastern Europe and NATO expansion. At the same time 
Lukashenko’s policy o f shunning ethnic Belarusian nationalism was criticised in Poland. 
“Poor national consciousness” of Belarusians and what was seen as Russification 
disappointed those in Poland cherishing plans of building a buffer region of Western 
friendly states between Poland and Russia. Lukashenko’s administration was also 
criticised for being antidemocratic.
Most Polish commentators meant by the undesirable political situation in Belarus and the 
need for Belarusian independence for Poland solely a Belarus conveniently independent 
from Russian Influence. Belarusian nationalism was hailed because It was seen as the 
only means of ensuring a Belarusian state resisting to Russian dominance. The Polish 
government, however, was careful enough to express its respect for the sovereign 
decisions of Belarus in terms of its bilateral ties with Russia.
Valery Karbalevicz, “Stosunki polsko-biaforuskle na tie Integracji europejskiej” in Maria Marczewska-Rytko 
(Ed,), Polska w systemie miqdzynarodowym w dobie integracji europejskiej, Pulawy: Wydawnlctwo Pulawskiej 
Szkoiy WyZszej, 2001, p. 153.
For a detailed analysis of the Belarus-Russia union see Ciella RontoyannI, “Belarus and the East” In Elena 
A, Korosteleva, John Lowenhardt, Stephen White (Eds), Postcommunist Belarus, Lanham, MD.; Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2005, pp. 123-142 and Clelia RontoyannI, Building the Wider Europe: Ambitions and Constraints in 
Russia’s Policies towards Belarus and Ukraine, Glasgow Papers No. 3, 2000.
Glogowska, "Biaiorué w polityce polskiej”, pp. 180-181.
See for instance Minister of Foreign Affairs Wiadystaw Bartoszewski's comments, Informacja rzqdu o 
podstawowych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski, Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 2 Kadencja, 50
213
7.1.2 increasing tensions
Despite concerns in Poland about internal developments in Belarus and its ties with 
Russia, Belarus was not by any means the most important topic of debate in the media or 
among the politicians.'’'^  The ruling Democratic Left Alliance - Polish Peasant Party {Sojusz 
Lewicy Demokratycznej - SLD / Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe -  PSL) coalition government 
and the Foreign Ministry expressed their support for Belarusian independence and named 
Belarus in all EP related documents and statements but in practice the EP agenda was 
dominated by issues relating to Russia and Ukraine. Nevertheless, dialogue with Belarus - 
continued by mutual visits and agreements on practical issues. One such high profile visit 
in March 1996 sparked interest in Belarus again. The meeting of presidents Kwasniewski 
and Lukashenko was criticised both by the Polish and the Belarusian opposition who 
perceived it as a sign of Polish acceptance of Belarus-Russia integration, an agreement 
about which was scheduled to be signed.’’® Both Kwasniewski and Lukashenko tried to 
give conciliatory messages to the opponents. Kwasniewski said that he was shown the text 
of Belarus-Russia Union treaty (to be signed on 2 April) and did not think it would have any 
effect on Poland’s relations with Belarus.’® Lukashenko, on the other hand, stated that 
even though they were against a hasty expansion o f NATO, Poland had the right to 
choose its alliances.’ ^
The conflict between Lukashenko, who wanted to change the constitution to introduce 
larger powers for himself and an extended term in office, and the Supreme Soviet, who 
opposed it and tried to impeach Lukashenko, deepened as international interest in Belarus 
heightened. The Polish Sejm adopted a resolution on 19 November 1996 that expressed 
support for Belarusian parliamentarians and warned about the dangers of a return to 
authoritarianism that threatened transition to democracy and market economy in the whole 
region.’® Even though the government and the opposition had different opinions about how 
to approach Belarusian issues, all parties in the Sejm unanimously voted for the resolution. 
During the debate on the resolution, some MPs drew an analogy between the events In 
Poland in the 1980s (Solidarity, martial law) and what was happening in Belarus. It was 
argued that Poland had a debt of gratitude to the international community (i.e. the West) 
that supported the anti-regime opposition in Poland through difficult times and now Poland
Posiedzenie, 2 Dzien, 25 May 1995. All parliamentary debates from the First Sejm on can be searched at 
http://ks.sejm.gov.pl:8009/forms/kad.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
Agnieszka Magzdiak-Mlszewska, "Belarus: Poland's strange neighbor” in Margarita M. Balmaceda, James I. 
Clem, Lisbeth L. Tarlov/ (Eds), Independent Belarus: Domestic Determinants, Regional Dynamics, and 
Implications for the kVesf, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 361.
Ryszard Bilski, “Mimo zastrze±eii opozycji Kwasniewski jedzie na Biatorus”, Rzeczpospolita, 29 March 1996. 
Wojclech Klewiec and Piotr Koécirtski, "Na rôznych falach", Rzeczpospolita, 01 April 1996.
Wojciech Klewiec and Piotr Koécirtski, "Na rôÈnych falach", Rzeczpospolita, 01 April 1996.
"Uchwala Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 19 listopada 1996 r. w sprawie sytuacjl w Republice 
Biatorus", Monitor Polski, 30 November 1996, No. 71, Pos. 654.
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had to pay this debt back by doing the same for Belarus.’® This analogy was to be 
repeated many times over the following years. A delegation from the Sejm visited 
Belarusian Supreme Soviet members in Minsk on 22 November and expressed their 
support for the Soviet against Lukashenko in no uncertain terms.^® Meanwhile, 
Kwasniewski contacted the presidents of Lithuania and Ukraine to issue a joint declaration 
on the Belarusian situation.^’
The referendum on the draft constitution took place in Belarus on 24 November 1996 and 
received the backing of the voters. The 13’” Supreme Soviet elected in 1995 was dissolved 
and a bicameral parliamentary system was introduced with the establishment of the 
Council o f the Republic, whose members were partly appointed by the president and partly 
selected with the president’s approval. Lukashenko’s term In office was extended by two 
years until 1999. Refusing to recognise the validity of the referendum, the reaction of the 
Western governments and organisations was to freeze their relations with Belarus. The 
European Parliament decided to abandon ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) in December 1996. The Council o f Europe cancelled Belarus’s special 
guest status in January 1997 and the North Atlantic Assembly followed suit In March by 
freezing its relations with Belarus. Finally, on 15 September 1997 the EU Council of 
General Affairs decided to suspend the PCA and the interim agreement, cancel all 
assistance programmes (except for humanitarian or regional projects and those deemed to 
support démocratisation) and ordered member states to refrain from contacts with Belarus 
at ministerial level.
The Polish government joined the European institutions in their decision not to recognise 
the referendum results and the legitimacy of the new parliaments in Belarus and to avoid 
political contacts with high levels of the Belarusian administration. But nevertheless it
reiterated that channels of dialogue would be kept open. It also came up with the idea o f a 
Belarusian round table where Belarusian government representatives would negotiate with 
the opposition (which proved impossible). However, especially with the elections coming 
up in September 1997, the government (and the president) could not escape heavy 
criticism by the opposition regarding their policies towards Belarus. The Council of Foreign 
Policy {Rada Polityki Zagranicznej), an NGO whose members were prominent politicians
'
See for Instance Ryszard Bugaj’s (UP) and Krzysztof Krôl’s (KPN) comments. “Plerwsze czytanie 
komisyjnego projektu uchwaty w sprawie sytuacjl na BlatorusI (druk nr 2025)", Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 2 
Kadencja. 94 Posiedzenie, 1 Dziert, 19 November 1996.
"International Chronicle- Sejm Delegation Visits Belarusian Parliament", Kronika Sejmowa, Vol. 268, 27 
November-3 December 1996, No. 145. http://kronika.sejm.gov.pl/kronika/index.htm (accessed 10 September
2005).
Maja Narbutt, “Bialoruski pat", Rzeczpospolita, 20 November 1996.
"Human Rights - Council conclusions on Belarus", Bulletin EU, No. 9, 1997, Point 1-3-56. 
http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/buli/en/9709/p103056.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
See minister Foreign Affairs Dariusz Rosati’s comments, Informacja ministra sprawzagranicznych o 
gtôwnych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski, Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 2 Kadencja, 106 Posiedzenie, 
3 Dzien, 09 May 1997.
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a:
and bureaucrats o f post-Solidarity origin and centre right political orientation, made a 
scathing attack on the government and president accusing them of hypocrisy. Accordingly, 
on the one hand, the government claimed that it supported Belarusian independence but, 
on the other, treated the biggest threat to it, namely Belarus-Russia integration, as a 
sovereign choice to be respected. Urging the government to shun contacts with the new 
parliament and presidential administration, the Council proposed to work towards 
strengthening national consciousness and civil rights in Belarus through activities of 
NGOs.^'’
The change of government in Poland from post-communist to post-Solidarlty in October 
1997 had not radically altered the policy line towards Belarus. Poland still avoided a 
complete breakdown of contacts with Belarus and hoped for a mediating role between the 
Belarusian government and opposition. Poland assumed the leadership of OSCE in 1998 
and, in his capacity as the head of OSCE, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Bronislaw 
Geremek visited Minsk in February 1998 after the Advisory and Monitoring Mission of 
OSCE was opened to monitor and advise on issues such as electoral law, democratic 
freedoms a civil society.^® The Belarusian government, however, was uneasy about the 
activities o f the Belarusian opposition in Poland and perceived approval o f Polish 
government of these as interference in Belarus’s internal affairs. This will be covered in the 
section 7.3 below.
7.1.3 Drozdy affair
Relations between the West and Belarus came to a breaking point when in April 1998 the 
Belarusian government asked 22 embassies, including the Polish, to move out from their 
diplomatic residences in the Drozdy district o f Minsk by June and threatened eviction if 
they did not comply. The stated reason was necessary infrastructural repairs. The EU 
states and the US called back their ambassadors (who would not return to Minsk until 
January 1999). The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs followed suit after a period of 
hesitation. The divergence between Poland and its Western allies became clearer in July 
when the EU and US decided to implement a travel ban on high level Belarusian officials.
In a rare display o f defiance, Poland announced that it would not be joining the ban. 
Geremek said that Poland’s relations with Belarus differed from those of the EU’s and, as 
the head o f OSCE and a neighbour, Poland had the duty of maintaining contacts with the 
Belarusian society and facilitate functioning of the OSCE mission.^® He also expressed
Jan Skôrzynski, "Kwestia bialoruska to kwestia miçdzynarodowa", Rzeczpospolita, 18 January 1997 and 
Piotr Koécirtski and Jan Skôrzyrtski, "Wiele sygnatôw, rôzne komentarze", Rzeczpospoiita, 29 January 1997.
For more information on OSCE in Belarus see Hans-Georg Wieck, "The OSCE and the Council of Europe in 
Conflict with the Lukashenko Regime" in Ann Lewis (Ed.), The EU and Belarus: Between Moscow and 
Brussels, London: Fédérai Trust, 2002, pp. 261-275.
Andrzej Stankiewicz and Jçdrzej Bieiecki, “Szczegôina sytuacja", Rzeczpospolita, 14 July 1998.
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resentment at the EU which took the decision without any consultation with Poland. While 
Poland’s decision did not get a strong reaction from the EU, it was still noted as a 
divergence from the common EU foreign policy which Poland had to follow in order to 
become a member,
In January 1999 the relations with Belarus was strained again when the Sejm issued a 
message to the Belarusian nation expressing moral support for the deputies of the 13th 
Supreme Soviet and advising the government to negotiate with the opposition in order to 
break out o f its “international [selfjimposed isolation".^®
7.1 A  A new flexibe policy?
Meanwhile, the EU reconsidered its harsh policy o f isolating Belarus after the tense 
atmosphere caused by the Drozdy affair subsided. The so called “selective engagement" 
policy o f complete isolation of the government in Minsk but engagement with the civil 
society gave way to a strategy more responsive towards possible steps taken by the 
Belarusian government.^® The travel ban was lifted in February 1999. The EU offered a 
gradual lifting of sanctions in place on the condition that Belarus fulfilled four conditions: 
Freedom of media, increasing the powers of the parliament, participation of opposition in 
electoral commissions and revising the electoral law.®® When Belarus signed the final 
document at the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999, this was seen a positive 
response to the EU’s new, more flexible policy.®’ The document praised the OSCE mission 
in Belarus for facilitating dialogue between the opposition and the government to solve the 
constitutional conflict and promoting democratic institutions.®^ It underlined the need for 
free and democratic elections.
However, the summit also witnessed angry exchanges between Lukashenko and 
Kwasniewski (as well as the Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus). When Kwasniewski 
pointed to human rights violations in Belarus and the need for democratic elections, 
Lukashenko retorted angrily by accusing Poland of interfering in Belarus’s internal affairs.®®
This was mentioned in the EU’s regular report on negotiations with Poland. Regular Report from the 
Commission on Poland’s Progress Towards Accession, 04 November 1998, p. 38, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/key_documents/index_archive_en.htm (accessed 06 November 2006) 
Uchwata Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 22 stycznia 1999 r. Postanie Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej do Narodu Biatoruskiego. Monitor Polski, 27 January 1999, No. 4, Pos. 16.
See Ruta Vainiene et ai. (Eds), Belarus: Reform Scenarios, Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 2003, p.
292.
®° John Lowenhardt, “Belarus and the West” in Elena A. Korosteleva, John Lowenhardt, Stephen White (Eds), 
Postcommunist Belarus, Lanham, M.D.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, p.145.
®’ Pawel Wolowski, "Polityka UE wobeo Bialorusi. Stan obecny i perspektywy" in Tematy polsko-bialoruskie, 
Olsztyn : Wspôlnota Kulturowa "Borussia", 2003, p. 177.
Article 22 of OSCE Istanbul Summit Declaration, Istanbul Document 1999, 
http://www.osce.org/mc/documents.html (accessed 12 September 2005)
®® Jan Maksymiuk, “Lukashenka Lectures Poland, Lithuania on Human Rights”, RFE/RL Poland, Belarus And 
Ukraine /Report, Vol. 1, 23 November 1999, No. 25.
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The EU’s new policy has not produced the desired results and both the parliamentary 
elections in Belarus in October 2000 and the presidential elections in September 2001 
were deemed undemocratic by the OSCE and Belarus was severely criticised by the 
European institutions for persecuting the opposition and stifling free media. However, the 
option of adopting a harsher policy towards Belarus was already tried and ruled out. The 
EU and its constituent countries were increasingly looking for a more flexible approach. So 
despite criticisms of the elections, the EU acknowledged in a Presidential Declaration of 14 
September 2001 “the emergence in Belarus of a degree of pluralism and of a civil society 
which is aware of the challenges of democracy" and expressed readiness to start 
“consultations on the subject with all the political forces of Belarus which are prepared to 
work in the same direction.”®^
However, translating this new relative openness into a common policy was no easy task. 
Different EU countries had varying attitudes towards Belarus.®® For instance while Britain 
and the Netherlands were against having any contacts with the Belarusian government at 
a level higher than already designated, Germany and Sweden saw higher level contacts as 
the key to bringing about change in Belarus in the long term.®®
Polish policy towards Belarus was also undergoing réévaluation: It was becoming clearer 
that Lukashenko would not be toppled anytime soon and even enjoyed popular support in 
Belarus. The Belarusian opposition was weak and divided. It was, hence, not possible to 
bring about regime change in Belarus by either supporting the opposition or offering 
carrots in exchange for fulfilling certain conditions. Poland could not resume official 
relations with the Belarusian government as this would be a breach of Poland’s 
commitment to EU policies. And especially when the US attitude towards Belarus was 
getting harsher (Belarus was added to the list of “axis o f evil" alongside countries such as 
Burma and Zimbabwe by the US Secretary o f State Condoleezza Rice In January 2005. 
Rice’s preferred nomenclature was “outpost of tyranny".)®^ Poland could not risk alienating 
its ally. Neither could it abandon the rhetoric o f supporting "civil society” In Belarus and 
playing host to the Belarusian opposition as it could face strong domestic criticism. One 
area where Poland was successful was managing to maintain contacts with the Belarusian 
authorities concerning practical issues such as border regime, regional cooperation, 
economic relations and cultural exchange. Several high level contacts had also taken
“Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the holding of presidential elections in 
Belarus, Brussels, 14 September 2001", No. 11812/01 (Presse 320)
P. 152/01. http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/11812.en1.pdf (accessed 23 February
2006)
Catherine Guicherd, “The EU and Belarus: From a Zero to a Positive Sum Game" In Ann Lewis (Ed.), The 
EU and Belarus: Between Moscow and Brussels, London: Federal Trust, 2002, pp. 330-331.
Carl Bjernstam, Joakim Larsson and David Shlshoo, “EU divided over dealing with Belarus”, RFE/RL 
Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report, Vol. 5, 21 October 2003, No. 39.
"Opening Statement by Dr. Condoleezza Rice. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 18, 2005", 
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2005/RiceTestimony050118.pdf (accessed 12 January 2007)
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place during international meetings. For instance, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Wtodzimlerz Cimoszewicz met his Belarusian counterpart during the OSCE summit In 
Bucharest in December 2001 and talked about regional and economic cooperation.®®
Even though Cimoszewicz pointed out at this meeting that contacts with high level officials 
could only be possible when Belarus fulfilled democratic criteria, there was an increasing 
awareness on the part o f the government that the consequences of isolating the 
Belarusian government worked against the regional interests o f Poland. At one point 
Poland even considered applying together with Lithuania for a special mandate from the 
Council o f Europe to hold talks with Lukashenko.®®
The realisation in Poland about the failure of the previous Western and Western guided 
Polish policies towards Belarus and the search for new concepts were evident in the Juiy 
2002 discussion on the issue at the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee.'’® The Undersecretary 
at the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs Adam Rotfeld began by reiterating Poland’s adherence to 
the "politically correct” perception of Belarus being a "grotesque regime”, ‘'skansen of 
authoritarianism” and Lukashenko’s policies as the main obstacle in developing bilateral 
relations. However, he pointed out that the current policies produced no tangible results 
and proposed initiating contacts with the Belarusian government at a higher level. He listed 
the reasons for Poland to have its own policy towards Belarus: having a 400 km common 
border, existence of sizeable minorities on both sides, trade between the two countries and 
the position of Belarus (and Poland) as the main transit route between Russia and the EU. 
He also drew attention to positive factors that would help boost cooperation such as having 
a strong treaty basis for bilateral relations, cultural proximity between the two societies and 
lack of blatant historical animosities. Accordingly, while agreeing with the general policy 
attitude of the EU and the US towards Belarus, Poland had to pursue a more “elastic and 
pragmatic” policy. Rotfeld admitted that the position of Lukashenko was quite stable and 
he had popular support and, therefore, to achieve success, policies should be directed not 
only at the Belarusian civil society and the NGO sector but also at the state 
representatives. There was opposition from the MPs belonging to post-Solidarity parties 
(who found themselves on the opposition benches after the September 2001 elections) to 
this proposed regeneration of contacts at a higher level. For instance MP Marek Jurek of 
Law and Justice Party {Prawo i Sprawiediiwoéc -  PiS) said that normalising relations with 
the Belarusian administration would hurt Poland’s interests as it would amount to an 
acceptance o f Belarus-Russia union and isolation of the Belarusian opposition. His party 
colleague Marian Pilka suggested lobbying the US for putting pressure on Russia to
Marcin Andrzej P iotrowskiPoland's Bilateral Relations -  Belarus”, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 2002, 
Warszawa: Zarzqd Obslugl MSZ, 2003, http://www.sprawymledzynarodowe.pl/ (accessed 01 April 2006) 
"Rozmowy zamlast Izoiowania", Rzeczpospolita, 02 March 2002.
See Bluletyn Komlsjl Spraw Zagranlcznych, No. 42, 816/iV, 16 July 2002. All commission bulletins from 
1993 on are searchable at http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Bluletyn.nsf (accessed 06 November 2006).
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change its policies supportive of Lukashenko. Bogdan Klich of the Civic Platform 
{Platforma Obywatelska -  PO) likened the dilemma o f Poland between pursuing national 
interest and standing up against infringement o f human rights and democratic principles to 
the situation in which the West found itself in the 1980s in the case of Poland. He said the 
proposed policy could be acceptable if ties with the Belarusian opposition were given the 
same weight as the ones with the state. He proposed building civil society institutions in 
Belarus together with American funding which would strengthen the "independence” of the 
Belarusian opposition.
During the discussion there was also a comment about Poland demonstrating double 
standards about human rights and Rotfeld was asked why Poland entertained heads of 
countries deemed undemocratic or in breach of human rights (referring to the Kazakh 
president that had recently visited Poland), while boycotting Belarus for the same reason. 
In his answer Rotfeld was more open than most of his Western counterparts about 
applying different standards while preaching a single one:
If we treat Belarus as a part of our region having a common civilisation-culture, then we judge 
it with the same measures as we judge ourselves. We cannot judge Belarus on the basis of 
standards that apply to certain Central Asian states that have a completely different culture, if 
there is a complaint about Nazarbayev (the Kazakh president) being treated differently than 
Lukashenko, one can say that Nazarbayev’s policies respond to the mentality, tradition and 
history of that region.
It is hard to say that there was any practical breakthrough in Poiish-Belarusian bilateral 
relations brought about by this new more flexible approach. Poland did continue to not join 
EU decisions on Belarus that it deemed would unnecessarily strain its neighbourly 
relations. For instance, the EU decided in November 2002 to impose a visa ban on 
Lukashenko and his closest associates when Belarus decided to curtail functions of the 
OSCE mission in Minsk. EU candidates also adopted the ban but Poland refused to join. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Cimoszewicz pointed out that Poland had to talk to Belarusian 
authorities to be able to manage common problems such as border crossings and matters 
relating to minorities. He said “I assure that nobody will invite Lukashenko [here]. What is 
happening in Belarus Is terrible. But the policy of isolating Belarus is ineffective.”'”  Poland 
had to maintain economic cooperation with Belarus because otherwise Belarusians would 
be completely left alone in their own country.
On another occasion when in January 2004 the EU Commission warned Belarus about 
violations o f trade union rights and threatened suspending EU trade benefits offered to it, 
Poland expressed its objection as such an embargo would hurt seriously Poland’s trade
Jçdrzej Bieiecki, “Polska nie przytq.czy siç do sankcjl", Rzeczpospolita, 19 November 2002.
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with Belarus.'’  ^The Deputy Minister of Economy said that Poland would try to block such a 
decision which was expected to be taken in June, by which time Poland would be a 
member of the EU.'’®
7.1.5 Conclusion
The most important aspect of the new flexible policy was that it was an Indication of the 
role Poland aspired to play within the proposed Eastern dimension of the EU. Seeing a 
possible Eastern dimension as a niche where Poland could assume leadership, it would 
have a chance to inject its own vision of relations with the EU’s Eastern neighbours rather 
than just carrying out Brussels policies mostly formulated by the larger EU members. 
However, in the case of Belarus, Poland had limited room for manoeuvre.
First, Poland’s relations with Belarus was hardly free from conflicts and tension despite 
Poland’s intended flexibility towards Belarus and initiatives of holding higher level contacts. 
Poland never hid its contempt for the Lukashenko administration. In turn Poland was 
perceived by Belarus as a breeding ground for the radical Belarusian opposition and an 
instrument o f the especially hardline US policy in the region. The Belarusian government 
and Lukashenko have consistently expressed their unease about Poland’s NATO 
membership and, Lukashenko pointed out in harsh terms that he considered this a security 
threat.'*'’ Relations were also marred by incidents like the spying scandal that broke out in 
April 2004 when the Belarusian authorities detained the Polish Defence Attaché in Minsk 
and announced that they had found on him confidential documents containing military 
information.'’® As a result Poland called back its attaché for consultations and the planned 
visit o f the Belarusian PM Sergei Sidorski to attend the European Economic Summit in 
Warsaw was cancelled.
Second, unlike Ukraine, Belarus never expressed any intention to join the EU so Poland 
could not try to play the “gateway to the EU” role which it cherished in terms of Ukraine.
Third, Belarus (like Ukraine, this time) is an important element in the EU-Russia relations. 
Therefore, itself hardly on good terms with Russia, Poland’s influence in terms of shaping 
the EU’s relations with Belarus is constrained by how much it concurs with the strategic 
interests of the large EU states.
MIrostaw Ikonowicz, "Polska do Unii, Biatorus do...", Przeglqd, No. 4. 20 January 2004.
Jçdrzej Bieiecki, "Nie chcemy karaô Biatorusi", Rzeczpospolita, 09 January 2004.
'*'* Tatiana Serwetnyk, "Nieprzyjaciel po drugiej stronie granicy", Rzeczpospolita, 05 July 2004.
'*® Jan Maksymiuk,"KGB catches spies, as usual”, RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report, Vol. 6, 04 May 2004, 
No. 16, and Andrzej Pisalnik, “Zatrzymany przez KGB", Rzeczpospolita, 30 April 2004.
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After becoming a member of the EU, Poland experienced its first disappointment at 
influencing EU policy towards Belarus when the EU issued its European Neighbourhood 
Policy Strategy Paper on 12 May 2004. Poland lobbied the EU so that the document would 
sanction contacts with Belarus at the ministerial level and give Belarus a long-term 
membership perspective. None of these were included in the final document: raising the 
level of political dialogue was made dependent on developments in Belarus and, let alone 
membership, even benefits included by the European Neighbourhood Policy were not 
offered fully to Belarus.'*® The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman said that 
Poland would continue pursuing Its current policy towards Belarus and would not give into 
the pressures from Poland’s partners to do the contrary. He said, “Belarus is not 
appreciated by the Europeans. We are the EU country who is going to lead the way for 
relations with Belarus."'*^
7.2 ECONOMIC RELATIONS
7.2.1 Trade and investment
The formal foundations of economic relations between Poland and Belarus were quickly 
established after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Poland and Belarus signed an 
economic cooperation and trade agreement on 10 October 1991 and treaty of good 
neighbourly relations in 1992, as mentioned above. By 1996 key agreements on taxation, 
investment, standards and certification and customs were in place. Important institutions 
such as the Polish-Belarusian Chamber of Trade and Industry were also established.'*® 
There was optimism about the development of trade especially as Poland became the 
biggest trading partner of Belarus outside the CIS countries in 1992.'*® Despite a fall in 
volume of trade between the two countries In 1993 due to limits imposed on barter 
transactions by Belarus, Polish hopes of holding onto its leading position in Belarus’s trade 
and investment were high. According to the Ministry of Economic Cooperation with Abroad 
(which was merged into the Ministry of Economy and Work in 1997) relations would 
steadily progress due to not only being neighbours and knowledge of each other’s 
markets, but also “similar direction of economic development.’’®®
'*® European Neighbourhood Policy - Strategy paper" [COiVt(2004) 373, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006)
'*^  Jçdrzej Bieiecki and Piotr Koscihski, "Zabawa wchowanego", Rzeczpospolita, 11 May 2004.
'*® Biaiorué. Przewodnik dia przedsiqbiorcôw {?o\iûh edition), Warsaw: UNIDO ITPG, 2004, p. 164.
'*® Urszuia Kopieb, "Polish Foreign Trade with East and Central European Countries" in Jan Anusz et al., Polish 
Foreign Trade In 1992, Warsaw: Foreign Trade Research Institute, 1993, pp. 95-97.
® Dorota Margas, "Wiçksze perspektywy wspôtpracy", Rzeczpospolita, 01 August 1994.
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Table 19: Poland: Foreign Trade Turnover with Belarus, 1992-1996
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Imports 161,154 114,093 165,514 238,397 257,392 220,889
Exports 158,790 103,208 136,582 240,634 272,394 319,381
Balance +2,364 +10,885 +28,932 +2,237 + 15,002 +98,492
Despite optimism, trade with Belarus had not reached desired levels. By 1995 the volume 
of trade with Ukraine was double that with Belarus even though in 1992 they were on a 
similar level.
Figure 11: Poland’s trade turnover with Belarus and Ukraine, 1992-200452
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For Poland, in terms of volume and value, trade with Belarus was not too significant. 
Percentage of trade with Belarus over Poland’s total trade never exceeded 1%. 
Comparatively for Belarus, trade with Poland was somewhat more significant. Percentage 
of turnover with Poland within the total trade turnover vacillated between 2.8 to 4.6%. 
Poland lost its leading position in Belarus’s trade with non-CIS countries. By 1995 
Germany’s trade turnover with Belarus exceeded that with Poland and its imports to 
Belarus were more than twice Poland’s.
Data from Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego, Years 1993-1998, Warsaw; Gtôwny Urz^d 
Statystyczny.
Data from Handel Zagraniczny, Years 1991 and 1992 and Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego, 
Years 1993-2005, Warsaw; Gtowny Urz^d Statystyczny.
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Table 20: Poland: Trade with Belarus, 1995-2004 (percentages of total export and
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Imports 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8
Exports 1.1 1.1 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.8
Table 21: Belarus: Trade with Poland, 1995-2004 (percentages o f total export and
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Imports 3.5 2.8 2.9 3.3 3.2 2.6 2.4 2.4 3.0 2.9
Exports 5.7 3.4 2.6 3.5 3.8 3.3 3.4 4.4 5.7 5.3
Although the plans for a Belarus-Russia union were criticised in Poland and the resultant 
economic dependence o f Belarus on Russia seen as a disadvantage, the customs union 
actually had a positive effect on Polish investment in Belarus and on Polish exports to 
Russia. Poland became the third biggest foreign investor in Belarus (after Germany and 
the US), taking advantage o f tax breaks offered to foreign investors and the prospect of 
selling products (51% of which ought to be manufactured in Belarus) in the Russian 
market. Polish investment in Belarus reached a total of 30 million USD by 1998.®® Another 
factor encouraging Polish investment was the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) established 
in Belarus from 1996 on, which offered foreign investors income tax exemption and the 
possibility o f customs free export of goods produced or part produced in SEZs outside of 
Belarus.®® SEZs near the Polish border In Grodno and Brest were especially attractive to 
Polish Investors.
Subsequent governments in Poland strove to limit the effects of political conflict with 
Belarus on bilateral economic relations and to keep the channels of communication and 
cooperation on economic issues open. However, this was not sufficient to bring about any 
significant increase in either bilateral trade or investment. It was true that inefficient 
bureaucracy, problems in banking, insurance and transport systems, instability brought by 
economic transition and shortage of foreign currency in Belarus were hindering 
development of economic relations. This was more or less the case in all ex-Soviet 
countries. But on the other hand, Polish governments hardly took any effective measures 
to facilitate trade with Poland’s Eastern neighbours. Poland’s unquestioning Western
Data from Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego, Years 1993-2005, Warsaw: Gtôwny Urzq^ d 
Statystyczny.
®'* Data for 1995-2003 from Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Belarus, Years 1997-2004, Minsk: Ministry 
of Statistics and Anaiysis. Data for 2004 from the website of the Ministry of Statistics and Analysis of the 
Republic of Belarus http://www.belstat.gov.by/homep/en/indicators/ftrade.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
®® Anna Sielanko, “Inwestycje na Biatorusi", Rzeczpospolita, 04 February 1994.
“MoZliwosci, perspektywy i zagrozenia", Rynki Zagraniczne, No. 40-41, 05-08 April 2005 and Henryk Borko, 
"Firmy powoli wchodzg. na rynek", Rynki Zagraniczne, No 58-59, 17-20 May 2005. 
http://rynki.sm.pl/archiwum.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
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orientation, i.e. predominantly political reasons, were considered as the reason for the loss 
of Eastern markets especially by PSL as previously stated in Chapters Four and Five.
The Russian financial crisis o f 1998 exposed Poiand’s weak hoid in Eastern and 
Belarusian markets more clearly. By 1999 the value of Poland’s trade turnover with 
Belarus of 399 million USD was one fourth less than what it was in 1997 and both exports 
and imports were affected by this decrease. Acting on similar decline in other Eastern 
markets, the Polish government took action by facilitating guarantees for export credits 
through KUKE and drawing up a programme for regaining Eastern markets in 2003 (see 
previous chapters). Trade with Belarus slowly recovered (somewhat slower than with 
Ukraine) but by 2003 the value of turnover had still not reached the 1 billion USD mark and 
Poland was relegated to third place after the United Kingdom and Germany among share 
of Belarusian trade among the non-CIS countries. However, the growth trend continued 
throughout 2004 and the value of turnover increased by almost 38% to 1.2 billion USD.
The increase in Poland’s imports from Belarus was much larger than its exports and as a 
result for the first time since 1992 Poland had a negative trade balance with Belarus.
Table 22: Poland: Foreign Trade Turnover with Belarus, 1998-2004
/ i n  n .1  t  t
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Imports 170,411 165,905 153,682 145,445 226,990 386,213 698,524
Exports 265,839 232,927 243,802 276,013 260,200 395,650 565,157
Balance +95,428 +67,022 +90,120 +130,568 +33,210 +9,437 -133,367
In addition to low turnover, the commodity structure of Polish-Belarusian trade did not 
permit either country to develop any dependence on the other. In 2003 more than 50% of 
Poland’s imports from Belarus were mineral products such as oil and natural gas, which 
were mostly reexports from Russia. The only commodity which Belarus was the main 
importer to Poland was potash fertilisers. Poland’s exports to Belarus are even more 
dispersed: Two biggest groups of commodities are agricultural and food products (about 
25%) and machinery and machine parts (also about 29%).
Data from Rocznik Statystyczny Handiu Zagranicznego, Years 1999-2006, Warsaw; Gtôwny Urz^d 
Statystyczny.
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Table 23: Poland's trade with Belarus by commodity groups, 1999 and 2003®®
Poland’s Export to Belarus { 
by commodity groups |^1 Poland’s Import from Belarus by commodity groups
1999 2003 I 1999 2003Commodity
groups MillionUSD %
Million
USD % 1
g  Million 
■ %
Million
USD %Agricultural and 
food products 58.77 25.23 79.07 19.98 1g  3.52 2.12 7.04 1.82Mineral products
1.88 0.80 2.43 0.61 1m  G9 27.66 221.95 57.47Chemical 
industry products 36.80 15.80 58.83 14.87 10m  62.88 37.90 87.81 22.74Ligth ind. prod, 
(textiles, footwear 
etc) 21.37 9.17 20.28 5.13 1E. 16.88 10.18 13.44 3.48Wood and paper 
products
15.53 6 67 56.61 14.31.10  17.29 10.42 18.67 4.83Stone, plaster, 
cement, glass products 4.81 2.07 19.00 4.8 1m  2.69 1.62 2.74 0.71Base metals
14.94 6.41 31.00 7.84 10  3.38 2.04 14.27 3.69Machinery, 
electrical, 
transport, optical 
equip. 69.60 29.88 114.90 29.04 1Ng  12.43 7.49 19.32 5.00Other
manufactured 
prod, (furniture, toys etc) 9.08 ' 3.90 13.43 3.3@| S  0 94 0.57 0.97 0.26Others
0.14 0.07 0.10 0.03 1g  0 0 0 0
Total 232.92 100 395.65 100 ! 0  165.90 100 386.21 100
Polish investment in Belarus also remained minor with 19.9 million USD in 2003 which 
constituted only 1.52% of total foreign investment.®® Polish companies investing in Belarus 
were mostly small and medium enterprises that would find the conditions of the Belarusian 
markets less demanding than that of the EU.®° Three fourths of Polish investors in Belarus 
were engaged in manufacture.®’ The value of Belarusian investment in Poland was and is 
negligible.
Due to the relatively low value of trade turnover with Belarus and the dispersed structure of 
traded commodities, Poland’s entry into the EU did not create as much debate as it did in 
the case of trade with Russia and Ukraine. There were worries about a possible decline in 
the two main Belarusian exports to Poland, potash fertilisers and machinery due to EU
Data from Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego, Years 2000 and 2004, Warsaw; Gtôwny Urz^d 
Statystyczny.
®® “Stan polsko-biatoruskich stosunkôw handlowych i gospodarczych w 2004 r. i w 2005 r” (Report by the 
Commerce Section of the Polish Embassy in Minsk) http;//www.embassypoland. nsys.by 
/w ehcontent.php?section=wehtrade (accessed 07 October 2005)
Zbigniew Lentowicz, “Brzeskie okno na Wschôd", Rzeczpospolita, 12 November 2003.
Henryk Borko, “Firmy powoli wchodz^ na rynek”, Rynki Zagraniczne, No 58-59, 17-20 May 2005. 
http;//rynki.sm.pl/archiwum.htm (accessed 07 October 2005)
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antidumping measures against the former and high EU tariffs on the latter. As other new 
EU accession countries from Central Eastern Europe would also be affected by the EU 
regime on these commodities, negotiations were held on this matter to resolve the 
emerging problems.
The most important effect of Poland’s EU accession was rather on the unregistered border 
trade with Belarus which, according to estimates by the Ministry of Economy, brought a 
turnover of as much as 250 million USD.®^ Implementation by Poland of visas on 
Belarusian citizens In 2003 as a part of harmonisation with Schengen regime raised fears 
about the loss o f this income that would especially harm the economies of the border 
regions. (See Appendix for a case study on the Podlasie region). The new visa regime, 
however, was not the only obstacle for the so called suitcase trade and changing customs 
regulations and certification rules on both sides of the border hindered it. For instance in 
August 2002, Lukashenko issued a decree limiting duty free import o f foodstuffs by private 
persons to 10 kg and for other goods brought a 1000 USD limit on value.®®
7.3 POLAND AND THE BELARUSIAN OPPOSITION
The Belarusian government has often accused Poland of interfering into its domestic 
affairs by offering a haven to Belarusian opposition activists. Even though subsequent 
Polish governments denied the charges of interference, the Belarusian opposition did 
attempt to base itself in Poland. Geographical proximity o f Poland to Belarus was not the 
only factor in this choice. One of the strands of Polish EP after the two-track policy period 
was the importance of Belarusian (as well as Ukrainian and Lithuanian) Independence for 
Poland and this fit in well with the claims of Belarusian opposition activists of protecting 
Belarusian independence from Lukashenko's pro-Russian course. Another reason, 
perhaps, was the hope of the Belarusian opposition that widespread anti-Russian and anti- 
Soviet sentiment in Poland would facilitate the flourishing o f a movement based on similar 
premises. The messianic flavour given to EP by mostly centre right formations in Poland 
was also promising for the Belarusian opposition.
7.3.1 Stance of the government and political parties
Political parties and subsequent governments in Poland made their support for the 
Belarusian opposition gradually more and more open. In 1996 the first resolution on 
Belarus passed by the Sejm appealed for solidarity with the political groups in Belarus that
Jçdrzej Bieiecki, “Wiçkszosé 'mrôwek' nie wràci", Rzeczpospolita, 26 September 2003. 
Cezary Golirtski, “Taniemu importowi nie!", Gazefa Wyborcza, 28 August 2002.
227
“stood for the defence of democracy and independence” and the resolution was passed by 
337 voted for and one against.®'*
The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to organise round table negotiations 
between the Belarusian government and the opposition in 1996 but failed as the former 
objected to the participants from the opposition side. The Solidarity Electoral Action - 
Freedom Union {Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc -  AWS / Unia Wolnosci -UW) coalition 
government that was in power from 1997 to 2001 was even more vocal about its support 
for the opposition. An AWS MP, Andrzej Anusz, even claimed that the strength of Poland’s 
foreign policy in comparison with other countries was that Poland had very strong ties with 
the Belarusian opposition.®® The AWS group proposed that the Sejm approved a message 
to the Belarusian nation which expressed the Sejm’s respect and sympathy for "all the 
democratic powers in Belarus" and offered moral support to the deputies of th e l 3**^  
Supreme Soviet, demanding the release form prison of two of them, Andrei Klimov and 
Vladimir Kudinov.®® However, unanimity on the issue gave way to dissent from some SLD 
politicians. During the discussion on the text of the message Wtodzimlerz Cimoszewicz 
said that it would be a diplomatic mistake for a national parliament like Sejm to express 
support for the opposition in another country.®^
Despite hopes about the opposition bringing about change in Belarus, Lukashenko’s grip 
on power proved more resilient and the Polish government (alongside other Central 
European and Western governments) reevaluated its policy towards Belarus, taking up a 
more flexible attitude, as explained above. The SLD-UP-PSL government that came to 
power in 2001 did not entirely give up on supporting the Belarusian opposition within the 
new policy, but put more focus on maintaining relations with the Belarusian government at 
a fairly high ievei. The opposition parties, especially PiS and PO, criticised the government 
for not doing enough to promote the Belarusian opposition.®® As mentioned earlier, PO 
MPs proposed funding Polish-Beiarusian dialogue and NGOs sympathetic to Poland with 
money from the US. PiS MPs declared that they worked closely with the Belarusian 
National Front (BNF) (whose leaders were mostly Catholic) and argued for forging closer 
ties with the Catholic Church in Belarus to support the anti-Lukashenko opposition. Other 
opposition parties, while agreeing about the nature of Lukashenko’s rule, were less 
enthusiastic about closer ties with the Belarusian opposition. MPs from the agrarian Self 
Defence {Samoobrona) argued against interfering in Belarusian internal affairs so overtly
®'* "Uchwata Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 19 listopada 1995 r. w sprawie sytuacji w Republice 
Biatorus", Monitor Polski, 1996, No. 71, Pos. 654.
® See Biuletyn Komlsji Spraw Zagranlcznych, No. 41/111, 05 January 1999.
®® “Postante Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej do Narodu Biatoruskiego, Uchwata Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej z dnia 22 stycznia 1999 r.". Monitor Polski, No. 4, Pos. 16, 27 January 1999.
See Biuletyn Komisji Spraw Zagranlcznych, No. 42/111,12 January 1999.
See comments by Marek Jurek, Marian Pitka, Bogdan Klich, Donald Tusk, Biuletyn Komisji Spraw 
Zagranlcznych, No. 42, 816/IV, 16 July 2002, No. 47, 900/lV, 26 July 2002, No. 186, 3426/IV, 15 July 2004,
No. 196, 3537/IV, 26 August 2004.
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by supporting the opposition and warned against such interference souring relations with 
both Belarus and Russia while MPs from the League of Polish Families {Liga Polskich 
Rodzin -  LPR) pointed out the anti-Polish stance some Belarusian opposition activists 
(from especially BNF) had assumed when they were in power before 1994.®®
Disagreement between the parties were obvious. However, for political correctness, all 
politicians had to first declare their opposition to Lukashenko’s government before voicing 
any criticism of Poland’s handling of Belarus. Pressure to repeat the anti-Lukashenko 
rhetoric became oppressive at times. The SLD MP and the president of BTSK Jan 
Syczewski came under heavy criticism both from his party and others when he made an 
off the cuff speech in Minsk in May 2001, blaming Poland for the state of relations between 
the two countries and praising the Belarusian government for not implementing 
privatisation the way Poland did.^° A similar case happened in 2003 when MP Aleksander 
Matachowski of UP also came under fire when he strayed from official rhetoric during a 
visit to Minsk by a Council of Europe delegation of which he was a member. Matachowski 
said he was impressed by how Belarus was developing and had lower rates of 
unemployment than Poland.^’ He was also criticised for not having met the Belarusian 
opposition during his v is it/^
7.3.2 Belarusian emigration into Poland
Asylum applications from Belarusians started trickling in from 1994 on but most of the 
political émigrés came to Poland (and to other countries) after 1996. Among the first 
comers was Zenon Pazniak, the leader o f the BNF, who was originally granted refugee 
status in the US but pursued his political activities in Poland, where his family applied for 
asylum. Journalists, youth activists, businessmen that fell out with the Lukashenko regime 
also applied for asylum in Poland and some chose to live in Poland on work permits.'"® 
Estimates of the number of political émigrés range from several dozen to several 
hundreds. It must, however, be noted that emigration levels from Belarus remained very 
low and, despite Western governments, NGOs and media portraying Belarus as one of the
® See comments by Tadeusz Samborski, Marian Curyto, Franclszek Stefaniuk, Alfred Budner, Janusz 
Dobrosz. Biuletyn Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych. No, 42, 816/IV, 16 July 2002, No. 196, 3537/IV, 26 August 
2004 and “Sprawozdanle Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych o poselsklm projekcie uchwaty w sprawie tamania 
praw cztowieka i obywatela na Biatorusi (druki nr 3164 i 3203)”, Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 4 Kadencja, 83 
Posiedzenie, 2 Dzien, 09 September 2004.
Jan Maksymiuk, "Lawmaker to be disciplined for speech at Lukashenko's 'Popular Congress", RFE/RL 
Report: Poland, Belarus and Ukraine, Vol. 3, 29 May 2001, No. 20.
Filip Gawrys, “Pod wrazeniem Biatorusi", Rzeczpospoiita, 24 September 2003. Matachowski explained the 
situation in his column in the weekly Przeglad. He said that Belarus was certainly an autocratic country but 
looking solely at its democratic deficiencies and ignoring economic and social development In the country was 
a mistake. Aleksander Matachowski, "Biatorus na nowo oglq.dana", Przeglad, 06 Ocotober 2003.
SLD MP and Orthodox minority activist Eugeniusz Czykwin was a lone voice who said Matachowski had 
shown courage and had the right to express his opinions. “Pod urokiem Biatorusi”, Kurier Poranny, 25 
September 2003.
See Anna Belka and Karolina Chrzq^stek, “Portrety biatorusklch uchodÉcôw polltycznych", Wi^Z, Vol. 496, 
2000, No.2, pp. 127-136,
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most oppressive regimes in Europe, the number of political asylum claims by Belarusians 
remained lower than most other East European countries. Comparison of asylum claims 
from Moldova and Bulgaria (which was set to be an EU member by 2007) makes an 
interesting contrast. Although Belarus has more than twice the population of Moldova and 
25% more people than Bulgaria, its number of asylum seekers caught up with Moldova 
only in 1999 and with Bulgaria as late as 2001 A very low percentage of Belarusian 
asylum seekers chose to apply in Poland, which is just across the border, and most 
preferred to wait until they got to North America.
Table 24: Number o f asylum applications according to the country o f origin 75
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Belarus 37 84 501 303 290 1,507 2,519 3,696 6,364 7,815
(to US and 
Canada)
30 55 88 122 163 1,195 2,281 3,309 3,384 4,092
(to Poland) 1 5 19 32 23 51 63 76 68 58
(% of total to 
Poland) 3.3 5.9 3.7 10.5 7.9 3.3 2.5 2.0 1.0 0.7
Moldova 965 1,292 1,601 1,271 875 1,452 3,735 5,270 5,789 5,556
Bulgaria 6,346 4,133 4,065 4,390 2,430 2,182 3,080 3,351 4,143 2,607
Despite the fact that numbers of Belarusian political refugees in Poland remained low, with 
local help, they managed to establish organisations and find themselves on the agenda of 
Polish-Belarusian relations from time to time.^® BNF, headed by Pazniak, had high hopes 
about setting up a powerful opposition-in-exile in Poland. During a visit to Wroclaw in 1996, 
Pazniak expressed the hope that the Belarusian opposition would unite in Poland and said 
"We expect Wroclaw to be for Belarusians what Krakow has become for Chechens.”^^  
Actually, Pazniak and other Belarusian opposition figures found more support in Bialystok 
from a certain section o f the Belarusian minority. The political party set up by this group of
Grigory Ioffe points out that Belarus has higher incoming migration from the CIS than outgoing. Grigory Ioffe, 
“Understanding Belarus: Economy and Political Landscape” , Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 56, 2004, No. 1, pp. 
91-93. This was the third by Ioffe in a series of three excellent articles concerning Belarusian language, identity 
and politics where he dispelled many negative myths about Belarus created through years of political hostility 
by the West.
 ^ Data for Bulgaria, Moldova, Belarus total and number of Belarusian asylum application to the US and 
Canada from “Belarus", “Bulgaria", “Moldova", 2003 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook, www.unhcr.org (accessed 
08 January 2006). Data for Belarusian applications to Poland: Data for 1994 to 2000 from “Dane liczbowe 
dotycz^ce zlozonych w latach 1992 - 2000 wnioskow oraz wydanych w tym okresie decyzji w sprawie o 
nadanie statusu uchodzcy w RP.xIs" and data for 2001 to 2003 from "Dane liczbowe dotyczq^ce postçpowan 
prowadzonych wobec cudzoziemcôw w latach 2001 -  2003 (wersja polska).zip" from the website of the Office 
for Repatriation and Aliens, www.uric.gov.pl (accessed 04 January 2006). The figures this table present are 
intended to give an idea about trends and must therefore not be taken as absolute as data utilised come from 
two different sources which presumably had used different methods of data collection and categorisation.
It is safe to assume that some of the Belarusians taking part in the opposition’s activities in Poland have 
immigration status other than refugees. Some of them had work permits or other kinds of leave to remain. See 
Belka and Chrzqstek, “Portrety biatorusklch uchodzcôw”.
Rafat Bubnicki, “Poszukiwanie wsparcia za granicq", Rzeczpospolita, 16 April 1996. The author doubts that 
such a declaration helped Pazniak score any brownie points with the Polish government which had its troubles 
with Russia about its support for Chechens. See Chapter Five for details.
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local Belarusians, Bialoruskie Zjednoczenie Demokratyczne {Belarusian Democratic 
Union), established contacts with the BNF, staged demonstrations supporting the 
Belarusian opposition and tried to unite the Belarusian opposition/® They also set up an 
NGO called Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej Polska-Biaforus (Centre of Civic Education 
Poland - Belarus), financed by the Ford Foundation, which would work with Belarusian 
NGOs sympathetic to the opposition and to support “pro-democratic” forces in Belarus. 
Among other activities, this group facilitated the Zwiqzek Bialoruskich Uchodzcôw  
Politycznych w Polsce (Union of Belarusian Political Refugees in Poland), established in 
Bialystok in 2001, to publish a paper called Emigrant in Poland to be smuggled into 
Belarus and distributed there/® The Belarusian government expressed its reaction to the 
Centre and its activities in no uncertain terms. The Belarusian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
even accused the leaders of this group to prepare the Belarusian opposition to take over 
power in Belarus by force.®®
Belarusian government also applied for the arrest and extradition of a number of 
Belarusians from Poland, mostly businessmen, on charges of financial irregularity on the 
basis of a 1994 treaty (Articles 60, 71 and 72).®’ Some of them were accused of 
substantial wrongdoings like Aleksander Pupiejka who had credit arrears of 1.2 million 
USD.®® Belarusian opposition figures argued that this was a method of persecuting those 
who financed or helped the opposition. Prominent figures like Shushkievich vouched for 
the anti-regime credentials o f some of these businessmen in Polish courts and asked the 
Polish government to amend the agreement.®® The Polish Ministry o f Justice and 
prosecutors did not find any fault with the agreement but even then, due to political 
reasons, courts had not allowed extradition citing lack of fair trial in Belarus as a reason.
Other groups with an interest in the opposition were Polish NGOs and think-tanks such as 
Centre for Eastern Studies {Osrodek Studiôw Wschodnich - OSW), the Batory Foundation, 
East European Democratic Centre {Stowarzyszenie Wschodnioeuropejskie Centrum 
Demokratyczne - EEDC) funded by the US based National Endowment for Democracy and 
Freedom House among others. These organisations focused on programmes supporting 
anti-Lukashenko youth organisations, media and NGOs in Belarus and gave Belarusian 
dissidents a platform to pursue their activities. NGOs undertook most o f the "exporting of 
democracy” work that the Polish government could not.
Anna Wieiopolska , “Zaraza”, Rzeczpospolita, 23 February 1998.
"KGB na Emigranfa", Kurier Poranny, 03 July 2002.
Piotr Koécirtski, “Rozmowa z Siergiejem Lingiem, premierem Biatorusi”, Rzeczpospolita, 10 July 1997 and 
Anna Wieiopolska , "Zaraza”, Rzeczpospolita, 23 February 1998.
"Umowa miçdzy Rzeczqpospolitq Polskqa Republikq Biaiorué o pomocy prawnej i stosunkach prawnych w 
sprawach cywilnych, rodzinnych, pracowniczych i karnych, sporzqdzona w Mirtsku dnia 26 paidziernika 1994 
r.", Dziennik Ustaw, No. 128, Pos, 691,15 November 1995.
Pupiejka's was one of the first controversies around the extradition process. He was arrested In Poland in 
1997 but later granted political asylum and not extradited. Cezary Golirtski et al,, “Na ziecenie 
Lukaszenki", Gazefa Wyborcza, 05 March 2001.
Ewa Slediecka , "Lukaszence nie pomagac", Gazefa Wyborcza, 10 March 2001.
231
7.3.3 Radio Free Belarus
Another project aiming to “export democracy” was “Radio Free Belarus" modelled on 
Radio Free Europe, to broadcast to Belarus from Poland. Polish press reported in 1998 
plans to establish such a station in Bialystok with American and European funding and 
government backing. Although the government denied involvement, it expressed its 
sympathy for such a project.®'* It was soon announced that the station would not be called 
Radio Free Belarus but Radio Racja and the majority stakeholder would be the Union of 
Belarusians in Poland {Zwigzek B iahruski w RP~ ZBwRP). The people behind the project 
were the same group of Polish Belarusians active in the Centre for Citizenship Education 
Poland-Belarus {Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej Polska-Bialorué).^^ There were press 
reports that the radio was funded by the Open Society Institute and US National 
Endowment for Democracy but these were not confirmed by the radio’s management, 
unwilling to disclose information fearing that its broadcasters in Belarus would be 
targeted.®®
Radio Racja had its enthusiasts like the government and the ex-director o f Polish section 
at the Radio Free Europe in the 1980s, Zdzislaw Najder, but it also had its opponents.®^ 
Poland’s EP legend Jerzy Giedroyc opposed the idea of such a station cooperating openly 
with the Belarusian opposition and questioned the merits of a radio with undisclosed 
donors when Polish state radio already had broadcasts in Belarusian and the Americans 
were pursuing their propaganda through Radio Liberty.®® Echoing Giedroyc, Jan Nowak 
Jeziorahski, who had also worked for BBC Polish and Radio Free Europe during the Cold 
War, argued that radio programmes broadcast from Poland should not compromise 
national security by waging a cold war against one of Poland’s neighbours. Poland could 
not allow any group with sufficient money to "establish a private army in Poland and 
pursue hostile activities against Poland’s neighbours” .®® The objections of Giedroyc and 
Jezioranski are worth noting as they, unlike most politicians connected with SLD, PSL or 
LPR, were ardent supporters of Belarusian national revival and independence and 
opponents of Lukashenko’s government.
®'* Jan de Weydenthal, “Report of a Radio Free Belarus Causes Stir", Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 15 
July 1998.
Jagienka Wllczak, “Racja szuka fail”, Polityka, 1998, No. 30.
Jan Maksymiuk, “Belaruslan-Language Radio Racja Starts Testing Signal” , RFE/RL Report: Poland, Belarus 
and Ukraine, Vol. 1, 09 November 1999, No 23.
Zdzislaw Najder, “Plerwsze -  nie podjudzaà", Polityka, 1998, No. 33.
®® Jerzy Giedroyc, “Notatkl redaktora", Kultura, Vol. 691,1999, No. 4, pp. 109-110.
Jan Nowak JezlorariskI, “Bardzo dluga mledza’’, Rzeczpospoiita, 22 September 1998. JeziorartskI was to 
change his mind about Radio Free Belarus In 2003 and argue that such a radio would be useful for promoting 
Belarusian cultural heritage and awareness history and teach Belarusians about freedom of speech. He still 
argued against such a radio becoming a centre for Belarusian opposition. Jan Nowak-Jezloratiskl and Jacek 
Gawlowskl, “Przebudzlc Blaloruslnow", Gazefa Wyborcza, 25 November 2003.
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Radio Racja stopped its broadcasts in 2002 due to financial problems, having failed to 
either establish a united and strong Belarusian opposition or to reach audiences on the 
scale of what Radio Free Europe had in the days of the Cold War.
7.3.4 Conclusion
Radio Racja failed and Podlasie (or Wroclaw) did not become a "Piedmont" for the 
Belarusian opposition. Just as Polish governments’ wish (in the case of right wing 
coalitions) or guarded hope (in the case of left wing) to bring about regime change in 
Belarus came to nothing, efforts by either Belarusian activists in Poland or Polish NGOs 
failed to make an impact. First, the number of Belarusian refugees in Poland (or those on 
other types of leave who were politically active) never reached any critical level, as noted 
above.
Second, those that were politically active failed to unite within an organisation or produce a 
joint campaign. They ended up competing for meagre resources among themselves and 
accusing each other o f being KGB agents or trying to swindle money given by Western 
donors.®®
Third, not all local Belarusians in Podlasie were enthusiastic about the region becoming a 
launching pad for the Belarusian opposition. Among the three main groupings of 
Belarusian minority, only the group affiliated with ZBwRP showed interest in supporting the 
opposition. The other groups, one mainly centred around the Orthodox Church and the 
other around the Belarusian Social-Cultural Association {Bialoruskie Towarzystwo 
Spoleczno-Kulturalne -  BTSK), the oldest minority organisation among the Belarusians, 
were against what they saw as interference into Belarusian affairs with the help of foreign 
funding.®’ Even the Polish Belarusians that enthusiastically worked with the Belarusian 
opposition showed signs of disappointment about the functioning of the latter.®®
Fourth, as mentioned above, disagreement between different political parties on what to do 
for Belarusian opposition was often masked by the ubiquitous rhetoric on "Lukashenko’s 
anti democratic regime". This lack of consensus prevented any government from assuming 
a stance towards Belarus which might be described as "Prometheic" in a Pitsudskiite 
sense (See Chapter Four for a description of Prometheism In the Polish context).
®® See Arkadiusz Bartosiak, “Z zubrem w klapie", Rzeczpospolita, 19 October 2002 for quarrels among the 
émigrés.
®’ Interview with Eugeniusz Czykwin (Editor of Przeglqd Prawosfawny and Podiasie MP from SLD), 18 July 
2002, Warsaw.
Interview with Professor Eugeniusz Mironowicz (University of Bialystok, Department of Beiarusian Cultural 
Studies), 25 July 2002, Bialystok. See also the following articles on the Beiarusian opposition In general by the 
two representatives of this group; Oleg tatyszonek, “Belarusian Nationalism and The Clash of Civilisation" and 
Eugeniusz Mironowicz, “The Attitudes of Belarusians and Poles Toward the Independence of Their Countries", 
both in the InternationalJournal o f Socioiogy, Vol. 31, 2001, No 3, pp. 62-77 and pp. 79-89.
233
7.4 ETHNIC MINORITIES
7.4.1 The Polish Minority in Belarus
According to the 1999 Belarusian census there were about 396,000 Poles living in Belarus 
but this number is not definitive given the difficulties of defining identity in the region/® 
Different (mostly Polish) sources estimate the number of Poles in Belarus to be between 
400,000 and 1.2 million. Of the 396,000 Poles accounted in the census about 81% of them 
live in Grodno and Brest regions bordering Poland.®^ The highest concentration of Poles is 
in Grodno where they constitute about 25% of the region’s population. However, those in 
Grodno that declared their native tongue as Polish is only about 19% o f those who defined 
their ethnicity as Polish.
The main organization o f Poles in Belarus, the Association of Poles in Belarus {Zwigzek 
Polakôw na Biatorusi - ZPB), was established in 1990 on the foundations of a Polish 
cultural organisation preceding it by two years. ZPB’s membership grew to 17,000 by 1992 
and 20,000 by 2002 which made it the biggest NGO in Belarus.®® During the initial phases 
of Belarusian independence, the Polish minority became the source of some tensions 
between Belarus and Poland. The Belarusian government circles dominated by the 
nationalist BNF were distrustful towards what they saw as the "polonising" activities they 
thought were supported by Poland and regarded the Polish minority as Poland’s agents 
and a threat to Belarusian independence. BNF were especially uneasy about the large 
number o f Polish priests serving in Western Belarus and Catholic churches that being 
used to "poionise Belarusian Catholics” .®® The president of BNF, Pazniak, wrote a letter to 
the Pope in 1991 requesting that he sent priests from countries other than Poland.®*'
The problem was somewhat shifted from Poland’s shoulders when the Vatican appointed a 
Nuncio In Belarus to deal with the issue of Polish priests, which numbered 130 (of a total of 
170 Catholic priests) by 1997.®® However, it was clear that both the ZPB and Polish
Respuhiika Belarus v tsifrakh. Kratki statisticheskii slovar’, Minsk: Minlsterstvo Statistiki I Analiza Respubliki 
Belarus, 2003, p. 57,
Piotr Eberhardt, "Polacy na Biatorusi I Ukrainie: Liczebnoéô i rozmieszczenie ludnosct polskiej wedtug 
ostatnich spisâw powszechnych", l/1/spô/nofa Polska, 2003, No.1, pp. 3-4.
Marek Kçpka, "Stosunki poisko-blaioruskie", Rocznik Polskiej Poiityki Zagranicznej (RPPZ) 1992 and J 
Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski. "Bilateral relations; Belarus", RPPZ 2002, Warszawa: Zarzqd Obstugi MSZ, 1992 
and 2002, http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/ (accessed 01 April 2006)
Complaints about Polish priests’ “polonising" activities instead of religious service was rife also during the 
1980s. In a letter to a Jesuit Conference in Poland In 1987, Wtadystaw Czarniauski, a Belarusian Catholic 
priest, wrote about Polish priests forcing Belarusian Catholics to pray in Polish and refusing baptism or 
marriage those who do not speak Polish. Wtadystaw Czarniauski, "List w obronie Biatorusinow katolikdw",
Wiqz, Vol. 388, 1991, No. 2, pp. 39-42.
®*' Michat Kurkiewicz, "Mitologia, nie polityka”, Wiqz, Vol. 522, 2002, No. 4, pp. 122-127.
Marek Ziôtkowski, “Stosunki z Biatorusiq", RPPZ 1997, Warszawa: Zarzqd Obstugi MSZ, 1997, 
http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/ (accessed 01 April 2006)
234
political and intellectual elite regarded the church as a bastion o f Pollshness and were 
against Belarusian being introduced as the language of church services, despite the fact 
that a larger percentage of Poles in Belarus used Belarusian than Polish in their daily 
lives/® According to a study by Engelking, the terms Polish and Catholic were identical for 
most of the inhabitants in the Grodno province and both the fluidity o f terms denoting 
identity and the struggle to establish a place for the nascent Belarusianness led inevitably 
to conflicts over the activities of the church.’ ®®
i
The conflict about Polish priests and the threat of Polish expansionism as perceived by 
BNF abated and by 1994 ZPB and BNF found allies in each other. ZPB, under the 
leadership of Tadeusz Gawin, openly supported BNF in its campaigns against Lukashenko 
in the 1995 elections which led to the Lukashenko campaigners to accuse BNF of trying to 
open Belarus to Polish domination.’ ®’ ZPB did not assume an anti-Lukashenko position 
because of any repression by his administration after he became the president in 1994. On 
the contrary, Lukashenko announced that he would increase the budget for national 
minorities and both Gawin and his deputy found the political situation in Belarus positive 
for Polish cultural and educational development in Belarus and for ZPB at the end of 
1994.’ °  ^The ZPB leadership thought that it was russification and Belarusian integration 
with Russia that was a threat to Polish existence as well as Beiarusian, hence the need to 
cooperate with BNF.’®®
However, relations were set to gradually sour between the government, the president and 
ZPB, which led to ZPB curtailing its contacts with the government in 1999.’ ®'* Despite a 
reduced enthusiasm on the part o f Belarusian government towards ZPB, two Polish 
schools, funded by Wspôlnota Polska and Pomoc Polakom na Wschodzle opened In 
Grodno in 1996 and Wolkowysk in 1999 and numerous Polish language classes started
•»'ioperating around Western Belarus. Nevertheless, ZPB complained about obstacles raised
by the Belarusian government about schoolbooks in Polish and Polish language courses. 
However, the Belarusian government had never gone into any open conflict with ZPB, nor
the Polish government ever demanded reciprocity in terms of government funding for
----------------------------------------
®® Iwona Kabziriska, "The Ethnic Identity of the Polish Population in Belarus; a Research Note" in Ray Taras
(Ed.), National Identities and Ethnic Minorities in Eastern Europe, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998, pp. 148- 
150. See also the articles in the MSZ in-house publication, RPPZ. Marek Ziôtkowski, "Stosunki z Biatorusiq"
RPPZ 1997 and Jerzy Stankiewicz, “Stosunki z Biatorusiq", RPPZ 1999, http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/
(accessed 01 April 2006)
°° For an interesting research on identity and self identification in the Grodno region see Anna Engelking, "The 
natsyas of the Grodno region of Belarus: a field study", Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 5, 1999, No. 2, pp. 175- 
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*®’ Piotr Koscihski, "Obawy biatorusklch Polakôw", Rzeczpospolita, 18 May 1995.
See comments by Tadeusz Gawin and Ryszard Kacynel. Biuletyn Komisji Iqcznoéci z Polakami za 
Granicq, No, 22, 1017/11, 22 November 1994.
’ ®® See comments by Tadeusz Gawin. Biuletyn Komisji tqcznoéci z Polakami za Granicq, No. 8, 453/111, 19 
May 1998. See also Andrzej Pisalnik, “Szkola odrodzenia", Rzeczpospolita, 07 June 1995 and Ewa Wilk,
"Tornistry na dtugqdrogç", Polityka, 1999, No. 19.
Jan Maksymiuk, “Parliamentary deputies visit compatriots in Belarus", RFE/RL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine 
Report, Vol. 1,13 July 1999, No. 7.
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minorities or pursued an overly aggressive policy about Poles in Belarus. Compared to 
Ukraine, the problems of Poles in Belarus looked rather less serious.’®®
In 2000 there was a sea change in the attitude of ZPB when Tadeusz Kruczkowski was 
elected its president. His policy was the opposite of Gawin’s. Kruczkowski believed that 
because of its cooperation with the Belarusian opposition and refusal to have dialogue with 
the government, ZPB unnecessarily caused harm to Poles and their cultural and 
educational development in Belarus.’®® He was also critical of Poland’s policy o f not having 
contacts with the Belarusian government at higher levels and argued that there was no 
point in sacrificing the interests of Poles in Belarus for the sale of keeping up a political 
orientation, as neither Poland nor the Belarusian opposition had the power to change the 
foreign policy of the Belarusian government. In 2002 the conflict between Kruczkowski’s 
and Gawin’s supporters turned nasty with both sides hurling accusations at each other and 
in 2003 ZPB faced a crisis when Gawin supporters tried to bring a vote of no confidence 
against Kruczkowski.’®*'
Polish government and the Foreign Ministry tried to keep a neutral façade about the 
internal fighting among different factions but it was safe to assume that as the main 
sponsor of ZPB’s activities and in line with Poland’s Polonia policy, the Polish government 
played a part in ZPB’s affairs. This caused a reaction from the Belarusian government, 
accusing Poland of interfering in its domestic affairs by manipulating ethnic Poles.’®®
7.4.2 The Belarusian Minority in Poland
Although the census o f 2002 gives the numbers of Belarusians in Poland as 48,700, its 
accuracy was disputed by many and estimates put the actual figures between 200,000 and 
400,000.’®® Just as in the case of the Belarusian census, this disparity is a result of 
complex and fluid identities in the region. A large majority o f Belarusians live in the 
Podlasie region.” ® As noted earlier, politically active Belarusians in Eastern Poland gather
’®® The president of Wspôlnota Polska, Andrzej Stelmachowski, also argued that. See his comments at 
Biuletyn Komisji tqcznoéci z Polakami za Granicq, No. 39, 2677/111, 11 April 2000.
For Kruczkowski’s policy see Tadeusz Kruczkowski, "Polacy na Bialorusi -  terazniejszosé i przyszlosd”, 
Wiqz, Vol. 522, 2002, No. 4, pp. 113-121. Piotr Koécirtski, “Zwiqzek bçdzie apolityczny", Rzeczpospolita, 20 
November 2000. Cezary Golirtski, "Nowy prezes", Gazeta Wyborcza, 20 November 2000. Tadeusz 
Kruczkowski, “Czego chcemy od Macierzy", Rzeczpospolita, 02 May 2002.
’®* Tadeusz Gawin, "Nasz los zalezy od nas", Rzeczpospolita, 02 May 2002. Tadeusz Kruczkowski, 
"Rozmawiamy z wtadzq bez ulegloéci", Rzeczpospolita, 28 August 2002. Andrzej Pisalnik, "Burza w Zwiqzku 
Polakôw na Biatorusi", Rzeczpospoiita, 20 September 2002. "Kruczkowski kontra Gawin", Nowa Mysl Polska, 
20 September 2002. Piotr Koécirtski “Konflikt trwa", Rzeczpospolita, 03 March 2003. Jacek C. Kamirtski, 
“Gawin i bialoruskie KGB", Nowa Myél Polska, 09 March 2003.
Wactaw Radziwinowicz and Jacek Gawtowski, "Lukaszenko atakuje Polskç”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 20 April 
2005.
Raport z wynikôw Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego Ludnoéci I Mieszkart 2002, GUS. 
http://www.stat.gov.pl/dane_spol-gosp/nsp/spisJud/lud.htm (accessed 07 November 2006).
For information on Belarusians in Podlasie see Andrzej Sadowski, Spoleczne problemy miejscowoéci 
pôlnocno-wschodniej Polski w procesie transformacji, Bialystok: Wydawnlctwo UwB, 2001. On Belarusians’
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around three organizations with three different orientations, one of which was for 
cooperating with the Belarusian opposition and pursuing an openly anti-Lukashenko 
policy.” ’
The Belarusian government so far refrained from manipulating the Belarusian opposition in 
Poland. It must be noted that unlike the Polish government, the Belarusian one did not 
have sufficient resources to offer Belarusians living abroad and did not have a 
“Belarusians abroad" policy as a dimension of its foreign policy. The only hitch in the 
Belarusian government’s neutrality towards Polish Belarusians happened in the early 
1990s when the Beiarusian nationalists that perceived a threat from Polish expansionism 
were in power. As previously mentioned, the Belarusian government insisted on including 
a reference to Bialystok being an ethnically Beiarusian land in the good neighbouriiness 
agreement and delayed the signing o f the agreement. Except for this relatively minor hitch, 
the issue has not been raised again. Although Polish Belarusians have problems of 
underrepresentation, assimilation or inadequate resources for culture and education, they 
have no expectations from Belarus in terms of financial help or political support in 
extending their rights.
7.5 CONCLUSION
A simple comparison between Poiand’s relations with Ukraine or Russia on one hand, and 
with Belarus on the other, is certainly impossible (and not too informative) due to the 
divergence o f issues concerning each country and the level o f severity of conflicts. 
However, to analyse Poland’s relations with these countries within the EP concept, it could 
be said that Poland’s policy towards Belarus has been more disjointed and has failed to 
produce any visible results. In the case of Ukraine, for instance, dialogue and cooperation 
has flourished and good progress has been achieved in terms of historical reconciliation. 
Poland’s EP, with Russia as the unquestionable “other", has faltered in terms of Belarus. 
Unlike for Ukraine, Poland failed to assume an easily identifiable role as “locomotive 
towards Europe”, "gateway to Western markets” or “Belarus’s advocate in the EU”. As 
explained in this chapter, the reasons for this can be summarized under five points.
First, Belarus’s political orientation has not been conducive for Poland’s interests and was 
an obstacle towards Poland’s aspiration to have a belt of countries friendly to Poland and 
the West and unfriendly to Russia. In addition, the lack o f any interest on the part of
participation in Polish politics see Alastair Rabagliati, A Minority Vote: Participation of the German and 
Belarusian Minorities within the Polish Political System 1989-1999, Krakôw: Nomos, 2001.
For perceptions of Belarusian elite in Podlasie on Polish foreign policy and Poland's policy towards Belarus 
see Ayse Artun, "Regional Perceptions of Foreign Policy: Eastern Poland", Perspectives on European Politics 
and Society, Vol. 6, 2005, No. 1, pp. 1-30 (included as Appendix).
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Belarus to join the EU and a clear policy o f close alliance with Russia robbed Poland of 
any effective way o f influencing Belarus’s policy choices.
Second, as stated previously, Poland’s relations with Belarus were dependent on many 
levels on the whole framework of Polish-Russian and EU-Belarusian-Russian relations. 
Although this is true for Poland’s relations with all the ex-Soviet countries, in the case of 
Belarus, this dependence is accentuated due to the extent of Belarus’s alliance with 
Russia.
Third, Poland’s economic relations with Belarus are underdeveloped and trade and mutual 
investment have been low even compared to Ukraine.
Fourth, Poland’s potential allies for inducing regime change in Belarus, namely the 
Belarusian nationalists, have not assumed any significance in Belarusian politics. Poland’s 
half hearted attempts at nurturing the Belarusian opposition in Poland or initiatives like a 
subversive radio station yielded no visible results. This was partly due to the attempts 
being half hearted, as stated above, but also partly (and significantly) due to the fact that 
such a policy overrated the strength of the opposition and ignored the extent of Soviet 
legacy in Belarus in which nationalists had little popular support and political participation 
remained low.
Fifth, Poland’s policy towards the Polish minority in Belarus has likewise been disjointed, 
vacillating between a hands off approach and interference in Belarus’s domestic affairs 
using the Polish minority. As hopes of Belarusian opposition abroad or at home for 
achieving any significant foothold in Belarusian politics waned, the Polish minority 
organisations became a more attractive instrument for Poland in order to influence 
Belarus.
Poland’s relations with Belarus also brought about a test case for how much Poland could 
perceive an independent EP within the EU. Poland did argue against proposed EU 
sanctions on Belarus and refused to limit its official contacts with Belarus but its policy 
towards Belarus still had to conform to the general policy line of the EU. Poland’s search 
for flexibility towards Belarus was successful in that channels of dialogue on practical 
issues remained open but still there was no progress on either influencing Belarusian 
government through these channels or increasing economic or cultural exchange or social 
dialogue in a visible manner.
Pawluczuk warned in 2000 that the Polish minority in Belarus and the Belarusian minority in Poland could 
find themselves as pawns in the "global geopolitics” if the Belarusian opposition assumes a more assertive 
stance with the backing of the West. Wtodzlmierz Pawluczuk, "Bialorus a sprawa polska”, Kultura, Vol. 634- 
635, 2000, No. 7-8, pp. 106-116.
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C h a p t e r  E i g h t
C o n c l u s i o n
8.1 DEVELOPMENT OF POLAND'S EP
Since 1989 the significance of Eastern policy (EP) and relations with Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus for Poland’s foreign policy agenda have steadily grown and Poland has 
increasingly aspired to assume the role of a facilitator for the EU and NATO’s policies for 
Ukraine and Belarus. Polish policy makers, confident that the transformation at home is 
mostly achieved and that Poland’s leverage internationally is higher than ever, are now 
looking towards a wider engagement on the regional and international levels. Poland’s 
active encouragement of Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” and sending troops to Iraq can be 
cited as evidence, although it should not be assumed that this more assertive attitude is 
entirely indigenous. It can also be Interpreted, as by Zaborowski and Longhurst, as Poland 
acting as the US’s “protégé in the East” and a “provider o f security” in the way the US 
wished.^ The recent discussions concerning the possible allocation of US anti-missile 
defence bases in Poland and the Polish government’s enthusiasm for the project despite 
its potential for souring of relations with Russia, corroborates this view.^
Previous chapters examined various domestic and external factors that shape EP and 
surveyed the gradual process by which EP became more institutionalised and its concepts 
more widely discussed. The most important reason why this process was so gradual was 
that the new Polish elite in power embarked on a political and economic transformation 
with the express intent of joining the Euro-Atlantic consensus. The foreign policy priorities 
naturally became joining NATO and the EU. Poland not only distanced itself from its 
immediate ex-Soviet neighbours, but also maintained a lukewarm attitude towards 
proposals for regional alliances in Central Eastern Europe. Neutrality was never 
considered as an option, either. The new political elite was fierce in its rhetoric about 
Poland’s independence, but the word only meant independence from the Soviet Union or 
Russia. The dependence to be created willingly by joining Western organisations and 
alliances were meant, ironically, to guarantee Poland’s “ independence” and it was 
perceived that the tighter the ties to the West, the stronger Poland could become vis-à-vis
 ^ Marcin Zaborowski and Kerry Longhurst, "America's Protégé In the East? The Emergence of Poland as'a 
Regional Leader", International Affairs, Vol. 79, 2003, No. 5, pp. 1009-1028.
 ^Although US Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Dan Fried claimed that the missile 
interceptors to be located in Poland and Czech Republic were not intended for Russian missiles but for 
countering threats from the Middle East, Russians were not convinced. Dan Fried, Assistant Secretary for 
European and Eurasian Affairs; Air Force Lt. General Henry A. Obering, Director of the U.S. Missile Defense 
Agency, U.S. Missile Defense Plans for Europe, Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington, DC, 22 February 
2007, http;//fpc.state.gov/fpc/ 80958.htm (accessed 06 March 2007). "Rosja zaatakuje tarczç?", PAP, 06 
March 2007.
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its East. In other words Poland’s relations with Its East became in a way dependent on 
how it fared in the West. The more confident Poland felt about its status with the West, the 
more active its EP became.
Much more attention could be given to the EP concept after Poland’s NATO membership 
became a certainty and the EU negotiations started. However, this was not exclusively due 
to the fulfilment o f Poland’s main foreign policy goals. As explained in Chapter Three, the 
process of transformation of the legal and institutional framework of foreign policy making 
produced positive results and by the end of the 1990s a power sharing conflict between 
the President’s office and the executive had been to a large extent resolved and foreign 
policy institutions became organisationally more stable. However, the institutional 
framework also reflected foreign policy priorities, especially joining the EU. While agencies 
dealing with EU affairs were numerous and well funded, a separate department on EP 
within the MSZ was not in existence until 2005. Despite conflicts about appointments and 
personnel at these institutions recurring after each election, the general consensus on 
Poland’s goals of NATO and EU membership between the mainstream post-communist 
and post-Solidarity camps facilitated a relatively smooth working o f foreign policy 
institutions on matters related.
The consensus between these camps was less obvious in terms of EP and especially 
relations with Russia. Although there was a nominal agreement on the main tenets of EP 
such as having peaceful relations with Eastern neighbours and fostering regional 
cooperation, the two camps disagreed on priorities and instruments of EP. The post­
communists advocated a less antagonistic and more cooperative approach towards 
Russia and advocated extending economic ties. On the other hand, the post-Solidarity 
parties have often not shied away from resorting to anti-Russian rhetoric and supported 
initiatives in ULB which were aimed at curbing Russian interests in the region and were 
potentially provocative. The mainstream post-communist/post-Solidarity cleavage 
regarding EP could also be observed in the intellectual debates in the first half of the 
1990s. Although the debate expanded in parallel to the evolution of EP to focus on issue 
areas such as economic relations with the East and Ukraine’s importance for Poland, 
Poland’s policies towards Russia remained a highly disputed area.
8.2 THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EP
As presented in Chapter Four, the concepts Poland’s EP have their modern roots in the 
political movements o f the last century. During the PRL period émigré publications acted 
as fora where theoretical foundations of a future EP were laid and in the 1970s opposition 
groups in Poland joined the debate and carried its concepts home. The EP discussions of
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the post-1989 period have drawn their references from these earlier theoretical 
approaches in order to analyse actual policies and to ascertain the applicability o f these 
ideas. Three main strands o f EP thought identified in this thesis as pro-Russian, pro- 
Western and Kultura were discernible in the first half of the 1990s. Although the main 
arguments o f the camps have not changed considerably, a diversification of the EP debate 
ensued parallel to changing geopolitics of the region and differing positions were 
advocated concerning a wide range of issues.
It Is fair to say that the precepts of the Kultura doctrine proved to be the most influential on 
not only the academics and intellectuals debating EP but also policy makers. Official 
discourse concerning EP more than often referred to the ideas of Giedroyc and 
Mieroszewski. However, the discord between the blueprint and the practical realities of 
Poland’s relations with its East spurred criticism, causing a major intellectual debate In 
2000-01 (the minimalism debate). Critics argued that most EP initiatives of the Third 
Republic failed because they were based on an idealistic (and romantic) interpretation of 
the Kultura doctrine. EP was formulated without a healthy assessment of the political and 
economic circumstances of Poland’s Eastern neighbours and without the necessary 
means to implement it.
In this thesis the dissonance in general between the theory and practice of Poland’s EP 
has been observed through analysis o f Poland’s bilateral relations with Russia, Ukraine 
and Belarus, First, the diversity of issues posed in relations with each country made it 
difficult to have a unified EP blueprint. While Polish foreign policy looked at Russia from a 
predominantly security centred (and mostly defensive) perspective, it considered Ukraine 
and Belarus potential buffer zones or even possible spheres of influence. However, by the 
end of the 1990s the differences between political orientations of Ukraine and Belarus also 
posed a serious challenge and the makers of Polish EP struggled to find appropriate 
methods to pursue Poland’s interests in the region. With Ukraine it was a matter of toning 
down overzealous objectives such as bringing Ukraine into the EU and NATO whereas 
with Belarus it was a rather an anxious search for a policy that stood a chance of 
influencing Belarusian politics.
As mentioned above Poland could embark on a more active EP after accession to the EU. 
Poland’s EU membership was considered an opportunity to pursue Polish EP through EU 
channels by utilising EU policy instruments. Having a say in the EU undoubtedly increased 
Poland’s bargaining power but at the same time Polish hopes of leading a future EU 
Eastern dimension were in no time dampened by realities. It became clear that whenever 
Poland’s perceived interests concerning Russia were not parallel to the EU’s, It would be 
reminded by leading members of its status as a newcomer and a medium size -a t  best
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regional- power. This was demonstrated when the leading EU members showed 
determination about negotiating the underwater Baltic pipeline with Russia, to the horror of 
Poles. The EU’s reluctance to offer Ukraine any perspective of candidacy also 
demonstrated that Poland’s regional interests could easily be overridden by the EU as a 
whole. Poland’s historical antagonism towards Russia and its emerging role as the major 
proponent o f US interests in the region is also likely to hamper its ability to lead the EU’s 
Eastern policy In the future.
In order to understand the constraints on Poland’s EP, it is imperative to look at economic 
relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and energy politics. As demonstrated in 
previous chapters, Poland’s trade turnover with its Eastern neighbours remained much 
below the desired level. Economic instability and financial volatility in these countries, the 
small volume of their economies and shortcomings in their (and Poland’s) legal framework 
hampered bilateral trade and investment. However, political choices also played a role. 
Economic Integration was the cornerstone of Poland’s Western orientation and In the 
beginning of the 1990s developing trade and investment links with the East was not 
considered an immediate objective (owing also to the wish to do away with dependencies 
from the Soviet period). While Poland’s economic reorientation towards the West was 
increasingly successful, Poland’s trade with its East had considerably weakened. Serious 
steps to regain Eastern markets came as late as the beginning of the 2000s and were only 
minimally successful in the short term (though it remains to be seen how they fare in the 
long term).
The commodity structure of Poland’s trade with its East was also disadvantageous with a 
large percentage of Its imports being mineral products (almost 90% of Poland’s imports in 
the case of Russia). The combined percentage of Poland’s exports to these three 
countries over Poland’s total exports was around 7% by 2004 (only a measly 0.8% with 
Belarus). The percentages of trade with Poland over the total turnover in the three 
countries were also low, with the highest about 3.8% for Belarus. EDI levels also remained 
low and, as we saw in the example of Huta Czestochowa privatisation, investment was 
hampered by the lack of political will (in this case Ukrainian companies were considered 
risky economic partners due to political reasons).^ Given the low level of turnover and
® Following the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine, Polish authorities were finally persuaded about awarding lUD 
the Huta Czestochowa deal. Mittal Steel was disqualified when it failed to sign a social package with the trade 
union and lUD took over the steel works in June 2005. This was considered a major step towards putting into 
practice the strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine. However, following the failure of the Orange 
cadres at keeping political power, lUD’s ownership of Huta Czestochowa (and other Ukrainian investments) 
may become a source of contention. Earlier signs of this could be observed when it was announced that !UD 
and the Russian metallurgical giant Gazmetal were considering a merger. Such a merger may, accordingly, 
facilitate Russians to enter the Polish steel sector by the back door. See Grzegorz Gromadzki and Oleksandr 
Sushko, “Between contentment and disillusionment. EU-Ukraine Relations a year after the Orange Revolution", 
Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, December 2005, p. 11. "Press Release: Handing over of resolutions 
passed by the General Shareholder Meeting of Huta Czestochowa S.A. and the General Assembly of
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disadvantageous structure of trade, Poland did not have powerful economic Instruments at 
the disposal o f its EP.
Energy politics in Europe posed the ultimate reality check (and a major constraint) on EP 
as the case studies on gas and oil pipelines in Chapters Five and Six demonstrated. As 
long as EU energy policy seeks to increase the share of oil and gas imports from Russia, 
Poland’s chances of using pipelines as an effective trump card are second to none. The 
fact that the second Yamal pipeline project was shelved in favour o f a undenA/ater pipeline 
in the Baltic was a stark reminder that neither the EU would let a medium size state like 
Poland bargain over its energy security nor would Russia let itself be blackmailed over Its 
main source of revenue and political leverage vIs-à-vis both Its Near Abroad and the EU. In 
Chapter Six it was suggested that Poland’s reluctance to push ahead with the Odessa- 
Brody-Gdansk oil pipeline and the resulting reverse use of the Odessa-Brody sector was 
evidence that a truly strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine did not exist. It 
also signalled a growing realisation among Polish policy makers that neither Poland nor 
Ukraine had the means to overturn their dependence on Russian energy supplies and that 
politicking over it had backfired many times in the past. It must be mentioned that even the 
enthusiasm for developing strategic partnership with Ukraine reignited by the "Orange 
Revolution” was not sufficient to change the fate of the Odessa-Brody-Gdarisk pipeline.'^ 
Despite many declarations about the plans to complete the project, by the beginning of 
2007 not much has happened and the pipeline was still being used in the reverse 
direction.®
For the time being there seems to be no viable alternative to Russian oil for Poland (or for 
Ukraine) and political decisions for diversifying the supply could incur heavy economic 
costs. This is also true in terms of gas (given that the Danish and Norwegian gas contracts 
in 2003 were cancelled due to high cost). It must also be noted that Poland has achieved a 
higher degree of diversification of gas supplies compared to oil. However, by 2004 Russia 
was still the biggest supplier o f gas to Poland providing half of the annual purchase. As for
oil, the figure is about 95%. As the Orlen scandal demonstrated, rhetoric about curbing 
Russian imperialism Is pervasive but despite all that political bickering about oil delivery 
contracts and privatisation o f refineries, Poland’s choices are limited.
Towarzystwo Finansowe Silesia Sp. z o,o. to the Ukrainian side", Ministry of Treasury, 30 June 2005, 
http://www.msp.gov.pl/index„eng.php?dzial=16&id=235 (accessed 03 March 2007). Andzrej Pisalnik,
“Niespodziewane wejscie Rosjan w polsksj. stai", Rzeczpospolita, 20 February 2007.
Vladimir Socor, "Orange Gold”, The Wall Street Journal Europe, 15-17 April 2005, "Miçdzy Polsk^ A Ukraine 
istnieje strategiczne partnerstwo, a rzeczywistosà w ostatnich mlesi^cach pokazata, na czym polega”, 04 
March 2005, Centrum Informacyjne Rzqdu (Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrow), 
http://www.kprm.gov.pi/2130_.13488.htm (accessed 04 March 2007)
® “Ukraine: Russians to continue using the Odessa-Brody pipeline under a new agreement”, East Week 
(Center for Eastern Studies), Vol. 67, 10 January 2007, No. 2, p. 6, Roman Kupchinsky, “Ukraine: Odesa- 
Brody Pipeline Potential Still Unused”, RFE/RL News Analysis, 12 January 2007. Andrzej Kubiik, "Od gadania 
ropa nie ptynie", Gazeta Wyborcza, 09 January 2007.
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8.3 DOES POLAND HAVE AN EP?
The question that was often asked by Polish commentators throughout the post-1989 
period was “Does Poland have an EP?” By 2004 the debate on the scope, instruments and 
effects of EP was still extensive but there was not much doubt anymore about its 
existence. The main conceptual framework is firmly rooted in Kuftura’s programme (which 
also means that the Pitsudskiite streak was dominant). Commitment to ULB’s 
independence and fostering reconciliation and close cooperation with Ukraine have been 
the unchangeable principles of EP. So far as these principles go, Poland recorded 
successes, especially in terms of its relations with Ukraine. Despite the fact that a genuine 
strategic partnership has not yet been achieved, the process of reconciliation was a 
success and ghosts of history are one by one being laid to rest through managing common 
historical heritage and deepening dialogue on issues where two nationalisms clash. A 
similar dialogue and understanding has also developed in the case o f problems concerning 
ethnic minorities and such problems have not escalated to a level which would harm 
bilateral relations.
Another positive contribution of Kultura doctrine to Poland’s EP was its principle of giving 
up territorial claims on ULB and eradicating signs of Polish imperialism. This was 
implemented from the very beginning of the Third Republic. However, there were times 
when the border between supporting the independence of ULB and intervention proved to 
be too vague. Poland’s support o f the Belarusian opposition and interventions on behalf o f 
the Polish ethnic minority have often been perceived by Belarus as a reincarnation of 
Polish imperialism.
While the Kultura inspired Polish EP has scored successes in terms o f cultivating relations 
with Ukraine and avoiding large scale conflict with Belarus, its inability to stabilise relations 
with Russia has constantly made not only its means and ends but its conceptual 
coherence as a subject of debate. Kultura affiliated thinkers argued that this was because 
the Kultura programme was not fully implemented following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and Poland’s passivity in EP encouraged Russia’s uncompromising attitude. Others 
o f pro-Russian leaning laid the blame on subsequent Polish governments’ perpetuating 
traditional enmity towards Russia and relying excessively on Western support in tackling 
Poland’s bilateral problems with Russia. On the other hand, those of pro-Western 
orientation found the lack of a clear Polish policy in Russia and Russian expansionism in 
the ULB region as the culprit. Notwithstanding different arguments, it is evident that 
contentious relations with Russia demonstrate an inherent contradiction within EP: While it 
preaches the need for amiable relations with Russia, its stated goals concerning ULB
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inevitably lead to conflict between Poland and Russia. As we have seen In the minimalism 
debate, the basis o f Poland’s EP were deemed delusional due to the fact that it overlooked 
the fact that Russia was the key economic and political factor for Poland’s policy in the 
region.
In sum, the Third Republic does have an EP inspired by the Kultura doctrine and Poland’s 
historical traditions, even though it is in its infancy and its merits may be questionable.
Due to the diverse political and economic conditions in the East and challenges posed by 
regional and international constraints, Poland’s EP is in a constant process of conceptual 
evolution, re-evaluation of goals and testing means and ends. The biggest challenge 
facing EP seems to be the need to normalise relations with Russia and adjust Poland’s 
policy towards its East in order to minimise (If not possible to avoid) the impact of conflicts 
resulting from clash o f interests in the region. This, as the minimalists argued, certainly 
necessitates a pragmatic calculation of Poland’s power in the region and policy 
instruments available to it, due regard for Russia’s role in the region and adjusting EP 
goals accordingly.
8.4 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
As stated in Chapter One, this study did not aim to validate any specific theory concerning 
foreign policy but took into account the fact that the study of foreign policy required 
analysis of a variety o f domestic and international factors at multiple levels. Hence, a 
number of theories could offer Insight into foreign policy processes and outcomes. Among 
them the constructivist approach, with Its focus on processes by which identities, values 
and policies are created, has substantial explanatory power when we consider the 
evolution o f Poland’s foreign policy. The conscious choice of Polish policy makers and 
societal support made it possible for Poland to pursue a coherent Western policy and the 
historical notion of Poland’s belonging to the Western civilisation also contributed to the 
formulation and practice of a unified foreign policy orientation, despite domestic political 
fragmentation. Poland’s entry into NATO and Russia’s objections to NATO enlargement 
have been analysed and explained mostly within a realist framework which still dominates 
security studies. However, it can also be argued that after the fall of the bipolar world 
system, a conscious choice of Western orientation by the policy makers and publics of 
Central and East European countries created the necessary circumstances for NATO 
expansion which in turn triggered Russian perceptions of antagonism and opposition to 
NATO expansion.
By the same token, Poland’s EP was also a cultural construct based on historical 
concepts, norms and values emanating from the 20^^  century historical origins and
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Kultura's legacy. This study examined how Kultura's programme came to dominate the EP 
discourse and its values in turn dominated the official rhetoric. Poland’s approach to 
Ukraine after 1989 demonstrates the influence of the EP discourse in shaping policy. The 
perception of Ukraine’s importance cannot be completely attributed solely to geostrategic 
circumstances. Kultura discourse undoubtedly contributed to the creation of the norm of 
supporting ULB’s independence and the perception of Ukrainian independence being a 
pillar o f Poland’s independence. This perception has been institutionalised through its 
inclusion in Poland’s key foreign policy documents and declarations by key policy makers.
The much hailed "strategic partnership” with Ukraine is also a product of this process.
A similar process is evident in terms of Polish perceptions of Russia as the "other” in 
contrast with which Polish national identity is defined.® Post-1989 foreign policy discourse 
was built on the existence of an implicit threat of resurgent Russian expansionism despite 
advocating friendly bilateral relations. Despite the fact that as a NATO and EU member 
Poland practically faces no more hard security threats from Russia, historical perceptions 
still influence the discourse that shapes EP. The Orlen affair analysed in Chapter Five 
reflects the pervasiveness of a perceived danger from Russia especially among the Polish 
post-Solidarity and right wing parties.
However, this is not to say that international systemic and economic constraints are not 
relevant to the making o f EP. As discussed extensively in the sections concerning 
economic relations and energy politics, Poland’s options were very much limited and the 
dissonance between the dominant EP concept and the realities of Ukraine-Russia relations 
became clear. One of the prime examples where objective economic calculations have 
overridden the dictates of strategic partnership was the failure to build the Polish sector o f 
the Odessa-Brody pipeline. As mentioned earlier, concerns about the economic feasibility 
and financing o f the project have superseded the commitment to extend the scope of 
strategic partnership.
This study also acknowledged the importance o f institutions and domestic political 
bargaining in creating foreign policy. It aspired to give an account o f who makes and runs 
Poland’s foreign policy by defining the institutions designated by law for the purpose and 
discussing conflicts and rivalries among them. The study also analysed the influence of 
domestic political cleavages in shaping foreign and economic policies. As mentioned 
above, the conflicting views of the post-Solidarity and post-communist parties were
.
discussed and the impact o f their vision on foreign policy making when they were in 
government was presented. The negotiations over economic relations and energy deals
® See Tomasz Zarycki, "Uses of Russia. The Role of Russia in the Modern Polish National Identity", East 
European Politics and Societies, Vol. 18, 2004, No. 2, pp. 595-627.
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with Poland’s East were presented to demonstrate domestic politics-foreign policy 
linkages.
The role of individuals has also been taken into account when considering the Presidents’ 
contribution to foreign policy. The difference between the foreign policy approaches of 
Presidents Watçsa and Kwasniewski was discussed. However, the impact of the profile of 
individual presidents on Poland’s foreign policy does not have a large explanatory power. 
Therefore, this level of analysis has no more than supplementary value when considered 
within the framework of the whole domestic politics and institutional bargaining processes.
8.5 FUTURE RESEARCH
Overall, this study aimed to contribute to the body of knowledge about Poland’s foreign 
policy by investigating the conceptual and practical evolution of Poland’s EP and the 
international and domestic constraints that shaped it. It has discussed the post-1989 
international political processes which Polish foreign policy had to respond to and the 
historic framework in which EP concepts developed. It has also presented current 
intellectual and academic debates on these concepts and domestic political negotiations 
on the implementation of EP. Poland’s relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus were 
analysed in order to demonstrate policy outcomes. However, especially with Poland’s EU 
membership, the interaction between Poland’s and the EU’s Eastern policies will be a 
rewarding subject for future research. The EU’s policy towards Ukraine and Belarus will 
continuously evolve to respond to challenges, as was the case for Poland, and its relations 
with Russia will for the foreseeable future be a major determinant affecting initiatives 
towards this region. Even though the current study estimated that Poland’s chances of 
dominating the EU’s Eastern policy are not high in the short term, it would still be valuable 
to undertake a comparative analysis of debates in Poland and the EU on this matter. The 
impact of Poland’s close alliance with the US on Poland’s EP and Poland’s chances of 
influencing the EU’s EP could also be brought into analysis.
Another future research suggestion would be to study Poland’s policy towards the whole of 
the ex-Soviet sphere and especially the Russian regions and assess whether the EP 
debate could be expanded to cover the whole region. As for Poland’s immediate 
neighbourhood, Polish-Ukrainian relations will continue to be a key focus for research on 
EP. An analysis o f Poland’s role In and attitudes towards the recent "Orange Revolution” Is 
a potential research project which would contribute to the understanding of the outcomes 
when Poland’s pro-Ukrainian orientation is actively pursued in line with the Western 
powers. For the time being works on Poland’s relations with Belarus are scarce compared 
to Poland’s relations with Ukraine and Russia, due to the low level o f economic and
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political interaction. However, given the intermittent bursts of conflict, such as the troubles 
with the Polish minority in Belarus in the spring and summer of 2006, a closer analysis of 
the instruments Poland utilises to bring about regime change in Belarus would bring forth 
new Insights.
Finally, future research will no doubt advance a still wider range of issues concerned with 
Poland's role in the region and the world. Whether Poland is, following Zaborowski and 
Longhurst’s argument, the US’s major European protégé and handyman in the region or is 
an aspiring hegemon building its regional dominance by steering the EU Eastern policy 
agenda Is perhaps the largest of these questions.
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